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Abstract
The magnitude of environmental degradation in Malawi suggests that environmental law
has not been effective. While inadequate enforcement of the law is certainly a significant
cause of ineffectiveness, it is demonstrated that the other cause is the current normative
state of the law. Malawi uses three traditional legal tools for achieving environmental
protection: the criminal sanction, administrative measures and civil measures. An
examination of the current environmental laws reveals that the criminal sanction is the
primary tool prescribed in Malawian environmental circles.
From a stage when the criminal sanction was used to reconcile the parties to a dispute and
to discipline the recalcitrant party, the criminal sanction has evolved to the current stage
when its purposes are retributive and utilitarian. It is contended that in the context of
environmental protection the most acceptable aspect of retribution is just deserts,
especially the notion of proportionality. With regard to utilitarianism, deterrence,
prevention and reinforcement may in various degrees be regarded as legitimate purposes
of the criminal sanction in environmental law.
In the current stage of the criminal sanction its operation is affected greatly by the Bill of
Rights in Malawi's Constitution. It is suggested that in dealing with various aspects of the
criminal sanction vis-a-vis the Constitution, Malawian courts should lean towards saving
them from unconstitutionality in the interest of environmental protection.
An analysis of Malawi's environmental statutes shows that some of the criminal offences
have not been articulated clearly and others conflict with constitutional provisions in a
non-defensible way. The criminal sanction is also shown to have weaknesses. When
these weaknesses are weighed against the criminal sanction's strengths, it is clear that the
criminal sanction has more weaknesses than strengths. This scenario has led many
scholars to conclude that criminal sanctions are not appropriate for crimes of all sorts.
They suggest that criminal sanctions should be reserved for serious offences and that
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other measures should be used for less serious offences. While this suggestion certainly
has merit especially in respect of First World and Second World countries, the practical
realities in Malawi as a Third World country urge a different - but related - approach.
These practical realities relate to the availability of alternatives to the criminal sanction in
Malawi. An analysis of the alternatives reveals that most of them are not viable
alternatives to the criminal sanction in Malawi at present and so criminal sanctions
inevitably remain the primary tool for achieving environmental protection. In these
circumstances, it is suggested that certain aspects of the criminal sanction should be
attended to in order to improve its performance. In this connection, it is suggested that
corporate criminal liability must be reformed in order to make available additional bases
upon which corporate offenders may be made answerable for their activities. Sentencing
must also be reformed in order to prescribe more effective punishments. Further, the use
of strict criminal liability should be discouraged: instead there should be wider use of
negligence as the fault element and wider use of the due diligence defence. In addition,
vicarious criminal liability may be retained as long as an element of fault on the part of
an employer or principal is introduced or the defence of due diligence is made available
to the employer or principal. Alternatively, vicarious criminal liability may be abrogated
in favour of primary criminal liability. Finally, it is suggested that provision be made for
the award of costs after successful prosecution of environmental offenders and for the
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The term "environmental law" is of fairly recent origin, having generally emerged within
the last twenty-five to fifty years. However, the existence of legal provisions which today
fall under the rubric of "environmental law" dates back to several centuries earlier. In
some countries rudimentary wildlife laws and forestry laws appear as early as the 1i h
century. Over time, especially in the zo" century, most countries have developed a
considerably large body of environmental laws, but the question is whether these
environmental laws have had any impact - positi ve or negative - on the protection of the
environment.
1.2 Too little, too late? 1
It has been argued that 'the destruction of the world 's life-support systems is proceeding
at such a pace and, indeed, has already gone so far, has cut so deep into the delicate fabric
of the natural world that no conventional response is adequate to deal with it.' By
conventional response is meant 'a framework of environmental law to punish polluters,
protect finite resources and steer society into a new way of living.' It is said that such a
response is totally inadequate to the scale of the problems we face and that the law has no
'meaningful role to play in tackling or finding solutions to the multiple environmental
crises we face. ,2 In essence this argument urges that environmental law is largely useless
as a tool for achieving environmental protection. An environmental lawyer's first reaction
to this contention may be to dismiss it as misguided. But the contention appears to have
I This subheading has been adopted from 8 Jones ' Environmental law - too little, too late' in Owen Lomas
(ed) Frontiers ofEnvironmental Law London: Chancery Law Publishing 1992 at 68 .
2 Jones op cit at 68-9 .
substance when one considers that in many developing countries environmental laws
have been in existence for quite some time and yet the tide of environmental degradation
seems to progress unabated. One report from Malawi illustrates the point.'
In the early 1980s the population of elephants in Malawi was about 2000 individuals in
eight discrete units country-wide. Approximately 200 of these (that is, about 10 per cent)
were located in the Majete Wildlife Reserve. This reserve lies in the Middle Shire Valley
which forms part of the Great Rift Valley in southern Malawi. Between 1985 and 1991
various reports indicated that the numbers of the elephant herd in the reserve were
declining. Towards the end of this period the reports suggested that the whole Majete
elephant population had been wiped out. In response, during 1992 and 1993, a survey
was commissioned by the government's Department of National Parks and Wildlife and
the Wildlife Society of Malawi 4 with support from the British Fauna and Flora
Preservation Society. Through analysis of Majete field reports, liaison with the
department's staff, extensive ground surveys and sample aerial inspections of both the
Majete Wildlife Reserve and surrounding communal lands, it was confirmed that all the
elephants of the reserve had been massacred. Fifty-two elephant carcass remains were
located, evidently killed illegally with military weapons' Thus over a period of about six
years from 1986, the elephant herd disappeared, mostly having been systematically shot
out within and around the boundaries of the reserve." In a related development, it is
3 This report is based on B Y Sherry The Demise of the Elephants of the Middle Shire Valley, Southern
Malawi Fauna and Flora Preservation Society United Kingdom 1995.
4 This society has since changed its name to the Wildlife and Environmental Society of Malawi.
5 The civil war that broke out after independence in Mozambique triggered an influ x of refugees into
Malawi especially between 1986 and 1990. It appears that the refu gees brought with them military weapons
and other poaching devices. Sherry op cit at 8 writes: ' During 1986 and 1987 the situation in Majete
changed dramatically, following the first influ x of refugees into the region from Mozambique. Along with
the refugees came stories of hunting methods in Mozambique, and the where-with-all to carry these out.
AK47 automatic assault rifles were introduced and the Mozambicans brou ght with them their skills in
muzzle-loader manufacture, ifnot muzzle-loaders themselves .'
6 Sherry op cit at 3-9.
2
significant to note that it was within the same period that Malawi's two last remaining
black rhinoceros in nearby Mwabvi Wildlife Reserve were killed by poachers.'
It may be observed that the extermination of the Majete elephants occurred at a time
when Malawi had environmental legislation'' outlawing poaching and the indiscriminate
killing of elephants.
The foregoing account of environmental degradation seems, on the face of it, to support
Jones's contention. Indeed, if environmental degradation is continuing in the face of
environmental law, then Jones or any critic is entitled to wonder as to what use
environmental law has. However, the question is whether the contention is really justified
after taking into account all relevant factors. This question calls for a substantive
response and it is expected that the current research will produce such response. In a
nutshell, it shall be contended that environmental law is an indispensable tool of
environmental management, only that certain facets of it must be attended to. First, some
environmental laws must be fine-tuned. Second, the implementation of environmental
law must be greatly improved to make it effective. The emphasis in the present research
is on the former. Ultimately this is a study of the effectiveness of environmental law in a
typical Third World country.
A study of the effectiveness of environmental law cannot be complete without an
understanding of what environmental law means . So environmental law will be defined
in the next segment. It will be noted from the definition that there are many
environmental laws. The current research is intended to consider mainly the principal
environmental laws of Malawi and determine their effectiveness in the context of tools
which will be developed towards the end of the present chapter.
7 Sherry op cit at 9.
8 National Parks Act , cap 66:07 of the Laws of Malawi. This Act was later repealed and replaced by the
National Parks and Wildlife Act I I of 1992.
3
1.3 The province of environmental law
1.3.1 General
There appears to be general agreement that environmental law is law relating to the
environment' Few would be the discordant voices who would detract from such an
obvious proposition. However, attempts have been made to put flesh to this proposition.
One attempt at this is that of David Hughes writing from England. He states that
environmental law 'is not a coherent, logica l body of principles and rules. What we have
is a number of diverse laws relating to the environment. These can be found, inter alia, in
criminal law, local government law, and the law of real property; however, the oldest
sources of law on the topic are the law of public health, the law of town and country
planning and the law of torts.' 10
In the same vein Michael Blumm, an American writer, is of the view that environmental
law 'is a loose amalgam of common law and (increasingly) statutory provisions designed
to protect public health, ecosystems and dependent animal and plant species.' 11
In South Africa Andre Rabie holds a similar view. In 1976 he wrote:
9 See, for instance, D E Fisher Environmental Law in Australia : an Introduction St. Lucia, Queensland:
University of Queensland Press 1980 at 5 and 8; M A Rabie ' Nature and Scope of Environmental Law' in
R F Fuggle and M A Rabie (eds) Environm ental Management in South Africa Cape Town: Juta 1992 at 83;
Gerry M Bates Environmental Law in Australia 3ed Sydney: Butterworths 1992 at 1. Cf Richard Burnett-
Hall Environmental Law London: Sweet & Maxwell 1995 who argues as follows at page viii:
'Environmental law is in essence the body of law concerned with the protection of living things (including
man) from the harm that human activity may , immediately or eventually, cause to them or their species,
either directly or to the media and the habitats on which they depend.'
10 David Hughes Environmental Law London: Butterworths 1986 at 3. Italics in original.
11 Michael C Blumm ' Introduction' in Michael C Blumm (ed) Environmental Law Aldershot, Hampshire:
Dartmouth 1992 at xi. Cf Roger W Findlcy and Daniel A Farber Environmental Law Cases and Materials
2ed St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co 1985 who at xvii contend that 'environmental law appears to
be a hodgepodge of statutes, cases and regulations dealing with matt ers as diverse as automobile design ,
bottle deposits, and dam construction .'
4
'The field of environmental law is bound together by the problems with which it
deals, i.e. pollution and the depletion of natural resources, and by the purpose it
serves, i.e. securing an adequate environment for man and conserving the earth's
natural resources. It does not, however, constitute a separate part of the law in the
sense that it contains separate legal princ iples: Legal provisions relating to the
environment are encountered in many conventional fields of law, such as
administrative law, criminal law, tax law, the law of delict and jurisprudence.
What these provisions have in common is therefore not so much their special
legal character, but the subject which they regulate. ' 12
In a later publication13 Rabie repeated his views when he said that environmental law
'consists of a potpourri of legal norms encountered in a number of conventional fields of
law, a feature it shares with other recognized areas of legal regulation, such as medical
law, labour law, press law, social welfare law and the law relating to consumer
protection. '
It may be observed that these attempts at elaborating what environmental law is are
seeking to define it by focusing on the subject matter of environmental law. This is what
Denis Cowen calls the subject-matter approach to the definition of environmental law."
This approach has been shown to be unsatisfactory. Cowen 15 discerned the following
shortcomings of the subject-matter approach:
12 Andre Rabie South African Environm ental Legislation Pretoria: University of South Africa Institute of
Foreign and Comparative Law 1976 at 3. CfThomas FP Sulli van ' Fundamentals of Environmental Law'
in J Gordon Arbuckle et al Environm ental Law Handbook 7ed Rockville, Maryland: Government Institutes
1983 at 2. Writing from an American perspective, Sulli van says, ' Environmental law encompasses all the
protections for our environment that emanate from the: (1) U.S. Constitution, (2) state constitutions, (3)
Federal and state statutes and local ordinances, (4) regul ations promulgated by Federal, state and local
regulatory agencies, (5) court decisions interpreting these laws and regulations and, (6) common law.'
13 Rabie op cit at 97.
14 Denis V Cowen 'Toward Distinctive Principl es of South African Environmental Law: Some
Jurisprudential Perspectives and a Role for Legislation ' 1989 (52) THRHR 3 at 7.
15 Cowen op cit at 8 - 11. As much as possible the shortcomings have been listed in the words of Cowen. It
must be noted, however, that Cowen 's fourth criticism has purposely been left out.
5
• It tends to cloak the fact that if lawyers concerned with the protection of the
environment are to be relevant and effective, they must reach out beyond the
principles, concepts and underlying philosophies of conventional branches of law;
for these have grave inherent limitations in the specific context of the
environmental challenge. The conventional branches of law were in large measure
designed to cope with different problems from those presented by the need to
protect the environment in modem industrialized societies and the developing
countries.
• By emphasizing that environmental law is merely an amalgam of conventional
laws without distinctive principles of its own , it tends to discourage the search for
distinctive principles - even perhaps to encourage the belief that their non-
existence is inevitable.
• The difficulty of defining 'environment' for legal purposes makes each exponent
of the subject free to give rein to his own preferred area of interest or expertise,
and by the same token makes him feel justified in restricting the scope of his
. 16enterpnse.
It is submitted that the outlined views of Cowen may be reconciled with the views of the
subject-matter approach proponents. In the first place, to deny that environmental law at
least presently consists primarily of legal norms drawn from a number of conventional
fields of law is sheer falsehood. A legal norm prescribing a criminal penalty for polluting
activity is not an independent or novel creation of ' environmental law'; it is simply a
criminal sanction which has been transplanted from the general field of criminal law to
the specific garden of environmental law with a view to serving the interests of protecting
the environment.
In the second place, acknowledging the current borrowing nature of environmental law
does not mean that the borrowed wisdom will be retained in original state. The borrowed
legal norms may just be used as the capital for the mega-business of formulating
16 This criticism is borne out by the texts on the subject. See , for instance, Burnett-Hall op cit at viii; Bates
op cit at viii,
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distinctive principles of environmental law. In the process of time the capital may, to
complete the metaphor, be returned to the lenders in the sense that the borrowed legal
norms may be developed so much as to lose their identity and graduate into distinctive
environmental norms which can be emulated by the conventional fields of law. This
process of development is, in the opinion of the writer, what Cowen is concerned with in
the first and second shortcomings listed above. Certainly, the process of development of
environmental law will be unduly hampered if environmental lawyers fail to reach out
beyond the borrowed legal norms. Environmental lawyers worth the name have been
called to the noble - and difficult - task of challenging the status quo where necessary
and seeking better legal norms or improved legal norms for the protection of the
environment.
Cowen's last listed shortcoming is significant in that the proponents of the subject-matter
approach appear to unify the matters they point out by tying them to the environment.
This adherence to the term 'environment' is by no means a speciality of the subject-
matter approach proponents. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, legal pundits seem
to agree that environmental law deals with the environment. A definition of environment
is therefore crucial to an understanding of environmental law.
1.3.2 Definition of environment
It has been said that 'environment' means various things to various people. For instance,
when applied to a city, the urban designer may understand the term to mean the spatial
structure of the city; the architect may think of the fabric of buildings; the municipal
engineer may envisage essential services; the medical officer of health may relate it to
living conditions; and the horticulturist may think of parks and gardens.17
17 R F Fuggle 'Environmental Management: An Introduction' in Fuggle and Rabie op cit at 4. Bates op cit
at 2 writes that the term environment "may be construed according to the context in which it is used, and
may reflect the interests and concerns of the person using the term. For example, to a conservationist the
'environment' may be taken to mean the natural living and non-living surroundings of persons but not the
'urban' or 'built' environment, except perhaps for items and places of 'heritage' value. To a planner,
primary focus may be precisely the opposite: that is, on the physical, human-made structures and
surroundings in which people live and work , and on their associated infrastructure services - transport,
water supply, sewerage, energy, education, health services and the like. To a social worker, the 'social'
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Rabie 18 contends that 'environment' is a relational concept; it denotes an interrelationship
between a person and his surroundings. He identifies at least two approaches to defining
environment: the extensive approach and the limited approach.
1.3.2.1 Extensive approach
Under this approach ' environment' is defined widely. One definition in this approach is
that of Albert Einstein who is reported to have once said, 'The environment is everything
that isn't me.d9 Fisher holds a similar view. He writes that the "ordinary meaning of the
word refers to the conditions or influences under which any person or thing lives or is
developed. A more detailed description includes 'everything external to the organism. ",20
Several other writers subscribe to this tradition.21 Environment so understood
encompasses a multitude of elements. It includes the natural environment.r' the spatial
environment.v' the sociological or social environment." the economic environment, the
environment of people may be more important; the way in which they relate to each other and to
government and bureaucracy, something which mayor may not be conditioned partly by their natural and
non-natural surroundings. A health worker may adopt a similar view of the ' environment' ; while 'health
and safety' workers may concentrate more on the 'work' environment, on the protection of employees in
the work place from physical hazards and environmental contaminants."
18 Rabie op cit at 84.
19 Justine Thornton and Silas Beckwith Environmental Law London: Sweet & Maxwell 1997 at 2.
20 Fisher op cit at 5. Simon Ball and Stuart Bell Environmental Law: the Law and Policy Relating to the
Environment London: Blackstone 1991 at 2 confess that the word 'environmental' is difficult to define and
go on to say that its "normal meaning relates to ' surroundings', but obviously that is a concept that is
relative to whatever object it is which is surrounded ."
21 For instance, Williarn H Rodgers Jr Handb ook on Environmental Law St. Paul , Minnesota: West 1977 at
I; Swaigen and Woods 'A substantive right to environmental quality' in Swaigen (ed) Environmental
Rights in Canada (1981) referred to in Rabie op cit at 85.
22 Rabie op cit at 84 defines the natural environment in a strict sense as ' the natural world in its pure state,
but more generally regarded as referring to renewable and non-renewable natural resources such as air,
water, soil, plants, animals, etc. '
23 Rabie op cit at 84 defines the spatial environm ent as 'man-made and natural areas such as a suburb
town, city, region , province, country, as well as cert ain specific landscapes, for instance mountains:
wetlands, rivers , sea-shore, forests , etc .'
24 Rabie op cit at 84 defines the sociological or social environment as ' other people such as the family ,
group , SOCIety, etc. '
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cultural - historic environment, the built environment, the political environment and the
labour or work environment.25
Malawi's Environment Management Act 23 of 1996 adopts the extensive approach. Its
section 2 defines environment as the 'physical factors of the surroundings of the human
being including land, water, atmosphere, climate, sound, odour, taste, and the biological
factors of fauna and flora, and includes the cultural, social and economic aspects of
human activity, the natural and the built environment' .
The extensive understanding of environment defeats entirely any efforts at investigating
the effectiveness of the law relating to the environment. For within its wide scope almost
any law would qualify as environmental law. Thus, a law prescribing severe penalties for
acts or omissions which upset a free trade economy would qualify as environmental law
since it is aimed at conserving the economic environment.i" In effect, the extensive
definition of environment makes the purpose of the current research almost impossible of
performance, as it has the effect of turning the inquiry in the present research into an
investigation of the effectiveness of all law.
1.3.2.2 Limited approach
Some authors have urged a limited approach to the definition of environment. According
to this approach, environment is narrowly defined. The wide ambit of the extensive
approach is restricted. One such author conceives of environment as natural
environmental elements. By 'natural environmental elements' is meant 'air, water and
soil, which have not been created by humans, but which they may modify either through
exploitation or the introduction of foreign matter. v" It is said that this appears to be more
realistic as it takes into account not only the natural environment in its pure state, but also
25 Rabie op cit at 84.
26 Cf Rabie op cit at 86.
27 Rabie op cit at 88.
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modifications imposed on it by humans.i'' The definition of environment in South
Africa's National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 goes further than this but
falls short of the extensive approach. Section 1 defines environment as 'the surroundings
within which humans exist and that are made up of
i) the land, water and atmosphere of the earth
ii) micro-organisms, plant and animal life
iii) any part or combination of (i) and (ii) and the interrelationships among
and between them; and
iv) the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and conditions of
the foregoing that influence human health and well-being.'
1.3.2.3 Rationalization
The differing proposals on the definition of environment call for rationalization for
purposes of the inquiry in the present research. To that end, the term environment is taken
to have, in the words of Hart/9 a 'core of meaning' surrounded by a 'penumbra of
uncertainty' .30 At its core environment refers to the earth's natural resources, both
renewable and non-renewable. In this connection, it may be noted that almost all
conservation and pollution-control measures are aimed, in one way or another, at these
natural resources." Everything else outside this core meaning may be regarded as part of
the penumbra of uncertainty. In the current study, the writer does not include within the
confines of environment mankind's own physical creations including the cultural
heritage.
28 Ibid.
29 H L A Hart The Concept ofLaw 2ed Oxford: CIarendon Press 1997 at 12.
30 Thomton and Beckwith op cit at 2.
31 Rabie op cit at 90.
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1.3.3 Scope of environmental law
Having determined the meaning of environment and environmental law , the discussion
will now focus on the specific laws in Malawi which fall under the rubric of
environmental law. These laws fall , inter alia , into the following categoricsr'f
a) Exclusive environmental legislation: this is legislation aimed exclusively at
environmental management and containing only environmentally specific
norms e g the Environment Management Act 23 of 1996.
b) Legislation predominantly containing environmentally specific norms but also
having other provisions e g the Public Health Act 12 of 1948 (cap 34:01 of the
Laws of Malawi).
c) Legislation incidentally containing environmentally specific norms e g the
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1983 (cap 61:02 of the Laws
of Malawi).
d) Common law norms: some common law norms may be useful in
environmental management e g the law of nui sance. Equitable remedies e g
the injunction (interdict) may also be instrumental in environmental
conservation.
From this brief survey it is clear that there are many laws which may be considered as
part of environmental law. The present research will mostly consider the principal
32 This categorization is almost entirely based on Rabie op cit at 92 - 95. However, it must be noted that
Rabic's categorization identifies two more categories which may qualify as environmental laws: (a)
Legislation with direct environmental relevance, that is, ' legislation not calculated to further environmental
management' but comprising 'provisions that are of direct environmental relevance' and (b) Legislation
with potential environmental relevance, that is, 'legislation which , although not aimed at environmental
management, includes provisions that are potentiall y of environmental significance,' for example tax
legislation. In the present research these are generally not regarded as part of environmental law. The
decision may appear arbitrary but there mus t be a cutting point in every useful research. Further, the
writer's concern is the core mean ing of environment and the core mean ing of environmental law. Debate on
whether the ousted categories fall within or without the ambit of environmental law may not contribute
anything sign ificant to the presen t research . In this connection, it may be noted that Paul G W Henderson
' Some Thoughts on Distincti ve Principles of South African Environmental Law ' (2001) 8 SAJELP 139 at
143 has criticised Rabie 's categorisation. He says that one diffi culty with Rabic 's approach is that ' even a
law that deals exclusively with the environment may still share principles with other branches of law. This
enquiry may therefore not qualify that law per se as representing an environmental norm or principle.'
11
environmental laws of Malawi and determine their effectiveness. As may be noted from
the next segment, the research is not intended to be a clause-after-clause examination of
the environmental laws; rather the emphasis is on effectiveness of the law with specific
reference to identified tools for effectiveness.
1.4 Tools for effectiveness
1.4.1 General
At the beginning of this chapter (segment 1.2 above) a report has been set out,
demonstrating the magnitude of environmental degradation that occurred when relevant
law was in place. It was impliedly suggested that the law did not achieve what the
legislators intended. This suggestion will be explored in more detail in the present
segment as it is essentially a question of effectiveness. The meaning of effectiveness will
be discussed in the context of environmental law. Thereafter the tools for achieving the
effectiveness of environmental law will be identified.
1.4.2 Effectiveness: what is it?
The noun 'effectiveness' is derived from the adjective 'effective'. The South African
Concise Oxford Dictionary defines 'effective', inter alia, as 'producing a desired or
intended result'. So effectiveness may be regarded as the state or condition of producing
a desired or intended result. Accordingly, the effectiveness of law means the law's state
of realizing its objectives, purposes or goals. Antony Allott writes that 'a Law or legal
system is a purposive system existing in a society [and] a general test of its effectiveness
will therefore be to see how far it realizes its objectives, i.e. fulfills its purposes. ,33
Although this statement is made in respect of a legal system, there is, it is suggested,
nothing wrong in applying the same to a particular provision or norm in the legal system,
since the legal system is essentially made up of these provisions or norms .
33 Antony A11ott The Limits ofLaw London: Butterworth 1980 at 28. Italics in original.
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Allott continues to say that the purpose of law is ' the shaping of behaviour in society in
conformity with the goals of those having influence within it. , 34 The idea of shaping
behaviour appears to be accepted by many wri ters. For instance, Rael Loon states that the
'primary role of law is the regulation of human conduct in order to protect that which is
perceived to be of value.,35 With regard to environmental law the human conduct would
be regulated in order to protect the environment. Thus the purpose of environmental law
is the shaping or regulation of human conduct or activity so as to protect the environment.
Michael Kidd puts this point in this way:
'[T]he aim of environmental law must be protection of the environment. ... Most,
if not all, environmental legislation throughout the world was devised in order to
address the need to conserve resources for the benefit of humans, both living now
and future generations, and protect human health. , 36
The extent to which this purpose IS realized determines the effectiveness of
environmental law.
34 Ibid . Cf Iredell Jenkins Social Order and the Limits of Law: a Theoretical Essay Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1980 at 118-119. At page x Jenkins writes: ' Law is a practical activity, having a decisive
impact on the structure of society and the affairs of individuals. Viewed from this perspective, .. . law is
being employed in ways and toward ends that are unprecedented: the legal apparatus is being asked to
intervene in areas of social and personal life that have hitherto been handled by other agencies in other
ways.'
35 Rael Loon 'The Effectiveness of the Law in the Conservation of Birds of Prey in South Africa' (1995) 5
SAlELP 168. See also P D Glavovic 'An Introdu ction to Wildlife Law ' (1988) 105 SALl 519 at 528.
36 Michael Kidd 'Environmental Crime - Time for a Rethink in South Africa?' (1998) 5 SAlELP 181 at
182 (This article will in this chapter be referred to as 'Kidd Rethinking Crime'). At pages 182 - 183 Kidd
continues to say that the rationale is anthropocentric and utilit arian and that the protection is not absolute:
'The degree of protection afforded by the anthropocentric , utilitarian rationale entails the notion of
sustainable use of natu ral resources and contro l over pollu tion in the sense that this envisages a line being
drawn between acceptable and unacceptable pollution, given that total prevention of pollution is
impossible. The determination of what is acceptable and unacceptable is important in assessing what
controls to use in ensuring adherence to the defined standards. In short , then , 'protection' is not to be
understood in an absolute sense, but rather as contingent on polic y goals , both national and international.'
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1.4.3 Tools for effectiveness
It must be appreciated that the promulgation of environmental norms does not
automatically lead to the shaping of human activity in favour of environmental
protection. Sometimes the law may be deliberately disobeyed. This possibility of
disobedience is reduced by the provision of measures or tools which persuade the
subjects of the law to shape their conduct or activity in compliance with the
environmental norm. Among the measures or tools used to encourage or ensure
compliance are the criminal sanction , administrati ve action (administrative measures) and
civil litigation (civil measures). These three may therefore be regarded as tools for
effectiveness since they encourage or lead to the realisation of the purpose of
environmental law, which is environmental protection.
Cheryl Loots identifies the criminal sanction , administrative action and civil litigation as
the methods of enforcement of environmental legislation . She argues that in order to
achieve effective enforcement all these methods must be fully utilizcdr"
Jan Glazewski38 answers the question of effectiveness (as defined herein) indirectly. In
the process of discussing implementation and enforcement of environmental law, he
distinguishes between administrative and judicial measures. Under judicial measures he
places criminal sanctions, civil sanctions , judicial review and interdicts, and under
administrative measures he cites subordinate legislation , regulations, statutory directives,
permit or licensing requirements, abatement notices and other indirect administrative
remedies. " While the classification is different from that of Loots, it is significant to note
37 Cheryl Loots 'Making Environmental Law Effective' (1994) 1 SAJELP 17.
38 Jan Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths 2000 at 142-143 .
Glazewski does not use the term 'effectiveness '. He writes, ' . .. South Africa has at its disposal a plethora
of environmental laws and statutory provisions. Given this sophisticated armoury of legislative weaponry
the question arise s as to why environmental degradation continues apace . While the solution to this
question probably lies somewhere in the subject of implementation , this section does not purport to supply
answers to this difficult issue , as it goes beyond the scop e of this book. ' The question he poses is essentially
a matter of effectiveness as defined in the text of the present chapter.
39 Glazewski op cit at 143-144.
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that he at least acknowledges that the criminal sanction, administrative measures and
aspects of civil litigation (civil sanctions, judicial review and interdicts) are instrumental
in the enforcement of environmental law.
Rabie et al hold a similar VIew. They point out that environmental law may be
implemented or enforced through administrative measures, criminal sanctions and the
. '1 40CIVI process.
Finally Michael Kidd argues that ' criminal sanctions should be reserved for the most
egregious contraventions of environmental law, with other measures being used for less
serious offences. ,41 He indicates that these other measures broadly fall into two
categories: administrative measures and civil measures. He says the former include
notices or directives, withdrawals of authorizations and administrative penalties, whereas
the latter include injunctive processes, civil penalties and delictual measures.Y
From this brief survey it is clear that there is general agreement among environmental
scholars that the criminal sanction, administrative action (administrative measures) and
civil litigation (civil measures) are essential instruments in the enforcement of
environmental law. Since these three have already been identified above as tools for
effectiveness, it follows that the effecti veness of environmental law has something to do
with enforcement. However, it may be observed that enforcement is not the only thing
that brings about effectiveness: proper articulation of the environmental law and other
factors also play a significant role in the effectiveness agenda. Some of the factors will be
elaborated on in later parts of this study.
40 MA Rabie, C Loots, R Lyster and MG Erasmus ' Implementation of Environmental Law' in Fuggle and
Rabie op cit at 120 and 128. See also MA Rabie ' Legal Remedies for Environmental Protection' (1972) V
CILSA 247.
41 Kidd Rethinking Crime op cit at 197. See also Zada Lipman ' Corporations, Crime and the Environment'
(1997) 4 SAJELP 69 at 88-89 . Cf Gregor McGregor Environmental Law and Enforc ement Boca Raton:
CRC Press Inc 1994 at 100; Herbert Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction Stanford: Stanford
Univ ersity Press 1968 at 364-365.
42 Michael Kidd 'Alternatives to the Criminal Sanction in the Enforcement of Environmental Law' (2002) 9
SAJELP 21 at 33-49. This article will in this chapter be referred to as 'Kidd Alternatives to Crime'.
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1.4.4 Scope of analysis
In subsequent chapters the three tools of effectiveness identified above will be analysed
in the context of Malawian environmental laws . The emphasis is on the criminal sanction
as this is the principal tool employed in the legislation for environmental protection. The
analysis of the other tools will essentially focus on what scope they have in operating as
alternatives to the criminal sanction. It is acknowledged that in-depth study of only one of
these tools may have advantages, but the current researcher is of the view that for the
sake of completeness, a few words must be said about the other tools. As noted by several
authors above.l'' there is need to use all the tools in the quest for effectiveness of
environmental law. If we can use all of them, then there is nothing wrong with
considering them in one treatise.
Actually a review of the literature on these tools reveals that they have been considered
together in several works. Virtually all the authorities cited in the text of segment 1.4.3
above examine these tools together with emphasis on the criminal sanction.44 It is
therefore not novel for the current research to consider all three tools. Where the present
study departs from the other works is on the location of focus: this study examines the
three tools in respect of a Third World country (Malawi) whereas the other works
generally focus on First World countries and/or Second World countries; they generally
leave out Third World countries. Thus one major difference between the present study
and the other works is that in the present study the wisdom of the three tools will be
tested in Third World circumstances.f It must be emphasised that the location of focus of
43 Kidd Rethinking Crime op cit; Kidd Alternatives to Crime op cit; Lipman op cit; Loots op cit at 17 and
34.
44 Except Rabie et al op cit who put emphasis on administra tive measures.
45 For the meaning of the terms 'First World country' , ' Second World country' and 'Third World country',
see segment 2.3 in Chapter 2 hereof and Rem igio E Agpalo ' Modernisation, Development, and
Civi lization: Reflections on the Prospects of Political Systems in the First, Second, and Third Worlds' in
Kenneth E Bauzon (ed) Development and Democratization in the Third World: Myths, Hopes , and
Realities Washington: Taylor and Francis 1992 81 at 84 - 86. See also Sixto K Roxas 'Principles for
Inst itutional Reform ' in 10 Marie Griesgraber and Bern hard G Gunter (eds) Developm ent: New Paradigms
and Principles f or the Twenty-first Century London: Pluto Press 1996 1 at 26 and S A Kuz'rnin The
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this study is Malawi - no comparative analysis with other Third World countries will be
carried out due to the non-availability of current material.
Limiting the research to a Third World country is necessary due to the numerous
differences that exist between Third World countries and other countries. There are
differences in environmental conditions, most Third World countries being located in
tropical areas whereas most First World countries and Second World countries are
located in temperate areas. Environmental models and environmental quality standards
appropriate to temperate conditions may therefo re not apply to Third World countries.
Further, the data needed to use the more sophisticated models developed in First World
countries and Second World countries may not exist in Third World countries. There are
differences in the significance of environmental impacts: the level of significance
attached to particular environmental impacts may differ considerably between a 'typical'
First or Second World country and a Third World country. In some traditional societies,
much higher values are assigned to particular environmental assets than is the case in
modem western societies. There are also technological differences, insti tutional and
regulatory differences and differences In arrangements for consultation and public
participation." These differences, it is submitted, justify a separate treatment of the
effectiveness of environmental laws of Third World countries from those of First World
countries and Second World countries.47
Developing Countries: Employm ent and Capital Investment New York: International Arts and Sciences
Press 1969 at 1 - 7.
46 http://www.art.man.ac.uk/eia/Lfl5.htm (Accessed August 200 1, but page no longer available).
47 These differences may, however, not be taken too far as generalizations about conditions in the Third
World are not always safe . The comments of Alan Milner on a related matter in Alan Milner (ed) African
Penal Sys tems London : Routledge & Kegan Paul 1969 at 1 are apposite. Writing in respect of Africa
(which has many Third World countries), he says: 'The making of generalizations about Africa is a foolish
pastime. From the basic question of the forms of social organization to such matters as economic
development, urbanization and industrialization, the level of inter-cultural contact, linguistic forms ,
monetary forms , religious affiliation and ethnic composition, it is a continent which displays the widest
imaginable range of alternatives.'
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1.5 Summary of Chapters
In the next chapter (Chapter 2) a profile of Malawi will be set out. This profile is meant
to introduce the reader to the historical, socioeconomic, environmental and legal status of
the country. It will be noted, among other things , that Malawi has a Constitution which is
the supreme law of the land - all laws (includi ng the criminal sanction) must conform to
it. For this reason it will be necessary to map out the constitutional framework of the
criminal sanction and this will be done in Chapter 3. In Chapters 4 and 5 criminal
offences created under Malawi's environmental legislation will be analysed. This
analysis (when considered together with the account in Chapter 6 of how far the other
tools of effectiveness are used) will demonstrate, inter alia, that in Malawi the primary
tool for achieving environmental protection is the criminal sanction. It will also be noted
in Chapter 5 that despite this reliance, the criminal sanction has weaknesses and that it is
necessary to complement its use with alternative tools. Chapter 6 will investigate which
alternative tools are available for use in environmental protection in Malawi. It will be
demonstrated that most alternatives are not practically available for use, and so Malawian
environmental protection is inevitably compelled to continue relying on the criminal
sanction. In these circumstances Chapter 7 will explore the optimisation of the criminal
sanction. This will be followed by conclusions and proposals for reform in Chapter 8.
1.6 Methodology
This study is largely based on documentary research.
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CHAPTER TWO
MALAWI: PROFILE OF A NATION IN TRAVAIL
2.1 Introduction
Two reasons may be advanced for the inclusion of this chapter in the present study. In the
first place, it seems that little is known in this country about Malawi and so the material
in the present chapter will go a long way in providing an introduction. In the second place
(and this is related to the first reason), some of the proposals that will be made towards
the end of this study are likely to appear strange in the absence of prior knowledge of the
historical background and social, economic, environmental and legal setup of Malawi. In
essence this chapter will give a brief country profile which is relevant for present
purposes. The narrative begins with the historical background, followed by a short report
on the socio-economic status of the country. Thereafter the state of the environment will
be briefly set out. The chapter will close with a discussion of the Malawi legal system
2.2 His torical Background
Historians and anthropologists claim, apparently at the behest of archaeologists, that four
or five racial groups live in Africa today and that the ancestors of these people (or at least
of some of them) lived on the continent many years past.' It is claimed that early peoples
in Malawi lived in three broad periods: the pre-Bantu period, the proto-Bantu period and
the Bantu period. During the pre-Bantu period Malawi was inhabited by people who were
larger than Bushmen in stature and more robust. They were hunters who adapted
themselves to a woodland or forest environment, They depended heavily on vegetable
foods. They used bows, arrows, traps and nets for hunting. Locally these people are
known as Abathwa, Akafula or Amwandionerapati.
I D D Phiti History of Malawi: From Earliest Times to the Year 1915 Blantyre: Christian Literature
Association In Malawi 2004 at 8 - 9.
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In the proto-Bantu period non-Bantu speaking peoples known as the Pule, Lenda or
Katanga migrated to Malawi from the north, apparently from the lands north of the
Congo rain forest. They were tall and had well-built bodies. Their size and strength seem
to have assisted them in fighting and displacing the pre-Bantu inhabitants. They lived in
villages and were agriculturalists and pastoralists. They used big spears for hunting
elephants. It is thought that they occupied Malawi in the third century A.D. and thereafter
until they were absorbed by the Bantu speaking peoples of the Bantu period.
In the Bantu period Bantu speakers known as the Maravi moved from northern Katanga
(located in modem Democratic Republic of the Congo) and settled in Malawi led by their
chief Kalonga? For various reasons the Maravi spread to central and southern Malawi
under the leadership of tributary chiefs. For instance, Lundu led a band of followers and
settled in southern Malawi: this group later came to be known as the Mang'anja.' The
north of the country was occupied by other tribes of Bantu speakers including the
Mzembe, Chiluba, Mwenekisindile, Mwenifumbo, Chilima and the 'Si clans,.4 They
were later joined by the Mbale, Ngulube and Ngonde. It is significant for present
purposes that before the Ngonde Kingdom was established, some of the tribes living in
northern Malawi were ruled politically by Simbowe who was an elephant hunter.
Simbowe is reputed to have been keeping large stocks of ivory' The migration of the
aforementioned Bantu speakers took place between the 10th and 16th centuries A.D. In the
18th and 19th centuries A.D. more Bantu tribes came into Malawi. Of these note may be
taken of five: first, the Yao who raided Malawi from Mozambique in search of slaves.
2 Bridglal Pachai Malawi: The History of the Nation London: Longman 1973 (hereinafter referred to as
'Pachai History of the Nation') at I - 5; Bridglal Pachai Land and Politics in Malawi 1875 - 1975
Kingston, Ontario: Limestone Press 1978 (hereinafter referred to as 'Pachai Land and Politics') at 1- 3; A J
Wilson An Introduction to the History of Central Af rica: Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe 4ed Oxford:
Oxford University Press 1985 at 13,48 - 52.
3 Bridglal Pachai 'The Zambezi Expedition 1858 - 1864: New Highways for Old ' in Bridglal Pachai (ed)
Livingstone: Man ofAfrica London: Longman 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Pachai Livingstone: Man of
Africa') 29 at 35 - 37 .
4 Owen J M Kalinga A History ofthe Ngonde Kingdom ofMala wi Amsterdam: Mouton 1985 at 32 - 41. 'Si
clans' is a term coined by Kalinga: these are clans whose names start with' Si' .
5 Kalinga op cit at 42 - 46; Pachai History ofthe Nation op cit at 13.
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Next, the Nguni (later called Ngoni) from South Africa who, it seems, were fleeing from
the wars of Tchaka Zulu. Third, the Makololo, a small group which came with Dr David
Livingstone and settled in southern Malawi (Lower Shire). Finally, the Sena and Lomwe
who moved peacefully from Mozambique to Malawi.6
In some of these tribes there was a central political authority.i Its effectiveness is,
however, debatable especially if we measure it by a modem yardstick. Some of the
powerful chiefs could collect tribute from smaller chiefs under them. The tribute took
various forms, for example, ivory.' It is worth noting that the collected tribute was
generally used by the chief for his own purposes: there was, it seems, no practice of
applying the tribute proceeds to environmentally friendly programmes. Pollution was not
an issue in those days as populations were small and industrialization was unknown in
this part of the universe. Land was plentiful and so land degradation did not have the
same sting it has nowadays: land which was worn out was simply abandoned for a
number of years under what is presently known as shifting cultivation. Other natural
resources were also plenty. For instance, wildlife was in such abundance that one non-
African is reported to have said that nowhere else in Africa had he seen 'such splendid
herds of the larger animals as here,.9 At that time exploitation of this wealth of wildlife
was by traditional methods (nets, traps, etc) and so the numbers of animals killed were
low. Consequently the absence of conscious preservation measures was ameliorated by
the minimal harvesting. Things began to change when guns were introduced, initially by
foreign traders in slaves and/or ivory from East Africa and other nations, and later by
European colonizers. In the mid 19th century A.D. slave traders raided villages using guns
and captured slaves. They also killed any of the larger animals they could find for food or
6R B Boeder Silent Majority: A History of the Lomwe in Malawi Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa
1984 at 1.
7 Cf J M Schoffeleers 'Livingstone and the Mang'anja Chiefs' in Pachai (ed) Livingstone: Man ofAfrica op
cit III at 116 - 125.
8 Elias C Mandala Work and Control in a Peasant Economy: A History of the Lower Tchiri Valley in
Malawi J859 - J960 Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1990 at 16.
9 Henry Drummond as quoted in Brian Morris A Short History of Wildlife Conservation in Malawi
Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh 1996 at 1.
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trade. When the European colonizers came they used guns openly to plunder the wildlife
resources of the country. Attention will now focus on these colonizers.
As far back as the is" and is" centuries A.D. Portuguese citizens had been visiting the
areas around the rivers Zambezi and Shire. They built ports such as Quelimane and Sena
and later took control of the town of Tete. From these places they traded with Africans
but made no significant effort to establish themselves in regions close to Lake Malawi
and upper Shire. When Livingstone visited the Lake Malawi-Shire River Valley regions
in the late 1850s and early 1860s, his reports about the region aroused interest in the area
on the part of both the British and Portuguese governments. In the course of time a
dispute arose. Portugal claimed sovereignty over the area but this was disputed by Britain
at the behest of British missionaries, managers of the African Lakes Company and British
nationals working in the area. Between 1860 and 1890 Portugal carried out a few military
incursions into Malawi. In January 1890 Britain responded with an ultimatum, calling
upon Portugal to stop these depredations or bear the consequences. Ultimately Portugal
complied. On 14th May 1891 Britain proclaimed a protectorate over Malawi and
appointed Harry Hamilton Johnston its first Commissioner and Consul General. 10
One of the first issues which Johnston had to deal with was that of land settlement. More
than a decade before the protectorate was proclaimed missionaries had entered Malawi
and acquired tracts of land for use by their missions. The effect of these acquisitions was
minimal when compared to the impact of land acquisitions by European individuals and
companies from about 1884. The European individuals were mainly planters, traders,
hunters and fortune-seekers. They entered into treaties with African chiefs for the
alienation of land. Actually most of the so-called treaties were a product of
misunderstanding. When the Europeans met the African chiefs looking for land on which
to settle, the former usually gave the latter gifts such as plates, spoons, calico, guns,
beads, money, etc. The chiefs interpreted these gifts as 'expressions of respect and
10 Phiri op cit at 200 - 214 . On the publicity Livingstone gave to the Lake Malawi-Shire River Valley
regions in the late 1850s and early 1860s , see some of his letters in Timothy Holmes (ed) David
Livingstone: Letters and Documents 1841 - 1872 London: Livingstone Museum & lames Currey 1990
passim .
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friendship' but the Europeans took them as 'payment for land'. In this way large tracts of
land came into the hands of Europeans. 11 It appears that complications rose right from the
beginning. The Johnston administration wondered whether the chiefs knew what they
were doing in the treaties. The administration was also unclear as to what would happen
in the event of a chief disputing the concessions claimed. These and other concerns
caused Johnston to engage in a land settlement exercise commencing in 1892, which was
guided by five principles:
(i) the protection of the rights of Africans;
(ii) the non-disturbance of existing villages and plantations;
(iii) the availability of sufficient land for future expansion;
(iv) the discouragement of land speculation; and
(v) the securing of the rights of the British Crown in the interest of national
development. 12
Those who claimed to have obtained or purchased lands from chiefs were required to
submit to Johnston proof of their claims. If sufficient proof was given, the administration
would recognize that land acquisition by issuing a Certificate of Claim. The effect of the
Certificate of Claim was to confer upon landholders freehold title to the land specified in
the certificate. Of the 73 Certificates of Claim which were registered, only one was issued
to an African and this African was Kumtaja of Blantyre.i''
It is worth noting that in line with the second principle of Johnston's land settlement,
most of the Certificates of Claim contained a non-disturbance clause which proscribed
the disturbance or removal without the administration's consent of any native village or
plantation existing on land granted under the certificate at the time of issuing the
11 Pachai Land and Politics op cit at 30 - 31; Phiri op cit at 233.
12 Pachai Land and Politics op cit at 33 - 35.
13 Pachai Land and Politics op cit at 35 - 47.
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certificate. 14 This purported protection of African interests had little practical effect; it
was a mere paper guarantee. One critique of the clause runs like this:
'The history after 1894 of land tenure in Malawi or private estates is in effect a
telling commentary on the weaknesses of the non-disturbance clause. Its
intentions were good but its practical safeguards were almost non-existent.
Whereas the estate holders' rights were legally defined in terms of boundaries
which were surveyed no such demarcation was required of existing villages and
plantations. There was also no requirement calling for a record to be made of
existing villages and plantations. No population statistics were noted for the
various private estates in order to safeguard legal rights or to provide a base for
comparisons when disputes arose over the interpretation of this clause in
subsequent years. It would have been difficult to define village and plantation
boundaries within the larger boundaries of the estates because of the traditional
practice of shifting cultivation. But the absence of any recorded information,
particularly census figures, played into the hands of the estate owners and made
Johnston's concern for the preservation of existing rights nothing more than a
declaration of good intentions. ' 15
The consequence of this arrangement was the ill-treatment of Africans on European
estates. The Africans were considered as being little more than slaves. They lived in
congested and cramped circumstances on small pockets of the estate lands, which
eventually led to land degradation. Further, they were divested of any right to engage in
14 Pachai Land and Politics op cit at 41 quotes the non -disturbance clause which reads as follows: 'That no
native village or plantation existing at the time of this certificate on the estate shall be disturbed or removed
without the consent in writing of Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General; but when such consent
shall have been given, the sites of such villages or plantations shall revert to the proprietor of the said
estate. No natives can make other and new villages or plantations on the said estate without the prior
consent of the proprietor.'
15 Ibid. At page 45 Pachai states that the need to preserve the existing rights of Africans was impressed
upon Johnston by Dr David Raffelle Scott, Superintendent of the Blantyre Mission, who had based his
advice on 'the Biblical incident when the kinsmen of Elimelech were reminded that they could only take
their inheritance if they accepted with it Ruth , the widowed daughter-in-law of the dead man.' This incident
is recorded in Ruth 4: I - 12.
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meaningful development of their villages or plantations within the European estates. This
problem of underdevelopment was exacerbated by the failure of the European settlers
themselves to carry out the development of the land. The European settlers were able to
retard the development of the country by clinging to enormous tracts of undeveloped
land. The settlers were more interested in the speculative value of the land. 16 Thus selfish
motives were at play. It is significant that this is not the only sphere in which the
selfishness of the European settlers manifested itself. Selfishness also dominated the
settler government's wildlife policy and law.
The attitude of the European settlers towards wildlife may be gleaned from the
description of the country by one Scottish citizen towards the end of the 19th century as
'the finest hunting country in the world' filled with 'elephant, buffalo, eland, lion,
leopard, zebra, hippopotamus, rhinoceros and endless species of antelope.' 17 When the
British Government took the reins of power in 1891, it did not concern itself with the
conservation of wildlife but rather reservation of wildlife for Europeans. The early game
regulations (1897) were geared towards restricting the hunting of large game animals to
Europeans only. This was achieved by the introduction of game licences which only the
Europeans could afford. Different types of licences enabled the licensee to hunt different
species of wildlife. All those who contravened these regulations were subjected to severe
penalties. Thus Africans who hunted the specified animals without a licence found
themselves being severely punished for enjoying a resource which they and their
ancestors had accessed freely for centuries. The new game regulations of 1902 brought
no joy to the Africans as the old order of things continued. Licences were still required
and animals which could be shot on a particular licence were specified. The game
ordinance of 1911 was not much different: apart from the usual licences, a special licence
was introduced at a fee of 1 pound. Through this special licence Africans were allowed to
kill animals threatening or damaging crops or molesting people. The 1911 ordinance gave
way to the 1926 game ordinance. Though generally following the pattern of the earlier
16 Pachai Land and Politics op cit at 47 .
17 Henry Drummond as quoted in Mortis op cit at 1.
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ordinances, the 1926 game ordinance brought new restrictions. It proscribed traditional
methods of hunting like the use of pits , dogs and nets. In this way the African populace
was sentenced to perpetual malnutrition as their main means of acquiring meat protein
was taken away. Most Africans could not afford a gun licence and so the alternative of
using guns (just like the Europeans) was not available. Actually there was a deliberate
policy of keeping rifles and ammunition in the hands of Europeans only as much as
ibl 18POSSl e.
From the early colonial period attempts were made to establish 'game reserves'. The
1897 game regulations established the Elephant Marsh and Lake Chilwa as game
reserves. The 1902 game ordinance specified the Elephant Marsh and Central Angoniland
as game reserves. In the 1911 game ordinance only the Central Angoniland was specified
as game reserve; the other game reserves had been disestablished. The 1926 game
ordinance made provision for four game reserves: Lengwe, Tangadzi, Chidyamphiri and
Kasungu. Seven years later the 1926 ordinance was revised and this revision brought
about two new game reserves: the Ngara and Nantundu reserves. Initially these reserves
did not function in the way wildlife reserves normally function, as persons with hunting
licences could hunt in them such that they could be called 'Europeans' hunting reserves' .
It was only in the 1926 ordinance that real protection of wildlife commenced, for the
ordinance articulated for the first time 'the need to conserve animals not as sporting game
for an elite, but so that they might be seen and enjoyed by future generations.l'f
In the period between 1933 and 1963 the colonial administration enacted a number of
environmentally relevant pieces of legislation, for instance the Natural Resources
Ordinances of 1946 and 1949, and the Land Use and Protection Ordinance of 1962. Most
of these failed to achieve their objectives for several reasons. First, there was little
enforcement as government did not have sufficient officers to carry out the various
18 Morris op cit at 1 - 24.
19 Morris op cit at 18.
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responsibilities. Second, the laws were not translated into local languages" and there was
no environmental education amongst Africans who constituted the majority in the
population. Third, there was growing opposition to colonial rule with its attendant vices.
The political agitation that accompanied the struggle for independence made it
impossible for environmental laws of the time to be implemented.
In 1964 Malawi attained independence from colonial rule. The new government of Dr
Hastings Kamuzu Banda faced formidable chall enges. The country was desperately in
need of economic development. Whil e the land in European hands had greatly been
reduced, there was no easy route to the use of this land for development purposes. The
wildlife reserves which the new government inherited from the colonial government
needed attention. The other natural resources in the country needed to be protected from
over-exploitation. In order to address all these challenges the government enacted several
Acts of Parliament. Some of these are still in force and will be referred to in subsequent
chapters. Others have been repealed and/or replaced.
In 1994 Malawi adopted a new Constitution. This Constitution is the supreme law of the
land. All laws must conform to it. Any law that is inconsistent with it is invalid to the
extent of the inconsistency.t' It is significant that this Constitution expressly states, for
the first time in Malawi's constitutional history, that policies and legislation be adopted
and implemented with a view to achieving the responsible management of the
environment in order to prevent environmental degradation, to provide a healthy living
and working environment for the people of Malawi, and to accord full recognition to the
20 As early as 1915 a complaint to this effect was voiced by Rev Stephen M Kundecha who was the second
African minister to be ordained by the Blantyre Mission (1911). Rev Kundecha complained (to the
commission set up to inquire into the causes of the Chilembwe Rising) in the following words: 'The natives
know very well that there is in the country a Legislati ve Coun cil Meeting , but they do not know what laws
they make. ... What stopped the law makers from publishing before the nati ves this Law, they don't know!
Did they suggest that if they published before the natives the said Law perhaps there would be only few to
fall into snare? The y are begging that any Law they make which would have any connection with a native it
mus t be trans lated into nati ve tongue and then publish it ': Pachai Land and Politi cs op cit at 100 -102.
21 Section 5 of the Constitution of the Republi c of Malawi 1994.
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rights of future generations.r' In the years that came after 1994 a number of important
statutes were passed, for example the flagship Environment Management Act 23 of 1996.
The aforementioned changes in government (from colonial rule to the Banda regime to
the multiparty dispensation) did not necessarily translate into improvements in the
economy or in environmental management. On the contrary it appears that environmental
improvements generally followed international trends. The transfer of political power
from the colonial masters to Dr Banda occurred at the beginning of real environmental
concern in the world. Since environmentalism on a world scale was generally in its
infancy, it seems that the Banda regime in its early years did not pay as much attention to
environmental matters as it did in later years. The primary concern of this regime in the
early years was apparently to economically develop the nation. In contrast when the
multiparty dispensation came on stage, it coincided with heightened environmental
concern in the world. So Malawi simply joined the global bandwagon of fine-tuning
environmental laws. This was done at a time when Malawi was still struggling
economically, with the result that noble environmental plans or programmes were
crippled by the absence of a sound , supporting economic base. This point is easily
understood when one considers the economic status of the nation. In the next segment the
state of the economy will be examined briefly in the context of social needs and the
discussion will lead to a short overview of the state of the environment.
2.3 Socioeconomic Status
The United Nations Organization categorizes Malawi as a landlocked developing
country.v' It is evident from the categorization that Malawi is being compared to or
contrasted with what are called 'developed' countries. The terms 'developing' country
and 'developed' country are connected to development, the socio-economic reality that
was once thought to be the arch-enemy of environmental conservation. For an inquiring
22 Section I3(d) of the Constitution of the Republi c of Malawi 1994.
23 http: //www.un.org/special-rep/ohrIIs/ohrIIs/aIIcountries.pdf (Accessed 10 March 2005). The United
Nations Organization also puts Malawi in the list of least developed countries.
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mind to understand what a developing country or developed country is, there is need to
know what development is all about. A number of expositors" have attempted to define
development but, as is usual with definition, dissension or rather divergence of opinion
has been loud and clear, making one author to conclude that development 'is a term that
means many different things to many different people' and that it is 'so imprecise and
vulgar that no doubt it should be stricken from any proper lexicon of technical terms. ,25
Be that as it may, a general understanding of the term may be gleaned from the various
writings on the subject.
In this regard, development may be equated with modernization and may therefore
signify 'the process of attaining the level of scientific and technological state of affairs of
the most advanced country in the world. ,2 6 Thus the more advanced a country's state of
science and technology in comparison to the most advanced nation in the world, the more
24 Three quotations will suffice for present purposes . Turid Sato and William E Smith 'The New
development Paradigm: Organizing for Implementation' in Jo Marie Griesgraber and Bernhard G Gunter
(eds) Development: New Paradigms and Principles for the Twenty-first Century London: Pluto Press 1996
89 at 92 report that in a development conference in 1993 development was described as 'an increase in
one 's capacity to pursue purposes, while taking into account the effects of achieving that purpose on others
and on the whole community. The achievement of human purpose becomes the goal of development, the
touchstone against which development is assessed.' David E Apter Rethinking Development London: Sage
Publications 1987 at 16 describes development in the following terms: 'Here, development will refer to
expanding choice. Choice refers to the range of articulated alternatives available to individuals and
collectivities, Increasing choice was and remains the central developmental "project." Distributive in
character, choice can be operationalized in terms of access through networks of roles, classes, and
institutions. When organized and ranked functionally according to con tributions to industrialization access,
these networks connect choice to hierarchy. Organized in terms of functionally germane reciprocities of
wealth and power, the degree of symmetry or asymmetry represents power in terms of distributive equity.
How to control access to choice and promote the sharing of it according to approved rules and conditions of
equity has been the special political concern of development. ' C A 0 Van Nieuwenhuijze Development: A
Challenge To Whom? The Hague: Mouton 1969 at 44 opines: ' the term development has an intriguing
etymological ambivalence that reflects occasionally in some ambivalence of meaning in its current usage.
There is an active meaning: development is action in order to make something develop. And there is a
medial meaning: something goes through a developmental process. ' At 46 he writes, 'Development is a
variant of process (the common intelligible appearance of sociocultural reality) that involves perceptibility
and an inherent moment of directedness.'
25 Apter op cit at 7.
26 Remigio E Agpalo 'Modernisation, Development, and Civilization: Reflections on the Prospects of
Political Systems in the First, Second, and Third Worlds ' in Kenneth E Bauzon (ed) Development and
Democratization in the Third World: Myth s, Hopes, and Realiti es Washington: Taylor and Francis 1992 81
at 85.
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modem or developed it is. In this sense , three classes of countries have been identified. In
the first place, there are First World countries which have the highest level of
advancement in science and technology. Examples are the United States of America and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland . In the second place, there are Second
World countries (for example South Africa and China) whose level of advancement in
science and technology falls below that of First World countries but is higher than that of
the last category of countries. In the third place , there are Third World countries which
have the lowest level of advancement in science and technology (for instance Malawi and
Zambia).27
It must be noted that this three-fold categorization is not universally used as some persons
prefer a two-fold categorization: they divide the countries of the world into developed
countries and developing countries. Developed countries are generally understood to be
First World countries. Developing countries are generally understood as encompassing
both Second World and Third World countries. Some scholars insist that since many
Third World countries are not registering positive economic growth, calling them
developing countries is a misnomer. They argue that alternative terms must be used for
such countries. Among such alternative terms are Global South, the South, least
developed countries, less developed countries, landlocked developing countries, poor
countries, non-industrialized countries and underdeveloped countries.28
While the foregoing categorizations are useful to a point, what is of crucial importance
for present purposes is the actual state of the economy and society in Malawi. It is the
actual state of affairs that will assist in determining how far environmental reforms
suggested by non-Third World scholars can go or how relevant such reforms are.
Therefore the discussion will now turn to the actual state of affairs.
27 Cf Agpalo op cit at 84-6 . Also see Sixto K Roxas ' Principles for Institutional Reform' in Griesgraber and
Gunter op cit 1 at 26; S A Kuz 'rnin The Developing Countries: Employment and Capital Investment New
York: International Arts and Sciences Press 1969 at 1-7.
28 http: //en.wikipedia.orglwiki/Developing_countries (Accessed 10 February 2005).
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Malawi's economy is generally agriculture-based. Agriculture accounts for more than 90
per cent of its export earnings. It contributes about 45 per cent of gross domestic product
(GDP). In the year 2003 Malawi's GDP (purchasing power parity) was estimated at US
$6.845 billion, in the year 2004 at US $7.41 billion and in the year 2005 at US $7.629
billion. In the year 2005 the GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) was estimated at
US $600, and the GDP real growth rate at 1 per cent. Major export crops include tobacco,
tea, cotton, coffee, sugarcane and macadamia nuts. Tobacco takes up about 60 per cent of
exports.i"
The economy considerably depends on econormc assistance from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and individual donor agencies and nations. In the
year 2005 its public debt stood at 208.6 per cent of GDP and its external debt was about
US $3.284 billion. In the year 2000 Malawi qualified for relief under the Highly Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative but this was adversely affected in April 2004 by the
cancellation of the country's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility due to renewed
fiscal indiscipline and slippagea."
Over 55 per cent of Malawi's population of about 12.3 million31 is poor. These poor
people live below the poverty line and they are unable to meet their basic needs. Most of
the people do not have access to a balanced diet for the greater part of the year as food is
not readily available. In many parts of the country food stocks do not last for the whole
year (that is, from one harvest to the next). Starvation is not unheard of. Causes of the
dire food shortage include 'selling food stuffs, as a coping mechanism to alleviate
poverty, poor access to farm inputs such as fertilizer, crude farming methods such as the
29 http://www.exxun.com/Malawi/e_ec.html (Accessed 09 February 2005) and http://web.worldbank.org
(Accessed 09 February 2005) and http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mi.html (Accessed 14
December 2005 and 18 March 2006).
30 Ibid.
3\ On http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/afTica/country_profiles/1 068913.stm (Accessed 24 March 2005) it
was stated that the estimated population below the poverty line was 65%. On
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mi.html (Accessed 18 March 2006) the estimated
population below the poverty line in 2004 was stated to have been 55%.
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use of hoes, lack of technical advice on agriculture, overdependence on maize, and
increasing population.Y' In a recent Integrated Household Surveyv' it was established
that the per capita household food expenditure for the whole nation is about MWK3 030
which is about US $23 at the current exchange rate (US $1 = MWK133).34 Poverty is
worse in the rural areas, the per capita household food expenditure standing at MWK2
650 (US $20), which may be compared to the urban areas ' MWK5 035 (US $38).35
Housing in rural areas is in an appalling state. While some houses are roofed with iron
sheets, many houses have thatched roofs which are sometimes reinforced with plastic
papers. It has been reported that in the rainy season community members sometimes
'spend nights standing in their houses because of leaking roofs'. Apparently this is so due
to the scarcity of thatch and the non-availability of money to buy reinforcing plastics. r"
Most of the rural households do not use electricity. Malawi produces 1.296 billion kWh
of electricity annually,37 which is principally used in urban areas . In rural areas energy is
obtained from fuel wood. This has inevitably led to the disappearance of forests in some
parts of the country.
From the foregoing it is evident that Malawi is in deep poverty. In the year 2000 it was
estimated that it would take MWK17.3 billion (US $130 million) to bridge the poverty
32 Garton Kamchedzera and Chikosa Banda ' We are People too : the Right to Development, the Quality of
Rural Life, and the Performance of Legisl ative Duties during Malawi 's First Five Years of Multiparty
Politics' Faculty of Law, Uni versity of Malawi Research Dissemination Seminar Number Law12001-
2002/001.
33 Published in the year 2000 by Malawi 's Nation al Statistical Office. The survey was apparently conducted
between 1997 and 1998.
34 http://www.natbank.co.mw (Accessed 10 March 2006).
35 http:/ /www.nso .malawi.net/data_onJine/economi cs/ihs/ihs_summary_table.htm (Accessed 11 March
2005 ).
36 Kamchedzera and Banda op cit.
37
http: //www.exxun.com/Malawi/e_ec.html (Accessed 09 February
http: //www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mi .html (Accessed 18 March 2006).
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2005) and
gap in that year. This amount was considered to be the absolute minimum required to
raise consumption levels of all the poor in the nation to above the poverty line. 38
Conditions have not improved since that year ; actually, at the time of writing (March
2005) conditions seem to have worsencd. i"
It may be argued that Malawi is not beyond redemption from poverty. A look at the state
of the environment, particularly the known natu ral resources, suggests that there are
adequate resources which can be exploited to the benefit of the nation. It appears that in
the past these natural resources were not put to full use. Exploitation of some of the
known natural resources was minimal while efforts were not made to look for further
resources. At present there is a general drive to disco ver new resources and exploit fully
known resources. This drive is likely to lead to conflict between economic development
and environmental concerns. While environmental optimists may hope that the powers
that be will go the way of sustainable development, it is not farfetched to fear that all
environmental caution may be thrown to the wind on at least two grounds. First, the
demands of alleviating present poverty are so urgent that talk about environmental
concerns may sound as sheer folly to policymakers and lawmakers. Secondly, it is not a
secret that most of the developed world attained their economic development without
taking into account environmental concerns. So enlightened policymakers and lawmakers
may validly argue that Malawi should be allowed to attain economic development
without being unduly hampered by environmental concerns. Only after attaining the
economic development should the nation seriously concern itself with environmental
matters. Countering these arguments is not easy but one way of addressing them is to put
in place a legal framework that is cognizant of both Malawi's urgent need for economic
development and Malawi's environmental needs.
38 http://www.nso.malawi.net/data_on_line/ec onomics/ihs/poverty_brieC 2.pdf (Accessed 11 March 2005).
39 Anonymous (Backbencher) 'Not an Inch Forward from Poverty ' published in Nation Online and dated
31 October 2004: http://www.nationmalawi.com (Accessed 12 March 2005).
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2.4 State of the Environment
Malawi's physiography consists of five zones: rift valley floor, rift valley scarp, hill ,
plain and high plateau. The differences in altitude influence the types of climate, soils and
vegetation which occur in the country. The climate is generally tropical continental and it
has two seasons: the rainy season (November to April) and the dry season (May to
October). Annual rainfall is between 700mm and 1800mm. Temperatures (mean annual
minimum and maximum) range from 12 to 32 degrees Celsius. Four main classes of soils
have been identified. First, latosols which include ferruginous soils and ferrallitic soils.
The ferruginous soils are found in some parts of the plain and are considered to be among
the best soils suitable for agriculture. The ferrallitic soils are also found in the plains.
Second, lithosols which occur in steep slopes. Soils on escarpment slopes and plateaux
are heavily leached and have medium fertility. Soils in the hills are shallow. Generally
hilly places operate as catchment areas and formal or informal sanctuaries of indigenous
fauna and flora. Third, calcimorphic soils which include the alluvial soils of the plains
near lakes and rivers. Alluvial soils of the rift valley are rich in nutrients and suitable for
agriculture. Fourth, hydromorphic soils which occur in areas that are seasonally or
permanently wet.40
With regard to vegetation, some of the major biotic communities are montane evergreen
forest, montane grassland, semi-evergreen forest, mopane woodland, woodland savanna,
and sand dune vegetation. Thirty eight per cent of Malawi's land area is forest - only
three per cent of this is plantations; the rest is indigenous forest. The major forest species
include brachystegia, julbemadia and isoberlinia which provide high quality firewood
and poles for building. A significant portion of this vegetation falls under the protection
of forest reserves, wildlife reserves and national parks."
40 http: //www.gov.mw/enviro/action_plan/chap_3.h tml (Accessed 06 January 2005).
41 Ibid.
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Water resources in Malawi are abundant. It has five lakes (Lakes Malawi, Malombe,
Chilwa, Chiuta and Kazuni), the largest being Lake Malawi. These lakes are
complemented by a network of rivers. The biggest river is Shire which empties its waters
in the Zambezi. Quantification of the nation's groundwater resources has not yet been
completed. However, two principal types of aqu ifers have been identified, one in the
plateau area which is low Yielding (1 to 2 litres per second) and the other in the lakeshore
plains and lower Shire valley which is high yielding (up to 15 litres per second). Despite
the apparent adequacy of these water resources, some rural areas experience domestic
water shortages during the dry season. Water shortages also surface in urban areas during
drought.Y
Among other things, Malawi's water resources are used for hydro-power generation.
Electricity contributes about 2.5 per cent of the energy consumed. Biomass is the main
source of energy as it constitutes 93 per cent of total energy consumed. The remaining
4.5 per cent is taken up by petroleum products (3.5 per cent) and coal, ethanol, solar
energy and other small sources (1 per cent). Electrical energy is generated locally,
principally on the Shire River. Petroleum products are generally imported as there is no
local production, with the notable exception of ethanol which is blended with petrol.
Local ethanol production is about 18 million litres per year. 43 For some time now there
has been a general feeling that crude oil is available underneath Lake Malawi: scientists
are yet to verify this. 44
Malawi has a wealth of mineral resources. When Malawi was under colonialism and the
greater part of the Banda regime, it was thought that the country had few or no mineral
resources. This was largely due to ignorance: no serious effort had been made to explore
for minerals on a wide scale. The country was generally made out as an agricultural
haven and a tourist attraction (mainly on account of the lake and fauna) with no potential
42 Ibid .
43 Ibid; http: //www.exxun .com/Malawi/e_ec.html(Accessed 09 February 2005).
44 http: //www.malawi.gov.mw/natres/geo /minerals.htm (Accessed 14 March 2005).
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for mineral extraction. In recent years scientific studies have been undertaken to
determine the availability of minerals. These studies , though far from complete, have








Coal: 13 coalfields have been identified with speculated reserves of 800 million
tons. Coal is used, inter alia, for raising steam in boilers, making cement and
production of pharmaceuticals.
Corundum: Thambani in southern Malawi has over 100 000 tons with extension
prospects to over half a million tons. Corundum is used in the manufacture of
refractory (furnace bricks) and abrasives (e.g. sand paper).
Strontianite/monazite: Over 11 million tons of strontium have been proved at
Kangankunde . About 11 600 tons of monazite have been delineated at Cape
Maclear. Both these occurrences are in southern Malawi. Strontianite and
monazite may be used to make permanent magnet generators of electricity,
lenses for cameras and television tubes, and may also be used in the making of
sugar and toothpaste. It is reported that 100 000 tons of strontianite/monazite
may be produced per year for export to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
Vermiculite: About 2.2 million tons have been proved around Mpatamanga in
Mwanza (southern Malawi) with expansion possibilities. This vermiculite is of
competitive quality on export markets and it is thought that 10 000 tons can be
exported to the European market. Vermiculite is used for building insulation in
temperate countries, for concrete and plaster aggregates and for soil conditi oning
in agriculture.
Graphite: 2.7 million tons and 5 000 tons have been delineated at Katengeza in
Dowa (central Malawi) and Lobi in Dedza (central Malawi) respectively. A
much larger deposit has been ident ified in Lilongwe but it has not yet been
evaluated. Graphite is useful for making lead pencils, refractories, foundries,
carbon steel, graphite electrodes, batteries and brake linings.
Phosphates: 2.3 million tons occur at Tundulu in Mulanje (southern Malawi).
8.76 million tons occur at Chingale in Zomba (southern Malawi). Phosphates
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have also been identified in two other locations but these are yet to be
delineated. Phosphates are useful in the production of fertilizers.
• Iron sulphide: Malingunde Hill in Lilongwe (central Malawi) has 10 million tons
proven reserves. Chisepo in Dowa (central Malawi) seems to have large
quantities of iron sulphide but there is need for further exploration. Iron sulphide
is used in the manufacture of sulphuric acid and its by-product, iron ore, may be
used in the steel industry.
• Ceramic clays: 15 million tons, 600 000 tons and 0.5 million tons have been
delineated at Linthipe in Lilongwe (central Malawi), Nkhande in Ntcheu (central
Malawi) and Senzani in Balaka (southern Malawi) respectively. Ceramic clays
may be used for the manufacture of cups and saucers, electric insulators on
power lines, tiles and refractory furnace lining.
• Limestones: Widespread in southern Malawi and estimated at over 600 million
tons. Limestones also occur at Uliwa, Mpata in Karonga (northern Malawi) and
Nthalire in Chitipa (northern Malawi). Limestone is used in the production of
cement, lime and dishwashing dust ('Vim').
• Bauxite: Mulanje mountain has over 25 million tons. Reserves have been
estimated at 60 million tons. Bauxite is useful in the manufacture of refractories
and aluminium sulphate for water purification.
• Uranium: Kayerekera in Karonga (northern Malawi) has a deposit of uranium
found in karoo sandstones. Uranium is used in research, nuclear fuels and
nuclear weapons.
• Heavy mineral sands: Over 112 million tons occur in all the three regions of the
country. Those in Salima and Karonga (along Lake Malawi) have not been fully
investigated.
• Silica (glass) sands: 1 million tons have been identified in low-lying moist areas
('dambos') in Mchinji (central Malawi) and 25 million tons at Lake Chiuta-Lake
Chilwa Sand Bar (southern Malawi) . These silica sands are suitable for making
pale green glass and brown bottles.
• Kyanite: 300 000 tons reserves have been identified and 1 million tons inferred
in Ntcheu (central Malawi) . Kyanite is used as a refractory.
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• Copper: 1 675 tons ore have been delineated at Namikunga Hill in Nsanje
(southern Malawi).
• Gypsum: Over 450 000 tons have been proved in dambos of Dowa (central
Malawi). Gypsum is used in the production of chalk and plaster of paris.
• Gemstones: Rubies and sapphires occur in Ntcheu (central Malawi), emeralds
and aquamarines in Mzimba, Chitipa and Nkhata Bay (northern Malawi), and
agates in Chikwawa (southern Malawi).
• Gold: Gold has been identified in Lisungwe valley in Mwanza (southern
Malawi), at Dwangwa in Nkhotakota (central Malawi) and at Nathenje in
Lilongwe (central Malawi). Further evaluation is required to identify the
quantities and exploitability of the deposits.
• Hydrocarbons: Research carried out in 1985 showed that there is potential for
the discovery of petroleum or gas especially in the northern part of Lake Malawi
and the Shire Valley area in the south. Further research is required in order to
have a clearer picture.
• Other: Nepheline syenites, talc and dimension stones occur in various parts of
the country. These minerals have high potential for exploitation.V
Although the occurrence or availability of the foregoing minerals has been ascertained,
there has been little exploitation of them. The current government (Mutharika
administration) is encouraging investors and other stakeholders to participate in the
development and exploitation of the country's resources for the ultimate benefit of the
poor. So as development or exploitation of these resources gains momentum, the conflict
between economic development and environmental concerns (as stated above) is likely to
Increase.
45 This summary of mineral resources is based on a document entitled' Investment Opportunities: Mineral
Resources of Malawi' published by Malawi 's Geological Surveys Department in the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environmental Affairs. The document used here is that available on the internet:
http://www.malawi.gov.mw/natres/geo /minerals.htm (Accessed 14 March 2005).
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Malawi also has fish resources. There are between 500 and 1 000 species, six of which
are endemic. Lake Malawi produces 400/0 to 60% of total fish landings and the main types
of fish from this lake include Oreochromis spp (Chambo), Baplochromis spp
(Kampango), Clarias spp (Mlamba), Lebeo mesons (Ntchila) and Haplochromis (Utaka).
Annual fish yield in Lake Malawi is approximately 50 000 tons. Rivers collectively have
some 30 species of fish. The potential sustainable catch for all lakes and rivers together
is estimated to be in excess of 100 000 tons per year. Fish provides the people with 60%
to 70% of animal protein. The fishing industry employs between 200 000 and 250 000
persons: this figure includes people working ashore as fish traders and in support
industries such as boat-building and net-making. The fishing industry contributes about
4% ofGDP.46
Apart from fish, Malawi has other wildlife resources. By early 1990s about 4 000 species
of animals and 1 000 species of micro-organisms had been described. About 1 500
species of vertebrates, 163 species of mammals, 92 species of reptiles, 54 species of
amphibians and 620 species of birds had been identified. Some of these wildlife species
are protected in national parks and wildlife reserves. At present there are five national
parks (Lengwe, Liwonde, Lake Malawi, Kasungu and Nyika Plateau) and four wildlife
reserves (Majete, Mwabvi, Vwaza Marsh and Nkhotakota). Lake Malawi National Park is
a United Nations world heritage site. It was established in 1980 and it is the first
freshwater and underwater national park in Africa. 47
This account of the state of the environment In Malawi will be incomplete if
environmental problems are left out. Therefore it is intended that these problems be
briefly stated in the next few paragraphs. Generally the following problems have been
identified: soil erosion, deforestation, water resource degradation, threat to fish resources,
threat to biodiversity, human habitat degradation, high population growth and air
pollution.
46 http://www.gov.mw/enviro/action_plan/chap_3.html (Accessed 06 January 2005).
47 Ibid.
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In the early 1990s unconfirmed estimates were to the effect that soil loss ranged between
oand 50 t/ha/year. The national average was put at 20 t/ha/year. The impact of soil loss
on yield (mean yield loss) was said to be between 40/0 and 11%. Analysis revealed that
the social cost of the soil erosion was about US $165 million.48 More recent figures are
not easily accessible/available, but there is nothing to suggest that the situation has
improved. The soil erosion is attributed to, among other things, inadequate information
about the cost of degradation and the benefit of conservation leading to uncertainties
about the effect of resource allocation decisions. It is also attributed to non-availability of
credit for soil conservation investments."
About a decade ago the rate of deforestation was 1.6 % per annum and the social cost of
deforestation was estimated to be US $55 million. It was established that deforestation
was caused by agricultural expansion and wood fuel consumption in households, brick
burning, tobacco leaf curing, fish curing and beer brewing. It was further established that
harvest rates of wood fuel exceeded sustainable yiclds .i''
Water resource degradation is slowly taking its toll. Factors responsible for the
degradation include sedimentation, siltation, biological contamination and chemical
contamination. Sedimentation occurs through the process of soil erosion: surface water
run-off carries sediments which affect the quality of water downstream, rendering it
unsuitable for human consumption. The heavy sediment loads in the principal rivers in
turn bring about siltation of the rivers themselves and water reservoirs. Biological
contamination of the water resources is caused by, inter alia, the non-availability of
toilets and the siting of pit latrines near water sources. Chemical contamination arises
when industrial waste is disposed of improperly especially in peri-urban areas; run-off of
agrichemicals plays the same role in rural areas. 51





Fish resources are under threat. Habitats and spawning grounds have been lost due to
sediment loads deposited in lakes by rivers. In one lake (Lake Malombe) over-fishing has
led to a drastic drop in landings. It appears that factors contributing to over-fishing
include increase in number of fishermen, fishing during 'off-season' periods (that is,
breeding seasons) and inappropriate methods of fishing such as blocking rivers and
setting fish traps at river outlets. Fish resources are also threatened by the increasing
presence of water weeds (especially water hyacinth) and the introduction of non-
indigenous fish. Other factors threatening fish resources include reduction in water flow,
increasing sedimentation in rivers and water pollution from human, agricultural and
industrial wastes. 52
Threats to biodiversity may be considered on two levels: wild fauna and flora, and
domesticated fauna and flora. Most terrestrial fauna is found in protected areas (national
parks, wildlife reserves and forest reserves). Encroachment and poaching have been
common. Government has had to change some boundaries of protected areas in order to
free up land for cultivation or occupation by the growing population. Poaching is
responsible for exterminating all the elephants from Majete wildlife reserve as reported in
Chapter 1. Most of the wild flora is in protected areas. Some of those outside protected
areas have a measure of legislative protection but policing of these is more difficult.
Domesticated fauna (especially cattle and goats) cause ovcrgrazing.v' Domesticated flora
(e.g. maize) generally give declining yields due to, inter alia, exhaustion of land.
Malawi faces severe human habitat degradation. Housing conditions are poor in many
areas. In rural areas housing structures are reported to be in inhabitable condition. In
urban areas low Incomes and overcrowding have led to the creation of squatter
settlements. The majority of the population uses pit latrines which may cause




rubbish pits and urban areas do not have adequate solid waste disposal facilities. 54 Rural
areas do not have landfill sites.
At present air pollution is not a big Issue. Current sources of air pollution include
quarrying and coal mining activities, uncontrolled bush fires, motor vehicle exhaust
fumes, burning of old tyres and gaseous emissions from industries. Since it is expected
that these activities (with the possible exception of bush fires and tyre burning) are likely
to increase, air pollution could soon be a formidable environmental challenge.55
With regard to population growth, data from the 1977 census, 1987 census and 1998
census" suggests that Malawi's population grows by about 2 million in a period of 10
years. As of the last census (1998) the total fertility rate (children per woman) was at 6.5,
which is lower than in previous censuses .t Overall these levels of population growth are
unacceptable for Malawi as the current state of the economy cannot provide the swelling
population with decent livelihoods. Further the resources of the nation (in their present
undeveloped state) cannot sustain the increasing demand placed on them by growing
numbers of people.
2.5 Malawi's Legal System
2.5.1 General
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, defines 'legal', among other things, as 'of or
pertaining to law'. It defines 'system' as 'orderly combination or arrangement, as of
particulars, parts, or elements into a whole; especially such combination according to
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 http ://www.nso.malawi.net (Accessed 11 March 2005).
57 In the 1977 census the total fertility rate was 7.6 whereas in the 1987 census the total fertility rate was
7.4: http://www.nso.malawi.net (Accessed 11 March 2005).
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some rational principle'. On the basis of these definitions, we may define 'legal system'
as an orderly combination or arrangement of parts or elements of or pertaining to the
law.58
Joseph Raz has written on what is meant by a legal system, how a legal system can be
identified, and what the criteria for the existence of a legal system are. His approach is
generally analytical. He acknowledges that legal systems contain laws and that the law is
' institutionalized in that its application and modi fication are to a large extent performed
or regulated by institutions. , 59 Meryll Dean, in her exposition of the Japanese legal
system, discusses the laws applicable in that system and some institutions concerned with
the law, for instance courts.60 Similarly, Werksmans, in their analysis of the South
African legal system, make reference to laws ' followed ' in the country and the hierarchy
and jurisdiction of the courts." So apart from applicable laws, institutions are an
important part of the legal system and some of these will be discussed below in the
context of Malawi.
In Malawi the legal system is made up of three major institutions: the executive branch of
government, the legislature and the judicature. The legislature and the executive have
little to do with the daily machinations (workings) of the legal system. It is the judicature
that is active in the day to day business of the legal system. The executive is responsible
for the initiation of policies and legisl ation and for the implementation of all laws which
embody the express wishes of the people of Malawi and which promote the principles of
the Constitution.62 The legislature is responsible for enacting laws. In doing so, it is
58 Cf Lawrence M Friedman The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective New York: Russell Sage
Foundation 1975 at 5 - 6.
59 .
Joseph Raz The Concept ofa Legal System: an Introduction to the The01Y ofLegal System 2ed Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1980 at 1 - 3.
60 Meryll Dean Japan ese Legal System: Text and Materials London : Cavendish 1997 passim.
61 http://www.werksmans.co.zalsabusguide/part_08.htm#40 (Accessed 30 March 2005). Werksmans is one
of the biggest firms of attorne ys in South Africa.
62 Section 7 of the Constitution.
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required to reflect in its deliberations the interests of all the people of Malawi and to
further the values explicit or implicit in the Constitution.Y The judicature has the
responsibility of interpreting, protecting and enforcing the Constitution and all laws in
accordance with the constitution in an independent and impartial manner with regard only
to legally relevant facts and the prescriptions of law. All courts and all persons presiding
over those courts are required to exercise their functions , powers and duties independent
of the influence and direction of any other person or authority. The judiciary has power
over all matters of a judicial nature and has exclusive authority to decide whether an issue
is within its competence."
The presentation in this segment begins with a discussion of applicable laws and ends
with the institutions. On the institutions it is intended to discuss the courts briefly and
then mention the other institutions in passing.
2.5.2 Applicable laws
The Malawi legal system has its roots in English law. Section 15 of the 1966 Constitution
of the Republic of Malawi provided that the law to be applied in Malawi should be Acts
of Parliament, the common law, doctrines of equity,' customary law and statutes of
general application'" in force in England on 11th August 1902.66 The 1994 Constitution of
the Republic of Malawi ('the Constitution') has changed this significantly. The precise
impact of this change is yet to be articulated by the courts. Section 199 of the
Constitution declares that the Constitu tion is the supreme law of Malawi. Section 200
provides as follows:
63 Section 8 of the Constitution.
64 Sections 9 and 103 (1) of the Constitution.
65 It seems that in England there were/are som e Acts of Parliament that applied/apply to specific areas
while other Acts of Parliament applied/appl y to the whole land. Th e latter are what are called statutes of
general application.
66 Chongwe v Nkhonjera [1991] 14 Malawi Law Reports 56 .
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'Except in so far as they are inconsistent with this Constitution, all Acts of
Parliament, common law and customary law in force on the appointed day [that
is, 18 May 1994]67 shall continue to have force of law, as if they had been made
in accordance with and in pursuance of this Constitution:
Provided that any laws currently in force may be amended or repealed by an Act
of Parliament or be declared unconstitutional by a competent court.'
Gracian Banda has expressed the view that section 200 continues the application of all
pre-1994 laws except statutes of general application.l" With due respect, this is not
entirely correct. It is arguable from an examination of section 200 that the only laws the
application of which has been continued are Acts of Parliament, common law and
customary law in force on 18 May 1994. Statutes of general application have been
excluded. Similarly doctrines of equity have been left out. It is submitted that the words
'any laws currently in force', which occur in the proviso to section 200, do not include
laws that are not mentioned in the section: otherwise we will have the unsatisfactory
result that the framers of the Constitution stipulated the continuation of some laws in the
proviso and not in the main provision. It is an affront to common sense to think that the
framers of the Constitution split the stipulation of the continuation of the laws into two:
some in the main provision and others in the proviso. There is simply no reason or
justification for that.
Further, it cannot be successfully argued that Acts of Parliament encompass statutes of
general application as the latter were separately laid out in a similar provision of the 1902
British Central Africa Order in Council and in section 15 of the 1966 Constitution of the
Republic of Malawi. Excluding them from the 1994 Constitution appears to have been
deliberate. Perhaps the rationale was that after 30 years of independence, Malawi was
67 Section 2 15 of the Constitution states that in the Constitution 'appointed day' means 18th May 1994, the
date when the Constitution came into operation .
68Gracian Z Banda 'Report on Reform of Environmental Legislation in Malawi: Determining the Scope and
Need for Sectoral Reviews ' 1997 (unpublished) at 12.
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mature enough to have or had had enough time to pass its own statutes. In any case
Malawi loses little from this exclusion.
Difficulties arise when we consider the exclusion of doctrines of equity. By way of
background, it must be recalled that equity is that portion of remedial justice in England
which was, formerly, exclusively administered by a Court of Equity as contra-
distinguished from that portion which was , formerly, exclusively administered by a Court
of Common Law. 69 In the 13th and 14th Centuries the Court of Equity was presided over
by the Chancellor who was usually an ecclesiastic, generally a bishop, and learned in the
civil and canon law. The Chancellor would give or withhold relief, not according to any
precedent, but according to the effect produced upon his own individual sense of right
and wrong by the merits of the particular case before him. People chose to go to the
Court of Equity in cases where the common law was inflexible and incapable of
providing a remedy.i'' In the course of time a number of doctrines and devices were
formulated from equity. Among these are equitable remedies, for instance the injunction
and specific performance, which are among the most useful creations of equity. Therefore
the exclusion of doctrines of equity from section 200 means that equitable remedies may
no longer be applied in Malawi. This conclusion is inescapable since there is nothing in
section 200 which suggests that doctrines of equity have been continued. Any attempt to
interpret this section as including doctrines of equity will simply amount to rewriting the
provision.
Doctrines of equity are crucial in the Malawi legal system. They are particularly
important in environmental matters. Potential polluters may be restrained from going
ahead with a polluting activity by an injunction. The non-applicability of doctrines of
equity is consequently a major lacuna in the law which must be filled with urgency. In
this connection, it is significant that legal practice in Malawi has apparently not realized
69 John S. James (ed) , Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, 4ed ., Vol 2,
London: Sweet & Maxwell , 1972 at 928.
70 Jill E Martin (ed) Hanbury & Martins Modern Equity 14th Edn. London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1993 at 5-7.
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the non-applicability of doctrines of equ ity. To judges and lawyers it is business as usual:
doctrines of equity have been used without objection in recent cases.7!
Apart from the laws specified in section 200 , there is room for the application of foreign
case law and public international law. These two species of law may be applied during
constitutional interpretation.f They are also app licabl e on a general level. The doctrine of
precedent (which is part of the common law) enjoins courts to use foreign case law as
persuasive authcrity.f Actually the general tendenc y in Malawian courts is to go for
English decisions if local authority is lacking. Only when English decisions do not
provide sufficient guidance do the courts look to other foreign jurisdictions. With regard
to public international law, the Constitution declares that international agreements ratified
by an Act of Parliament and international agreements entered into before 18 May 1994
and binding on Malawi, form part of the law of Malawi. In addition international custom
may be applied. i"
71 For instance in Candlex Limited v Mark Katsonga Phiri Civil Caus e No . 713 of 2000 (Judgment of 11
May 2000); Micahil Jama Ali tla Put/and Importing Company v Ali Dere and Others Civil Cause No. 3684
of 2004 (Judgment of 10 January 2003) and Jeffrey Chikumbanje v Indefund Limited Civil Cause No. 340
of2003 (Judgment of28 April 2003).
72 Section 11(2) of the Constitution provides: ' In interp reting the provisions of this Constitution a court of
law shall ... where applicable, have regard to current norms of publ ic international law and comparable
foreign case law.'
73 The Malawi Supreme Court of Appe al applied several foreign cases in Attorney General v Malawi
Congress Party and Others MSCA Civil App eal No. 22 of 1996 (commonly known as 'The Press Trust
case '). A copy of this judgment was available on http ://www.judiciary.mw when accessed on 24 March
2005 . See also Thomas Trier Hansen ' Implementation of Internation al Human Rights Standards through
the National Courts in Malawi ' [2002] 46 Journal ofAfrican Law 31 at 39.
74 Sections 11(2)(c) and 211 of the Constitution . International agreements entered into before 18 May 1994
are applicable as long as Parliament has not provided otherwise and as long as the agreement has not
lapsed. International custom is applicable as long as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of
Parliament. See Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa 'A Full Loaf is Better than Half: the Constitutional Protection
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Malawi ' [2005] 49 Journal ofAf rican Law 207 at 233 - 234 for
one view on the meaning of these clauses . Another view is provided by Redson E Kapindu and Justin M
Kalima 'Malawi' in Environm ental Laws of Southern Africa Juta (forthcoming).
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2.5.3 Institutions of the law
2.5.3.1 Courts
Malawi's judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court and
Subordinate Courts.f Subordinate Courts may be divided into three: Industrial
Relations Court, Magistrate Courts and Traditional or Local Courts. i" There are five
types of Magistrate Courts:
• Resident Magistrate Courts
• First Grade Magistrate Courts
• Second Grade Magistrate Courts
• Third Grade Magistrate Courts
• Fourth Grade Magistrate Courts
The Malawi Supreme Court of App eal ("MSCA") is the highest appellate court in
Malawi and it has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the High Court. MSCA may also hear
appeals from other courts and tribunals as an Act of Parliament may prescribe.f MSCA
is composed of the Chief Justice and three or more Justices of Appeal. 78 When
determining any matter, other than a constitutional or an interim (i.e. not final) matter, the
MSCA is composed of an uneven number of Justices of Appeal, not being less than
three. 79
75 See generally chapter IX of the Constitution; Courts Act cap 3:02 of the Laws of Malawi ;
Supreme Court of Appeal Act cap 3:01 of the Laws of Malawi.
76 See generally Macnight R E Machika The Mala wi Legal System: An Introduction Zomba: University of
Malawi Law Department 1983 at 3 - 18.
77 Section 104 (2) of the Constitution.
78 Section 105 (l) of the Constitution ; section 3 of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act.
79 Section 105(2) of the Constitution.
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The High Court of Malawi has unrestricted powers to hear and determine any civil or
criminal proceedings under any law. The High Court may also review any action or
decision of the Government, for conformity with the Constitution. In addition, the High
Court may hear appeals from Subordinate Courts in both civil and criminal matters. A
Subordinate Court may reserve for consideration by the High Court any question of law
which arises during the trial of any civil action or matter and may give any judgment or
decision subject to the opinion of the High Court and the High Court has power to
determine every such question, with or without hearing argument. 80 The High Court is
required to have three or more judges." Every proceeding and all business arising out of
the High Court is generally heard and disposed of by a single judge except in matters
centering on the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi in which case a minimum of
three judges is required.r'
Subordinate Courts are courts which are subordinate to the High Court. As stated above,
they are divided into three: Industrial Relations Court, Magistrate Courts and Traditional
or Local Courts.
The Industrial Relations Court determines labour disputes and other issues relating to
employment. 83 Its procedures are more "user - friendly" to people who have not been
trained as lawyers. It is not really necessary to hire a lawyer to represent a person in this
court.
Magistrate Courts have criminal and civil jurisdiction. Resident Magistrate Courts are the
highest courts among the magistrate courts , followed by the First Grade Magistrate
Courts. The jurisdiction of a magistrate court depends on its type. In respect of criminal
jurisdiction, a Resident Magistrate Court, a First Grade Magistrate Court and a Second
80 Sections 108 and 110 (4) of the Constitution; sections 18, 19 and 21 of the Courts Act.
81 Section 109 of the Constitution, section 5 of the Courts Act.
82 Section 9 of the Courts Act.
83 Section 110(2) of the Constitution.
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Grade Magistrate Court may, with few exceptions , try any criminal offence.84 The
criminal offences which may be tried by Third Grad e and Fourth Grade Magistrate
Courts are specifically set out in the Second Schedule to the Criminal Procedure and
Evidence Code."
With the exception of the death penalty, a Magistrate Court may impose any sentence or
order authorised by law. 86 Where, however , a fine or term of imprisonment is imposed,
section 14 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code prescribes the limits.
With regard to civil jurisdiction.Y Magistrate Courts have power to deal with, try and
determine any civil matter in which the amount in dispute or the value of the subject
matter, does not exceed prescribed amounts. However, Magistrate Courts have no power
to deal with, try or determine any civil matter:-
(a) whenever the title to or ownership of land is in questionr"
(b) for an injunction;
(c) for the cancellation or rectification (i.e. correction) of instruments;
(d) in which the guardianship or custody of infants is in question;
(e) in which the validity or dissolution of any marriage is in question.f"
(f) relating to the title to any right, duty or office; and
(g) seeking any declaratory decree.
84 Section 13(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidenc e Code cap 8:01 of the Laws of Malawi. The
exceptions are treason , concealment of treason , murder and manslaughter.
85 Section 13(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code.
86 Section 12 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code ; David Newman, Criminal Procedure and
Evidence in Malawi Zomba: University of Malawi Faculty of Law 1982 at 9.
87 Section 39 of the Courts Act.
88 Except as provided by section 156 of the Registered Land Act, cap 58:01 of the Laws of Malawi.
89 Except as specifically provided in any writt en law for the time bein g in force.
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On Traditional or Local Courts, the Constitution states that Parliament may make
provision for Traditional or Local Courts presided over by lay persons or chiefs. The
powers of these courts are limited exclusively to civil cases at customary law and such
minor common law and statutory offences as prescribed by an Act of Parliament.90 At the
time of writing (October 2005) these Traditional or Local Courts had not been
established.
The following diagram shows the hierarchy of the Courts in Malawi.
Hierarchy ofCourts in Malawi










Institutions which have potential for use in environmental protection include the Malawi
Human Rights Commission, the Malawi Law Commission, the Office of the Attorney
General and the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The primary purpose of the
Human Rights Commission is the protection and investigation of violations of the rights
accorded by the Constitution or any other law." This arguably includes the
environmental right provided for in the Environment Management Act 1996. The Human
Rights Commission may act upon the applications of an individual or class of persons. It
has such powers of investigation and recommendation as are reasonably necessary for the
effective promotion of the rights conferred by or under the Constitution.Y
The Law Commission is mandated to review and make recommendations relating to the
repeal and amendment of laws. 93 This commission is therefore likely to be at the centre of
amending or formulating new environmental legislation. The Attorney General is the
principal legal adviser to the Government. The office of Attorney General may either be
the office of a minister or may be a public office. 94 An environmentally sensitive
Attorney General is likely to give independent and sounder advice affecting the
environment.
The Director of Public Prosecutions ("DPP") is a public officer. The DPP has power in
any criminal case in which he considers it desirable so to do:
(a) to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any
court (other than a court-martial) in respect of any offence alleged to have been
committed by that person;
91 Section 129 of the Constitution.
92 Section 130 of the Constitution .
93 Section 132 of the Constitution.
94 Section 98 of the Constitution.
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(b) to take over and continue any criminal proceedings which have been instituted or
undertaken by any other person or authority; and
(c) to discontinue at any stage before judgment is delivered any criminal proceedings
instituted or undertaken by himself or any other person in authority.
Thus the DPP is responsible for prosecuting environmental offenders. Where the DPP
does the things specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) above, he must provide reasons for his
action to the Legal Affairs Committee of Parliament within ten days. The DPP may not
discontinue proceedings with respect to any appeal by a person convicted in any criminal
proceedings or to any case stated or question of law reserved at the instance of such a
person." The DPP is assisted in his work mostly by police prosecutors.
2.6 Observations
In many respects the history of Malawi has followed the general pattern of the national
histories of countries in the region in that Bantu speakers from other parts of Africa
moved to the country followed by Europeans and people from other continents. With
relatively small populations of the Bantu in old Malawi environmental problems were not
pronounced. The arrival of foreigners brought new ways of exploiting resources and new
problems: the colonial eco-drama staged elsewhere was performed with little change.'"
Increasing populations began to strain the environment and they continue to strain it.
95 Section 99 of the Constitution. See also section 42(2)(f)(viii) of the Constitution.
96 Ravi Rajan 'The Colonial Eco-drama: Resonant Themes in the Environmental History of Southern Africa
and South Asia' in Stephen Dovers, Ruth Edgecombe and Bill Guest (eds) South Africa's Environmental
Hist01Y: Cases and Comparisons Cape Town: David Philip 2002 at 259 - 260 reports that Timothy Weiskel
has suggested that imperialism engenders a particular type of ecological drama involving five characteristic
acts. The opening act 'depicts the acute social and ecological disruption caused by European colonisers,
their plant and animal species, and their biotic regimes, in the immediate aftermath of colonial intrusion.
The second act involves the colonisers occupying previously under-occupied eco-niches and then
expanding into and exploiting others. Act Three portrays the immediate impact of such expansions on local
peoples: the disruption of colonised societies, their eco-niches and biotic regimes; and the many acts of
resistance by colonised societies against their forced ecological dislocation. The fourth act is about the
processes of re-configuration following the radical disruption caused by the colonial encounter, and depicts
the colonising populations moving into "nee-niches" such as the "virgin lands" of the white settler
agriculturists. Finally, the last act explores the mature "predator- prey relationships within the colonial
ecosystem" established during the earlier stages. These involve the creation of new kinds of relations
sometimes symbiotic and enduring, between indigenous and intrusive populations. ' '
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The minimal exploitation of natural resources has been a blessing in disguise as the
pollution from massive exploitation has not been encountered, suggesting that perhaps
there should not be massive exploitation of natural resources (especially those in
environmentally sensitive areas such as lakes) for the sake of environmental protection.
This, however, may not be accepted by the majority of the citizenry as Malawi is
desperately in need of these resources for economic development purposes. The country
may actually be viewed as being in a birthing process: trying with all its energy to bring
forth a middle-income economy that at least meets the needs of its people. Therefore
conflict between economic development and environmental concerns is inevitable."
Against this backdrop there is hope: Malawi has a modem legal system which can be
used to mediate the perceived conflict. Malawi can use its legal system in the campaign
against environmental degradation and in encouraging only the kind of economic
development which is sustainable. To this end, it is necessary to fashion the elements of
the legal system in such a way that they take into account the economic and social state
of the country. This is one of the central concerns in the present study especially with
reference to applicable laws. In subsequent chapters proposals shall be made to alter or
amend some laws so as to make them workable or more effective in the current
socioeconomic atmosphere. This endeavour commences in the next chapter with a
discussion of the criminal sanction.
97 It is commendable that in Malawi 's National Long-Term Development Perspective (commonly known as
'Malawi Vision 2020') environmental concerns were explicitly included. The Malawi Vision 2020
statement reads, 'By the year 2020, Malawi as a God-fearing nation will be secure, democratically mature,
environmentally sustainable, self reliant with equal opportunities for and active participation by all, having
social services, vibrant cultural and religious values and being a technologically driven middle-income
economy': http://www.sdnp.org.mw/-esaias/ettah /vision-2020/ (Accessed 01 April 2005).
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CRIMINAL SANCTION: PURPOSE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction
Elements of the criminal sanction were imposed on wrongdoers by at least some of the tribes
that lived in pre-colonial Malawi. A person who committed a wrong - which today may be
classified as criminal - was generally required to pay a fine in kind. There is no record of
imprisonment of wrongdoers before the arrival of Europeans.' It must be noted that the
criminal process followed was markedly different from the criminal process of today. For
instance, one authority remarks that the court proceedings were so open that any passerby had
the liberty to cross-examine the witncsses.i
After the advent of the Europeans, particularly the British, the process and substance of the
criminal sanction took a form similar to that of modem times. When Malawi (then known as
Nyasaland) was declared a British protectorate in 1891 , the Queen of England appointed
Henry Hamilton Johnston first Commissioner and Consul General. In his appointment letter
Johnston was mandated, inter alia, ' to supervise the organisation of justice as regards
foreigners.':' Courts were established and trials were conducted at first by district
commissioners." These trials were apparently modelled on the British system. In 1902 the
I Gracian Z Banda 'Report on Reform of Environmental Legislation in Malawi: Determining the Scope and
Need for Sectoral Reviews' 1997 (unpublished) at 8; Owen J M Kalinga A HistOJY of the Ngonde Kingdom of
Malawi Amsterdam: Mouton 1985 passim; R B Boede r Silent Majority: A HistOJY of the Lomwe in Malawi
Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa 1984 passim ; Elias C Mandala Work and Control in a Peasant
Economy : A HistOJY ofthe Lower Tchiri Valley in Malawi 1859 - 1960 Madison: University of Wisconsin Press
1990 passim .
2 Banda op cit at 8.
3 D D Phiri HistOIY ofMalawi: From Earliest Times to the Year 1915 Blantyre: Christian Literature Association
in Malawi 2004 at 213.
4 Phiri op cit at 230 - 231 reports that a white man known as Ziehl stole Africans' cattle. The cattle was
recovered and Ziehl was put on trial. He was, inter alia, fined fifty pounds. The trial was presided over by C A
Cardew who at that time was district commissioner for Nkhata Bay.
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British government enacted the British Central Africa Order in Council which extended to
Malawi the application of principles of common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of
general application in force in England before 11th August 1902. Customary law was retained
as long as it was not contrary to justice, morality and good governance' The effect of this was
that English law essentially supplanted customary law. The criminal sanction as understood in
England at that time was applied to Malawi. 6 It is significant that despite the numerous laws
that have been passed since 1902 the nature of the criminal sanction in Malawi has not
departed from the English lead. With this background in mind, the discussion will now focus
on the purpose of the criminal sanction in environmental protection in Malawi followed by
the constitutional framework of the criminal sanction.
3.2 Purpose of the Criminal Sanction in Environmental Protection
In Malawi tribal society the criminal sanction appeared to have two purposes: reconciliation
of the parties to a dispute and the disciplining of a recalcitrant party.' At present the criminal
sanction may be taken as having two general purposes: retributive purposes and utilitarian
purposes.f The discussion will dwell first on retribution.
5 Banda op cit at 9. Emmet V Mittlebeeler African Custom and Western Law: the Development of the Rhodesian
Criminal Law for Africans London: Holmes & Meier 1976 at 9 makes the following observation: 'In British
Africa, policy varied from one territory to another, but in general the tendency was to disturb, at least overtly,
African custom as little as possible. The standard procedure was to recognize custom, except insofar as it ran
counter to what the British considered general principles of right and wrong. In Kenya, the phrase embodying the
criterion of recognition was "not repugnant to justice and morality," while in Southern Rhodesia it was "not
repugnant to natural justice and morality".'
6 Phiri op cit at 271 - 273 records court proceedings (in the form of an inquest) on the death of John Chilembwe.
The inquest was held on 4 February 1915 by Colin Grant, the Resident Magistrate at Mulanje. Some of
Chilembwe's men were captured and put on trial. They were sentenced to death and shot. The most serious trials
were conducted by High Court judge, Robert William Lyall Grant.
7 Banda op cit at 8.
8 J Burchell and J Milton Principles of Criminal Law Cape Town: Juta 1991 at 42 - 53. C R Snyman Criminal
Law 3ed Cape Town: Butterworth 1995 at 17 - 19 refers to the purposes of the criminal sanction as 'theories of
punishment' . He classifies these theories into three. First, the absolute theory; second, the relative theory; and
third, the unitary theory. There is only one absolute theory which is retribution. The relative theory is divided
into the preventive, deterrent and reformative theories. The deterrent theory is further divided into individual
deterrence and general deterrence. The unitary theory seeks to reconcile or unify all the other theories. J C Smith
and B Hogan Criminal Law 6ed London: Butterworths 1988 at 3 - 16 identify retribution, protection of the
public and reform of the offender as purposes of the criminal sanction. They include deterrence under the
protection of the public.
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3.2.1 Retributivism
Retributivism expresses the idea that those who hav e caused harm should themselves suffer
harm. Justification for this is fourfold: first , the appeasement of society or revenge. It is said
that the commission of a crime causes indignation on the part of the wronged person and the
community generally. When the offender is punished for his crime the indignation is
cancelled out or wiped clean." Second, retribution is justified on the ground of expiation or
atonement: the idea is that a person who has harmed society deserves to be punished. After
suffering harm (in the punishment) proportionate to that which he inflicted, his debt to society
is paid. His crime is said to have 'expiated"." Third, it is claimed that retribution may be
justified on the basis of denunciation, that is, the public 's condemnation of the crime.
Denning LJ once said as much:
'The punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt
by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of
punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else .. .. The
ultimate justification of any punishment is not that it is a deterrent, but that it is the
emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime... ' 11
Fourth, it is argued that retribution is necessary on the premise of just deserts: the offender
simply gets what he deserves. Writers agree that inherent in this justification is the notion of
proportionality.l/ Punishment must vary with moral blameworthiness: thus the maximum
sentence for an offence is reserved for the worst case. Further, punishment must be
proportionate to the harm done. Consequently the sentence for an attempt to commit a crime
is generally less severe than the sentence for the same crime when completed.l ' Malawi's
9 J Burchell and J Milton Criminal Law 2ed Kenwyn: Juta 1997 at 39; Cf Snyman op cit at 19. The validity of
this justification was recognised by Schreiner JA in R v Karg 1961 (1) SA 231 (A) at 235 - 236.
10 Burchell and Milton op cit at 39 - 40.
11 Quoted by Smith and Hogan op cit at 7.
12 Smith and Hogan op cit at 4 - 11; Burchell and Milton op cit at 41 - 42; Snyman op cit at 19 - 20.
13 Smith and Hogan op cit at 4 - 10.
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Penal Code," the principal criminal statute, takes cognizance of this principle. Section 402
provides:
'Any person who attempts to commit a felony of such a kind that a person convicted
of it is liable to the punishment of death or imprisonment for a term of fourteen years
or upwards, with or without other punishment, shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be
liable, if no other punishment is provided, to imprisonment for seven years.'
Retributivism has been criticized at length by theorists. It is reported that philosophers in the
first three decades of the zo" century were convinced of the 'poverty of retributive justice'.
'They found it isolating and asocial, practically useless, backward looking and cruel, and they
saw as the core weakness the idea of an ideal moral relationship of requital between the
individual and the State, that is, the theory's abstract individualism.' 15
In the environmental context retribution has a role to play although aspects of it do not assist
much. If those who have caused environmental harm are punished for the harm done in order
to appease society or mete out revenge on behalf of the society, the interests of environmental
law are not met. What environmental law seeks to achieve is environmental protection. Mere
appeasement or revenge, it is submitted, does not contribute to environmental protection.
Similarly atonement or expiation does not provide a sound basis for the criminal sanction in
environmental protection. With regard to denunciation, it may be argued that many
environmental crimes lack moral turpitude; as such they may not attract condemnation or
disapproval by the society." It follows that for such environmental crimes denunciation may
not justify retribution as a purpose of the criminal sanction.
Perhaps the most acceptable justification for retribution in environmental cnmes is just
deserts, especially the notion of proportionality. On the one hand, a person who commits a
serious environmental crime must be punished severely. On the other hand, a person who
14 Cap 7:01 of the Laws of Malawi.
15A Norrie Punishment, Responsibility and Justice: a Relational Critique Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000
at 4. For further criticisms of retribution see Snyman op cit at 20 - 21.
16 Cf Michael Anthony Kidd 'The Protection of the Environment through the Use of Criminal Sanctions: A
Comparative Analysis with Specific Reference to South Africa ' unpublished PhD Thesis University of Natal
(2002) at 17 - 18.
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transgresses a minor environmental regulation ought to be punished less severely. Further, an
attempt to commit an environmental crime must be visited by a more lenient sentence than the
commission of the full offence. It may therefore be concluded that retribution provides a
theoretical framework for environmental crime to the extent that it ensures proportionality
between punishment and moral blameworthiness and between punishment and the harm done.
3.2.2 Utilitarianism
Utilitarian theories of punishment contend that punishment has a social benefit for society and
is thus justified by the advantage it brings to the social order. Four theories may be isolated.
First, prevention or incapacitation: if the perpetrator of a crime is subjected to punishment, for
instance imprisonment, it will (with few exceptions) be impossible for him to commit further
crimes. Thus an English judge, after convicting a number of youths of crimes of violence and
sentencing them to four years' imprisonment each , said:
'Nothing is more effective to stamp out crime than a long term of imprisonment. That
may sound harsh, but we have to remember the twelve thousand or so of ordinary
people who last year were the victims of crimes of violence. They, and their like, must
be protected. And in these circumstances it does not wring my withers at all to be told
how awful it is that a comparatively young man should be shut up for a long time.' 17
In the same vein Malawi's Justice Dunstain Mwaungulu has commented that the criminal law
is 'publicly enforced with the purpose of preventing crime. There is a public utility and public
good in preventing crime ... ,18
This theory has been faulted on the ground, inter alia, that its application may result in the
passing of sentences which are too severe, regardless of applicable circumstances, as long as
the criminal can be kept away from committing further crimes. 19
17 Per Salmon J [1960] CLJ 45 at 48, quoted in Smith and Hogan op cit at 13.
18 The Republic v Shabir Suleman and Aslam Osman Criminal Case Number 144 of 2003 (High Court _
unreported). A copy of the case was available on http://www.judiciary.mw when this website was accessed in
December 2004 .
19 For further criticisms of the theory see Snyman op cit at 21.
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In the second place, punishment may achieve individual or general deterrence. It has actually
been contended that judges believe in the value of punishment as a deterrent to both the
person sentenced and to other members in the community." Individual deterrence entails
teaching an individual convict a lesson that will persuade him to desist from committing
crimes in future. It may be noted , however, that the basis of individual deterrence is
undermined by the prevalence of recidivism (the repeated commission of crimesj.i' With
regard to general deterrence, Rabie and Strauss state:
'The idea [behind general deterrence] is that man, being a rational creature, would
refrain from the commission of crimes if he should know that the unpleasant
consequences of punishment will follow the commission of certain acts. It is thus the
inhibiting effect of the threat of punishment, or of the imposition of punishment on
others, which should cause man to think twice before he would commit a crime. This
restraint is referred to as psychological coercion. Y'
The learned authors continue to say that the success of general deterrence depends largely on
'effective promulgation of the threat of punishment and of punishment which is in fact
imposed, because in this respect it is publicity and not punishment which deters.,23 It may be
added that the success of general deterrence depends on the following complementary factors:
the likelihood of being apprehended, being successfully prosecuted, being convicted and
being sentenced to a significant penalty"
20 Smith and Hogan op cit at 12.
21 Snyman op cit at 21 - 22.
22 M A Rabie and S A Strauss Punishment: An Introduction to Principles 3ed Johannesburg: Lex Patria 1981 at
92.
23 Ibid. Quotation marks within the original quotation have been left out.
24 C Reasons 'Crimes Against the Environment: Some Theoretical and Practical Concerns ' (1991) 34 Criminal
Law Quarterly 86 at 96 - 97 writes: 'Unlike "crimes of passion", which are emotive, situational and difficult to
deter through punishment, white-collar and corporate crime (including polluting) is often intenti onal, rational ,
calculated, premeditated and a "normal" part of doing business. This type of "instrumental offence" is potentially
more deterrable based upon the rational-person model of behaviour underl ying penal sanctions. Studies of
deterrence note the significance of the likelihood of apprehension, prosecution, conviction and significant
penalty as all important facets of deterrence on both a "specific" and "general" level. That is, the law may have
heavy potential penalties, but there may be little enforcement, use of prosecution, and relatively light penalties. '
Thus the listed factors are also necessar y for the success of individual deterrence. Hans Zeisel The Limits ofLaw
Enforcement Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982 at 57 illustrates the power of the criminal law to deter
through, inter alia, an empirical example. He writes that ' a revealing involuntary experiment occurred in 1944,
when the entire Danish police force was arrested by the German invaders. At that time, the number of robberies
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Just like the other theories, general deterrence has been criticized. It has been forcefully
argued that man does not always weigh the advantages and disadvantages of a prospective act
before he acts, especially where the offence is committed in the heat of the moment. Further,
there is no empirical proof of the theory's assumption that a reasonable person would be
deterred from committing criminal offences by the punishment imposed on others.v' This last
criticism, it is submitted, does not have much merit as not everything can be proved
empirically.
The third utilitarian theory is reform of the offender: it is said that punishment may lead to the
reform of the offender. Some writers believe that a person engages in criminal conduct
because of defects in his personality or psychological factors in his background. So the aim of
punishment is alleged to be to reform the offending person so that at the end of it he can
become a changed person, a law-abiding citizen. Thus the theory focuses its attention on the
person of the offender.26 While courts may take into account the circumstances of the offender
when sentencing." it seems that they seldom expressly pass sentences with rehabilitation of
the offender in mind. 28 It appears that the predominant approach of the courts is to fix the
punishment as justice demands and then let the penologist undertake the rehabilitation of the
offender while the offender is undergoing the punishment.29
in Copenhagen, normally around ten per month in that law-abiding country, quickly rose to over one hundred per
month and kept rising. '
25 Snyrnan op cit at 22; Smith and Hogan op cit at 12.
26 Snyrnan op cit at 23.
27 In Republic v Lloyd Amani Confirmation Case Number 144 of 2003 the Court said: 'Besides circumstances
around the offence, the sentencing court should regard the defendant's circumstances generally, before, during
the crime, in the course of investigation, and during trial. The just sentence not only fits the crime, it fits the
offender. A sentence should mirror the defendant's antecedents, age and, where many are involved, the degree of
participation in the crime. The defendant's actions in the course of crime showing remorse, helpfulness,
disregard or highhandedness go to sentence. Equally a sentencing court must recognize cooperation during
investigation or trial.' The same sentiments were expressed in Republic v Peter Chapendeka and Others
Confirmation Case Number 451 of 2000; Republic v Fred Chabwera Confirmation Case Number 728 of 2002;
Republic v Ganizani Banda Confirmation Case Number 884 of 2002; and Chimwemwe Gulumba v Republic
Miscellaneous Criminal Application Number 51 of 2003. All these are unreported High Court cases but copies
were available on http://www.judiciary.mw when accessed in January 2005.
28 The most likely time when the court takes into account the rehabilitation of offenders in sentencing is when
dealing with juvenile offenders: see the Probation of Offenders Act cap 9:01 of the Laws of Malawi.
29 Patrick Devlin (aka Lord Devlin) The Judg e Oxford: Oxford University Press 1979 at 29 - 30 writes: 'There is
at first sight an attraction about dovetailing the penologist into a judge, but consideration shows the attraction to
be superficial: A lawyer is not by nature a social worker. The two characters have not the same sort of aptitudes;
they have a different set of talents and a different framework for their ideas. The lawyer's working hypothesis is
that all men are reasonable; but the social worker rarely finds that the individual with whom he has to deal has
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The objective of reforming the offender may lead to the imposition of long periods of
employment so that the offender is adequately rehabilitated. Further, it seems that 'the
rehabilitation of the offender is more often than not an ideal rather than a reality. ,30
Finally, Burchell and Milton make reference to the utilitarian theories of reinforcement. They
write that 'the consistent punishment of offenders creates and reinforces in every citizen a
respect for the criminal law and inhibits contraventions of it.' Thus, the reinforcement theory
takes punishment as an educational medium. Punishment assists in the formation and
strengthening of the society's moral code and in so doing brings about conSCIOUS and
unconscious inhibitions against engaging in criminal conduct: it induces in the citizen 'an
attitude of obedience to the prohibitions of the criminal law.' :"
It may be noted that the reinforcement theory is similar in many respects to the deterrence
theory. It also has aspects of denunciation.32 Accordingly, some of the criticisms of deterrence
and denunciation may be levelled against reinforcement.
just stepped off the Clapham omnibus. I am not saying that judges do not have compassion, but that the talents
that led them to the vocation of the law are not the sort needed for treating the individual offender. ... When the
period has been fixed as justice demands, the law authorizes and indeed encourages the penologist to use it for
the work of reformation. It will allow some flexibility for this purpose , being willing within limits to make the
sentence longer or shorter to accommodate different forms of treatment. But only within limits. The sentence
must not be longer than is justified by the gravity of the crime and must not fall below the least that retribution
demands. This is the lawyer's objective. The penologist's objective is to send the prisoner back into the world
changed for the better. He may not always hope for complete reformation, but at least he does not want him to
leave while there is still a reasonable chance that further treatment may improve his prospects. When these
objectives clash, it is the just sentence that must prevail, notwithstanding that it deprives the expert of the time he
wants. To hold otherwise would be to move on to the route, though doubtless with many stages still to go, which
leads as in the U.S.S.R. to mental institutions for the dissident. '
30 Snyman op cit at 24.
31 Burchell and Milton op cit at 45 - 46. At page 46 they quote J Andenaes 'General Prevention' (1952) 43
Journal ofCriminal Law Criminology and Police Science 176 at 179 as follows: 'The idea is that the punishment
as a concrete expression of society's disapproval of an act helps to form and to strengthen the public's moral
code and thereby creates conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing crime ... . Purely as a matter
of habit , with fear, respect for authority or social imitation as connecting links, it is possible to induce favourable
attitudes towards this and that action and unfavourable attitudes toward another action.' It may be added that it
was perhaps in the same spirit that Mwaungulu J in Republic v Shabir Suleman and Aslam Osman (cited above)
said, 'It is important that the court sends a right message to public officials and the public alike of the importance
and need to resist and report corruption. '
32 Cf Burchell and Milton op cit at 46 - 47.
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These utilitarian theories will now be tested on the background of environmental law to
determine whether they provide a sound basis for the criminal sanction in environmental
protection.
Since environmental law seeks to protect the environment, criminal sanctions are acceptable
in environmental law if they advance that objective. Prevention or incapacitation may
therefore be admitted as a legitimate basis for environmental criminal sanctions. The
imprisonment of a polluter who would have continued to pollute if he was enjoying freedom,
is certainly in line with the goals of environmental protection.
Similarly deterrence may readily be welcomed as forming part of the necessary conceptual
framework for environmental criminal sanctions. Smith argues that 'at the moment
environmental crimes are punished chiefly because of the potential for social harm that they
pose, not because of deep underlying conceptions of moral wrongfulness of conduct on
individual victims.Y' In effect Smith seems to support the deterrence theory in combating
environmental crime as most environmental crimes lack moral turpitude. In fact Michael Kidd
has demonstrated that the primary aim of the criminal sanction in the context of
environmental regulation is deterrence. 34
Reinforcement and reformation may also justify in varying degrees the use of criminal
sanctions in environmental protection. In Malawi literacy levels are low. 35 As a result many
people may not resort to formal sources of information to understand what is right or wrong
environmentally. Further, poverty is on the increase and so many people may plunder natural
resources for survival purposes. The punishment of environmental offenders may therefore
create and reinforce in the people a respect for environmental criminal law and stop or
33 Susan L Smith 'An Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove: Redefining the Role of Criminal Prosecution in Creating an
Effective Environmental Enforcement System' (1995) 19 Criminal Law Journal 12 at 18, quoted in Kidd op cit
at 17.
34 Kidd op cit, particularly Abstract and Chapter 2.
35 At national level only 34% of the female population and 50% of males aged 5 years and above were reported
to have some education in the early 1990s. These statistics are recorded in the National Environmental Action
Plan as captured on http://www.gov.mw/enviro/action plan/chap 3.html (Accessed on 06 January 2005). Since
more than ten years have passed since the statist ics were taken , it is likely that the figures of educated persons
have gone up.
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discourage contraventions of it. The views of Kidd on this point are arguably applicable to
Malawi even though he writes in respect of South Africa. He states:
'Certain crimes, which would be regarded in other countries as very serious, would,
for various reasons, probably only be regarded as serious by certain sectors of [this
country's] society today. By visiting criminal sanctions on serious environmental
offences ... , public attitudes could be shaped in such a way that people who would not
at the moment regard such offences as serious might change their viewpoint. ,36
Reformation has limited scope for justifying the environmental criminal sanction. Since
reformation's main focus is on the person of the offender, it cannot easily be adapted to
satisfy the demands of environmental protection unless the rehabilitation is structured in such
a way that the offender is fully persuaded that as a responsible citizen he must, where
applicable, take necessary and appropriate measures to protect the environment and refrain
from actions that prejudice the environment.
From the foregoing analysis it may be concluded that the purposes of the criminal sanction in
environmental law are not exactly the same as those for the criminal sanction in the general
law. While in both areas the criminal sanction has both retributive and utilitarian purposes, the
purposes in environmental law are tempered with the goal of environmental protection.
Accordingly it has been suggested that retribution is a sound purpose of the criminal sanction
in environmental law only in respect of the theory of desert, particularly the notion of
proportionality. With regard to utilitarianism, deterrence, prevention (incapacitation) and
reinforcement may be regarded as legitimate purposes of the criminal sanction in
environmental law. Reformation of the offender lies on the verge and it does not seem to lay a
significant claim to the status of being a purpose of the criminal sanction in environmental
law.
Having analyzed the purpose of the criminal sanction, the discussion will now focus on the
constitutional framework of the criminal sanction. It is necessary to appreciate this aspect
because the Constitution is the supreme law of Malawi.




The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi binds all executive, legislative and judicial organs
of the State at all levels of government.r" Accordingly when the courts are exercising their
duties in respect of the criminal sanction in environmental protection, they are bound to
operate within the confines of the Constitution. Section 10 of the Constitution declares that in
the interpretation of all laws the provisions of the Constitution shall be the supreme arbiter
and ultimate source of authority. The courts are enjoined to have due regard to the principles
and provisions of the Constitution when applying any Act of Parliament and when applying
and developing the common law and customary law. Any act of government or any law that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is invalid to the extent of the
inconsistency."
The unique character and supreme status of the Constitution has been widely recognized by
the courts in Malawi. In the High Court case of Registered Trustees of the Public Affairs
Committee v Attorney General and Speaker of the National Assembly39 Justice Anaclet
Chipeta affirmed the supremacy of the Constitution and struck down part of an Act of
Parliament that offended the right to freedom of association and political rights in a manner
which could not be saved by the limitations clause in the Constitution.l"
There are two prongs to the constitutionality enquiry. Section 44 of the Constitution
distinguishes between derogable rights and non-derogable rights. In the first prong of the
inquiry, no derogation, restriction or limitation is permissible with regard to non-derogable
37 Section 4 of the Constitution.
38 Section 5 of the Constitution.
39 Civil Cause Number 1861 of 2003 (High Court - unreported) . Copy available on http:///www.judiciary.mw
(Accessed in January 2005). The Malawi Human Rights Commission participated in this case as amicus curiae.
40 The statute in question in the Constitution (Amendment) (No . 2) Act 2001. This statute sought to extend
' crossing the floor ' to outside Parliament. It provided that Members of Parliament would be deemed to have
crossed the floor if, inter alia, they joined a pol itical party not represented in Parliament or any other association
or organisation whose objectives or activ ities were political in nature . These extensions were declared to be
illegit imate and invalid.
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rights." As such any act of government or any law that is inconsistent with these non-
derogable rights is unconstitutional and invalid outright. In the second prong of the inquiry,
restrictions or limitations are permitted in respect of derogable rights. In relation to these
derogable rights, the courts appear to recognize two stages in the inquiry. When there is an
allegation that a piece of legislation is contrary to the spirit and intendment of the
Constitution, the Court first determines whether the legislation (or part of it) transgresses the
Bill of Rights. If the legislation (or part of it) does infringe the Bill of Rights, the court moves
to the second stage, which is to determine whether the infringement is permissible under the
limitations clause (Section 44 of the Constitution). In the case of Registered Trustees of the
Public Affairs Committee v Attorney General and Speaker of the National Assembly (cited
above) the court first considered whether the Cons titution (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 8 of
2001 infringed sections 32 and 40 (part of the Bill of Rights) of the Constitution. The court
held that the Act significantly interfered with the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
provided for under those sections. The court then proceeded to examine the question of
limitation. Ultimately the court held that part of the enactment could be saved but the rest was
unconstitutional and invalid. Ackermann J in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others42 expresses the
two stage inquiry of a comparable constitutionality inquiry in the following way:
'The task of determining whether the provisions of ... the Act are invalid because they
are inconsistent with the guaranteed rights here under discussion involves two stages:
first, an inquiry as to whether there has been an infringement of the ... guaranteed
right; if so, a further inquiry as to whether such infringement is justified under ... the
limitation. The task of interpreting the . . . fundamental rights rests, of course, with the
Courts, but it is for the applicants to prove the facts upon which they rely for their
claim of infringement of the particular right in question. Concerning the second stage,
41 The non-derogable rights are listed in subsection 1 of section 44. They are: (a) the right to life; (b) the
prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (c) the prohibition of genocide;
(d~ the prohibition of slavery, the slave trade and slave-l ike practices; (e) the prohibition of imprisonment for
~allure. ~o meet contractual ~bligatio~s; .(t) the prohibition on retrospective criminalisation and the retrospective
l~pOSltlon of greater penalties for cnmmal acts; (g) the right to equality and recognition before the law; (h) the
nght to freedom of conscience, belief, thought and religion and to academic freedom; and (i) the right to habeas
corpus .
42 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at para 44. See also lain Currie ' Bill of Rights Jurisprudence' (2001) Annual Survey of
South African Law 37 at 55 - 58.
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[it] is for the Legislature, or the party relying on the legislation, to establish this
. ificati ,43jusn ication ...
The limitations clause (Section 44 of the Malawi Constitution), as far as is material, provides
as follows:
'44 - ...
(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1), no restrictions or limitations may be placed on
the exercise of any rights and freedoms provided for in this Constitution other than
those prescribed by law, which are reasonable, recognized by international human
rights standards and necessary in an open and democratic society.
(3) Laws prescribing restrictions or limitations shall not negate the essential content of
the right or freedom in question, shall be of general application. ,44
In terms of this section a restriction of a fundamental right will pass constitutional muster if it
meets the following condinons:"
(a) it must be prescribed by law;
(b) it must be reasonable;
(c) it must be recognized by international human rights standards;
(d) it must be necessary in an open and democratic society.
Each of these will now be considered in turn.
43 See also S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at paras 100 - 102 per Chaskalson P, and S v
Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) per Kentridge AJ. The quoted words of Ackermann J refer to the South
African Constitution and legislation.
44 It appears that section 44(3) of the Constitution is not grammatically perfect. A connecting word seems to be
missing before the last mention of ' shall'. It is suggested that the word 'and' be inserted before the last mention
of 'shall ' in order to rectify this defect. When this is done, section 44(3) will read as follows: 'Laws prescribing
restrictions or limitations shall not negate the essential content of the right or freedom in question, and shall be of
general application. '
45 Justice Lovemore Chikopa in Republic v Maggi e Kaunda Criminal Appeal Number 89 of 2001 (High Court,
Mzuzu District Registry , unreported) recognised the importance of these conditions.
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3.3.2 Prescription by law
The restriction must be prescribed by a law that does not negate the essential content of the
right or freedom in question. On an ordinary and grammatical reading of subsections 2 and 3
of section 44, it appears that it is the law - not the restriction - that must not negate the
essential content of the right or freedom. This wording may be compared with that of section
33(1) of the 1993 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa," which relates the negation of
the essential content of the right to the restriction itself. It may be observed that what, strictly
speaking, must not negate the essential content is the restriction itself and not the whole law
in which the restriction is found. For instance, an Act of Parliament may have twenty sections.
Nineteen of these sections may not conflict with any provision of the Bill of Rights, and so
may not be restrictions. One of the twenty sections may conflict with the Bill of Rights and so
qualify as a restriction. In this scenario, to say that this Act of Parliament negates the essential
content of a right would be inexact. Rather, one must single out the restriction provision and
say that it (the restriction provision) negates the essential content of the right. It follows from
this that the wording of the South African Constitution on this aspect is more exact. However,
this does not mean that there is a substantive defect in the Malawian provision. It is submitted
that relating law to the negation encompasses, inter alia , the restriction. For it is not possible
to have a law which does not negate the essential content of a right but which at the same time
contains a restriction which negates the essential content of the right. In other words, a law
containing a negating restriction cannot be described as a law that does not negate the
essential content of the right: the negating restriction disqualifies the law from that
description.
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is legitimate to say that the restrictions or limitations
(contained in the law) must not negate the essential content of a right if they are to escape
being declared unconstitutional and invalid. Turning now to the meaning of the negation
46 Act 200 of 1993. Section 33(1) is in the following terms: ' (1) The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be
limited by law of general application, provided that such limitation -
(a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is
(i) reasonable; and
(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, and
(b) shall not negate the essential content of the right in question,
and provided further that any limitation to -
(aa) a right entrenched in section 10,11 ,12,14(1),21 ,25 or 30(1)(d) or (e) or (2); or
(bb) ~ right entrenched in section 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 or 24, in so far as such right relates to free and fair political
actrvrty,
shall , in addition to being reasonable as required in paragraph (a)(i), also be necessary.'
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phrase, Stuart Woolman suggests that 'to negate the essential content of a right, the restriction
must either make it impossible for the right to serve its intended social function or bar
permanently an individual from exercising the right. ,47 In S v Makwanyane'" Chaskalson P
states that the purpose of the negation provision is to ensure that 'rights should not be taken
away altogether'. In other words, the restrictions on rights are limitations and not
confiscations.49 Didcott J in AZAPO and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa
and Others50 wondered as to its meaning. He commented: 'Negating the essential content of a
constitutional right is ... a concept I have never understood. Nor can I fathom how it applies
to a host of imaginable situations. ,51 A more authoritative meaning is awaited from the
Malawi courts.
Apart from the absence of negation of the essential content of the right, section 44(3) requires
the law prescribing the restrictions to be of general application. In searching for a meaning of
'law of general application' the sacrosanct words of Justice Anaclet Chipeta on interpretation
of the Constitution must be borne in mind. His Lordship said:
'I do believe that the answer we need on this issue and in this case will come directly
from our own Constitution, which after all is the document that contains the wishes
and aspirations of our people. The more genuinely we give it attention and the more
sincerely we evaluate its enabling provisions without rushing to disable them by trying
to force them to fit in some ancient and expiring doctrinaire concepts, the nearer we
will get to the justice regime the framers of the Constitution contemplated for the
people of Malawi ....
I have just advocated for a chance to be given to the Constitution to speak with
47 Stuart Woolman 'Riding the Push-me Pull-you: Constructing a Test that Reconciles the Conflicting Interests
which Animate the Limitation Clause' (1994) 10 SAJHR 60 at 74.
48 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 134.
49 J R L Milton and M G Cowling South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol III 2ed Kenwyn: Juta 1988
(Service No . 7, 1995) at para 1-54.
50 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at para 66.
51 Stuart Woolman 'Limitation' in Matthew Chaskalson, Janet Kentridge, Jonathan Klaaren, Gilbert Marcus,
Dere.ck Spitz and Stuart Woolman (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa Kenwyn: Juta 1996 (Revision
Service 5, 1999) at 12-40 argues that '[the] judge should not be understood to be saying that he could find no
P?ssible.meaning i~ the phrase nor that it defies application. Rather he should be read as commenting upon the
d~fficult1es o,fma~mg . se~se of the phrase, his inclination to see it play a limited role in limitation analysis, and
his pleasure m seeing It disappear from the text of the final Constitution.'
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an uninterrupted voice and to first try and understand what it means before rushing to
borrow the influence of decisions in other jurisdictions for the construction of our
Constitution. I should think that it is only when a direct understanding of the
Constitution proves difficult to capture that resort can be meaningfully had to such
other guiding material and precedent. The exercise thus involves the employment of
appropriate and effective ways of interpreting the Constitution. ,52
Applying the learned judge's wisdom to the present task, it will be noted that 'law of general
application' may mean law that is applicable to the whole territory of Malawi or greater part
of it and to all or most people in Malawi. Although prima facie this meaning seems legitimate,
it ousts from the ambit of 'law of general application' pieces of subsidiary legislation which
are enacted for specific locations under the direction of generally applying legislation. For
instance, under the Local Government Act 42 of 1998 - a generally applying statute - the
local authorities are required to make bylaws relating to, inter alia, solid waste disposal in
their areas of jurisdiction.t' Should these bylaws really be excluded from being 'laws of
general application'?
What 'law' means in section 44 is probably clarified by section 200 of the Constitution. The
latter section acknowledges that law includes Acts of Parliament, common law and customary
law as long as they are consistent with the Constitution. Since properly enacted subsidiary
legislation is generally considered part of the principal Act, it may be argued that the
subsidiary legislation qualifies as 'law of general application'. 54 If this is accepted, it may be
concluded that law of general application may include law which applies to a segment of the
territory and to a portion of the people, provided that the demarcation of the territory and
52 Chipeta J made these remarks in the case of Regist ered Trustees of the Public Affairs Committee v Attorney
General and Speaker ofthe National Assembly (cited above).
53 Sections 6 and 103 of the Local Government Act 42 of 1998.
54 In Larbi-Odam v Member of the Executive Council for Education (North-West Province) and Another 1998
(1) SA 745 (CC) at para 27 Mokgoro J (the other Constitutional judges concurring) held that subordinate
legislation which applied generally to all educators in South Africa was a law of general application. Contra
African Lakes Corporation Limited v Director ofPublic Prosecutions 7 Malawi Law Reports 154 at 162 where it
was stated that ' [r]egulations are not part of a statutory enactment, but , in our view, regulations made under the
provisions of an Act may give a guide to interpretation of the Act.' It is doubtful whether the first part of this
statement is still the law.
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people is not based on arbitrary reasons.f Writers seem to be agreed on this formulation. For
instance, Gerhard Erasmus56 writes that law of general application includes parliamentary
legislation, provincial ordinances, regulations and rules of the common law, and that arbitrary
restrictions and discriminatory measures will not be permitted. John Milton and Michael
Cowling." identify parliamentary legislation, provincial laws, rules of the common law and
municipal bylaws as falling within the confines of law of general application. Johan de Waal
et al58 are of the same view. They write:
"The 'law of general application' requirement is the expression of a basic principle of
liberal political philosophy and of constitutional law known as the rule of law. There
are two components to this principle. The first is that the power of the government
derives from the law. The government must have lawful authority for all its actions;
otherwise it will not be a lawful government but will be a despotism or tyranny. . ..
The second component of the rule of law relates to the character or quality of the law
which authorises a particular action. Law must be general in its application. At the
level of form, this means that the law must be sufficiently clear, accessible and precise
that those who are affected by it can ascertain the extent of their rights and obligations.
On a substantive level, it means that, at a minimum, the law must apply equally to all
and must not be arbitrary. The 'law of general application' requirement ... therefore
prevents laws which have unequal or arbitrary application from qualifying as
legitimate limitations of fundamental rights ...
What forms of law qualify as 'law of general application'? [It] seems that all
forms of legislation (delegated and original) would qualify as 'law', as would the
55 In S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 32 the Constitutional Court of South Africa held that section
277 of the Criminal procedure Act 51 of 1977 was a law of general application despite the fact that this section
did not apply to the whole of South Africa. The dissenting judgment of Mokgoro J in President of the Republic
ofSouth Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) is to the effect that the Presidential Act considered in that case was a
law of general application although it only applied to mothers in prison who had children under the age of
twelve.
56 Gerhard Erasmus 'Limitation and Suspension' in Dawid van Wyk, John Dugard, Bertus de Villiers and Dennis
Davis (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order Kenwyn: Juta 1994 629 at 645.
These authors have qualified their listing of municipal bylaws with 'perhaps '.
57 Milton and Cowling op cit at 1-51. These authors have qualified their listing of municipal bylaws with
'perhaps ' .
58 Johan de Waal , lain Currie and Gerhard Erasmus The Bill ofRights Handbook 4ed Lansdowne: Juta 2001 at
147 - 154.
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common law (whether the rules of the private law or public law rules of the common
law such as criminal law or administrative law) and customary law."s9
It may be observed from the foregoing that the meaning of ' law of general application' is
wide. This mode of interpreting the phrase complies with the principles of constitutional
interpretation established by the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal. 60
3.3.3 Reasonableness
The restriction of a fundamental right must be reasonable. This entails, it has been suggested,
that at a minimum the restriction must serve some purpose." The question is 'whether the
purpose sought to be achieved by limiting the right is of sufficient importance to outweigh the
59 De Waal et al op cit at 147 - 148. CfLe Dain J' s dictum in R v Therens (1985) 13 CRR 193 as quoted in John
D Whyte , William R Lederman and Donald F Bur Canadian Constitutional Law: Cases, Notes and Materials
3ed Toronto: Butterworths 1992 at 19-2. Le Dain J said: ' Section 1 [of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms] requires that the limit be prescribed by law, that it be reasonable, and that it be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society. The requirement that the limit be prescribed by law is chiefly concerned with
the distinction between a limit imposed by law and one that is arbitrary. The limit will be prescribed by law
within the meaning of s. 1 if it is expressly provided for by statute or regulation, or results by necessary
implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its operating requirements. The limit may also result
from the application of a common law rule.' See also Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law ofCanada Scarborough:
Thomson Carswell1997 at 35-11 to 35-15.
60 In Fred Nseula v Attorney General and Malawi Congress Party MSCA Civil Appeal Number 32 of 1997
(unreported) the Supreme Court said: 'Constitutions are drafted in broad and general terms which lay down
broad principles and they call, therefore, for a generous interpretation avoiding strict legalistic interpretation.
The language of a Constitution must be construed not in narrow legalistic and pedantic way but broadly and
purposively. The interpretation should be aimed at fulfilling the intention of Parliament. It is an elementary rule
of constitutional interpretation that one provision of the Constitution cannot be isolated from all others. All the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject must be brought to bear and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purpose of the Constitution.' In Gwanda Chakuamba, Kamlepo Kalua, Bishop Kamfosi Mnkhumb we vs
Attorney General, Malawi Electoral Commission and United Democratic Front MSCA Civil Appeal Number
20 of 2000 (unreported) the Supreme Court said: 'Section 11 of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court
to develop principles of interpretation to be applied in interpreting the Constitution. The principles that we
develop must promote the values which underl ie an open and democratic society, we must take full account of
the provisions of the fundamental constitutional principles and the provision on human rights. We are also
expressly enjoined by the Constitution that where applicable we must have regard to current norms of public
international law and comparable foreign case law. We are aware that the principles of interpretation that we
develop must be appropriate to the unique and supreme character of the Constitution. The Malawi Constitution is
the supreme law of the country. We believe that the principles of interpretation that we develop must reinforce
this fundamental character of the Constitution and promote the values of an open and democratic society which
underpin the whole constitutional framework of Malawi . It is clear to us therefore that it is to the whole
Constitution that we must look for guidance to discover how the framers of the Constitution intended to
effectuate the general purpose of the Constitution. There is no doubt that the general purpose of the Constitution
was to create a democratic framework where people would freely parti cipate in the election of their government.
It creates an open and democratic society. '
6\ De Waal et al op cit at 157.
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right. ,62 In the absence of local decisions on the meaning of ' reasonable' in section 44(2) of
the Constitution, resort will be had to comparable foreign case law. In the Canadian case of R
v Oakes 63 the court interpreted a provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
which partly reads: 'such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society.' Dickson CJC said that the inquiry into the meaning of this
phrase involves a proportionality test. He continued:
'Although the nature of the proportionality test will vary depending on the
circumstances, in each case courts will be required to balance the interests of society
with those of individuals and groups. There are in my view, three important
components of a proportionality test. First the measures adopted must be carefully
designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or
based on irrational considerations. In short they must be rationally connected to the
objective. Secondly, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in the
first sense, should impair as little as possible the right or freedom in question. . ..
Thirdly, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are
responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been
identified as of sufficient importance. , 64
This approach was adopted by South African courts for some time. The cases of Park-Ross
and Another v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences" and Nortje and Another v
Attorney General, Cape, and Another66 are on the point. In S v Zuma and Others" the
62 Milton and Cowling op cit at 1-52.
63 (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200.
64 At 227 (Quotation marks in original quotation have been left out). This exposition may be compared with that
ofChaskalson Pin S v Makwanyane (supra) at para 104 where he said: ' [T]he requirement of proportionality '"
calls for the balancing of different interests. In the balancing process the relevant considerations will include the
nature of the right that is limited and its importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom and
equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to such a society ; the
extent of the limitation, its efficacy and, particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the
desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in question. In the
process regard must be had to the provisions of [the limitation clause] and the underlying values of the
Constitution ... ' . See also generally Francois Venter Constitutional Comparison Lansdowne: Juta 2000 at 189 -
190.
65Park-Ross and Another v Director: Office/or Serious Economic Offences 1995 (1) SACR 530 (C) at 549.
66Nortje and Another v Attorn ey General, Cape, and Another 1995 (1) SACR 446 (C) at 462.
67
S v Zuma and Others 1995 (1) SACR 568 (CC) at para 35.
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Constitutional Court accepted the applicability in appropriate circumstances of the
proportionality enquiry as expounded by the Canadian courts but stated that in the case at
hand it did not see any reason to attempt to fit its analysis into the Canadian pattern, since the
South African limitation clause at that time set out the criteria which the court was to apply.
This trend was followed in S v Makwanyane (cited above): Chaskalson P could also see no
such reason and he was satisfied to apply the criteria specified in the limitation clause itself.68
The limitation clause in Malawi's Constitution is different from that in the Canadian Charter
and that in the South African Constitution. Accordingly, courts in Malawi may adopt an
interpretation of 'reasonable' that is not on all fours with either the Canadian or South African
interpretation. The Constitutional Court of South Africa was able to resist adopting the
Canadian pattern on the ground that the South African limitation clause contained in specific
terms the criteria to be applied for the limitation of different categories of rights. The
Malawian limitation clause does not have similar criteria. As such it is more open to a wide
reception of the Canadian pattern. In the premises, it is submitted that Malawian courts may
use the Canadian pattern as a springboard from which they can launch an appropriate meaning
or understanding of 'reasonable' restriction as demanded by Malawi's limitation clause.
3.3.4 Necessity in an open and democratic society
According to section 44(2) of the Constitution a restriction on the exercise of a right, apart
from being reasonable, must be necessary in an open and democratic society. If the restriction
is not necessary, it cannot be saved by the limitation clause. The official basis for the
restriction must be in line with democratic rule. The purpose of the restriction must further the
basic objectives of democratic rule.69 It is accepted that democracy is sometimes compatible
with limitations on rights and freedoms. For instance, democracy demands that restrictions be
put in place to prevent the exploitation of rights and freedoms for the purpose of destroying
democracy itself.7o
68 At ~ara 110. It is significa~t that the apparent change of heart on the part of the courts to follow fully the
Canadian pattern took place III a space of about six months . Park-Ross was decided on 19 December 1994
Nortje on 7 February 1995, Zuma on 5 April 1995 and Makwanyane on 6 June 1995. '
69 Milton and Cowling op cit at 1-55.
70 Erasmus op cit at 646.
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It seems that necessity IS part of the proportionality inquiry and that necessity and
reasonableness may be considered together. In S v Makwanyane (cited above) Chaskalson P
said that the limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms 'for a purpose that is reasonable
and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and
ultimately an assessment based on proportionality' [Emphasis supplied]. He went on to say:
'The fact that different rights have different implications for democracy ... means that
there is no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness
and necessity. Principles can be established, but the application of those principles to
particular circumstances can only be done on a case-by-case basis. This is inherent in
the requirement of proportionality, which calls for the balancing of different
interests. ,71 [Emphasis supplied].
3.3.5 Recognition by international human rights standards
For the restriction to pass constitutional muster, it is also required to be recognized by
international human rights standards. The point of departure in defining this phrase is
arguably section 11 of the Constitution which calls upon courts, in interpreting the
Constitution, to have regard to current norms of public international law. Few, if any, would
dispute the proposition that international human rights standards spring from public
international law. The sources of public international law are international conventions or
treaties, international custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,
judicial decisions, codification, jus cogens and binding decisions of international
organizarions" It may be questioned whether all these sources contain international human
rights standards. The answer seems to be in the affirmative, only that in some of these sources
the standards may be few. Antonio Cassese writes that the Universal Declaration of Human
71 At para 104.
72 William Edward Hall A Treatise on Interna tional Law 8ed edited by A Pearce Higgins Oxford: Clarendon
Press 1924 at 1 - 12; L C Green International Law Though the Cases 3ed London: Stevens & Sons 1970 at 15 -
22; Anthony Carty The Decay of International Law ? A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal Imagination in
International Affairs Manchester: Manchester University Press 1986 at 13 - 22; Antonio Cassese International
Law Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001 at 117 - 161; DJ Harris Cases and Materials on International Law
Sed London: Sweet & Maxwell 1998 at 21 - 67; Martin Dixon Textbook on International Law 2ed London:
Blackstone Press 1990 at 18 - 40; D W Greig International Law 2ed London: Butterworths 1976 at 5 -51' and
John Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective Kenwyn: Juta 1994 at 23 - 35. '
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Rights (UDHR) and international human rights treaties are standard-setting.r' Ian Brownlie
states that the United Nations Organization, especially its General Assembly and Economic
and Social Council, gave impetus to the development of standards concerning human rights .
He then refers to a number of international human rights treaties as standard-setting"
Kathryn English and Adam Stapleton claim that the UDHR was aimed at setting basic
minimum international standards for the protection of human rights, and that the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) flesh out the standards prescribed in the UDHR. 75 It
may therefore be concluded from this brief survey that international human rights standards
are primarily contained in the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR and other international human rights
treaties.
It must be noted that section 44(2) of the Constitution does not qualify the international
human rights standards by a requirement of acceptance by Malawi. So even though the
standards are provided for in a treaty to which Malawi is not a party, the Courts are entitled to
consider those standards. The courts, therefore, have a free hand to examine all international
human rights standards. To be specific, the courts must decide whether a restriction of a right
in the Constitution is recognized by these international human rights standards.
An analysis of the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR and other international human rights conventions
reveals that the rights provided in them may generally be subjected to limitations or
restrictions. Two species of limitations have been identified: general limitations and specific
limitations. The general limitations purport to limit almost all the rights in the instrument
concerned. The specific limitations are included in articles defining particular rights and they
limit those particular rights. For example, Article 29(2) of the UDHR generally permits
limitations determined by law, for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
73 Cassese op cit at 357 - 360.
74 Ian Brownlie (ed) Basic Documents on Human Rights 2ed Oxford: Clarendon Press 1981 at 1 - 2 and 117 _
170.
75 Kathryn English and Adam Stapleton The Human Rights Handbook Kenwyn: Juta 1997 at 2, 13 and 15. At 15
they write : ' If governments pass laws that contrave ne the UDHR and ICCPR, whatever their justification, they
are acting outside internationally recognized standa rds of conduct. What a government argues is 'lawful ' just
because it enacts legislation may turn out to be arbitrary or unlawful interference when compared with
international standards' [Emphas is added]. Cf Richard B Lillich International Human Rights: Problems ofLaw,
Policy and Practice 2ed Boston: Little , Brown and Company 1991 at 232 - 307 .
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rights of others and for meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and general
welfare in a democratic society." On the other hand Article 12(3) of the ICCPR contains a
specific limitation on the right to liberty of movement to the effect that this right may be
subject to restrictions which, inter alia, are necessary to protect national security, public order,
public health or public morals. These restrictions, couched in identical or similar terms, are
provided for in other instruments. Perhaps the best summary of the kinds of restrictions
allowed or recognized by international human rights treaties is that by Paul Sieghart.f He
writes that the treaties permit restrictions for protecting the rights of others, the general
interest, specific interests and compatibility of purpose. Further, the restrictions are required
to be prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society and consistent with other protected
rights. The restrictions must be justified by, among other things, national security, public
safety, public order, prevention of disorder, prevention of crime, law and order, public health,
public morals, territorial integrity, economic wellbeing of a country, cogent economic and
social reasons, interests ofjustice and interests ofjuveniles.78
Since the foregoing restrictions are found in international instruments which have been shown
above to be setting international human rights standards, it may be concluded that any
restriction of a constitutional right which falls within the international restrictions, may
legitimately be regarded as a restriction recognized by international human rights standards.
From the preceding analysis it is clear that an allegation of unconstitutionality may call upon
lawyers and the court to enter into an exhaustive and long inquiry as described. This
eventuality/development may become a feature of criminal prosecutions (whether based on
environmental legislation or not) because it is undeniable that the Constitution (especially the
Bill of Rights therein) has a tremendous impact on criminal law. Johan de Waal et a179 suggest
that there are four ways in which the Bill of Rights affects criminal law:
76 Asbjorn Eide, Gudmundur Alfredsson, Goran Melander, Lars Adam Rehof and Allan Rosas (eds) The
Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights: A Commentary Oslo: Scandinavian University Press 1992 at 459 - 463.
Cf Gert Westerveen (ed) The International Bill of Human Rights: Normative and Institutional Developments
1948 -1985 Utrecht: Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM) 1986 at 120.
77 Paul Sieghart The International Law ofHuman Rights Oxford: Clarendon Press 1983 at 85 - 103.
78 See also Loukis G Loucaides Essays on the Developing Law of Human Rights Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
1995 at 25 - 29.
79 De Waal et al op cit at 585 - 586.
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1. The circumstances under which a person may be deprived of freedom and the
types of conduct which may be criminalized.
2. Some rights, e.g. the right to privacy, have a bearing on the investigation of crime.
3. The rights of arrested, detained and accused persons deal with the procedure
before, during and after trial and the fairness of the criminal trial itself.
4. The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment deals with sentencing of the convict.
These suggestions are made in relation to the South African Constitution and the South
African criminal justice system. It is, however, submitted that they may be applied to
Malawi's Constitution and criminal justice system. While the Constitutions and systems of
the two countries are considerably different, they have fundamental similarities.
According to Kidd80 the third way (listed above) in which the Bill of Rights affects the
criminal justice system is very significant in environmental matters. He argues that found in
many pieces of environmental legislation are presumptions which require accused persons to
disprove something rather than putting the burden on the State to prove that thing, and that
such presumptions are likely to transgress partly the letter and spirit of the Bill of Rights. The
same may be said about Malawi's Constitution and criminal justice system. Specifically, such
presumptions in environmental legislation may affect the rights of accused or detained
persons set out in section 42 of the Constitution. This section is in the following terms:
42- (l)Every person who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, shall have
the right-
(a) to be informed of the reason for his or her detention promptly, and in a language
which he or she understands;
(b) to be detained under conditions consistent with human dignity, which shall include
at least the provision of reading and writing materials, adequate nutrition and
medical treatment at the expense ofthe State ,'
80 Kidd op cit at 25. Kidd is also writing for South Africa but his views may arguably be applied to Malawi.
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(c) to consult confidentially with a legal practitioner of his or her choice, to be
informed of this right promptly and, where the interests ofjustice so require, to be
provided with the services ofa legal practitioner by the State;
(d) to be given the means and opportunity to communicate with, and to be visited by,
his or her spouse, partner, next-of-kin, relative, religion counsellor and a medical
practitioner ofhis or her choice;
(e) to challenge the lawfulness of his or her detention in person or through a legal
practitioner before a court oflaw; and
(f) to be released ifsuch detention is unlawful.
(2) Every person arrested for, or accused of, the alleged commission ofan offence
shall, in addition to the rights which he or she has as a detained person, have the right
(a) promptly to be informed, in a language which he or she understands, that he or she
has the right to remain silent and to be warned of the consequences of making any
statement;
(b) as soon as it is reasonably possible, but not later than 48 hours after the arrest, or
if the period of48 hours expires outside ordinary court hours or on a day which is not
a court day, the first court day after such expiry, to be brought before an independent
and impartial court oflaw and to be charged or to be informed ofthe reason for his or
her further detention, failing which he or she shall be released,'
(c) not to be compelled to make a confession or admission which could be used in
evidence against him or her;
(d) save in exceptional circumstances, to be segregated from convicted persons and to
be subject to separate treatment appropriate to his or her status as an unconvicted
person,'
(e) to be released from detention, with or without bail unless the interests ofjustice
require otherwise,'
(f) as an accused person, to a fair trial, which shall include the right -
(i) to public trial before an independent and impartial court of law within a
reasonable time after having been charged,'
(ii) to be informed with sufficient particularity ofthe charge,'
(iii) to be presumed innocent and to remain silent during plea proceedings or
trial and not to testify during trial ,'
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(iv) to adduce and challenge evidence, and not to be a compellable witness
against himselfor herself;
(v) to be represented by a legal practitioner ofhis or her choice or, where it is
required in the interests ofjustice, to be provided with legal representation at
the expense ofthe State, and to be informed ofthese rights,'
(vi) not to be convicted of an offence in respect of any act or omission which
was not an offence at the time when the act was committed or omitted to be
done, and not to be sentenced to a more severe punishment than that which
was applicable when the offence was committed,'
(vii) not to be prosecuted again for a criminal act or omission ofwhich he or
she has previously been convicted or acquitted,'
(viii) to have recourse by way of appeal or review to a higher court than the
court offirst instance,'
(ix) to be tried in a language which he or she understands or, failing this, to
have the proceedings interpreted to him or her, at the expense ofthe State, into
a language which he or she understands,' and
(x) to be sentenced within a reasonable time after conviction,'
(g) in addition, if that person is a child, to treatment consistent with the special needs
ofchildren, which shall include the right -
(i) not to be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility ofrelease;
(ii) to be imprisoned only as a last resort and for the shortest period oftime,'
(hi) to be separated from adults when imprisoned, unless it is considered to be
in his or her best interest not to do so, and to maintain contact with his or her
family through correspondence and visits,'
(iv) to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion ofhis or her sense
of dignity and worth, which reinforces respect for the rights and freedoms of
others,'
(v) to be treated in a manner which takes into account his or her age and the
desirability of promoting his or her reintegration into society to assume a
constructive role; and
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(vi) to be dealt with in a form of legal proceedings that reflects the
vulnerability of children while fully respecting human rights and legal
safeguards. 81
The rights entrenched in section 42 may affect the criminal enforcement provisions of
environmental legislation in many areas. For present purposes, only two of these areas will be
identified and discussed. These are:
1. Statutory presumptions violating the right to be presumed innocent and to remain
silent during plea proceedings or trial and not to testify during trial.
2. The right to challenge evidence in circumstances in which expert evidence may be
given by certificate or report.82
3.3.6 Statutory presumptions violating the right to be presumed innocent, to remain
silent and not to testify
A number of environmental statutes in Malawi contain presumptions which have the general
effect of making easier the task of the prosecution in proving the environmental criminal
81 For a useful commentary on this section, see B P Wanda 'The Rights of Detained and Accused Persons in
Post-Banda Malawi' [1996] 40 Journal ofAfrican Law 221.
82 Cf Kidd op cit at 32. Kidd refers to two more areas: first, the gathering of evidence through search and seizure.
This is based on section 35(5) of the 1996 South African Constitution which provides that evidence obtained in a
manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would
render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. There is no equivalent
provision in the Malawian Constitution. As a result this impact area has been left out here. Comments on search
and seizure will be made when dealing with the environmental legislation provision-by-provision. The second
additional area identified by Kidd is the right against self-incrimination. Again this is based on the South African
Constitution (section 35(3)(j)) which has no equivalent in the Malawian Constitution. In the Malawi scenario this
right against self-incrimination is arguably subsumed under the right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent
and not to testify. Actually, some authors regard the right against self-incrimination in the same way. In J J
Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 5ed Lansdowne: Juta 2001 at 8 it is written: 'Not unrelated to the
presumption of innocence is the rule that an accused can never be forced to testify; he has a right to silence,
which is also called his privilege against self-incrimination or his right to a passive defence. This applies to the
pre-trial stage (i e the investigative or police phase, as well as the pleading phase), the trial phase and also the
sentencing stage - Dzukuda 2000 (2) SACR 443 (CC)' [Emphasis added]. In the same vein Jack Watson
'Talking about the Right to Remain Silent' (1991) 34 Criminal Law Quarterly 106 at 107 writes (from a
Canadian perspective) as follows: 'In sum the "right to remain silent" refers to the right of a person to choose
whether or not to make (i.e., create), for the state, statements, the testimonial value of which statements can be
employed by the state to incriminate that person in later legal proceedings. All of the currently cognizable
common law or constitutional rights based in principle upon the "right to remain silent" are variants of the right
as expressed in those terms.' As so understood the right against self-incrimination would encompass confessions
and admissions before trial: a relevant case on this point is Stanley Richard Palitu and Others v Republic
Criminal Appeal Number 30 of 2001 (High Court - unreported but copy available on http://www.judiciary.mw
when accessed in January 2005).
81
offence. These presumptions have the potential to infringe the accused person's right to be
presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to testify.
Three categories of statutory presumptions have been identified: evidential or factual
presumption, reverse onus presumption and irrebuttable presumption. An evidential or factual
presumption gives the evidence adduced by the prosecution the status of prima facie proof
and then calls upon the accused to raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the
presumed fact. A reverse onus presumption places a legal burden on the accused to convince
the court on a preponderance of the evidence that the presumed fact does not exist. An
irrebuttable presumption assumes the existence of a fact without proof and even when there is
proof to the contrary.v' Of these presumptions it is only the reverse onus presumption which
greatly affects the burden of proof.
Recent Malawian jurisprudence is lacking on these matters.i" In the circumstances it IS
suggested that in determining whether statutory presumptions in environmental legislation can
still be used in the criminal prosecution of environmental offenders, the courts in Malawi
should seek guidance from comparable foreign case law. A few suggestions will now be
made.
The evidentiary or factual presumption does not violate the accused person's right to be
presumed innocent since it does not shift the burden of proof. 85 It does, however, infringe the
83 De Waal et al op cit at 631. Chaskalson et al op cit at 26-9 to 26-11. De Waal et al (ibid) exemplify the
presumptions by saying that an evidential or factual presumption is mostly cast in the form 'fact A is presumed if
fact B is proved'; a reverse onus presumption in the form 'fact A follows fact B unless the contrary is proved';
and an irrebuttable presumption in the form ' if B is proved, A is deemed '.
84 But it is generally understood that the accused has a right ot be presumed innocent, that the onus of proof is on
the prosecution and that the requisite standard is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Chipeta J summarized this
general understanding in Republic v Alice Joyce Gwazantin i Criminal Case Number 208 of 2003 (High Court
judgment of 25 March 2004 on case to answer) (unreported but copy available on http://www.judiciary.mw
when accessed in January 2005). The learned judge said: 'The premise we start from in matters criminal is that
he/she who makes an allegation must prove it. The presumption at law is that every person who is accused of a
crime is innocent and that he/she remains so until proven guilty. Since more often than not criminal allegations
come from the State, as is the case here , the burden of proof in such cases necessarily throughout lies on the
State . The age-old authority of DPP vs Woolmington [1935]A.C. 462 is I am sure, the locus classicus case in
the mind of every criminal case lawyer in this respect in the Common Law system as ours is. The degree of
proof expected to be discharged by the State at the end of every such case is quite a heavy and onerous one. For
a Court of Law to convict an accused it needs to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt about the guilt of the
Accused. Any proof falling short of that standard is supposed to end up in an acquittal.'
85 De Waal et al op cit at 632; contra Chaskalson et al op cit at 26-10.
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accused person's right to remain silent and not to testify during trial, as the accused is
required to adduce evidence raising a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the presumed
fact.86 Such infringement may be justified under the limitations clause in appropriate
circumstances, for instance, where in the majority of cases the presumed fact is peculiarly
within the knowledge of the accused and not the State." In such cases there is 'nothing
unreasonable, oppressive or unduly intrusive' in asking the accused to adduce evidence in
order to set aside the presumed fact.88
Unlike the evidentiary or factual presumption, the reverse onus presumption clearly
transgresses the accused person's right to be presumed innocent as the prosecution is relieved
of the overall burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, thus creating
the risk of wrong conviction.I" There is also no doubt that the reverse onus presumption
infringes the right to remain silent and not to testify, for the moment the accused embarks on
the task of discharging the reversed onus, he no longer can be said to be enjoying the right to
remain silent and not to testify during trial. In spite of these glaring violations, it is accepted
that reverse onus presumptions are justifiable in appropriate circumstances. In S v Zuma and
Others90 the Constitutional Court of South Africa said:
'Some [reverse onus presumptions] may be justifiable as being rational in themselves,
requiring an accused person to prove only facts to which he or she has easy access,
and which it would be unreasonable to expect the prosecution to disprove.... Or there
may be presumptions which are necessary if certain offences are to be effectively
prosecuted, and the State is able to show that for good reason it cannot be expected to
produce the evidence itself.'
86 Cf Director ofPublic Prosecutions v Henderson 8 Malawi Law Reports 9.
87 In Rv Chunga 1961 - 63 ALR Mal 247 at 250 the High Court of Malawi (per Southworth AgCJ) did not see
any problem in a statutory provision which required an accused person to prove that he held a driving licence,
' this being a matter peculiarly within his own knowledge. ' See also Mulonda s/o Chimombo v R 1923 - 60 ALR
Ma1 316.
88 S v Manamela and Another (Director-General ofJustice intervening) 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) at para 38.
89
S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388(CC) at para 15; De Waal et al op cit at 634.
90 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC) at para 41.
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Five years later the Court reiterated its position in S v Manamela (Director-General ofJustice
intervening)91 as follows:
'The effective prosecution of crime is a societal objective of great significance which
could, where appropriate, justify the infringement of fundamental rights.
This Court has expressly kept open the possibility of reverse onus provisions being
justifiable in certain circumstances. Ordinarily, a reverse onus could be justifiable only
if the risk and consequences of erroneous conviction produced by a statutory
presumption against the accused are outweighed by the risk and consequences of
guilty persons escaping conviction simply because of categorical adherence to an
impervious presumption of innocence.
A broad context in which reverse onus provisions might be justified concerns
'regulatory offences' as opposed to 'pure criminal offences'. Thus, regulatory statutes
dealing with licensed activity in the public domain, the handling of hazardous
products or the supervision of dangerous activities, frequently impose duties on
responsible persons, and then require them to prove that they have fulfilled their
responsibilities. The objective of such laws is to put pressure on the persons
responsible to take pre-emptive action to prevent harm to the public.'
In Canada, United States of America and international law circles reverse onus provisions
have been upheld on similar grounds.Y It may therefore be argued that environmental
legislation containing reverse onus presumptions should not be declared unconstitutional
outright but should be examined carefully with a view to saving them as much as possible in
the interest of achieving environmental protection. It is necessary to do so because the
urgency of stemming the tide of environmental degradation in Malawi demands a paradigm
shift in the way the courts handle issues pertaining to the environment.
With regard to irrebuttable presumptions, it was held in Scagell and Others v Attorney
General, Western Cape, and Others 93 that an irrebuttable presumption is a rule of substantive
912000 (3) SA 1 (CC) at paras 27 - 29. Footnotes and paragraph numbers in the original text have been left out.
92 Canada: Rv Downey 90 DLR (4th) 449. United States of America: In re Winship 397 US 358 (1970). European
Court of Human Rights: X v United Kingdom application number 5124/71 , Collection ofDecisions ECHR 135.
93 1997 (2) SA 368 (CC) at paras 30 and 31.
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law, and not a rule of evidence. As such it cannot result in the conviction of an accused person
despite a reasonable doubt as to his guilt in relation to an element of the offence. Thus an
irrebuttable presumption does not infringe the accused person's right to be presumed
innocent. Since the prosecution shoulders the onus to prove all the elements of the offence
throughout, it follows that the accused person's right to remain silent and not to testify during
trial is not violated. 94
3.3.7 Righ t to challenge evidence where expert evidence is given by certificate or
report
Environmental issues are multidisciplinary in nature. Consequently, in some environmental
crimes scientific evidence may be needed to establish the guilt of the accused. This evidence
may be given by way of certificate or report . For instance, section 50 of the Environment
Management Act 23 of 1996 provides that an analyst of a substance must produce a certificate
showing the results of the test or analysis and the methods used in the test or analysis. Such a
certificate is prima facie evidence of the results of that test or analysis." Now, it may be
objected that the admission of such certificate or report transgresses the accused person's
right to challenge evidence since the author thereof is not required to tender it in court
himself, thus obviating the possibility of testing its merits through cross-examination. Such a
constitutional challenge is not farfetched . It will therefore be considered here, albeit briefly.
The right to challenge evidence entails the availing of an opportunity to an accused to cross-
examine witnesses generally and authors of documents tendered in court particularly. So the
acceptance of a certificate or report written by an environmental expert, on the face of it,
infringes the right to challenge evidence. While the environmental statutes do not require that
the certificate or report be presented to the court by the author thereof, it appears that in
94 The position here is just like in a case in which the prosecution calls a number of witnesses to testify for the
State, and the accused does not testify nor call any witness as happened in Sudi Sulaimana, Benard Chisala
Chirwa and Samu el Edward Nthenda v Republic MSCA Criminal Appeal Number 7 of 1998 (unreported but
copy available on http://www.judiciary.mw when accessed in January 2005).
95 The whole section 50 reads as follows : ' (1) There shall be issued by every analyst in respect of any test or
analysis , a certificate showing the results of the test or analysis. (2) The certificate shall state the method or
methods used in carrying out the test or analysis and shall be signed by the analyst who carried out the test or
analysis. (3) A certificate issued under this section shall be prima facie evidence of the results of any test or
analysis carried out under this Act. '
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criminal matters the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code 96 may be used to bring the author
to court for purposes of cross-examination. The Code provides that any person who appears to
have useful information in respect of criminal proceedings may be summoned to appear
before the court." So the author of the certificate or report may be called as a witness. This
will allow the accused to cross-examine the author on the certificate. In this way the accused
person's right to challenge evidence is not infringed."
Even in the absence of cross-examination, it appears that the certificate or report may be
received in evidence constitutionally on the basis that the apparent infringement of the right to
cross-examination (that is, the right to challenge evidence) is a justifiable limitation under the
Constitution. This line of thinking is supported by the oft-cited South African case of S v Van
der Sandt. 99 In this case a forensic analyst had given his testimony, inter alia, by way of a
certificate in terms of a statutory provision. It was argued that this statutory provision
curtailed the right of cross-examination. The court rejected the argument and held that the
dictates of fairness did not prescribe that evidence be presented in a certain manner. Evidence
could be tendered in any form. The mere fact that evidence was adduced by affidavit or
certificate did not per se render the proceedings unfair. What mattered was the nature of the
evidence. The evidence allowed by the impugned statutory provision was generally of a
formal non-contentious nature and so allowing it to be adduced by way of affidavit or
certificate was not only meaningful but it was also essential to the proper administration of
justice. The court concluded that of course this had the effect of curtailing the right to cross-
96 Act No 36 of 1967, cap 8:01 of the Laws of Malawi.
97 Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code. The whole section reads as follows: 'If it is made
to appear that evidence material to any criminal cause or matter before, or pending before, any court can be
given by, or is in the possession of, any person, it shall be lawful for a police officer of the rank of Assistant
Superintendent or above, or the Registrar of the High Court, or the magistrate having cognizance of such cause
or matter, to issue a summons to such person requiring his attendance before such court or requiring him to bring
and produce to such court for the purpose of evidence all documents and writings in his possession or power
which may be specified or otherwise sufficiently described in the summons.'
98 All expert certificates or reports which are not raised to the status of prima facie evidence by legislation, may
be accepted in evidence on the basis of general rules relating to admission of expert documents. Section 180 of
the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code permits the admission of such documents as long as the parties to the
case consent or as long as there is service of the document on the other party and that other party does not object
to its admission: Mphatso Chimangeni v Republic Criminal Appeal Number 2 of 2003 (High Court - unreported
but copy available on http://www.judiciary.mw when accessed in January 2005).
99 1997 (2) SACR 116 (W) . This case has been cited by many authors, for instance, Chaskalson op cit at 27-94A;
De Waal op cit at 643; Kidd op cit at 56.
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examination but that such curtailment could be seen as a proper limitation of the right to fair
trial in terms of the limitation clause in the South African Constitution of 1996.
3.4 Conclusion
In this introductory chapter on the criminal sanction in Malawi, the purpose of the criminal
sanction has been explored. It has been shown that the courts in Malawi do recognize at least
aspects of the retributive and utilitarian purposes of the criminal sanction and that the
purposes generally have varying degrees of relevance in the environmental sphere. The
discussion then turned to the constitutional framework within which the criminal sanction
works. Addressing the constitutional framework at this stage was necessary as it provides a
solid foundation on which to build an analysis of the individual criminal offences provided for
in environmental statutes, which is the focus of the next chapter. 100




ANALYSIS OF CRIMES IN MALAWI'S
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION: PART ONE
4.1 Introduction
In general Malawian criminal law follows the traditional division of a crime into actus
reus and mens rea.' Thus a person is not guilty criminally for his conduct unless he had
the appropriate state of mind. This principle is sometimes expressed in Latin: actus non
facit reum nisi mens sit rea? Recently Mwaungulu J partly confirmed the position in
Malawi when he said, 'Under our criminal law, the person who actually commits the act
or omission with the requisite state of mind is guilty of the offence whether such act or
omission was counselled or procured at the aegis of another.v' The learned judge's
I D 1 Lanham [1976] Crim LR 276 is of the view that a crime is made up of three elements. This has not
been followed in Malawi.
2 1 C Smith and B Hogan Criminal Law 6ed London: Butterworths 1988 at 32 . In Haughton v Smith [1975]
AC 467 at 491 - 492 Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone LC said: ' Before proceeding further, I desire to
make an observation on the expression "actus reus" used in the quotation above [that is, statement of Lord
Parker Cl in Davey v Lee [1968] 1 QB 366 at 370]. Strictly speaking, though in almost universal use, it
derives, I believe, from a mistranslation of the Latin aphorism: "Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea."
Properly translated, this means "An act does not make a man guilty of a crime, unless his mind be also
guilty." It is thus not the actus which is "reus", but the man and his mind respectively. Before the
understanding of the Latin tongue has wholly died out of these islands, it is as well to record this as it has
frequently led to confusion.'
3 Republic v Shabir Suleman and Aslam Osman Crim inal Case No. 144 of 2003 (Judgment of 30 March
2004) (unreported). In Republic v Lloyd Amani Confirmation Case No. 144 of 2003 (unreported)
Mwaungulu 1 said: 'Sentences courts pass , considering the public interest to prevent crime and the
objective of sentencing policy, relate to actions and mental component comprising the crime.
Consequently, circumstances escalating or diminishing the extent, intensity or complexion of the actus reus
or mens rea of an offence go to influence sentence. It is possible to isolate and generalize circumstances
affecting the extent, intensity and complexion of the mental element of a crime: planning, sophistication,
collaboration with others, drunkenness, provocation , recklessness , preparedness and the list is not
exhaustive. Circumstances affecting the extent, intensity and complexion of the prohibited act depend on
the crime. A sentencing court, because sentencing is discretionary, must, from evidence during trial or
received in mitigation, balance circumstances affecting the actus reus or mens rea of the offence.' His
Lordship made similar statements in Republi c v Peter Chapendeka and Others Confirmation Case No. 451
of 2000 (unreported), Republic v Fred Chabwera Confirmation Case No . 728 of 2002 (unreported) and
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confirmation is partial because he left out some elements of the actus reus. The act and
omission he identified are not the only forms of actus reus. A consequence or a state of
affairs may also constitute actus reus." In addition, a specified state of mind on the part of
the victim of a crime may form part of the actus reus .' Perhaps a more comprehensive
way of describing actus reus would be that it is 'the external manifestation of the offence'
and it includes 'all the elements in the definition of the crime except the accused's mental
element.,6
Mens rea is the accused's mental state or degree of fault. It may take various forms. In
Director ofPublic Prosecutions v Morgan' Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone said, 'The
Republic v Ganizani Banda Confirmation Case No. 884 of 2002 (unreported). Cf Austin Shaba v Republic
MSCA Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 2002 (unreported). All the cases cited in the current footnote were
available on http://www.judiciary.mw when accessed towards the end of the year 2004 and in the first
quarter of the year 2005.
4 Peter Murphy (ed) Blackstone 's Criminal Practice London: 8lackstone Press 2000 at 3; Smith and Hogan
op cit at 46.
5 For instance, in the offence of rape contrary to section 132 of the Penal Code (cap 7:01 of the Laws of
Malawi) the lack of consent on the part of the victim (that is, the victim' s state of mind) is a component of
the actus reus of the offence. See generally Smith and Hogan op cit at 5 - 6.
6 Murphy op cit at 3. Footnote within the quotation has been omitted.
7 [1976] AC 182 at 213. In fact what Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone said (at 213 - 214) is: 'The
beginning of wisdom in all the "mens rea" cases to which our attention was called is, as was pointed out by
Stephen J in Reg v Tolson, 23 Q8D 168, 185, that "mens rea" means a number of quite different things in
relation to different crimes. Sometimes it means an intention , e.g., in murder, "to kill or to inflict really
serious injury." Sometimes it means a state of mind or knowledge, e.g., in receiving or handling goods
"knowing them to be stolen." Sometimes it means both an intention and a state of mind, e.g., "dishonestly
and without a claim of right made in good faith with inten t permanently to deprive the owner thereof."
Sometimes it forms part of the essential ingredients of the crime without proof of which the prosecution, as
it were, withers on the bough. Sometimes it is a matter , of which, though the "probative" burden may be on
the Crown, normally the "evidential" burden may usua lly (though not always) rest on the defence, e.g.,
"self-defence" and "provocation" in murder, though it must be noted that if there is material making the
issue a live one, the matter must be left to the jury even if the defence do not raise it. In statutory offences
the range is even wider since , owing to the difficulty of proving a negative, Parliament quite often
expressly puts the burden on the defendant to nega tive a guilty state (see per Lord Reid in Sweet v Parsley
[1970] AC 132, 150, or inserts words like "fraudulently," "negligently," "knowingly," "wilfully,"
"maliciously" which import special types of guilt y mind , or even imports them by implication by importing
such word as "permit" (cf per Lord Diplock in the same case at p. 162) or, as in Reg v Warner [1969] 2 AC
256, prohibit the "possession" of a particular substance , or as, in Sweet v Parsley itself, leaves the courts to
decide whether a particular prohibition makes a new "absolute" offence or provides an escape by means of
an honest, or an honest and reasonable belief. Moreover, of course, a statute can , and often does , create an
absolute offence withou t any degree of mens rea at all.'
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beginning of wisdom in all the "mens rea" cases . . . is . .. that "mens rea" means a
number of quite different things in relation to different crimes. ' It is therefore necessary
to examine particular criminal offences in order to determine the type of mens rea
required. In some offences the requirement of mens rea is satisfied by intention,
recklessness, negligence or some other state of mind. Intention does not have the same
meaning in every context in the criminal law.8 In some circumstances intention may
mean the state of desiring a cons equence to follow from one's action. In other
circumstances it may mean the state of not des iring the consequence to occur but of
forseeing the occurrence of a consequence as a by-product of one's action: in two recent
cases it was stated that foresight of virtual certainty or at least a very high degree of
probability could give rise to an inference of intention.9 With regard to recklessness, it is
generally understood that the hallmark of recklessness is unjustifiable risk-taking." A
person is reckless if he has foreseen that a particular type of harm might be done and yet
has gone on to take the risk. 11 He is also reckless if (1) he does an act which in fact
creates an obvious risk that a particular type of harm will occur and (2) when he does the
act, he either has not given thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or has
recognized that there is some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it. 12 One
authority has commented that before the last version of recklessness was conceived, it
was easy to draw a distinction between recklessness and negligence.l ' At present it is
difficult but not impossible. In general terms , negligence is the failure to comply with the
8 R v Woollin [1999] AC 82 at 96 per Lord Steyn.
9 R v Bowden [1993] Crim LR 379; R v Woollin [1999] AC 82. Ian Dermis 'The Critical Condition of
Criminal Law' in Michae1 Freeman (ed) Law and Opinion at the End of the Twentieth Century Oxford:
Oxford University Press 1997 at 223 - 228 notes the critical condition of the criminal law in the area of
intention and other aspects of mens rea.
10 Murphy op cit at 21; Smith and Hogan op cit at 61; 0 J Birch 'The Foresight Saga ' [1988] Crim LR 4.
11 R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396. This type of recklessness is known as Cunningham recklessness.
12 Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell [1982] AC 341. This type of recklessness is known as
Caldwell recklessness. Both Cunningham and Caldwell were cited with appro val by Mwaungulu J in
Chimwemwe Gulumba v Republic Miscell aneous Crimin al Application No. 51 of 2003 (unreported, but
copy ofjudgment available on http ://www.judi ciary.mw when accessed in January 2005).
13 Smith and Hogan op cit at 68.
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standards of a reasonable man. 14 Other possible forms of mens rea are knowledge and
belief. IS
In this connection, it must be noted that in construing criminal legislation the courts
operate from the presumption that Parliament intended that mens rea be part of the crime.
In Sweet v Parsley I6 Lord Reid said:
'[I]t is firmly established by a host of authorities that mens rea is an essential
ingredient of every offence unless some reason can be found for holding that that
is not necessary. It is also firmly established that the fact that other sections of the
Act expressly require mens rea, for example because they contain the word
"knowingly", is not in itself sufficient to justify a decision that a section which is
silent as to mens rea creates an absolute offence. In the absence of. a clear
indication in the Act that an offence is intended to be an absolute offence, it is
necessary to go outside the Act and examine all relevant circumstances in order to
establish that this must have been the intention of Parliament. I say "must have
been" because it is a universal principle that if a penal provision is reasonably
capable of two interpretations, that interpretation which is most favourable to the
accused must be adopted.'
14 Murphy op cit at 28.
IS Murphy op cit at 27.
16 [1970] AC 132 at 149. The second sentence in the quotation begins a new paragraph. This paragraphing
has been omitted. The presumption in favour of mens rea has recently been affirmed by the House of
Lords. In B (A Minor) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] 2 AC 428 at 460 Lord Nicholls of
Birkenhead stated: 'As habitually happens with statutory offences, when enacting this offence Parliament
defined the prohibited conduct solely in terms of the proscribed physical acts .... In these circumstances the
starting-point for a court is the established common law presumption that a mental element, traditionally
labelled mens rea, is an essential ingredient unless Parliament has indicated a contrary intention either
expressly or by necessary implication. The common law presumes that , unless Parliament has indicated
otherwise, the appropriate mental element is an unexpressed ingredient of every statutory offence.' The
presump tion was similarly given effect in R v K [2002] 1 A.C. 462.
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In Sherras v De Rutzen 17 Wright J held that the presumption that mens rea is an essential
ingredient of every offence can be displaced in three principal classes of cases, two of
which are, firstly, cases where the prohibited acts are not criminal in any real sense but
are acts which in the public interest are prohibited under a penalty, and, secondly, cases
of public nuisance. Wright J also said that the presumption 'is liable to be displaced either
by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the subject matter with which it
deals, and both must be considered.' 18 Wright J's formulation of principle was approved
in Lim Chin Aik v The Queenl" In this case the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
said:
'Where the subject matter of the statute is the regulation for the public welfare of
a particular activity - statutes regulating the sale of food and drink are to be found
among the earliest examples - it can be and frequently has been inferred that the
legislature intended that such activities should be carried out under conditions of
strict liability. The presumption is that the statute or statutory instrument can be
effectively enforced only if those in charge of the relevant activities are made
responsible for seeing that they are complied with. When such a presumption is to
be inferred, it displaces the ordinary presumption of mens rea.' 20
In Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney General ofHong Kong21 Lord Scarman, after
considering the above three cases, summarized the law in this area in five statements:
(1) There is a presumption of law that mens rea is required before a person can be
held guilty of a criminal offence;
17 [1895] 1 QB 918.
18 [1895] 1 QB 918 at 921.
19 [1963] AC 160.
20 [1963] AC 160 at 174.
21 [1985] AC 1 at 14. The Gammon case was considered and applied in Wings Ltd v Ellis [1985] AC 272, R
v Wells Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex p. Westminster City Council [1986] 1 WLR 1046, R
v Brockley 99 Cr App R 385, R v Bezzina 99 Cr App R 356 and R v Blake [1997] 1 All ER 963.
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(2) The presumption is particularly strong where the offence is 'truly criminal' in
character;
(3) The presumption applies to statutory offences, and can be displaced only if
this is clearly or by necessary implication the effect of the statute;
(4) The only situation in which the presumption can be displaced is where the
statute is concerned with an issue of social concern;
(5) Even where a statute is concerned with such an issue, the presumption of
mens rea stands unless it can also be shown that the creation of strict liability
will be effective to promote the objects of the statute by encouraging greater
vigilance to prevent the commission of the prohibited act.22
It may be observed that many offences in environmental statutes are not 'truly criminal'
in nature; they are quasi-criminal.v' As such the presumption in favour of mens rea is not
strong in respect of such offences. It may be added that the subject matter of
environmental statutes is generally the regulation of particular activities for the public
welfare. Undoubtedly environmental protection is an issue of social concem.i" and since
environmental statutes are aimed at achieving environmental protection, the presumption
in favour of mens rea can be displaced in appropriate environmental offences, especially
where that is clearly or by necessary implicatiorr" the effect of the statute. The creation
22 On 12 December 1945 the High Court of Malawi (per Jenkins Cl ) in R v D 'Arcy 1923 - 60 ALR Mal
121 endorsed a passage from Kenny 's Outlines of Criminal Law, 15ed (1936) at 44 to the effect that the
legislature creates offences of strict liability where: (a) the penalty incurred is not great; (b) the damage
caused to the public by the offence is, in comparison with the penal ty, very great; and (c) the offence is
such that there would usually be peculiar difficult y in obtaining adequate evidence of the ordinary mens
rea, if that degree of guilt was to be required. Despite the attractiveness of these points, it is unlikely that a
modern Malawian court would use only these points in determining whether an offence is one of strict
liability. It is likely that a modern Malawian court will follow the Gammon case.
23 On what offences are truly criminal or quasi-criminal in nature, see R v Muhamad [2003] QB 1031 and
Neil Parpworth 'Unlicensed Tree Felling: A Further Example Of A Regulatory Offence' [2003] Journal of
Planning & Environment Law 1234.
24 In Kirkland v Robinson [1987] Crim LR 643 it was said that the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 was
designed to protect the environment, an objective of 'o utstanding social importance. ' It was acknowledged
that ' [t]here are areas of national life which are regarded as being of such importance that there must be an
absolute prohibition against the doing of certain acts which undermine the welfare of society.'
25 The phrase 'necessary implication ' was explained by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in B (A Minor) v
Director ofPublic Prosecutions [2000] 2 AC 428 at 464 as follows : " 'Necessary implication" connotes an
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of strict liability in environmental offences is likely to promote environmental protection
by encouraging greater vigilance to prevent the commission of the prohibited conduct,
especially where there is great publicity of the strict liability nature of the offences.26
With the foregoing background in mind, the discourse will now centre on the analysis of
crimes in the environmental legislation of Malawi. The analysis will begin with Malawi's
flagship environmental statute, the Environment Management Act.
4.2 Environment Management Act 23 of 1996
4.2.1 General
The Environment Management Act 23 of 1996 ("EMA") is a coordinating statute on
environmental matters. Its declared purpose is to make provision for the protection and
management of the environment and the conservation and sustainable utilization of
natural resources and related matters.27 Subject to the provisions of the Constitution of
implication which is compellingly clear. Such an implication may be found in the language used, the nature
of the offence, the mischief sought to be prevented and any other circumstances which may assist in
determining what intention is properly to be attributed to Parliament when creating the offence.'
26 Colin Howard Strict Responsibility London: Sweet & Maxwell 1963 at 25 argues that 'we have no idea
what the social effect of strict responsibility has been . There is simply no relevant knowledge [evidence].'
Whatever merit this argument has, it may be observed that the courts are prepared to find that strict liability
has a deterrent effect. This is clear from the case of Gammon itself, decided over twenty years after
Howard's criticism. Since court cases are generally dec ided by courts on the basis of precedent, Howard's
argument may be dismissed as being contrary to authority. An example of the courts' readiness to find that
strict liability has a deterrent effect is contained in the following statement from Lord Salmon in Alphacell
Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824 at 848 - 9: ' If this appeal succeeded and it were held to be the law that no
conviction could be obtained under the Act of 1951 unless the prosecution could discharge the often
impossible onus of proving that the pollution was caused intentionally or negligently, a great deal of
pollution would go unpunished and undeterred to the relief of many riparian factory owners. As a result
many rivers which are now filthy would become filthier still and many rivers which are now clean would
lose their cleanliness. The legislature no doubt recognised that as a matter of public policy this would be
most unfortunate. Hence section 2 (1) (a) which encourages riparian factory owners not only to take
reasonable steps to prevent pollution but to do everything possible to ensure that they do not cause it.'
Similar sentiments were expressed by Mitchell J in Harrow London Borough Council v Shah [2000] 1
WLR 83 at 89 and by the Court of Appeal in R v Muhamad [2003] QB 1031 at 1037 and 1039. See also J C
Smith 'Kirkland v Robinson' [1987] Crim LR 643 at 644 where he said that the approach of the court in
Kirkland v Robinson - which is a typical strict liability approach - is understandable 'where the court
wishes to discourage an activity altogether. '
27 Long title of the EMA.
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the Republic of Malawi, the EMA enjoys the status of an environmental constitution. Its
section 7 declares that where a written law on the protection and management of the
environment or the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources is
inconsistent with any provision of the EMA, that written law is invalid to the extent of
the inconsistency. The language of section 7 is wide and suggests that a provision of the
Constitution which is inconsistent with the EMA may be invalid to the extent of the
inconsistency. However, such a construction stultifies the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy as understood and applied in Malawi's legal system. Accordingly, it is
submitted that in the present context the inconsistent written law does not include the
Constitution. Thus section 7 must be read subject to the provisions of the Constitution.
4.2.2 General offence
Section 61 of the EMA states that a person who contravenes any provision of the Act for
which no other penalty is specifically provided shall be guilty of an offence and liable to
a fine of not less than MWKI0 000 (US $75) and not more than MWK500 000 (US $3
759). In addition a fine ofMWK5 000 (US $38) may be imposed for each day the offence
continues to be committed. The EMA has six sections dealing specifically with offences
(sections 62 to 67). Contravention of these sections generally amounts to commission of
the crimes specified therein. There is therefore no doubt as to the criminal nature of the
acts, omissions, etc, set out in those sections. Problems arise when considering the
purport or effect of section 61. From a literal interpretation of the content of this section,
it appears that it seeks to criminalize every contravention of any provision of the EMA.
While this may be a simple and easy way of creating offences which may have been
inadvertently left out, it is unlikely that the courts will take this general criminalization on
face value because it may lead to absurdity. For instance, section 8(2)(e) provides that the
Minister must prepare and lay before the National Assembly at least once every year a
report on the state of the environment. It is absurd to think that Parliament intended to
criminalize the Minister's failure to do SO.2 8 It is arguable that the correct approach is for
28 Section 68 of the EMA provides that the Minister is immune from legal proceedings "in respect of
anything done in good faith under the provisions of this Act." It is clear from the quoted words that the
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the courts to disregard the literal meaning of section 61 and to select and say in what
cases they think Parliament intended contravention of a particular section of the Act to
amount to a crime the criminalization and penalty of which are prescribed in section 61.
Thus the courts 'must ascertain, by ordinary techniques of construction of statutes,
whether the legislature had intended that disobedience to a particular command or
direction should attract the criminal sanction' as laid out in section 61.29
4.2.3 Hindering, obstructing, etc, of inspectors
The EMA makes provision for the appointment of environmental inspectors whose
functions are to administer, monitor and enforce measures for the protection and
management of the environment and for the prevention and abatement of pollution to the
environment. Every inspector is issued with an identity card. On request by any person
affected by the exercise of his powers, an inspector is required to produce the identity
card for inspection. In the performance of his duties an inspector has various powers. He
may enter any premises at any reasonable time to examine any activity which the
inspector reasonably considers to be detrimental to the environment or natural resources
and to collect from such activity samples of any pollutant or other substance for analysis.
While on the premises the inspector may demand the production of any relevant book,
document or record for retention by him. An inspector may also inspect and examine any
vehicle in which he has reasonable cause to believe that a pollutant or other substance is
being or has been transported. He may order the production of any document pertaining
to the transportation of the pollutant or other substance, and may collect samples of the
pollutant or other substance for analysis. He may also request information from any
person who has or appears to have custody or control of the pollutant or other
substance.i''
Minister's immunity is only in respect of acts ; the imm unity does not extend to omissions. So, theoretically,
legal proceedings in respect of failure to carry out a duty may be brought against the Minister.
29 J R L Milton and M G Cowling South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol III 2ed Kenwyn: Juta
1988 (Service No. 7,1995) at § 1-16. See also R v Bornman 1912 TPD 66 at 68 and Rv Mgibantaka 1934
CPD 121 at 126.
30 Section 46 of the EMA. Section 47 of the EMA provides for (a) prior notice of intention to collect
samples to be given to the owner or occupier of the premises or vehicle or other person in control of the
96
In the context of these duties, functions and powers of inspectors, it is provided that any
person who engages in any of the following acts or omissions shall be guilty of an
offence:3)
(a) hindering or obstructing an inspector in the execution of his duties;
(b) failing to comply with a lawful order or requirement made by an inspector;
(c) preventing an inspector or any person duly authorized by the inspector from
gaining entry into any premises which he is empowered to enter;32
(d) impersonating an inspector or any person duly authorized by the inspectorr"
(e) preventing an inspector from having access to any relevant record or
document required by the inspector;
(t) misleading or giving false information to an inspector or any person duly
authorized by the inspectorr'"
(g) failing to comply with measures directed by the inspector for the protection
and management of the environment and the conservation and sustainable
utilization of natural resourcesr"
Upon conviction the punishment is a fine of MWK5 000 (US $38) or more up to a
maximum of MWK200 000 (US $1 504) and imprisonment for two years.i"
vehicle; (b) placing of sample in three packages and deli vering one package each to the Director, analysing
laboratory and owner or occupier of the premises or vehicle or other person in control of the vehicle; and
Cc) referral of disputes in respect of the sampl e to the Environmental Appeals Tribunal.
3 1 Section 62 of the EMA.
32 Preventing the Director of Environmental Affairs or any person authorised by him is also criminalized.
33 Impersonating the Director of Environmental Affairs or any person authorised by him is also
criminalized.
34 Misleading or giving false information to the Director of Environmental Affairs or any person authorised
by him is also criminalized.
35 The measures may also be those directed by the Minister or the Director of Environmental Affairs.
36 Section 62 of the EMA.
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It is not clear from the wording of the relevant section whether the acts or omissions
listed above must be accompanied with mens rea for them to amount to criminal
offences. There is a possibility that mens rea is not an element in these offences. Several
reasons may be advanced for this. In the first place, it is in the public interest that the
work of inspectors should not be hindered or interfered with unnecessarily as they are
crucial agents in the enforcement of environmental law. A requirement of mens rea may
render ineffectual the enforcement of environmental law by inspectors. In the second
place, the use of words importing mens rea in other sections creating offences in the Act37
and the non-use of such words in the present group of offences suggest (though not
conclusively) that the offences under consideration do not require mens rea. The
possibility of the accused being sentenced to a term of imprisonment does not detract
from the conclusion that mens rea is not required as strict liability may be imposed even
in such circumstances. 38
Further, it may be observed that some of the proscribed acts listed above may be done in
the name of the right to privacy. In this way the constitutionality of aspects of these
offences may be brought into question. For instance, the owner of premises may contend
that he prevented an inspector from gaining entry into his premises with a view to
protecting his constitutional right to privacy. Similarly the owner of premises may argue
that he prevented an inspector from accessing relevant records or documents in the
interest of safeguarding his right to privacy. These challenges need to be examined. In
essence the question is whether an inspector's powers of entry, search and seizure are
constitutionally valid. If these powers are valid, preventing the inspector's entry into
premises or preventing his collection of documents would be constitutionally valid
offences.
Section 21 of the Constitution provides that every person has the right to personal
privacy, which includes the right not to be subject to (a) searches of one's person, home
37 For example, sections 63, 64 and 66 of the EMA.
38 R v Blake [1997] I WLR 1167; Pharmac eutical Society ofGreat Britain v Storkwain Ltd [1986] 1 WLR
903.
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or property; (b) seizure of private possessions; or (c) interference with private
communications (mail and all forms of telecommunications).39 On the face of section 21
of the Constitution, it is unacceptable for the inspector to enter and search premises or
vehicles and seize samples or documents. However, privacy is not an absolute right: it is
a derogable right. It may be restricted or limited as long as the restrictions or limitations
are prescribed by law, reasonable, recognized by international human rights standards
and necessary in an open and democratic society." For present purposes it is beyond
dispute that the entry, search and seizure are prescribed by law.41 What remains to be
established is whether the entry, search and seizure are reasonable, recognized by
international human rights standards and necessary in an open and democratic society.
As suggested in segment 3.3 of Chapter 3, the yardstick for measuring the reasonableness
of a restriction or limitation was laid out in R v Oakes.42 The starting point is that the
limitation must have a purpose or objective. The inquiry involves a proportionality test
which has three components. Firstly, the limitation must be carefully designed to achieve
the objective. Secondly, the limitation, even though rationally connected to the objective,
should impair as little as possible the right in question. Thirdly, there must be
proportionality between the effects of the limitation and the objective. Applying this
yardstick to the present matter, it will be noted that entry, search and seizure have a good
39 William J Stuntz 'Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure' (1995) 93 Mich L Rev 1016 at
1020 - 1021 defines privacy as follows: 'In legal discourse privacy encompasses, among other things, the
ability to engage in certain conduct free from government regulation, freedom from being stared at or
stalked or "singled out" in public, the "right to be let alone," and the ability to keep certain information or
aspects of one's life secret. If one takes privacy to mean all these things, or some fuzzy and varying
combination of them, it quickly becomes impossible to say anything useful on the subject. ... A more
refined definition is needed. In the law of criminal procedure, two kinds of privacy seem to matter. The first
is fairly definite: privacy interests as interests in keeping information and activities secret from the
government. The focus here is on what government officials can see and hear, what they can find out. ...
The second kind of privacy is much harder to get one's hands on: it is easier to say what it is not than what
it is. It is not, other than coincidentally, about protecting secrets and information. Rather it is about
preventing invasions of dignitary interests, as when a police officer publicly accosts someone and treats
him as a suspect. Arrests and street stops infringe privacy in this sense because they stigmatize the
individual, single him out, and deprive him of freedom.'
40 Section 44(2) of the Constitution.
41 Sections 46 and 47 of the EMA.
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purpose or objective. The rate of environmental crime is high in Malawi. The need to
fight environmental crime is therefore an important objective in Malawian society. To
this end, Parliament enacted the EMA which authorizes the appointment of
environmental inspectors to administer, monitor and enforce measures geared towards
environmental protection. In view of the complexities of environmental crime and the
difficulty of identifying environmental criminal conduct which mayor may not constitute
a specified offence, there is arguably a need for the environmental inspectors to have
entry, search and seizure powers.v' Thus the entry, search and seizure are rationally
connected to the objective of fighting against environmental crime. This important
objective must be weighed against the premises/vehicle-owner's right to privacy. Of
course that 'right is not meant to shield criminal activity or to conceal evidence of crime
from the criminal justice system. On the other hand, State officials are not entitled,
without good cause, to invade the premises of persons for purposes of searching and
seizing property; there would otherwise be little content left to the right to privacy. A
balance must therefore be struck between the interests of the individual and those of the
State. ,44 In this regard, it may be observed that the environmental inspectors are not
required to obtain a search warrant before the entry, search and seizure. All that is
required of them is that they must enter at a reasonable time, that they must reasonably
consider the activity under investigation to be detrimental to the environment, and that
they must give notice of intention to collect to the owner of the premises or vehicle
before collecting any samples. It may further be observed that the inspectors may
exercise these powers of entry, search and seizure in respect of any premises which
certainly includes dwelling houses. While on the premises, they may not only examine
the activity in question, but they may also demand production of any book, document or
record concerning any matter relevant to the administration of the EMA. The process of
42 (1986) 26 OLR (4th) 200.
43 Cf Langa OP (as he then was) in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 at paras 48 and 53.
44 Per Langa OP (as he then was) in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 at para 54. See also Scott E Sundby , "Every man" 's
Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust between Government and Citizen?' (1994) 94 Columbia Law
Review 1751 at 1765 - 1766.
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obtaining these documents may lead to the possibility of inspectors accessing private
letters and other private documents, a possibility which transgresses the core of the right
to privacy.
In the recent case of Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa and
Others 45 the Constitutional Court of South Africa dealt with section 28(1) of the
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965 which gave inspectors of
medicines the authority to enter into and inspect any premises, place, vehicle, vessel or
aircraft where such inspectors reasonably believed that there were medicines or other
substances regulated by the statute, and to seize any medicine or any books, records or
documents found in or upon such premises, place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft which
appeared to afford evidence of a contravention of any provision of the statute. No search
warrant was required. Sachs J (the other justices concurring) held that to the extent that a
statute authorized, in the absence of a warrant, entry into private homes and rifling
through intimate possessions, such activities would intrude on the inner sanctum of the
persons in question and the statutory authority would accordingly breach the right to
personal privacy. The learned judge went on to say that it is necessary to decide on a case
by case basis how invasive a regulatory inspection would be. The more public the
undertaking and the more closely regulated, the more attenuated would the right to
privacy be and the less intense any possible invasion. In the case of any regulated
enterprise, the proprietor's expectation of privacy with respect to the premises,
equipment, materials and records had to be attenuated by the obligation to comply with
reasonable regulations and to tolerate the administrative inspections that were an
. inseparable part of an effective regime of regulation. In the case at hand the impugned
section did not confine itself to authorizing periodic inspections of the business premises
of health professionals. The impugned section was so wide and unrestricted in its reach as
to authorize any inspector to enter any person's home without a warrant simply on the
basis that medicines were or were reasonably suspected of being there. In the
45 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC). See also lain Currie 'Constitutional Jurisprudence' (1998)
Annual Survey ofSouth African Law 51 at 80.
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circumstances the court held that the section was inconsistent with the right to privacy
and invalid.
The content of section 28(1) of the Medic ines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of
1965 is similar - not identical - to the content of section 46 of the EMA in material
respects. In both provisions there is no requirement of a warrant. Both provisions do not
confine themselves to periodic, regulatory inspections. Both provisions do not contain
enough safeguards to impair the right to privacy as little as possible. Further, in both
provisions the extent of the invasion of the right to privacy is substantially
disproportionate to its objective or purpose. It may therefore be concluded that if
Malawian courts are persuaded to follow the authori ty of Mistry , section 46 of the EMA
in its present state will be held not to be a reasonable limitation to the right to privacy,
that is to say, an environmental inspecto r ' s powers of entry, search and seizure as
presently articulated are not constitutionally reasonable.
In Hunter v Southam46 the Supreme Court of Canada held that search and seizure would
be reasonable if, among other things , they were authorized before being conducted or
performed. The court stated that the power to authorize a search and seizure must be
given to an impartial and independent person (usually a justice) who is bound to act
judicially in discharging that function. Further, the person seeking the authority must
have reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been committed. The purpose of
this prior authorization requirement is ' to provide an opportunity, before the event, for
the conflicting interests of the State and individual to be assessed, so that the individual's
right to privacy will be breached only where the appropriate standard has been met, and
the interests of the State are thus demonstrably superior.,47 It follows that the search and
seizure provided for in section 46 of the EMA are generally not reasonable since they are
not required to be preceded by an authorization (valid warrant).
46 (1985) 14 CCC (3d) 97 SCC at 102 - 103. See also Park-Ross v Director: Office for Serious Economic
Offences 1995 (2) SA 148 (C).
47 At 109.
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However, it must be noted that in some searches and seizures prior authorization is not
required. For example, in periodic regulatory inspections of business premises with a
view to enforce public welfare laws warrants are generally not required. Similarly a
warrant is not necessary if the object of the search or seizure would be frustrated by a
delay." One instance of this is where an enforcement officer intends to search a motor
vehicle that could be quickly moved away."
The discussion will now turn to an examination of the last two qualifications of an
acceptable limitation: necessity in an open and democratic society, and recognition by
international human rights standards. With regard to the former, the words of Sachs J in
Mistry are apposite: 'The existence of safeguards to regulate the way in which State
officials may enter the private domains of ordinary citizens is one of the features that
distinguish a constitutional democracy from a police State. ,5 0 This being the case, it
cannot be said that section 46 of the EMA (with its lack of appropriate safeguards) is
necessary in an open and democratic society. Similarly international human rights
standards do not support entries and searches without warrants or appropriate safeguards.
Article 12 of the UDHR prohibits 'arbitrary interference' with a person's privacy. In the
same vein Article 17 of the ICCPR declares that no one should be subjected to 'arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy.' The word ' arbitrary,' it has been suggested,
means 'without justification in valid motives and contrary to established legal
48Michael A Kidd 'The Protection of the Environment through the Use of Criminal Sanctions: A
Comparative Analysis with Specific Reference to South Africa' unpublished PhD Thesis, University of
Natal 2002 at 34; Johan de Waal, lain Currie and Gerhard Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 4ed
Lansdowne: Juta 2001 at 281; George E Devenish The South African Constitution Durban: LexiaNexis
Butterworths 2005 at 85 writes : '[S]ome kind of prior authorisation by an independent authority is usually
necessary before a search may be carried out. The general rule is that a warrant must be obtained unless the
object of the search would be hampered by delay. However, warrants are not obligatory when regulatory
inspections are employed. These are routine in nature and are used to control potentially dangerous
activities. '
49 Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada Scarborough: Thomson Carswell 1997 at 45-26. Cf A C
Oosthuizein 'The search, seizure and forfeiture provisions of the Customs Act: a cause for concern' [2002]
Acta Juridica 220 at 222 - 223 where he says that although some arguments in support of warrantless
search and seizure are compelling, ' they do not justify the creation of a regime where warrantless seizures
are the order of the day .'
50Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council ofSouth Africa and Others 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) at para
25.
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principles. ,51 It is arguable that searches and seizures without appropriate safeguards
would readily be classified as 'arbitrary' and an unjustifiable infringement of the right to
pnvacy.
From the foregoing analysis it may be concluded that an inspector's powers of entry,
search and seizure under section 46 of the EMA are inconsistent with section 21 of the
Constitution (right to privacy) in that they are too wide and unrestricted in their reach
and in that they do not require prior authorization in appropriate circumstances. The
inspector's powers of entry, search and seizure are therefore invalid to the extent of such
inconsistency. It follows that an inspector's warrantless entry, search or seizure that does
not qualify as a periodic regulatory inspection or that is not urgent, can lawfully be
opposed by the owner or occupier of premises or owner of a motor vehicle. In other
words, the owner or occupier of premises may prevent an inspector from entering the
premises or accessing documents therein as long as the inspector is conducting an
unlawful entry, search and/or seizure. Thus the acts or omissions set out in section 62 of
the EMA constitute offences only when the inspector is performing his constitutionally
valid functions and powers.
It follows from this conclusion that the validity of the offences set out in section 62 of the
EMA depends largely on the scope of the inspector 's powers and functions laid out in
section 46 of the EMA. If the inspector's powers in section 46 are exercised within the
constitutionally acceptable scope, the offences in section 62 can be committed. Since the
constitutionally acceptable scope of the inspector's powers is not apparent from a reading
of section 46, it is necessary to amend section 46 with a view to making it clear as to
what an inspector can constitutionally do. To this end, it is suggested that section 46
should read as follows:
'46. - (1) For the purpose of performing the functions referred to in section
45(1), a judge or magistrate may, on application by an inspector or any person
51 Asbjom Eide, Gudmundur Alfredsson, Goran Melander, Lars Adam Rehof and AIIan Rosas (eds) The
Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights: A Commenta ry Oslo: Scandinavian University Press 1992 at 190.
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duly authorized by the inspector, issue a warrant authorizing the inspector or
person named therein to, without prior notice and at any reasonable time, enter
any premises to examine any activity which the inspector reasonably considers to
be detrimental to the environment or natural resou rces and to collect therefrom
samples of any pollutant or other subs tance for analysis at any laboratory
designated by the Minister under section 48.
(2) An application under subsection (1) shall be supported by information
supplied under oath or affirmation, establishing the facts on which the application
is based.
(3) A judge or magistrate may issue the warrant referred to in subsection
(1) if he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an activity
detrimental to the environment or natural resources is taking place or took place
in the premises specified in the application.
(4) A warrant issued under subsection (1) shall identify the premises to be
entered and searched and the person alleged to be responsible for the activity.
(5) Upon entering the premises the inspector may require the owner or
occupant or the agent of the owner or occupant of the premises to produce for
inspection any book, document or record or copies thereof for retention by the
inspector concerning any matter relevant to the administration of this Act.
(6) It shall be the duty of the owner or occupant or the agent of the owner
or occupant of the premises to render an inspector reasonable assistance in the
performance by the inspector of the functions referred to in section 45(1).
(7) Where the inspector has reasonable grounds to believe that -
(a) the activity may pre-emptively be interfered with or
relevant information, documents or things are about to be
removed or destroyed; and
(b) a warrant cannot be obtained timeously to prevent such
interference, removal or destruction,
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such inspector may enter the premises on which the activity is or the information,
documents or things are and exercise all the powers granted by this section, as if a
warrant under subsection (1) had been obtained.
(8) An inspector may -
(a) inspect and examine any vehicle, in or upon which he has
reasonable cause to believe that a pollutant or other article
or substance which he believes to be a pollutant is being or
has been transported;
(b) order the production of any document pertaining to the
transportation of the pollutant or such other article or
substance;
(c) collect any sample of the pollutant or such other article or
substance from the vehicle or place where it has been
delivered, for analysis at a laboratory designated by the
Minister under section 48;
(d) request information from any person who has or appears to
have custody or control of the pollutant or such other article
or substance or the vehicle in which it is or has been
transported. '
The reworked section 46 is intended to avoid the criticisms of the current section 46 and
the problems of determining whether the acts or omissions set out in section 62 of the
EMA constitute valid offences.
4.2.4 Offences relating to environmental impact assessments
Section 63 of the EMA makes provision for offences relating to environmental impact
assessments (EIAs). Of these offences one relates to section 24(3) and the remaining two
offences are in respect of section 25. Section 24(3) is in the following terms:
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'Where, upon exarrunmg the project brief, the Director considers that further
information is required to be stated in the project brief before an environmental
impact assessment is conducted, the Director shall require the developer, in
writing, to provide such further information as the Director shall deem necessary.'
What does section 63 mean when it says that any person who contravenes this provision
commits an offence? Two meanings may be suggested. In the first place, it may mean
that where the Director of Environmental Affairs unreasonably fails to require additional
information from the developer, he (the Director) commits an offence.Y The merit of this
interpretation lies in that it has the potential of encouraging vigilance or adequate scrutiny
on the part of the Director whenever a project brief is submitted to him. In the second
place, it may mean that the developer who fails to provide further information as
demanded by the Director commits an offence. This second meaning sounds more likely
to be the meaning Parliament intended as this Act mainly seeks to police the activities of
subjects (e.g. developers) and not necessarily government officials. However, there is
scope for arguing that both interpretations are acceptable as they both further the purpose
or object of the Act, which is the protection and management of the environment and the
conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources. The problem of interpreting
this provision arises partly from the legislative device of criminalizing conduct by
reference. It is likely that this problem would not have been there if section 63 had not
made any reference to section 24(3) but simply stated what acts or omissions were
criminalized.
As stated earlier on, the last two offences in section 63 are connected to section 25. The
latter section states that upon being satisfied that sufficient information has been stated in
the project brief, the Director shall require the developer to conduct an environmental
impact assessment and to submit to him (Director), in respect thereof, an environmental
52 The immunity of the Director from legal proceedings articulated in section 68 of the EMA relates to acts
only and not omissions. In the present context the Director's failure to require additional information is an
omission and so falls outside the ambit of the immunity.
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impact assessment report containing specified information.53 If the developer fails to
prepare an environmental impact assessment report, he is guilty of an offence. It seems
that for this offence mens rea is not an element. If the developer or any person knowingly
gives false information in an environmental impact assessment report, he is guilty of an
offence. The word 'knowingly' suggests that mens rea is an element of this offence of
giving false information. It has actually been said that 'knowingly' is the word most apt
to introduce an element of mens rea.54 In R v TaafJe55 it was said that 'the principle that a
man must be judged upon the facts as he believes them to be is an accepted principle of
the criminal law when the state of a man 's mind and his knowledge are ingredients of the
offence with which he is charged.' Accordingly, the question whether the developer or
any person knowingly gave the false information will depend on what the developer or
that other person believed the information to be. If the developer or other person believes
that the information is not false, although in fact it is false, he cannot be found to have
53 According to section 25(1) of the EMA the report must have the following content: (a) a detailed
description of the project and the activities to be undertaken to implement the project; (b) the description of
the segment or segments of the environment likely to be affected by the project and the means for
identifying, monitoring and assessing the environmental effects of the project; (c) the description of the
technology, method or process to be used in the implementation of the project and of any available
alternative technology, method or process and the reasons for not employing the alternative technology,
method or process; (d) the reasons for selecting the proposed site of the project as opposed to any other
available alternative site; (e) a detailed description of the likely impact the project may have on the
environment and the direct, indirect, cumulati ve, short-term and long-term effects on the environment of
the project; (t) an identification and description of measures proposed for eliminating, reducing or
mitigating any anticipated adverse effects of the project on the environment; (g) an indication of whether
the environment of any other country or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is or are likely to
be affected by the project and the measures to be taken to minimize any damage to the environment; (h) an
outline of any gaps, deficiencies and the adverse environmental concerns arising from the environmental
impact assessment and from the compilation of the environmental impact assessment report; and (1) a
concise description of the method used by the developer to compile the information required under this
section.
54 Per Lord Rawlinson of Ewell , counsel for the accused in R v TaafJe [1984] AC 539 at 544. See also Peter
Hungerford-Welch and Alan Taylor Sourcebook on Criminal Law London: Cavendish Publishing 1997 at
34.
55 [1984] AC 539 at 546. In Nankondwa v Republic 1966 - 68 ALR Mal 388 at 394 - 395 the Malawi
Supreme Court of Appeal held that the test to be applied in determining whether an accused had the
requisite knowledge for murder was not the objective test of whether a reasonable person would have
contemplated that death or grievous harm was likely to result from the accused's action but the subjective
test of what the accused himself contemplated. In essence this understanding of ' knowledge ' appears to be
the same as that for ' knowingly' in R v TaafJe. Cf Menyan i v Republic 1966 - 68 ALR Mal 79 at 81 which
may now be regarded as no longer good law.
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knowingly given false information. If the developer or other person believes the
information to be false, he obviously can be found to have knowingly given false
information. The developer or other person will also be found to have knowingly given
false information if he believes that the information is false in some respect but turns out
to be false in another respect.i" However, he does not knowingly give false information if
he believes incorrectly that the information is false when in actual fact it is not false. 57
Any person convicted of an offence relating to environmental impact assessments may be
sentenced to a fine of not less than MWK5 000 (US $38) and not more than MWK200
000 (US $1 504) and to imprisonment for two years. 58
4.2.5 Offences relating to records
It is an offence to fail to keep records required under the EMA or under any regulations
made thereunder. 59 The EMA confers on the Director of Environmental Affairs the power
to prescribe activities in respect of which records must be kept for purposes of the Act.
The records may be used by the Director or an inspector for purposes of environmental
auditing, monitoring, control and inspection and other purposes related to the protection
and management of the environment and to the conservation and sustainable utilization of
natural resourccs.P" Further, the Minister may cause to be kept proper books and other
records of account in respect of receipts and expenditures of the Environmental Fund.61 It
56 This is the effect of the decisions in R v Ellis, Street and Smith (1987) 84 Cr App R 235; R v Hennessey
(1979) 68 Cr App R 419; and Rv Hussain [1969] 2 QB 567.
57 Cf R v TaafJe [1984] AC 539; G J Bennett and B Hogan 'Criminal Law and Sentencing' All ER Rev
1983 129 at 132 - 133. In such a scenario the actus reus is absent, so the developer or other person cannot
be found guilty of the offence.
58 Section 63 of the EMA.
59 Section 64(a) of the EMA.
60 Section 51 of the EMA .
61 Section 58 of the EMA. The Environmental Fund is created under section 53 of the EMA. It is vested in
the Minister and it is administered in accordance with his directions (subject to the provisions of the EMA
and the Finance and Audit Act): section 55 of the EMA. According to sections 56 and 57 of the EMA the
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appears that failure to keep any of these records is an offence even in the absence of mens
rea as section 64(a) does not require any state of mind to accompany the failure.
It is also an offence to 'fraudulently or knowingly ' alter any such records.Y The meaning
of 'knowingly' in the present context is similar to that explained above in relation to
knowingly giving false information. It is submitted that the only difference is that the
meaning here is informed by 'altering records ' instead of 'giving false information.'
However, 'fraudulently' means something else. Previously it was thought that in offences
involving fraud terminology, dishonesty was not necessarily a part of the offence.63 The
position is now different. The meaning of ' fraudulently' is associated with the meaning of
'intent to defraud.' Both the word 'fraudulently' and the phrase 'with intent to defraud'
have been held to import dishonesty" In Re Companies Acts, Ex p. Wilson65 Wills J
lamented the misuse of the word 'fraud.' He said, " 'Fraud,' in my opinion, is a term that
should be reserved for something dishonest and morally wrong, and much mischief is, I
think, done, as well as much pain inflicted, by its use where ' illegality' and 'illegal' are
the really appropriate expressions." In the present context there is nothing in section 64 of
the EMA suggesting that the word ' fraudulently' is being used in a sense other than that
objects of the Fund are generally the protection and management of the environment and the conservation
and sustainable utilization of natural resources. Specifically the Fund may be applied to: (a) research and
training which is calculated to promote the protection and management of the environment and the
conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources ; (b) the acquisition of land, equipment,
materials and other assets and the construction of buildings in order to promote the objects of the Fund; (c)
the cost of any scheme which the Minister cons iders to be in the interes t of the protection and management
of the environment and the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources; (d) meeting any
expenses arising from the establishment and maintenance of the Fund ; and (e) any purpose which the
Minister considers to be in the interest of the objects of the Fund.
62 Section 64(b) of the EMA.
63 Welham v DPP [1961] AC 103; Murphy op cit at 395.
64 R v Cox and Hodges (1982) 75 Cr App R 291 ; Smith and Hogan op cit at 127. in Re Patrick and Lyon
Ltd [1933] Ch 786 at 790 Maugham J said: " I will express the opinion that the words 'defraud' and
'fraudulent purpose,' where they appear in the section in question , are words which connote actual
dishonesty involving, according to current not ions of fair-trading among commercial men, real moral
blame." Maugham J has been so quoted at [1983] Crim LR 167.
65 (1888) 21 QBD 301 at 309. See also John S. Jam es (ed) Stroud 's Judicial Dictionary of Words and
Phras es 5ed Vol 2 London: Sweet & Maxwell 1986 at 1029 and the authorities cited there. One of these
authorities states that fraud is inconsistent with a claim of right made in good faith to do the act complained
of.
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which it normally signifies (that is, the sense of dishonesty). In fact the use of
'fraudulently' in conjunction with 'knowingly' seems to suggest that Parliament intended
to distinguish dishonest alteration of the records from other proscribed ways of altering
the records. In this connection it must be noted that 'fraudulently' is generally taken as
. duci I f 66mtro ucmg an e ement 0 mens rea.
Another offence relating to records is provided for in section 52 of the EMA. A person
who, in the course of his duties under the EMA, gets to know the contents of any
document, communication or information relating to the Act, is not permitted to publish
or disclose such contents to any person otherwise than in accordance with the EMA
without the written consent of the Director. So for a person to be guilty of this offence
there must be:
(a) publication or disclosure of the contents of any document, communication or
information;
(b) the publication or disclosure must be contrary to the provisions of the EMA;
(c) the publication or disclosure must have been done without the consent of the
Director;
(d) the contents of the document , communication or information must relate to his
duties under the EMA; and
(e) the contents of the document , communication or information must have come
to his knowledge in the course of his duties under the EMA.
In essence this offence seeks to criminalize improper disclosure of information. There are
proper channels for disclosing information; channels which are generally beneficial to the
environmental cause. One instance in which this offence may be committed is as follows.
Suppose that the Director has information relating to the environmentally prejudicial
66 Smith and Hogan op cit at 127 claim that nothing could be more apt to introduce a requirement of mens
rea than the word 'fraudulently' or the phrase ' with intent to defraud.' This claim is similar to that of Lord
Rawlinson of Ewell in R v TaafJe [1984] AC 539 at 544 in respect of the word ' knowingly.' These claims
do not add anything substantive to the legal discourse. The generally settled position is that both
'fraudulently ' and 'knowingly' import a requirement of mens rea.
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activities of a particular company and one of the officers in the Director's office discloses
this information. If the company consequently covers up its sins with the result that the
Director is not able to effectively take enforcement measures against the company, the
disclosure has not benefitted the environmental cause. The disclosing officer may be
charged with this offence.
The punishment for these offences relating to records varies. The offences of failure to
keep records and alteration of records attract a fine of not less than MWK5 000 (US $38)
and not more than MWK200 000 (US $1 504) and imprisonment for two years. With
regard to improper disclosure, the punishment is a fine of between MWK2 000 (US $15)
and MWK100 000 (US $752) and imprisonment for one year."
4.2.6 Offences relatin g to environmental standards and guidelines
On the advice of the National Council for the Environment" the Minister may prescribe
environmental quality standards generally and, in particular, for air, water, soil, noise,
vibrations, radiation, effluent and solid waste. The prescription of these standards is
required to be based on scientific and environmental principles and to take into account
the practicability and availability of appropriate technology for ensuring compliance with
such standards. Different standards may apply in different areas of Malawi with respect
67 Sections 52(4) and 64 of the EMA.
68 The National Council for the Environment was established under section 10 of the EMA. According to
section 12, the Council's functions include: (a) advising the Minister on all matters and issues affecting the
protection and management of the environment and the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural
resources; (b) recommending to the Minister measures necessary for the integration of environmental
considerations in all aspects of economic planning and development; and Cc) recommending to the Minister
measures necessary for the harmonization of activities, plans and policies of lead agencies and non-
governmental organizations concerned with the protection and management of the environment and the
conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources. It must be noted that although it is the
responsibility of the Council to advise the Minister on environmental quality standards, it is actually not the
Council itself which comes up with the proposed standards. Strictly speaking, it is the Technical Committee
on the Environment established under section 16 that prepares the standards, for section 17 states that the
Committee is mandated to carry out investigations and conduct scientific studies of any activity,
occurrence, product or substance and to recommend to the Council appropriate standards, criteria and
guidelines for environmental control and regulation.
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to different segments of the environment. The Min ister has power to vary these standards
from time to time. 69 It is an offence to violate any of these standards. i''
Section 65(b) makes reference to 'measure. ' It provides that violation of 'any measure'
prescribed under the Act is an offence. The meaning of 'measure' is not clear. The word
appears in fifteen other sections." The following is a representative sample of the phrases
in which it occurs: measures necessary for promoting the protection and management of
the environment and the conservation and sustainabl e utilization of natural resources;72
duty to take all necessary and appropriate measures to protect and manage the
environment and to conserve natural resources and to promote sustainable utilization of
natural resources;73 take steps and measures as are necessary for promoting a clean
environment;74 measures to prevent or stop any act or omission deleterious to the
environmentr" take such measures as are necessary for achieving the objects of the Act;76
measures necessary for the harmonization of activities, plans and policies of lead
agencies and environmental non-governmental organisations;77 measures for eliminating,
reducing or mitigating any anticipated adverse effects of the project on the
environment;78 measures necessary to regulate safe disposal of waste by local
authorities;79 and measures for ensuring that the implementation of a project commenced
69 Section 30 of the EMA .
70 Section 65(a) of the EMA.
71 Sections 2 (definition of National Environmental Action Plan), 3(1) and (2) , 5(2)(b), 8(1) and (2)(m) ,
12(b) and (c), 22, 25(1)(t) and (g) , 27(3 ), 28, 31(b), 33(2)(a), 35(1 )(d) and (e) and (2), 37(2) and 3(a) ,
40(2)(b), 45( I), and 62(g).
72 Section 2 (definition of National Environmental Action Plan) .
73 Section 3(1) of the EMA.
74 Section 3(2) of the EMA.
75 Section 5(2)(b) of the EMA.
76 Section 8( I) of the EMA .
77 Section 12(c) of the EMA.
78 Section 25(1)(t) of the EMA.
79 Section 37(2 ) of the EMA .
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before the Act came into force complies with the provisions of the Act. 8o It is arguable
that the meaning of measure in these phrases is no more than 'a means of achieving the
specific purpose or object associated with the word .' Thus a measure to regulate safe
disposal of waste signifies a means for achieving the safe disposal of waste. On this
understanding it may be concluded that the 'measure ' in section 65(b) must be interpreted
as 'any means' for achieving the objects of the Act. Since almost every provision of the
Act is intended to assist in achieving the objects of the Act , this meaning of 'measure'
may lead to the unsatisfactory conclusion that almost every provision of the Act is a
measure and so contravention of it is an offence. It is unlikely that Parliament intended
the word 'measure' in section 65(b) to have such a wide meaning. It is more likely that
Parliament intended the word to mean some generall y applicable action, step or activity
that is not set out in the main body of the Act but which is specified by the appropriate
authority identified in the Act. For example, section 31(b) directs the Minister, on the
recommendation of the Council and in consultation with the Minister of Finance, to
determine such measures as are necessary for preventing the unsustainable use of natural
resources and controlling the generation of pollutants. Further, section 35(1)(d) requires
the Minister, on the advice of the Counc il, to devise such measures as are necessary for,
inter alia, mitigating the effect of threats to biological diversity. In such circumstances it
makes sense to say that any person who contravenes these measures is guilty of an
offence.
It must be pointed out that the hallmark of the preferred mearung of measure is
generality, that is to say, the action , step or activity specified is general in application; it
is not directed to a particular person. That general type of measure is the one
contravention of which is proscribed under section 65(b). The Act makes separate
provision (in section 62(f)) for contravention of measures directed to a specific person. If
this were not so, there would be the unsat isfactory position that contravention of a
specifically directed measure would be puni shed under two separate sections, namely
section 62(f) and section 65(b).
80 Section 28 of the EMA.
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The last part of section 65 proscribes the use of natural resources otherwise than in
accordance with the ACt.8I According to section 4 it is permitted to use natural resources
for domestic purposes without any specific authorization from the government. Any other
use or exploitation must be authorized in writing by the government. So any person who
utilizes or exploits natural resources for non-domestic purposes without the prior written
authority of the government is guilty of an offence.
The punishment for all offences relating to environmental standards and guidelines is the
same as that for offences relating to environmental impact assessments.
4.2.7 Offences relating to wastes, chemicals, pesticides or hazardous materials,
processes and wastes
It is an offence to: (a) fail to manage hazardous materials, processes and wastes in
accordance with the Act; (b) knowingly or fraudulently mislabel wastes, pesticides or
chemicals; or (c) aid or abet the illegal trafficking in wastes, chemicals, pesticides or
hazardous processes, wastes or substanccs.Y The Act provides some background to these
offences. With regard to (a) it is provided that importation or exportation of any
hazardous waste or substance may only be done under a permit, In the case of
exportation, the exporter is required, before a permit is issued, to produce to the Minister
written confirmation from an appropriate authority of the receiving country that the
hazardous waste or substance may be exported to that country.Y A permit is also required
81 Section 65(c) of the EMA.
82 Section 66 of the EMA.
83 Section 39(1) of the EMA. The purpose of this prior written confirmation requirement is to avoid
international conflicts and to meet Malawi's obligations under international law, particularly the
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 1989
(the Basel Convention). Malawi acceded to this convention on 21 April 1994. At the time of writing
(October 2005) Malawi had not yet ratified the Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the
Control of Transboundary Movements and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa 1991 (the
Bamako Convention) .
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for transportation of hazardous wastes or substances within Malawi. 84 Failure to meet
these and other requirements relating to hazardous material s, processes and wastes is an
offence.
The Minister may make rules in respect of the registration, labelling and packaging of
pesticides.V Any person who mislabels the pesticides is guilty of an offence. As may be
apparent from (b) above, the offence of mislabelling may also be committed in
connection with wastes or chemicals. It may be observed at this stage that the word
'hazardous' does not occur in paragraph (b) but it occurs in (a), suggesting that the word
'wastes' in (b) is more general and so may include both hazardous and non-hazardous
wastes. Thus mislabelling may be committed in respect of any type of wastes.
For a person to be convicted of these offences of mislabelling, mens rea must be proved.
The words 'knowingly' and 'fraudulently' make this clear. The meanings of these words
have been explored already in segments 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 above.
Paragraph (c) addresses aiding or abetting illegal trafficking. It is noteworthy that the
offence in (c) is not the illegal trafficking itself, but rather aiding or abetting the illegal
trafficking. It has been recommended that the words ' aid and abet' in a statute should be
given their ordinary meaning and that their separate listing suggests that there is a
difference between them. 86 In this light to aid means to help or support, and to abet means
to encourage or assist someone to do something wrong. 87 However, it is clear that the
words may not be given their ordinary meaning in all circumstances.f For present
84 Section 39(2) of the EMA.
85 Section 40(2)(a) of the EMA.
86 Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773 per Lord Widgery Cl. See also P J
Richardson (ed) Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practic e London: Sweet and Maxwell 2004 at
paras 18-9 and 18-10 where reference is made to the cases of Ferguson v Weaving [1951] 1 KB 814,
National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11, Thambiah v R [1966] AC 37 and Blakely v DPP [1991]
RTR405.
87 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2002). See also Peter Hungerford-Welch and Alan Taylor
Sourcebook on Criminal Law London : Cavendish Publishing 1997 at 45.
88 Smith and Hogan op cit at 133.
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purposes 'aid and abet' should be taken as covering assistance and encouragement given
at the time of the offence.89 The nature of this offence of aiding or abetting is that it is
accessory to the commission of the principal offence or at least the execution of the actus
reus of the principal offence. It is fairly sett led that an aider or abettor can be liable as
long as 'there is the actus reus of the principal offence even if the principal offender is
entitled to be acquitted because of some defence personal to himself. , 90 If the actus reus
of the principal offence has not been executed, there cannot be aiding or abetting of the
principal offence. Thus aiding or abetting illegal trafficking only becomes an offence if
the 'principal offence' of illegal trafficking is committed or if the actus reus of illegal
trafficking is executed.
The trouble at present is that the EMA does not make specific provision for the offence of
illegal trafficking in wastes, chemicals, pesticides or hazardous processes, wastes or
substances. Section 66(c) is actually the only place in the EMA where the phrase 'illegal
trafficking' is used. The phrase is not defined in the EMA. The ordinary meaning of
trafficking is dealing or trading in something illegal ." So the target here may be the
illegal commercial buying and selling of wastes, chemicals, pesticides or hazardous
processes, wastes or substances.Y An example of this illegal commerce may be the
buying and selling without a permit (where a permit is required). If this ordinary meaning
is adopted, the conclusion is inescapable that no such offence has been provided for in the
Act, and so it is impossible to talk of the secondary offence of aiding or abetting illegal
trafficking. This argument is based on the principle that there cannot be an accessory
89 Murphy op cit at 69.
90 Murphy op cit at 76, cited with approval in R v Millward [1994] Crim LR 527.
91 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2002). In Republi c v Ndhlob vu 1971 - 72 ALR Mal 467 and
Republic v Phiri 9 Malawi Law Reports 159 Chatsika J used the word ' trafficking' but did not define it.
92 On this understanding one difficulty arises: it does not seem proper to talk of 'buying and selling
hazardous processes.' The word 'process' signifies a series of actions or steps towards achieving a
particu lar end: South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2002) . So hazardous processes may mean actions
or steps relating to hazardous substances; in other words, performance of services relating to hazardous
subs tances. In this light 'buying and sellin g hazardous processes ' may be taken as meaning buying and
selling services relating to hazardous substances.
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offence in the absence of a principal offence. No person can be convicted of aiding or
abetting a non-existent offence or a lawful act or omission . It is recognized that there is
an exception to this rule, namely accessory offences relating to suicide. Suicide is not an
offence and yet a person can be convicted of aiding suicide.f' It is not difficult to discern
the justification for this exception. The person who successfully commits suicide cannot
be prosecuted for the 'offence' of suicide as prosecution and criminal proceedings are the
portion of the living and not the departed. Glanville Williams puts it in startling legal
terms when he says that the person who commits suicide 'automatically puts himself
outside the jurisdiction. ,94 On the other hand, those living persons who aid or abet the
commission of the suicide can be prosecuted as they are available to answer for their acts
or omissions which transgress the law's desire to preserve life. In this light, can it be
contended that the offence of aiding or abetting illegal trafficking was meant to follow
the example of aiding or abetting suicide in the sense that it can be valid in the absence of
a principal offence? The answer to this question, it is submitted, must be in the negative.
As demonstrated above, there is justification for not criminalizing suicide but no such or
similar justification exists in respect of not criminalizing illegal trafficking. Since
Parliament cannot be assumed to make irrational laws, it may be inferred that Parliament
did not intend to make aiding or abetting illegal trafficking a secondary offence in the
absence of its principal offence.
In order to solve the difficulty in section 66(c), it is suggested that the meaning of illegal
trafficking should be informed by its context, specifically its object. It must be noted that
the trafficking is done with respect to 'wastes, chemicals, pesticides or hazardous
processes, wastes or substances.' Three of these matters (wastes, chemicals and
pesticides) are the object of mislabelling under section 66(b) while the remaining three
matters (hazardous processes, wastes or substances) are the object of illegal management
93 Section 228 of the Penal Code (cap 7:01 of the Laws of Malawi) provides for the secondary offences
relating to suicide. It reads: 'Any person who - (a) procures another to kill himself; or (b) counsels another
to kill himself and thereby induces him to do so; or (c) aids another in killing himself, is guilty of a felony,
and shall be liable to imprisonment for life.'
94 Glanville Williams Criminal Law: the General Part 2ed London: Stevens & Sons 1961 at para 131.
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under section 66(a).95 The lumping together of the two groups under section 66(c) seems
to imply a relationship between mislabelling and illegal management on the one hand,
and illegal trafficking on the other hand. It seems that mislabelling and illegal
management may have been intended to make up the meaning of illegal trafficking. In
other words, illegal trafficking may have been intended to mean or at least encompass
mislabelling and illegal management. If this is so, illegal trafficking may be regarded as a
shorthand method of expressing mislabelling and illegal management. This interpretation
of illegal trafficking explains the omission of a specific provision for the offence of
illegal trafficking in the Act as a specific provision is unnecessary in the circumstances.
In effect this interpretation validates the offence of aiding or abetting illegal trafficking
since aiding or abetting illegal trafficking in effect becomes aiding or abetting
mislabelling and illegal management. Thus the secondary offence of aiding or abetting
has mislabelling and illegal management as the principal offences.
Admittedly the suggested solution to the difficulty of interpreting the offence in section
66(c) is not very convincing. A better way of dealing with this difficulty must be found.
Before getting to the better solution, two observations must be made on section 66(c). In
the first place, it is strange that the draftsman articulates the offence of aiding or abetting
illegal trafficking. This is unusual. The rules relating to parties to crimes form part of
general principles of criminal law and they are generally implied in almost all crimea"
For example, there is no specific statutory provision for aiding, abetting, counselling or
procuring murder but it is generally agreed that if a person aids, abets, counsels or
procures murder, he will be convicted of the secondary offence of aiding, abetting,
95 There is a slight difference here. In section 66(a) the word 'materials' is used while in section 66(c) the
word 'substance' is used. In common parlance, material is the matter from which a thing is or can be made;
it may also mean items needed for an activity. On the other hand, substance is a particular kind of matter
with uniform properties. There is scope in these definitions for using the words interchangeably. In
addition, substance appears to be more general in its ambit than material and may therefore include
material. It follows that the 'substance' of section 66(c) includes the 'materials' of section 66(a).
96 In R v lefJerson and Others (1994) 99 Cr App R 13 at 22 Auld J, on behalf of the Court of Appeal,
stated: 'An aider and abettor of an offence is a common-law notion , not a creation of statute. It is of general
application to all offences, whether at common law or of statutory creation, unless expressly or impliedly
excluded by statute.' See also J C Smith ' Public Order' [1993] Crim LR 880 at 882 and R v lames (1890)
24 QBD 439.
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counselling or procuring the murder. 97 So why did the draftsman specifically articulate
the offence of aiding or abetting illegal trafficking? Can this be an indication that
contrary to the general position, the secondary offences of aiding or abetting are excluded
under the EMA except for section 66(c) under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius? This manner of drafting does not make easy the implementation of the Act;
rather it complicates it.98
In the second place, if the interpretation of section 66(c) is accepted or if another way of
validating the offence of aiding or abetting illegal trafficking is found, the next hurdle
will be to determine whether mens rea is an element of the offence. In general terms
mens rea is required for aiding and abetting. The mens rea may take the form of
knowledge, intention to aid or abet , and contemplation. This comes out of a number of
decisions. In Nyasaland Transport Company Limited v R99 Cram 1 said that an aider and
abettor must have mens rea and that it is settled that an aider and abettor cannot be
convicted in the absence of actual knowledge. In Johnson v Youden 100 Lord Goddard Cl
expressed the view that before 'a person can be convicted of aiding and abetting the
commission of an offence, he must at least know the essential matters which constitute
that offence.' In National Coal Board v Gamble 101 Devlin 1 added that apart from
knowledge of the circumstances, there must be proof of an intention to aid. By intention
to aid is not meant intention that the principal offence be committed.l 'f Intention to aid
may be found where the accused does not actually desire to assist or encourage the
97 According to section 21(c) of the Penal Code , such person may also be charged with actually committing
the murder.
98 Glanville Williams Criminal Law: the General Part 2ed London: Stevens & Sons 1961 at para 129
footnote 2 suggests that it is not necessary for Parliam ent to make express provision for secondary parties.
99 1961 - 63 ALR Mal 328 at 337 and 338.
100 [1950] I KB 544 at 546 .
101 [1959] 1 QB 11 at 20.
102 In National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] I QB II at 23 Devlin J stated: ' If one man deliberately sells to
another a gun to be used for murdering a third, he may be indifferent about whether the third man lives or
dies and interested only in the cash profit to be made out of the sale , but he can still be an aider and abettor.
To hold otherwise would be to negati ve the rule that mens rea is a matter of intent only and does not
depend on desire or motive. '
120
commission of the principal offence, provided that the accused knows that his actions are
extremely likely or virtually certain to have that result. I03 So contemplation or foresight
of a real or serious risk can constitute part of the mens rea for aiding or abetting.
With regard to the best solution for the difficulty in section 66(c), it is submitted that
most of the problems identified above will be avoided if the words 'aids or abets' in
section 66(c) are replaced with the words ' engages in '. This amendment will have the
effect of making illegal trafficking the principal offence, leaving general principles of
criminal law to deal with issues of secondary parties. There is nothing strange in this
proposal to omit some words and add others. For long courts have done this in the
process of interpreting statutes. In Federal Steam Navigation Co v Department of Trade
and Industry'i" Lord Reid held that words can be struck out of a statute and others
substituted in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd or totally
unreasonable, unworkable, or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute, and that in
the case of substitution the words read in must be necessarily implied by words which are
already in the statute. For example, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
exercised these powers in Salmon v Duncombe. I 05 The court had been called upon to
interpret the Natal Ordinance of 1856 which made provision for the making of wills by
natural-born British subjects resident in Natal. The draftsman had not made allowance for
the provisions of English private international law which state that gifts by will of
immovable property are governed by the law of the country where the property is located.
In order to overcome the difficulties caused by the draftsman' s ignorance, oversight or
omission, the court disregarded nine words from the Ordinance and read in eight words.
In the present matter involving section 66(c), if the words 'aids or abets' are left intact,
the secondary offence created by that provision will be unworkable as the Act does not
103 Murphy op cit at 71 citing Rv Molon ey [1985] AC 905 and R v Hancock [1986] AC 455.
104 [1974] 2 All ER 97 at 100. See also John Bell and George Eng le (eds) Cross: Statuto ry Interpretation
2ed London: Butterworths 1987 at 47 and 102; Francis Bennion Statuto ry Interpretation London:
Butterworths 1984 at 676 ; Francis Bennion Statute Law 2ed London: Oyez Longman 1983 at 158.
105 (1886) 11 App Cas 627.
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provide for the principal offence of illegal trafficking . So striking out the words 'aids or
abets' from section 66(c) will prevent that provision from being unworkable. As for the
words to read in (the words ' engages in ' ), it is arguable that they are necessarily implied
by the words already in section 66 for the proscription of illegal trafficking presupposes
that someone may engage or participate in it.
The punishment for the foregoing offences relating to wastes, chemicals, pesticides or
hazardous processes, wastes, substances or materials is a fine in the range between
MWK20 000 (US $150) and MWK1 000000 (US $7 519). If these penalties are anything
to go by, it may be inferred that these offences are regarded as serious offences.
4.2.8 Offences relating to pollution
It is an offence to discharge or emit any pollutant into the environment otherwise than in
accordance with the Act. 106 By pollutant is meant any substance whether in a solid , liquid
or gaseous form, which directly or indirectly: (a) alters adversely or destroys the quality
of the environment, or (b) is dangerous or potentially dangerous to public health, plant or
animal life. Examples are objectionable odours , radioactive substances or particles, noise ,
vibration, or any substance or particle that causes temperature change or physical,
chemical or biological change to the environment. 107
It appears from the phrase 'otherwise than in accordance with the Act' that the discharge
or emission of pollutants into the environment is not prohibited per se. What is prohibited
is the discharge or emission which is contrary to the Act. For the law-abiding citizen to
avoid contravening the section, he needs to know what the Act prescribes as the
permissible discharge or emission of pollutants. There isn ' t much guidance on this aspect
from the Act. No criteria are clearly laid out for lawful discharges or emissions. The main
section dealing with the discharge of pollutants (section 42) repeats the proscription
106 Section 67 of the EMA.
107 Section 1 of the EMA .
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against discharges or emissions contrary to the Act. Then it places a duty on every person
to prevent discharges or emissions contrary to the Act and a duty to comply with general
or specific directions of the Minister or Director of Environmental Affairs in respect of
the prevention, minimization, cleaning-up, removal or disposal of pollutants. Thus it
makes no mention of permissible discharges or emissions.
In this connection, it may be noted that the Act requires the other polluting activities (e.g.
discharge of effluents or disposal of waste) to be undertaken on the authority of a
licence. 108 It is surprising that the licence requirement is not expressly demanded by
section 42 in relation to the discharge of pollutants. Perhaps there is scope for arguing
that a licence is required for the discharge of pollutants. Since the definitions of waste
and effluent under the Act 109 seem to be capable of falling under 'pollutants' as defined
by the Act and since a licence is required for the discharge of waste or effluent, it may be
argued that licences are required for the discharge of pollutants as long as the pollutant in
issue is waste or effluent. Reference may also be made to the environmental quality
standards which the Minister is empowered to prescribe generally and, in particular, for
air, water, soil, noise, vibrations, radiation, effluent and solid waste.i" It may be
contended that any person who discharges or emits pollutants in such a way as to
contravene the environmental quality standards discharges or emits the pollutants
'otherwise than in accordance with the Act' and consequently commits an offence under
section 67. The defect in this argument apparently lies in the fact that section 65 already
makes provision for offences arising from violation of environmental standards and so
violation of environmental standards in respect of pollutants may seemingly be punished
under two sections (section 65(a) and section 67). This, however, would be an incorrect
108 Section 67 of the EMA (for licence to discharge effluent) and section 38 of the EMA (for licence for
waste). The licence may presumably indicate the permissible way of discharging the effluent or disposing
of the waste.
109 Section I of the EMA defines waste as including domestic, commercial or industrial waste whether in a
liquid, solid or gaseous or radioactive form which is disc harged, emitted or deposited into the environment
in such volume, composition or manner as to cause pollution. Section I defines effluent as waste water or
other fluid originating from a domestic or an agricultural or industrial activity, whether treated or untreated
and whether discharged directly or indirectly into the environment.
110 Section 30 of the EMA.
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way of looking at the matter. The maxim generalia specialibus non derogant' :' suggests
that the provision dealing generally with infringements of environmental standards
(section 65(a)) does not override the provision dealing specifically with infringements of
environmental standards by way of discharge of pollutants (section 67). So infringement
of environmental standards generally would be punished under section 65(a) but
infringement of environmental standards by way of discharge of pollutants would be
punished under section 67. Justification for this difference may possibly be found in the
more severe consequences that may result from the infringement of environmental
standards through the discharge of pollutants. This agrees with the more severe
punishment provided for discharge of pollutants. 112
4.3 National Parks and Wildlife Act 11 of 1992
4.3.1 General
The National Parks and Wildlife Act 11 of 1992 ('NAPWA') came into force on 01 April
1994. 113 It replaced the National Parks Act and repealed the Game Act, Wild Birds
Protection Act and Crocodiles Act. 114 It is a consolidating statute. Its long title declares
that the Act seeks to consolidate the law relating to national parks and wildlife
management. The Act proceeds to do this by incorporating within its reach the substance
of the aforementioned repealed Acts. Section 3 of NAPWA sets out the general purposes
of the Act as:
I11 This maxim means 'general provisions do not derogate from particular ones.' This maxim was applied
in Re Standard Manufacturing Co [1891] 1 Ch 627.
112 Under section 67 of the EMA the punishment for offences relating to pollutants are a fine of not less
than MWK20 000 (US $183) and not more than MWKl 000 000 (US $9 174) and to imprisonment for 10
years. This may be contrasted with section 65's punishment: a fine of not less than MWK5 000 (US $46)
and not more than MWK200 000 (US $1 835) and imprisonment for two years.
113 G N 57/1994.
114 Section 124(1) of NAPWA. The repealed Acts were cap 66:03 , cap 66:04 and cap 66:06 of the Laws of
Malawi respectively. The replaced National Parks Act was cap 66:07.
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(a) the conservation of selected examples of wildlife communities in Malawi;
(b) the protection of rare, endangered and endemic species of wild plants and
animals;
(c) the conservation of wildlife throughout Malawi so that the abundance and
diversity of their species are maintained at optimum levels commensurate with
other forms of land use, in order to support sustainable utilization of wildlife
for the benefit of the people of Malawi;
(d) the control of dangerous vertebrate species;
(e) the control of import, export and re-export of wildlife species and specimens;
and
(f) the implementation of relevant international treaties, agreements or any other
arrangements to which Malawi or the Government is a party.
Of NAPWA's sixteen parts, six parts have specific purposes. 115 As all these purposes are
indicative of legislative intent, they are crucial in understanding the crimes created by the
Act. The discussion will now focus on the various criminal offences in the Act.
4.3.2 Obstruction of officers and information to officers
It is an offence to obstruct any officer in the performance of his functions under
NAPWA. 116 By 'officer' is meant the Chief Parks and Wildlife Officer ('CPWO') and
other officers subordinate to him responsible for the administration of the Act. 117 As for
'obstruct' it may be noted that obstruction does not necessarily involve a physical act: the
obstruction may be verbal, for instance answering questions incorrectly. I IS The
115 Parts VI, VII, VIII, IX, X and XI. The relevant sections containing the specific purposes of the parts are
42, 46, 63, 73, 85 and 96.
116 Section 15(a) ofNAPWA. J W Cecil Turner (ed) Russell on Crime 12ed London: Stevens & Sons 1964
at 317 writes that obstructing the execution of lawful process is an offence against public justice.
117 Section 1 as read with section 5 ofNAPWA.
118 Ledger v DPP [1991] Crim LR 439 ; Green v Moore [1982] QB 1044; R v George [1981] Crim LR 185.
Cf Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414 .
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obstruction may also be by way of omission if the person obstructing is under a pre-
existing duty to act. 119 Further, it appears from the wording of section 15 of NAPWA that
mens rea may not be an element of the offence of obstruction as there is no word
suggesting mens rea in section 15(a) whereas such words are used in section 15(c).120
It is an offence to refuse to furnish to any officer on request, particulars or information to
which the officer is entitled under the Act: section 15(b). Again there is no indication that
mens rea is an element of this offence. 121
Section 15(c) provides that any person who wilfully or recklessly gives to any officer
false or misleading information which the officer is entitled to obtain under the Act, is
guilty of an offence. On the face of it, this provision gives the impression that the officer
may be entitled to false or misleading information under the Act. This impression is,
without doubt, wrong. The better way of construing this provision is to regard the officer
as being entitled to certain information under the Act instead of which he receives false
or misleading information. On this view, the elements of the offence would be: (1)
officer's entitlement to obtain information under the Act; (2) giving of false or
misleading information to satisfy or meet that entitlement; and (3) wilfully or recklessly.
Of these elements (1) and (2) do not merit further discussion. With regard to element (3),
the word 'recklessly' has already been defined at the beginning of this chapter, so only
the word 'wilfully' will be defined here.
The leading authority on the meaning of 'wilfully' is R v Sheppard. 122 In that case Lord
Diplock stated that the adverb 'wilfully,' where it qualifies a particular act or failure to
119 Lunt v DPP [1993] Crim LR 534. See also Murphy op cit at 161, Smith and Hogan op cit at 395 and
Wane s/o Kawinga v R 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 551 .
120 Of course this point is not conclusive of the fact that mens rea is not required, but it is one factor that is
considered: Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918 at 921 and Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 at 149.
121 See the immediately foregoing footnote.
122 [1981] AC 394.
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act in the definition of a crime, makes it clear that the offence 'requires mens rea, a state
of mind on the part of the offender directed to the particular act or failure to act that
constitutes the actus reus and warrants the desc ription "wilful". ,\23 In agreement with him
Lord Keith of Kinkel said that the word was used in the statute under consideration in
that case to describe the mental element. His lordship went on to say that the primary
meaning of 'wilful' is 'deliberate' and that as a matter of general principle, recklessness
is to be equiparated with deliberation.124 In the result the majority of the House of Lords
equated 'wilfully' with recklessness as understood under common law. 125 In R v
Newingtoni" Watkins LJ, after concluding that the mens rea for ill-treating a mentally
disordered patient was contained in the word 'wilfully,' said that the mens rea imported
by that word was 'a guilty mind involving either an appreciation by the appellant at the
time that she was inexcusably ill-treating a patient or that she was reckless as to whether
she was inexcusably acting in that way. ,\27 The effect of these decisions is that the word
'wilfully' denotes basic mens rea in the sense of intention or recklessness.l'" This
position has been accepted and applied in a recent Malawian case. 129 The accused had
been convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and malicious damage to
property (namely, a shirt) contrary to sections 254 and 344 of the Penal Code. On appeal
both counsel urged the court to acquit the accused on the malicious damage count
because the accused, having only wanted to injure the complainant and only damaged the
shirt in the course of the other crime, cou ld not have damaged the shirt wilfully.
Rejecting the argument, Mwaungulu J said:
123 [1981] AC 394 at 403.
124 [1981] AC 394 at 418.
125 P J Richardson (ed) Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice London: Sweet and Maxwell
2004 at para 17-48.
126 (1990) 91 Cr App R 247.
127 (1990) 91 Cr App R 247 at 254.
128 Murphy op cit at 26.
129 In this case it appears that counsel for the prosecution and counsel for the defence had been classmates
in law school and the accused was a relative of counsel for the defence. This state of affairs may explain the
kind of arguments that were made in court.
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Both [counsel for the State and counsel for the defence] thought that on the facts
the lower court accepted, the defendant did not wilfully destroy the clothes, she
only intending to injure the complainant. The argument is, as I understand it, that
the defendant never intended to destroy the property. This submission, in my
judgment, can only be premised on the narrower understanding of the word
'wilfully.' The understanding of the word 'wilfully' under section 344 and,
indeed, under other provisions in the Code, is informed, under section 3 of the
Code, by the meaning of the word under English Criminal Law. The word there is
not understood only to mean 'deliberately' or 'voluntarily'. It covers both
intention and recklessness. One, in my judgment, acts wilfully not only where
what one does is as [a] result of his volition but also, where the immediate acts
[are] as a result of one's volition; the consequences of his wilful act are matters
known by all reasonable men and women to follow naturally from his act of
volition. If a man intends to shoot an attendant inside a shop through a glass
window, destruction to the window, even though not the immediate concern, is a
result of his wilful act and therefore acts wilfully in destroying the window. 130
The conclusion that 'wilfully' encompasses both intention and recklessness does not fit
nicely in section 15(c) of NAPWA. It will be recalled that this section specifically lists
'recklessly' and so to say that 'wilfully' in section 15(c) also includes 'recklessly' may
mean that Parliament was repeating itself unnecessarily. It is suggested that to deal with
this problem, 'wilfully' in section 15(c) should be regarded as importing mens rea in the
form of intention only.
The penalties for the offences under section 15 of NAPWA are arguably laid out in
section 108 of the Act. In the case of a first offence, a fine of not less than MWK200 (US
$1.50) but not more than MWK500 (US $4) may be imposed together with imprisonment
for a term of three months. In the case of a second or subsequent offence, the minimum
130 Chimwemwe Gulumba v Republic Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 51 of 2003 (unreported, but
copy ofjudgment available on http: //www.judiciary.mw when accessed in January 2005).
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fine is raised to MWK500 and the maximum is pegged at MWKl 000 (US $8) and the
term of imprisonment is increased to six months.
4.3.3 Official records
It is an offence, without lawful authority, to alter, deface or remove any 'official record'
maintained in pursuance of the Act or any regulation or order made under the Act. It is
also an offence to alter or deface any 'p rescribed document' issued under the Act.131
NAPWA makes provision for the keeping of records. For instance , it requires the
Minister to ensure that proper books and other records of account be kept in respect of
receipts and expenditures of the National Parks and Wildlife Fund. 132 Subsidiary
legislation under the Act also provides for records in certain cases. For example,
regulation 5 of the National Parks and Wildlife (Control of Trophies and Trade in
Trophies) Regulations' < requires an officer to whom a rhinoceros horn or other ivory is
produced, to indelibly mark it with the acronym for the district where it was found, the
year of registration and a serial number, and then enter these particulars in a register kept
by the State. Altering, defacing or removing of such records arguably falls within the
scope of this offence. It may be observed, in this regard, that the word 'official' is
probably meant to distinguish records kept or owned by the State from records kept or
owned by private persons.
With regard to the term 'prescribed document, ' the reference is to documents issued
under the Act, for example licences to take or hunt wildlife. These licences are required
to be in the prescribed form.l " Some of the licences limit the kinds of wildlife which
131 Section 16 ofNAPWA.
132 Section 105 ofNAPWA.
133 G N 86/1994. These regulations were made under section 87 of NAP WA.
134 Section 48(4) ofNAPWA.
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may be taken or hunted. So altering or defacing such limitations may lead to a conviction
under this provision.
The punishment seems to be the same as that for obstruction of officers, that is, the
penalties laid out in section 108 ofNAPWA.
4.3.4 Offences relating to temporary management measures for protected areas
NAPWA gives power to the Minister to declare any area of land or water within Malawi
to be a national park or a wildlife reserve. 135 When an area is proposed for declaration as
a national park or wildlife reserve and action to do so has been started, the Minister may,
on the recommendations of the Wildlife Research and Management Board,136 make
administrative arrangements for managing the area by imposing temporary management
measures for a period of up to six months pending declaration of the area as a national
park or wildlife reserve. The CPWO presides over such temporary management measures
and has power to direct or instruct any person in connection with the management of the
area. The directives or instructions may also be issued by another officer provided he is
duly acting on behalf of the CPWO. Any person who fails to comply with any directive
or instruction of the CPWO or such other officer commits an offence of strict liability. 137
It is significant that section 30 expressly says: ' ... for the avoidance of doubt, the offence
hereby created is a strict liability offence.' Does this mean that all offences under
NAPWA which do not have this express indication of strict liability are offences which
require mens rea? This question must be answered in the negative. An examination of the
Act reveals that some of its provisions creating offences expressly require mens rea as an
element of the offence by the use of such words as 'wilfully' or 'recklessly' (for example,
135 Section 28(1) ofNAPWA.
136 The Wildlife Research and Management Board is established under section 17 of NAPWA. According
to section 19 of NAPWA its functions are to advise the Minister on all matters relating to national parks
and wildlife management in Malawi , including in particular advising on the declaration of areas to be
national parks or wildlife reserves, and advising on the import, export and re-export of wildlife specimens
into and out of Malawi.
137 Section 30 ofNAPWA.
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section 15(c)). A similar question may be asked here: does this mean that all offences
under NAPWA which do not have this express requirement of mens rea are offences of
strict liability? Again this question must be answered in the negative. It all depends on the
particular provision creating the offence. A proper construction of a particular provision
should lead to a finding as to whether the offence in issue is one of strict liability or of
mens rea. In this endeavour, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the presumption
that mens rea is an ingredient of the offence is not strong where the offence in issue is not
truly criminal in nature, and many environmental offences are of this type.
The penalties for offences relating to temporary management measures for protected
areas are provided for in section 108 ofNAPWA.
4.3.5 Prohibition of entering or residing in national park or wildlife reserve without
authority
It is an offence for any person to enter into or reside in, or attempt to enter into or reside
in, any national park or wildlife reserve .138 'Entry' in this offence certainly means what as
a matter of ordinary English usage one would say constitutes entry. It may also include
placing the upper part of the body in the national park or wildlife reserve although both
feet are outside it,139 It is suggested that in understanding entry, use must be made of the
definition of entry in the offences of burglary and housebreaking under the Penal Code.140
If this is accepted, the entry in section 32(1) of NAPWA will mean that a person will be
deemed to have entered a national park or wildlife reserve as soon as any part of his body
or any part of any instrument used by him is within the national park or wildlife reserve.
As may be apparent, the offence in section 32(1) has two limbs: first, enter or reside; and
second, attempt to enter or reside. The first limb is the completed offence whereas the
138 Section 32(1) of NAPWA.
139 R v Brown [1985] Crim LR 212 .
140 Section 308 of the Penal Code provides, inter alia , that ' [a] person is deemed to enter a building as soon
as any part of his body or any part of any instrument used by him is within the building.'
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second limb is a preliminary offence (or what is sometimes called an inchoate offence).
The section does not provide for any mens rea for the complete offence of entry or
residence and so there is a possibility that it may be an offence of strict liability. The
section does not also indicate any mens rea for the pre liminary offence of attempt to enter
or reside. The difficulty with the attempt is that it cannot be an offence of strict liability:
it is impossible to attempt to commit a crime without a guilty mind. Russell on Crime14 1
puts it in this way:
,[A] man cannot attempt to do that which he does not intend, if he is able, to do.
Whether he is confident or doubtful as to his chances of success nonetheless the
word "attempt" cannot be properly used to describe his activity unless he intends,
by means of that activity, to succeed in reaching his objective.'
Accordingly, it must be implied that mens rea is an ingredient of the attempt to enter or
reside. The relevant type of mens rea is intention: ' there can be no question of
"recklessness" or "negligence" amounting to sufficient mens rea. ,\42 In R v Mohan 143 the
court considered what is meant by ' intention ' when that word is used to describe the
mens rea in attempt. In the process of answering this question the court distinguished
'intention' from 'motive' in the sense of an emotion leading to action. The court held that
in attempts 'intention' means 'specific intent, a decision to bring about, in so far as it lies
within the accused's power, the commission of the offence which it is alleged the accused
attempted to commit, no matter whether the accused desired that consequence of his act
or not.'
141 J W Ceci I Turner (ed) Russell on Crime 12ed London: Stevens & Sons 1964 at I 17.
142 Ibid, especially footnote 27. In P J Richardson (ed) Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice
London: Sweet and Maxwell 2004 at para 17 it is stated: 'The mental element required to make a man
guilty of an attempt to commit an offence is often , if not invariably, greater than that required for the full
offence.'
143 [1976] QB I at 8 and 11. See also Ian Dennis 'The Law Commission Report on Attempt and
Impossibility in relation to Attempt, Conspiracy and Incitement: (1) The Elements of Attempt' [1980] Crim
LR 758 at 761 - 762.
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Having ascertained the type of mental element required generally in attempts, the
question remains whether mens rea is an essential ingredient of an attempt to commit an
offence of strict liability. Put another way, the issue is whether an attempt to commit an
offence of strict liability is itself an offence of strict liability. In Jamaica it was decided
that the attempt in these circumstances is not an offence of strict liability.l'" It is
submitted that Malawian courts should follow this lead . The effect of this is that it is
acceptable for the offence of attempt to enter or reside in a national park or wildlife
reserve to require proof of mens rea although the full offence of entry or residence in a
national park or wildlife reserve may be an offence of strict liability.
With regard to the actus reus for the attempt, it may be pointed out that the law is not
very settled. Perhaps a useful guide is that of Lord Parker CJ in Davey v Lee,145 quoting a
text writer: 'the actus reus necessary to consti tute an attempt is complete if the prisoner
does an act which is a step towards the commission of the specific crime, which is
immediately and not merely remotely connected with the commission of it, and the doing
of which cannot reasonably be regarded as having any other purpose than the commission
of the specific crime.' At present it is not possible to give a comprehensive list of acts
which qualify as actus reus for attempt. All that can be said is that it will depend on the
facts of each case .
144 Dorcas White'Attempts: Initiatives in Common Law Caribb ean ' [1980] Crim LR 780 at 782 - 784. The
particular case which decided this is Lockhart reported in The Daily Gleaner, December 6, 1977 at 13. The
English case of R v Mohan [1976] QB 1 dealt with a situation in which the complete offence did not have
mens rea as an ingredient. The court held in effect that even though this was the position, mens rea was an
essential ingredient of an attempt to commit the complete offence.
145 [1968] QB 366 at 371. Lord Parker quoted para graph 4104 of the 36th edition (1966) of Archbold's
Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice. See also DPP v Ston ehouse [1978] AC 55 at 68 where Lord
Diplock said: 'The constituent elements of the incho ate crime of an attempt are a physical act by the
offender sufficiently proximate to the compl ete offence and an intention on the part of the offender to
commit the complete offence. Acts that are merely preparatory to the commission of the offence ... are not
sufficiently proximate to constitute an attempt. The y do not indicate a fixed irrevocable intention to go on
to commit the complete offence unless involuntarily prevented from doing so. As it was put in the locus
classicus Reg. v Eagleton (1855) Dears. C.C. 515, 538: "The mere intention to commit a misdemeanour is
not crim inal. Some act is required, and we do not think that all acts towards committing a misdemeanor are
indictable. Acts remotely leading towards the commission of the offence are not to be considered as
attempts to commit it, but acts immediately connected with it are ; ... " In other words the offender must
have crossed the Rubicon and burnt his boats.' [The format (paragraphing) in this quotation has been
modified].
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It is not clear why Parliament specifically provided for the offence of attempt in this
particular instance. Every attempt to commit a criminal offence, whether such offence is
created by statute or is an offence at common law, is itself a criminal offence at common
law. 146 As a result an attempt to commit any of the full offences created in NAPWA is a
criminal offence even in the absence of express statutory provision for such attempt.
Therefore it was not necessary for Parliament to specifically provide for the offence of
attempt to enter into or reside in any national park or wildlife reserve.
It must be noted at this stage that the offences of entry or residence or attempt to enter or
reside can only be committed where the person does so without authority. The 'authority'
is at two levels. In the first place, the Act allows certain persons to enter or reside in a
national park or wildlife reserve without incurring any liability under section 32(1).
These persons include the Minister, the CPWO, any member of the Wildlife Research
and Management Board, any officer appointed for the purposes of the Act, any employee
of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife and any police officer on official duties
requiring his presence in a national park or wildlife reserve. 147 This group of people does
not have to obtain any permit in respect of the entry or residence. In the second place, the
Act exempts from liability under the section those people who enter or reside in the
national park or wildlife reserve on the authority of a permit. They obtain the permit from
the CPWO. 148
Section 32 does not specify the penalty for its contravention. However, section 11Q(d) of
NAPWA provides that the punishment for contravention of section 32 is a fine of
MWKI0 000 (US $75) and imprisonment for five years.
1% ~R v Scofield (1784) Cald Mag Cas 397 at 402 ; 10 Halsbury 's Laws of England (3 edition) 306, para
567. In Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476 at 491 Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone LC said. "An attempt to
commit a criminal offence, is itself a criminal offence at common law . . . '
147 Section 32(2)(a) and (b) ofNAPWA.
148 Section 32(2)(c) and (3) of NAPWA. The permit is required to be in the format of Form I of the
Schedule to the National Parks and Wildlife (Miscellaneous Forms) Regulations promulgated under section
1230fNAPWA.
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4.3.6 Prohibition of conveyance, possession or use of weapons, traps, explosives or
poisons
It is an offence to convey into, or possess or use within, any national park or wildlife
reserve any weapon, trap, explosive or poison.l'" The word 'convey' must be given its
primary ordinary grammatical meaning, that is, transport or carry to a place. Any attempt
to employ the legal meaning of 'convey' (that is, transfer title to property) is
unacceptable as it may lead to an absurdity. Similarly ' use' must be accorded its plain,
ordinary meaning. As for 'possess ' more must to be said. There is general agreement that
a person cannot 'possess' without a mental element. 150 The 'legal concept of possession
involves both the actus reus element of physical possession, and a state of mind, the
animus possidendi, which can only be a part of the requisite mens rea. ,\51 In Warner v
Metropolitan Police Commissioner' V the court held that a person may be said to
'possess' prohibited drugs if he knows that he possesses drugs, even though he is
unaware of their precise characteristics. P'' It is no defence that the person did not know
and could not be expected to know that the drugs were prohibited drugs. 154 The Malawian
decision of Republic v Chipole155 endorsed this interpretation of the word 'possess'. In
the present context a person will be convicted of possession under section 31 if he knows
that he possesses the weapon, trap, explosive or poison even though he is unaware of its
149 Section 33(1) ofNAPWA.
150 Smith and Hogan op cit at 128.
151 Murphy op cit at 64.
152 [1969] 2 AC 256 .
153 Murphy op cit at 64 .
154 R vll radish [1990] 1 QB 981; R v Wailer [1991] Crim LR 381 ; and Rv Steele [1993] Crim LR 298.
155 8 Malawi Law Reports 202.
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characteristics. The actus reus of possession consists in a measure of control over the
thing alleged to be possesscd.l'"
It may be observed that conveyance, possession or use of weapons, traps, explosives or
poisons in a national park or wildlife reserve is permissible in specified circumstances. In
the first place, conveyance, possession or use by any officer acting in the performance of
his duties is acceptable. 157 In the second place, the conveyance, possession or use is
permitted where it is intended for harvesting resource within a national park or wildlife
reserve. If this is the intention, the CPWO issues authority to any person not to comply
with the prohibition against conveyance, possession or use to the extent specified in the
h . 158aut onty.
The Act makes provision for a specific penalty for these offences of conveyance,
possession or use. Section 11O(d) states that the penalties are a fine of MWK1 0 000 and
imprisonment for five years.
4.3.7 Prohibition of deposition of litter or waste
It is an offence to discard or deposit any litter or any waste material in a national park or
wildlife reserve otherwise than into a receptacle provided for the purpose.1 59 NAPWA
156 Smith and Hogan op cit at 129.
157 Section 33(2) of NAPWA. Arguably these duties include general duties and special duties received by
virtue of section 40 of NAPWA. Under section 40 it is provided that if the CPWO is satisfied that an
otherwise unlawful act specified by sections 34 to 37 should be carried out in any national park or wildlife
reserve in the interest of better wildlife management, he may seek the opinion of the Wildlife Research and
Management Board. If the board agrees with the CPWO, the board can, with the approval of the Minister,
issue written instructions to any officer authorizing him to undertake the act. These acts include hunting or
disturbing wild plants or animals. Obviously these acts may be executed through the use of or may involve
the possession of or conveyance into the park or reserve of, weapons, traps , explosives or poison . Such use,
possession or conveyance is permitted on account of the exemption in section 33(2).
158 Section 39(a) of NAPWA. Section 39(b) vests in the CPWO the responsibility to regulate and control
the harvesting in the national park or wildlife reserve. In carrying out this responsibility, the CPWO is
under a duty to ensure that the annual harvest does not exceed sustainable yield level unless it is judged
desirable by the Minister to exceed temporarily such level for the purposes of management.
159 Section 34 ofNAPWA.
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does not define the terms 'litter' and 'waste material' . These words are also not defined in
EMA. What EMA defines is 'waste ' alone. It is suggested that the definition of 'waste
material' should be informed by EMA's definition of 'waste,,\ 60 since EMA is the
supreme law in this area and any law inconsisten t with it is invalid to the extent of the
inconsistency.l'" No mens rea or specific penalty is indicated for this offence. It is likely
that offenders of this provision will be sentenced to the general penalties set out in
section 108 ofNAPWA.
4.3.8 Other prohibited acts in a national park or wildlife reserve
Section 35 of NAPWA lists a number of acts which are prohibited in a national park or
wildlife reserve. It declares that any person who performs any of these acts commits an
offence unless he is authorized to perform it in terms of section 39 or section 40.
162
The
prohibited acts are as follows: 163
(a) hunting, taking, killing, injuring or disturbing any wild plant or animal, or any
domestic animal or cultivated plant occurring lawfully in a national park or
wildlife reserve;
(b) taking, destroying, damaging or defacing any object of geomorphological,
archaeological, historical , cultural, or scientific interest, or any structure
lawfully placed or constructed therein;
160 Section 2 of EMA defines waste as including domestic, commercial or industrial waste whether in a
liquid, solid , gaseous or radioactive form which is discharged, emitted or deposited into the environment in
such volume, composition or manner as to cause pollution.
161 Section 7 of EMA.
162 Section 39 deals with harvesting resource in a natio nal park or wildlife reserve with the authority of the
CPWO. Section 40 deals with carrying out an otherwise unlawful act by an officer at the instruction of the
Wildlife Research and Management Board and with the approval of the Minister in the interest of better
wildlife management.
163 All the matters specified in section 35 can properly be described as acts with the exception of permitting
a domestic animal to stray into a national park or wildlife reser ve. So the language in the text should have
been in terms of ' acts and omissions. ' Howe ver, for the sake of convenience of expression , the reference to
omissions has been left out.
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(c) preparing land for cultivation, prospecting for minerals or mines or attempting
any of these operations;
(d) driving , conveying or introducing any wild animal into a national park or
wildlife reserve;
(e) driving, conveying or introducing any domestic animal into a national park or
wildlife reserve, or permitting any domestic animal, of which he is for the
time being in charge, to stray into a national park or wildlife reserve.
There is an overlap of terminology in the above prohibitions. For instance section 2 of
NAPWA defines 'take' in relation to an animal as ' to wound, capture , or kill the animal,
or remove or destroy its nest or egg or any part of it.' Thus, taking, in relation to an
animal, encompasses killing; yet the first set of prohibited acts above includes both taking
and killing. It must be noted, however, that the first set of prohibited acts refers to both
animals and plants and since the Act only defines taking in relation to animals, it may
have been necessary to include both ' taking' and 'killing' for the sake of the plants. It
may further be observed that here the word ' taking' has a broader meaning than that set
out in section 2. The context suggests that while the section 2 meaning of taking may be
maintained in respect of animals, an ordinary grammatical meaning of taking may be
adopted in respect of the plants. The ordinary grammatical meaning of 'take' is to lay
hold of with one's hands or to remove from a place.l?"
Interesting issues arise when one considers the meaning of 'hunt'. According to section 2
'hunt' means to attempt to take. Since ' take' is defined in the Act in relation to animals
only, it follows that 'hunt' is allied with animals in terms of section 2. However, when
'hunt' is considered in the context of the first set of prohibited acts above, its meaning
will have to follow the broader scope of ' take' as suggested. So apart from meaning an
attempt to take as defined in section 2 in relation to animals, 'hunt' in relation to plants
will have to mean an attempt to take in the ordinary grammatical meaning of 'take'. The
effect of this is that 'hunt' in relation to plants means an attempt to lay hold of plants with
164 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2002).
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one's hands or to remove plants from a national park or wildlife reserve. From these
proposals on the meaning of 'hunt' it will be noted that the meaning of 'hunt' has two
prongs, one relating to animals and the other relating to plants. This two-pronged
meaning must be compared to a purely ordinary grammatical meaning of hunt. In
common parlance there is no problem with the phrase 'hunting animals': people generally
talk of hunting animals, but it is not normal or ordinary to talk of 'hunting plants'. Thus,
strictly speaking, there is no ordinary meaning of 'hunting plants'. This suggests the
impossibility of directly attaching an ordinary meaning to 'hunting plants'. It may be
added that trying to attach an ordinary meaning to 'hunting plants' ignores the effect of
section 2's interpretation of the word 'hunt'. For these reasons, a purely ordinary
grammatical meaning of 'hunt' is not acceptable. It is submitted that the two-pronged
meaning of 'hunt' outlined above is more sensible.
It is apparent from the preferred meaning of 'hunt' that 'attempt' is a crucial element of
its meaning. So the law relating to attempts, set out above, applies. Accordingly, for a
person to be convicted of hunting under section 35(a) , it must be proved that he had the
requisite mens rea and that he had executed the actus reus. In this case the requisite mens
rea is a specific intent (or a decision) to take an animal or a plant. The actus reus is any
act which is a step towards taking an animal or a plant, which is immediately and not
merely remotely connected with the taking of the animal or plant, and the execution of
which act cannot reasonably be regarded as having any other purpose than the taking of
the animal or plant. 165
Section 35(b) of NAPWA - containing the second set of prohibited acts listed above -
makes reference to 'taking'. This time the object of the taking is not an animal. The
ordinary grammatical meaning may therefore be adopted without difficulty.
Section 35(c) of NAPWA - containing the third set of prohibited acts listed above -
proscribes the preparation of land for cultivation, prospecting for minerals or mines ,
165 The suggested actus reus has essentially followed the language of Lord Parker Cl in Davey v Lee [1968]
QB 366 at 371.
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attempting to prepare land for cultivation and attempting to prospect for minerals or
mines. Again the use of the word 'attempt' implies that the law relating to attempts
discussed above applies. In this connection, it may be observed that , for reasons stated
above, it was not necessary for Parliament to make speci fic provision for the attempt as
an attempt will generally have been implied as a matter of general principle.
With regard to mens rea, section 35 of NAPWA does not expressly state the kind of
guilty mind that must accompany the listed prohibited acts. The possibility of strict
liability may therefore be explored, but it is clear that some of the offences cannot be
committed in the absence of mens rea: attempts and hunting are examples.
The punishment for the offences listed in section 35 is set out in section 11O(d) of
NAPWA. This provision states that any person who is convicted of an offence involving
contravention of, inter alia, section 35 of the Act , is ' liable to a fine of Kl 0 000 and to
imprisonment for a term of 5 years , and in any case the fine shall not be less than the
value of the specimen involved in the commission of the offence.' Section 11O(d) was the
subject of interpretation in the recent case of Republic v Maria Akimu. 166 The court said
166 Revision Case No. 9 of 2003 (unreported, but copy availabl e on http://www.judiciary.mw when
accessed in June 2005. The case appears to be based on the National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1992, that
is, the NAPWA under discussion. Section 110 of this Act is in the following terms: 'Any person who is
convicted of an offence involving -
(a) taking, hunting, molesting, or redu cing into possession any protected species other than game
species; or
(b) possession of, selling, buying, trans ferrin g or accepting in transfer any specimen of protected
species other than game species;
(c) contravention of provision of this Act which provides for the conduct of a licensee under a
professional hunter 's licence; or
(d) contravention of sections 32, 33 and 35 of this Act ,
shall be liable to a fine of K 10,000 and to imprisonment for a term of 5 years , and in any case the fine shall
not be less than the value of the specimen involved in the commission of the offence. '
The court apparently did not use this section, for the section it used is different in material respects. The
court said:
' Section 110 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act provides: "Any person who unlawfully
possesses or who purports to buy, sell or otherwise transfer or deal in any government trophy shall
be guilty of an offence . . . and shall be liable to a fine of K 10,000.00 and to imprisonment for a
term of 5 years and in any case the fine shall not be less than the value of the specimen involved in
commission of the offence". '
It is possible that the court used an earlier version of the Act. Nevertheless the authority of the case is not
affected by these defects as the issue before the court was punishment for an offence, and the punishments
for the offences in both versions of section 110 are ident ical.
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that there were uncertainties in the wording of section 110. Several scenarios were noted.
First, the section could mean that the court could impose a fine above MWKI0 000. The
difficulty was whether the MWK10 000 was the minimum, maximum or whatsoever. It
could not be the minimum because the trophy could be less than MWK10 000 in which
case the court could still impose a fine below MWKI0 000. It was thought that the
MWK10 000 was neither the minimum nor the maximum. Second, does the section mean
that the defendant is only liable to a fine of up to the value of the trophy? Or does the
section mean that the court should impose a fine equivalent to the value of the trophy?
Third, assuming that the legislature thought that the value of any trophy would be less
than MWKI0 000, the section may mean that while the fine must not exceed MWKI0
000, the court cannot impose a fine less or greater than the trophy's value and must
impose that value. Faced with these difficulties the court applied the presumption that
penal statutes are construed strictly and that where uncertainty arises in a penal provision,
the courts construe the provision in a manner favourable to the subject. The court
continued:
'Where there are many divergent constructions of a statute and it is difficult to
sufficiently ascertain what Parliament intended the construction favourable to the
defendant must be preferred. The legislature cannot intend to affect a subject's
liberty by unclear and ambiguous words. On the wording of the section, the lower
court assumed, correctly in my judgment, that the maximum fine was KI0 000.'
The effect of the court's decision in Akimu is that the words 'not more than' must be read
into section 110 between 'of and 'KI0 000 '. Thereafter the 22 words after the last 'and'
in the section, that is, the words 'in any case the fine shall not be less than the value of the
specimen involved in the commission of the offence' must be read subject to the
assumption that Parliament thought that the value of any specimen (or trophy) would be
less than MWKI0 000. It is submitted, with due respect, that this way of interpreting the
section leaves much to be desired. In the first place, there is no ground for assuming that
Parliament thought that the value for any trophy would be less than MWKI0 000. It is a
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fact of common notoriety that ivory sells at high prices167 and one of the reasons for the
continuation of the illicit trade in ivory is that it enriches its traders. Therefore the
assumption is contrary to common knowledge, and Parliament cannot be taken to assume
a fact that offends common sense. In the second place, the court' s mode of application of
the presumption of strict construction of penal statutes is somewhat anachronistic. In
earlier times this presumption was more than an example of the presumption against
unclear changes in the law. If a criminal provision was capable of two meanings,
however unreasonable one of those meanings might be, it was applied if it favoured the
accused.l'" For example, in R v Harris169 a statute provided that it was an offence to
'unlawfully and maliciously stab, cut, or wound any person.' The accused bit off a joint
of her victim's finger. It was held that the accused was not guilty of wounding within the
meaning of this statute. Similarly, in another case a statute 'deprived a man of benefit of
clergy if he stole horses, but the judges refused to apply this to the case of a man who
stole a single horse.' 170 This ancient approach to the construction of penal statutes has
given way in modem times to a purposive approach. In Anderton v Ryan 171 Lord Roskill
declared:
'It is ... important that the question of construction should be approached by
reference to well known principles, ignoring that which is irrelevant however
interesting, but remembering that statutes should be given what has become
known as a purposive construction, that is to say that the courts should where
possible identify "the mischief' which existed before the passing of the statute
167 This argument is valid even for 1994 prices. 1994 is the year when NAPWA came into force.
168 IJo m Bell and George Engle (eds) Cross: Statutory Interpretation 2ed London: Butterworths 1987 at
174 - 175.
169 (1836) 7 C & P 446.
170 John Bell and George Engle (eds) Cross: Statutory Interpretation 2ed London: Butterworths 1987 at
175.
171 [1985] AC 560 at 573. At 578 Lord Roskill warns: 'T he principle ... that where more than one
construction of a statute is possible that preferred should be the construction which eliminates the
"mischief' at which the statute was directed must not be carried to extremes. '
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and then if more than one construction IS possible , favour that which will
eliminate "the mischief' so identified. '
Thus, in general the modem court principally seeks 'the interpretation which makes sense
of the statute and its purpose, and the presumption of strict construction is merely an
ancillary aid for resolving difficult cases. ' 172
In the Akimu case the court did not use a purposive approach in interpreting section 110.
If the court had used a purposive approach the resultant meaning would have been
different. The purposes of NAPWA are set out in its section 3. These include the
conservation of selected examples of wildlife communities in Malawi, and the protection
of rare, endangered and endemic species of wild animals. A proper interpretation of
section 110 must conform to these purposes and seek to achieve them. Of the possible
interpretations of the penalty in section 110, the following may be noted: Firstly, the
MWK10 000 may be the minimum fine. Secondly, the MWK10 000 may be the
maximum fine. Thirdly, the MWK10 000 may be neither the minimum fine nor the
maximum fine, but simply a guide indicating that the offences punishable under this
section are of a more serious nature than most of the other offences in NAPWA which are
generally punished by fines of less than MWK2 000. The Akimu court opted to take the
MWK10 000 as the maximum fine but this cannot fit comfortably in the scope of the last
22 words of section 110. If the value of the specimen involved in the commission of the
offence is less than K10 000, for example MWK7 000, problems do not arise: the court
can impose a fine of between MWK7 000 and MWKlO 000. However, if the value of the
specimen is more than MWK10 000, for example MWK13 000, a conflict arises. On the
one hand, the last 22 words of section 110 require that the court should impose a fine that
is not less than MWK13 000. On the other hand the Akimu court's view suggests that the
fine to be imposed should not exceed MWK1 0 000. This conflict must be resolved in
favour of the last 22 words of section 110 because the 22 words permit the imposition of
172 John Bell and George Engle (eds) Cross: Statutory Interpretation 2ed London: Butterworths 1987 at
175. The purposive approach was also emplo yed in R v Bloxham [1983] lAC 109, [1982] 1 All ER 582; R
v Clarke [1985] AC 1037, [1985 ] 2 All ER 777.
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a heavy fine in line with the benefit the offender would likely get out of the specimen.
The imposition of such a heavy fine would teach the offender and society generally that
crime in this area does not pay. This conforms to NAPWA's purpose of protecting
species of wild animals. The Akimu court's suggestion that the MWK10 000 be regarded
as the maximum fine would lead to smaller or illogical fines being imposed, with the
likely result that there would be less compliance with the law and so defeating NAPWA's
purpose of protecting species of wild animals . Thus the meaning adopted by the court is
contrary to the purpose ofNAPWA.
A more acceptable meaning is provided by the third interpretation above: the MWK10
000 is neither the minimum fine nor the maximum fine, but simply a guide indicating that
the offences punishable under this section are of a more serious nature than most of the
other offences in NAPWA. The merit of this meaning lies in three factors. First, this
meaning does not necessitate the reading in or reading out of words in the section.
Second, this meaning gives effect to the last 22 words of the section. In other words, the
last 22 words are permitted to influence the penalty imposed on the offender in the sense
that they provide the minimum fine that can be meted out. This minimum fine is based on
the value of the specimen involved in the commission of the offence. So a person who
commits an offence relating to a specimen worth MWK50 000 will be fined to a
minimum fine of MWK50 000. If the specimen is valued at only MWK15 000, the
minimum fine will be MWK15 000. This way of looking at section 110 commends itself
to common sense. Third, the emancipation of the last 22 words of section 110 from the
Akimu bondage of reasoning leads to the attainment of NAPWA's purpose of protecting
species of wild animals as argued above.
All in all, it is submitted, with due respect to the learned judge in Akimu, that the
MWK10 000 in section 110 is not the maximum fine as held by the judge. Such a
meaning flies in the face of common sense, ignores the purpose of the enactment and
becomes possible only after an unnecessary reading in of words coupled with an
unacceptable assumption on Parliament's thoughts regarding the value of specimens. The
better view, it is suggested, is to regard the value of the specimen as the minimum fine
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and the MWKI0 000 as a possible fine subject to the minimum and as a guide to the rank
the offences under section 110 occupy in the general scheme of crimes under the Act.
It may finally be observed that the difficulties in the construction of section 110 have
arisen from the way the section is worded. These difficulties would disappear if the
reference to MWKI0 000 is omitted, that is, if the words 'ofKI0 000' are left out. If this
is done, the section will read: ' ... shall be liable to a fine and to imprisonment for a term
of 5 years, and in any case the fine shall not be less than the value of the specimen
involved in the commission of the offence.' An amendment along these lines is hereby
recommended.
4.3.9 Introduction of plants into national park or wildlife reserve
Section 37(1) ofNAPWA provides that 'except as otherwise provided by section 39' any
person who conveys or introduces any plant, whether of a wild or cultivated species, into
a national park or wildlife reserve, commits an offence. It appears that the words 'except
as otherwise provided by section 39' do not add anything to the offence created by this
section. Section 39 empowers the CPWO to issue authority to any person absolving him
from compliance with section 35(a). In essence that person can hunt, take, kill, injure or
disturb any wild plant or animal or any domestic animal or cultivated plant occurring
lawfully in a national park or wildlife reserve, without incurring any liability. It is not
easy to see the connection between this absolution from liability and the prohibition
against introduction of plants into a national park or wildlife reserve. In general the words
'except as otherwise provided by', when they appear in a statutory provision, may signal
the existence of a defence; they exclude from the ambit of that statutory provision
conduct which would otherwise have been impugned under that statutory provision. In
the statutory provision under discussion - section 37(1) - the words do not seem to
indicate any defence nor do they seem to exclude from the ambit of section 37(1) any
conduct set out in section 39 which would otherwise have been impugned under section
37(1). For the absolution from liability when hunting, taking, killing, injuring or
disturbing plants or animals in a national park or wildlife reserve does not seem to affect
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the prohibition against the introduction of plants in a national park or wildlife reserve. In
fact section 37(1) deals with plants that are in the national park or wildlife reserve
unlawfully whereas section 39 as read with section 35(a) deals with those plants and
animals that are in the national park or wildlife reserve lawfully.173 Perhaps the best way
to make sense of the words is to envisage a situation where in the process of hunting,
taking, killing, injuring or disturbing animals, the person uses plants. In other words, the
person conveys or introduces plants in a national park or wildlife reserve for the purpose
of hunting, taking, killing, injuring or disturbing animals. If this were to happen, such
conveyance or introduction of plants would not constitute an offence under section 37(1)
by virtue of the operation of the words' except as otherwise provided by section 39.'
The idea of conveying or introducing plants in a national park or wildlife reserve for
purposes of hunting, taking, killing, injuring or disturbing animals, does not make a lot of
sense. Therefore on its own, this idea cannot justify the retention of the words 'except as
otherwise provided by section 39.' In the premises, it is recommended that these words
be expunged from the section. Section 37(1) should simply read: 'Any person who
conveys or introduces any plant, whether of a wild or cultivated species, into a national
park or wildlife reserve shall be guilty of an offence. '
From the wording of section 37(1), it is easy to see the actus reus of the offence: it is
conveying or introducing a wild or cultivated plant into a national park or wildlife
reserve. However, there is no suggestion from the wording of the section regarding the
need for mens rea. Therefore, for reasons set out at the beginning of this chapter, there is
a possibility that mens rea is not an ingredient of this offence.
173 .Section 35(a) ~f ~APWA deals with domestic animals or cultivated plants occurring lawfully in a
national park or wildlife reserve. It also deals with wild plants or wild animals. It is not clearly indicated
whether these wild plants or wild animals occur lawfully or not in the national park or wildlife reserve.
There is no suggestion in the text of the statute that they are occurring unlawfully. In the circumstances, it
has been assumed that the wild plants or wild animals are occurring lawfully. In fact there is room for
arguing that the words 'occurring lawfully therein' may be applied to the wild plants or wild animals as
well.
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Offenders under this section are liable to the general penalties prescribed in section 108
ofNAPWA. 174
4.3.10 Prohibition against fire in national park or wildlife reserve
It is an offence to start or maintain any fire in a national park or wildlife reserve. 175 A
person may escape from liability under this offence if he has the written permission of the
CPWO or the Wildlife Officer to light a fire or cause a fire to be lighted, or to leave any
fire which has been lighted or which he has caused to be lighted, unextinguished, or to
discard any burning object. 176
Again this offence is introduced by the words 'except as otherwise provided by section
39.' These words would only make sense if it is assumed that in hunting, taking, killing,
injuring or disturbing any plant or animal in a national park or wildlife reserve with the
intention of harvesting resource, a person may use fire. An examination of section 39
even as read with section 35(a) reveals that it does not authorize the harvesting of
resource in a national park or wildlife reserve through the use of fire. Accordingly, the
reference to section 39 in the offence under discussion does not add anything. For this
reason it is recommended that the reference to section 39 should be excised from section
38. The recommendation is not to excise the words 'except as otherwise provided by
section 39,' but rather it is to excise only the words 'by section 39, or'. The reason for
this is that section 38 makes reference to both section 39 and section 41(2)(b). The
reference to section 41(2)(b) is valid, as such the words 'except as otherwise provided'
may be saved for the sake of the reference to section 41(2)(b). After the suggested
excision is effected, section 38 will read as follows: 'Except as otherwise provided by
section 41(2)(b), any person who starts or maintains any fire in a national park or wildlife
reserve shall be guilty of an offence. '
174 It must be added that apart from prosecuting offenders under this section, the CPWO is empowered
under section 37(2) of NAPWA to order the destruction or removal of any plant and any seedling or
offshoot thereof, brought into the national park or wildlife reserve.
175 Section 38 ofNAPWA.
176 Regulation 9 of the National Parks and Wildlife (Protected Areas) Regulations apparently promulgated
under section 41(2)(b) ofNAPWA. The regulations were promulgated in GN 87/1994 and GN 73/1997.
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In considering whether mens rea is an element of this offence, care must be taken to
avoid likening this offence to arson. At common law arson is defined as 'maliciously and
voluntarily burning the house of another by night or by day' 177 and in Holmes ' Case178 it
was held, inter alia, that the offence of arson may be committed by wilfully setting fire to
one's house, provided the house of another be thereby burned. Thus, at common law
mens rea is an element of arson. Similarly under section 337 of the Penal Code arson is
proscribed and defined in terms of wilfully and unlawfully setting fire to building, etc. 179
From this it may be inferred that the Penal Code requires mens rea for a person to be
convicted of arson. 180 It may be argued that since both the offences of arson and starting
or maintaining fire in a national park or wildlife reserve are based on causing to bum,
both offences must have mens rea as an element. This argument emphasizes the
similarities between the two offences but overlooks the differences between them. One
fundamental difference is that in arson some property, for example a building, must bum,
whereas in starting or maintaining a fire in a national park or wildlife reserve, it is not
necessary that some property or something, for example an animal or plant, bum.
Secondly, arson is a more serious offence and is punishable by life imprisonment. 181
Thirdly, if the legislature intended to make mens rea an element of the offence of starting
or maintaining fire in a national park or wildlife reserve, appropriate words would have
been used in NAPWA similar to or along the lines of the words employed in the Penal
Code. The different terminology in section 38 of NAPWA (for instance, the absence of
words importing mens rea) suggests that mens rea may not be an ingredient of the
offence of starting or maintaining fire in a national park or wildlife reserve.
177 J C Smith and B Hogan Criminal Law London: Butterworths 1965 at 494. Emphasis added.
178 (1634) Cro Car 376,79 ER 928.
179 See Republic v Metani 7 Malawi Law Reports 341 and Republic v Komihiwa 7 Malawi Law Reports
325 .
180 ~ctually all the full offences committed by the use of fire (sections 337 and 339 of the Penal Code)
require mens rea.
181 Section 337 of the Penal Code.
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Upon conviction of starting or maintaining fire in a national park or wildlife reserve, the
offender is liable to imprisonment for a period of up to six months and a fine of up to
MWK1000. 182
4.3.11 Offences against regulations for use of national park or wildlife reserve
The Minister is authorized, on the recommendation of the Wildlife Research and
Management Board, to make regulations in respect of the use or integrity of national
parks or wildlife reserves. Among other things, the regulations may provide for
conditions under which any person, vehicle, boat or aircraft may enter, travel through,
reside in or be kept in a national park or wildlife reserve. 183 Contravention of the
provisions of these regulations is an offence. 184 The precise elements of these offences
obviously depend on the wording of the particular regulation. The wording will
determine the required actus reus and, if applicable, mens rea. The punishment for any of
these offences is arguably the general penalty prescribed under section 108 of NAPWA.
This is evident from the penalty clauses of the regulations that have been promulgated so
far 185 and from the fact that where no other penalty is provided for an offence, the general
penalty under section 108 applies.
182 Section 108 of NAPWA. Under regulations 9 and 18 of the National Parks and Wildlife (Protected
Areas) Regulations a similar offence is punished in the same way.
183 The other matters the regulations may provide for, according to section 41(2) of NAPWA, are: (i)
prohibition or regulation of lighting camp or picnic fires in a national park or wildlife reserve; (ii) fees for
entry into national parks or wildlife reserves or for services or amenities provided therein; (iii) prohibition
or control of low flying aircraft over a national park or wildlife reserve; (iv) rules for persons within a
national park or wildlife reserve; (v) prohibition or control of commercial enterprises within a national park
or wildlife reserve; and (vi) efficient management of a national park or wildlife reserve.
184 Section 41(3) ofNAPWA.
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4.3.12 Hunting or taking without a licence
It is an offence to hunt or take any protected species, except in accordance with the
conditions of a licence issued pursuant to Part VII of NAPWA. 186 Two broad exceptions
are expressly set out in the section creating this offence. First, it is not an offence to hunt
or take protected species contrary to the conditions of a licence if the Act itself authorizes
it otherwise. This exception originates from the qualification of the offence by the words
'except as otherwise provided by this Act. ' An example of the operation of this exception
is where the CPWO authorizes a person to hunt or take any animal in a national park or
wildlife reserve with the intention of harvesting resource therein. 187 The authority given
by the CPWO in this instance is not in the form of a licence and so in the absence of the
words 'except as otherwise provided by this Act,' the authority given by the CPWO
would be in conflict with the offence of hunting or taking without a licence. As it is, there
is no conflict. The second broad exception is contained in the proviso to section 47(1).
This proviso states that any officer shall not be required to possess a licence while acting
in the performance of his duties or in exercising his powers under the Act. So any officer
who is authorized by the Wildlife Research and Management Board in the interest of
better wildlife management and with the approval of the Minister, to hunt or take animals
from a national park or wildlife reserve l88 does not incur liability under the offence of
hunting or taking without a licence even though he hunts or takes without such a licence.
The elements of the offence of hunting or taking without a licence are: (a) hunt or take;
(b) protected species; and (c) contrary to the conditions of a Part VII licence. The
meanings of 'hunt' and ' take' have been elaborated on above (segment 4.3.8). The
meanings are similar here. So 'hunt' in this offence has a two-pronged meaning. First, in
relation to animals, it means an attempt to wound , capture or kill the animal, or remove or
destroy its nest or egg or any part of it. Second , in relation to plants , 'hunt' means an
185 For instance, regulation 18 of the National Parks and Wildlife (Protected Areas) Regulations.
186 Section 47(1) of NAP WA.
187 Section 39(a) as read with section 35(a) of NAPWA.
188 Such authority is given under section 40 as read with section 35(a) ofNAPWA.
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attempt to lay hold of plants with one ' s hand or to remove plants. With regard to 'take,'
there are also two prongs to its meaning: one prong is based on section 2 ofNAPWA and
the other prong is its ordinary grammatical meaning. Thus, according to section 2, 'take'
in relation to animals means to wound, capture or kill the animal, or remove or destroy its
nest or egg or any part of it. In relation to plants, ' take' means to lay hold of plants with
one's hand or to remove them. The effect of these meanings is that ' take' is the complete
offence while 'hunt' is its inchoate offence, that is, the offence of attempt to take.
Consequently mens rea may be added as an element of the offence of hunting without a
licence since, as demonstrated above , mens rea is an absolute necessity in the offences of
attempt. The mens rea in this respect is a specific intent (or a decision) to take protected
species. Whether mens rea is also an element of the offence of taking without a licence is
debatable.
By 'protected species' is meant any plant or animal declared as such under section 43. 189
Under this section the Minister may, from time to time, on the recommendations of the
Wildlife Research and Management Board, declare any species of wild plant or wild
animal as a protected species. The declaration may be in respect of individual species
throughout Malawi or all or some species in a specified area, or varieties of a species
including sex and age groups. The purpose of such declaration is to accord appropriate
management priority to these particular species of plants and animals. 190 It must be noted
that protected species of animals are known as game speci es.l '"
With regard to the last element identified above (that is, contrary to the conditions of a
Part VII licence), two observations may be made. In the first place, it is obvious that a
person who hunts or takes protected species without a licence issued under Part VII of the
Act commits an offence. In the second place, a person who has the requisite licence may
still be guilty of this offence if he does not abide by the conditions laid out in the licence.
189 Section 2 of NAPWA.
190 Section 42 of NAPW A.
191 Section 44 of NAPWA.
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The word 'conditions' brings to mind a whole range of literature. That word has been
used in bills of lading, 192 contract,193 lease.!" and even wills. 195 Of the meanings attached
to the word in these fields, the closest to conditions in a licence is that expounded in the
law of contract, since the licence to hunt or take protected species may in a sense be
regarded as a sort of contract between the licence-holder and government. In the law of
contract the terms of a contract are classified into three: conditions, warranties and
intermediate or innominate terms. 196 Elizabeth Macdonald197 has summarized the nature
of these contractual terms as follows:
"The modem usage of the classification of terms as 'conditions,' 'warranties' and
'intermediate or innominate terms' categorises them according to the
consequences which follow their breach. Basically, when a condition is breached
the injured party has the right to sue for damages and also to rescind the contract.
A breach of warranty gives rise to the right to sue for damages. When an
innominate term is breached the legal consequences of the breach depend upon its
factual consequences, i e there is a right to rescind the contract, in addition to
suing for damages, if the breach of an innominate term is such as to deprive the
injured party of substantially all the benefit which he, or she, was intended to
derive from the contract."
192 See, for example, Serraino & Sons v Campbell [1891] 1 QB 283.
193 See, for example, Wallis, Son & Wells v Pratt & Hayn es [1910] 2 KB 1003 at 1012.
194 See, for example, 23 Halsbury's Laws (3rd Edn) at 599.
195 See, for example, Re Frame, Edwards v Tay/or [1939] Ch 700 at 703 - 704.
196 Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen -Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 at 998. See also H G Beale et al
(eds) Chitty on Contracts 2ged vol 1 London: Sweet & Maxwell 2004 at paras 12-019 to 12-040; T A
Downes Textbook on Contract 5ed London: Blackstone Press 1997 at 246 - 256; A G Guest (ed) Anson 's
Law of Contract 25ed Oxford: Clarendon Press 1979 at 129 - 137; P S Atiyah An Introduction to the Law
ofContract 3ed Oxford: Clarendon Press 1981 at 145 - 151; M P Furrnston (ed) Cheshire and Fifoot 's Law
ofContract lOed London: Butterworths 1981 at 128 - 138; G H L Fridman The Law ofContract in Canada
Toronto: Carswell 1976 at 268 - 276 , 278 - 289; and J C Smith Smith and Thomas: A Casebook on
Contract ged London: Sweet & Maxwell 1992 at 416 - 433.
197 'Chapter 3: Contents ' in MP Furrnston (ed) The Law ofContract 2ed London: LexisNexis Butterworths
2003 at 562 para 3.34. Footnotes in quotation have been omitted.
152
From this summary it appears that a condition is a more serious term of a contract than a
warranty or innominate term. It has actually been said that conditions'go so directly to
the substance of the contract or, in other words, are so essential to its very nature that
their non-performance may fairly be considered by the other party as a substantial failure
to perform the contract at all.' 198 It may be argued that the conditions of the licence,
breach of which amounts to an offence under section 47(1) ofNAPWA, must be those of
a nature similar to conditions under a contract. Such argument is acceptable as it obviates
the possibility of convicting a person of breach es of trivial terms of the licence. This
point is bolstered by the fact that upon conviction for this offence , the licence may be
surrendered to the CPWO, thus bringing to an end the relationship previously created by
the licence between the government and the offender, which may be likened to the
rescission of a contract upon breach of a contractual condition. From the foregoing
analysis, it follows that breach of a serious term in the licence may amount to an offence
whereas breach of a subsidiary term of the licence may not. In this connection, it may be
pointed out that the same or at least similar result may be reached by way of the
application of the maxim de minimis non curat lex - the law does not concern itself with
trifles. 199 Since the law does not deal in trifles, breaches of trivial terms of a licence fall
outside the concern of the law, but breaches of central terms (conditions) of the licence
constitute offences under section 47(1).
The offence of hunting or taking without a licence may not necessarily be proved
throughout by the prosecution. Under section 47(2) it is provided that in any proceedings
for the offence of hunting or taking without a licence, the onus of proving that the
hunting or taking was in accordance with a valid licence shall rest upon the accused. This
reverse onus has the potential to infringe the accused 's right to be presumed innocent, to
198 Per Fle tcher Moulton J in Wallis, Son & Wells v Pratt & Hayn es [1910] 2 KB 1003 at 1012: approved
[19 11] AC 394 . In L Schul er AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 Lord Reid said that a
condition is of a fundamental character goin g to the root of the contract.
199 Bryan A Gamer A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987 at 176'
Anon Latin for Lawyers 3ed London : Sweet & Maxwell1960 at 137. '
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remain silent and not to testify.2°o ' It is by now axiomatic ,' said Ngcobo J, ' that a
provision in a statute that imposes a legal burden [also known as a reverse onus] upon the
accused limits the right to be presumed innocent and to remain silent. ,201 It has been
stated above that one of the elements of the offence of hunt ing or taking without a licence
is that the hunting or taking was done not in accordance with the conditions of a licence.
The presumption of innocence demands that this element be proved beyond reasonable
doubt by the prosecution. By providing that the accused should bear the onus of proving
that the hunting or taking was in accordance with a licence, section 47(2) essentially
cancels the prosecution's duty to prove the abovementioned element. The prosecution
may opt not to give any evidence at all proving the element, and if the accused fails to
discharge the onus placed on him, he will be convicted even though there is a reasonable
doubt as to whether the hunting or taking was out of accord with the conditions of a
licence. It is therefore clear that the onus on the accused spelt out in section 47(2) limits
the accused's right to be presumed innocent. In addition, the process of discharging that
onus inevitably involves the accused breaking his silence. Thus the onus also limits the
accused's right to remain silent. Having found that the reverse onus limits the
presumption of innocence and the right to silence, the next task is to determine whether it
is justifiable under section 44 of the Constitution (the limitations clause). In this regard, it
may be recalled that for a restriction or limitation on a right to pass constitutional muster,
it must be prescribed by law, reasonable, recognized by international human rights
standards and necessary in an open and democratic society.2°2
The reverse onus is prescribed by section 47(2) which is part ofNAPWA, a statute which
is undoubtedly a law of general application. Whether the reverse onus under discussion is
200 Section 42(2)(f)(ii1) of the Constitution of the Repub lic of Malawi 1994.
20 1 S v Singo 2002 (4) SA 858 at para 25. Footnotes in quotation have been omitted. At para 26 Ngcobo J
continued: 'A provision which imposes a legal burden on the accused constitutes a radical departure from
our law, which requires the State to establish the guilt of the accused and not the accused to establish his or
her innocence. That fundamental principle of our law is now firm ly entrenched in ... the Constitution
which provides that an accused person has the right to be presumed innocent. What makes a provision
which imposes a legal burden cons titut iona lly objectionable is that it permits an accused to be convicted in
spite of the existence of a reasonable doub t. ' Footnotes in quot ation have been omitted.
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reasonable depends on whether the purpose it seeks to achieve is of sufficient importance
to outweigh the presumption of innocence or the right to silence. The declared purpose of
the Part of the Act under which the reverse onus falls is to regulate the hunting and taking
of wildlife resources. This regulation is done thro ugh, inter alia, the requirement that the
hunting and taking must be done under the authority of a licence. Once the licence is
issued, the State does not follow the licence-holder to ensure that he is complying with
the conditions laid out therein. Compliance or non-compliance with the conditions is
peculiarly within the knowledge of the licence-holder. So the reverse onus is rational in
itself as it requires the licence-holder to prove only facts to which he has easy access?03
The conditions in the licence are in essence duti es imposed by the State, and it does not
appear to be unreasonable or oppressive to require the licence-holder to account to the
State how he has used his licence in respect of those duties. Of course the reverse onus
makes easier the prosecution's task of proving the offence of hunting or taking without a
licence, and this may ultimately lead to enhanced environmental protection. In S v
Manamela (Director-General of Justice intervening)204 it was stated that reverse onus
provisions might be acceptable in regulatory offences, for example, regulatory statutes
dealing with licensed activity in the public domain. NAPWA is such a regulatory statute
and so it is not out of line with court decisions to say that the reverse onus in issue is
reasonable.
With regard to recognition by international human rights standards, it may be observed
that a reverse onus provision has been upheld on similar grounds.i'" As for necessity in
an open and democratic society, it is accepted that democracy is sometimes compatible
with limitations on rights and freedoms . Where facts are peculiarly within the knowledge
of the accused, it has been found to be in line with democratic rule to require the accused
202 ~he meaning of these components of the limitations clause have been discussed at length under segment
3.3 In Chapter 3 hereof. In the discussion that follo ws in the text of the present chapter, knowledge of the
Chapter 3 discussion is assumed.
203 S v Zuma and Others 1995 (4) BCLR 40 1 (CC) at para 4 1.
204 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) at paras 27 - 29.
205 X v United Kingdom Application Number 5 124171, Collection ofDecisions ECHR 135 (European Court
of Human Rights ).
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to divulge those facts for his own benefit. All in all, it may be concluded that there is
room for successfully contending that the reve rse onus in section 47(2) does not offend
the presumption of innocence or the right to silence ; that it is a justifiable limitation of
those rights. Admittedly, it is not easy to make out this contention, and there is a real
possibility that a court which is not environment-friendly may reject the argument and
strike down the reverse onus. To avoid the materialization of the possibility, it is
suggested that section 47(2) of NAPWA should be amended in such a way that it is
transformed into an evidentiary presumption. Such a presumption does not violate the
accused person's right to be presumed innocent since it does not shift the burden of
proof.206 Courts more readily accept the validity of such presumptions. The proposed
amendment may be effected by inserting the words ' there is a reasonable possibility that'
between 'that' and 'the'. After this insertion, section 47(2 ) will read as follows: 'In any
proceedings for an offence against subsection (1) the onus of proving that there is a
reasonable possibility that the hunting or the taking was in accordance with a valid
licence shall rest upon the accused.'
The punishment for the offence of hunting or taking without a licence is addressed in two
sections ofNAPWA: section 109 and section 110. The applicability of these two sections
depends on the meaning of 'protected species '. It must be borne in mind that the term
refers to game species on the one hand, and species of wild plants declared as protected
species on the other hand. Section 109 prescribes the punishment for offences relating to
game species.i'" It states that any person who is convicted of an offence involving (a)
taking, hunting, molesting or reducing into possession any game species, or (b)
possession of, selling, buying, transferring or receiving in transfer any specimen of game
species, is liable to a fine and imprisonment. In the case of an offence committed in a
206 Johan de Waal , lain Currie and Gerhard Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 4ed Lansdowne: Juta
2001 at 632.
207 According to section 2 of NAPWA game species are species of animals designated as game species
unde r section 44 of the Act. Section 43 of the Act gives the. Minister power, from time to time , on the
recommendations of the Wildlife Research and Management Board , to declare any species of wild plant or
wild animal as protected species. Section 44 says that protected species of wild animals shall be classified
as game species. Th~ stated purpose of this classification is to accord appropriate management priority to
those particular species of plants and animals (section 42 ofNAPWA).
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protected area,208 the offender is liable to a fine of not less than MWK800 (US $6) but
not more than MWK.2 000 (US $15) and to imprisonment for a term of one year. If the
offence is committed outside a protected area, the offender is liable to a fine of not less
than MWK50 (US $0.38) but not more than MWK.2 000 and to imprisonment for a term
of one year. The offences of hunting or taking without a licence are punished under
paragraph (a).
As for section 110, it sets out the penalties for offences relating to, inter alia, protected
species other than game species. Since there are two groups of species under protected
species (namely, game species and species of wild plants declared as protected species),
the phrase 'protected species other than game species' must mean species of wild plants
declared as protected species. According to section 110 as read with the phrase just
defined, any person who is convicted of an offence involving taking or hunting species of
wild plants declared as protected species is liable to a fine of MWKI0 000 and to
imprisonment for a term of 5 years, and in any case the fine is required to be not less than
the value of the specimen involved in the commission of the offence. The scope of this
penalty (especially the fine) has been elaborated on above when discussing various
prohibited acts in a national park or wildlife reserve. Reference must be made to that
discussion and the amendment suggested there must be noted.
4.3.13 Offences relating to possession and production of licence and keeping of
records of game
Section 60 of NAPWA provides that every licensee under Part VII of the Act is required
to: (a) have the licence in his possession whenever he is hunting or taking any animal or
plant; (b) produce the licence for inspection by an officer or police officer upon request;
and (c) keep a true record, in the prescribed form, of all game species hunted or taken by
him during the validity of the licence. Contravention of any of these requirements is an
offence. Each of these requirements will now be considered in turn .
208 Section 2 of NAPWA states that ' protected area ' includes a national park , wildlife reserve and forest
reserve.
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Failure to have the licence in one's possession when hunting or taking any animal or
plant may be likened to failure to have a driving licence in one's possession when
driving. In the case of driving without a licence in possession, mens rea is not an element
of the offence.i'" It is suggested that failure to have a licence in one's possession when
hunting or taking any animal or plant should also not require proof of mens rea. The same
is urged for failure to produce the licence for inspection by an officer or police officer
upon request.
The offence of failure to keep a true record of all game species hunted or taken by him
during the validity of the licence must be understood in its context. In computing the
numbers or quantities of animals hunted or taken under the licence, only animals that are
killed, wounded, captured or taken are counted. If any animal is killed or wounded
through accident or error by any licensee whose licence entitles him to hunt, such animal
is counted as having been hunted under such licence. 2l O This mode of computing the
numbers or quantities obviates the difficulty on the part of the licensee to record the
numbers of animals he pursued but never managed to kill or capture. It must be noted that
the record-keeping is only required with reference to game species; the licensee is not
under a duty to keep a record of plants taken.
The punishment for contravention of paragraphs (a) and (b) is arguably set out in section
108 of NAPWA. As for paragraph (c), the penalties prescribed in section 109 are
applicable, as paragraph (c) contains an offence involving taking or hunting of game
species. Both section 108 and section 109 have been discussed above and so nothing
more will be said here.
209 J R L Milton and M G Cowling South Af rican Criminal Law and Procedure Vol III 2ed Kenwyn: Juta
1988 (Service No. 7,1995) at G3-1!. Cf Taylor v Kenyon [1952] 2 All ER 726; John v Humphreys [1955]
1 WLR325 .
210 Section 61 ofNAPWA.
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4.3.14 Prohibited hunting by guides, trackers or porters
Any licensee under Part VII of the Act may emplo y or use another person to assist him as
a guide, tracker or porter in hunting protected species . If such guide, tracker or porter is
not himself a licensee, it is an offence for him to chase , drive or employ any weapon
against any protected species. 211 The only exception to this prohibition relates to the
holder of a professional hunter's licence issued under Part X of the Act. The holder of a
professional hunter's licence may, in the process of assisting his employer, chase, drive
or employ a legally permissible weapon against any protected species.
212
The word
'licensee' in the phrase 'not being himself a licensee ' in section 62(2) must be taken to
refer to a licensee under Part VII of the Act. If the ' licensee' is regarded generally as a
licensee under the Act, then the exception in section 62(3) would not be necessary since it
would be subsumed under that general licensee.
Offenders under this section are liable to fines of up to MWK2 000 (US $15) and
imprisonment for a term of one year, if the protected species involved are game
species.i':' If the protected species involved are wild plants which have been declared
protected species, the offenders are liable to imprisonment for a term of five years and to
a fine of more or less than MWK10 000 but in any case the fine is required to be not less
than the value of the specimen involved in the commission of the offence? 14
4.3.15 Use of fires for hunting
2 11 Section 62(1) and (2) ofNAPWA.
212 Section 62(3) of NAPWA. It is necessary to qualify ' weapon ' with the words 'legally permissible'
because some weapons are not allowed for use in hunting or taking protected species. In the National Parks
and Wildlife (Hunting Weapons) Regulations made under section 67 of the Act (and promulgated in G N
83/1994 and G N 70/1997) it is provided that the weapon to be used in hunting protected species shall be a
rifle. It must be noted that by 'protected spec ies ' under these regulations is meant buffalo crocodile
elephant or hippopotamus. ' ,
21 3 Section 109 of NAPWA.
2 14 Section 110 of NAPWA. The penalty here has been set out after taking into account the observations on
the scope and effect of the fine in section 110. These observations were made when discussing prohibited
acts in a national park or wildlife reserve.
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It is an offence to cause any fire for the purpose of hunting, taking or assisting another to
hunt or take, any wild animal or plant. 215 This offence is wide: it applies to the hunting of
protected species and even species of wild animals and plants other than protected
species. The elements of this offence are: (a) causing fire; and (b) for the purpose of
hunting, taking or assisting another to hunt or take any wild animal or plant.
The word 'causes,' it has been held, demands proof of a positive act.216 In Price v
CromacIC 17 the appellant entered into an agreement to allow effluent created by an
215 Section 64(1) ofNAPWA.
216 J L J Edwards Mens Rea in Statutory Offences London: Macmillan 1955 at 254 states: 'It will be
recalled that "causing" is by no means identical with conduct envisaged by words like permitting or
suffering. Whereas ... "permits," "suffers," and "allows" all denote passive acquiescence in the
commission of the prohibited act, "causes" is a far more positi ve epithet and indicates an express
authorisation of the forbi dden event.'
217 [1975] 2 All ER 113. See also Alphacell ua v Woodward [1972] 2 All ER 475 , [1972] AC 824. Briefly,
what happened in Alphacell was that the premises of the appellants, who manufactured paper from manilla
fibres, were situated on the bank of a river. Their manufacturing process produced two effluents: boiling
liquids which were taken away by tanker, and wash water which was run into two settling tanks and then
recirculated and reused. From the lower of the settling tanks there was an overflow direct into the river, and
the wash water was prevented from overflowing into the river by two pumps: one operating automatically
when the water reached a certain level, the other being switched on by hand as a standby. The intake of
each pump was protected by a strainer. The apparatus had been installed for about a year and had never
given any trouble. The pumps were inspected each weekend. On the day in question the appellants'
foreman inspected the tanks four times, at 8.15 am when he found that the automatic pump was working
and everything was normal; at 11.30 am when he found that the water level was rising and switched on the
standby pump; and at 1.15 pm and 3.45 pm when he found the level unchanged with both pumps working.
At 4.30 pm an inspector of the river authority found that polluted water was overflowing into the river at an
estimated rate of 250 gallons an hour. On inspection it was discovered that brambles, ferns and leaves had
got through the strainers of the pumps and blocked the impellers. The appellants were charged with causing
polluting matter to enter the river contrary to section 2(1) of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951.
The answer of the appellants was, inter alia , that they had not done anything which could be described as
causation of the overflow into the river. The y had installed a perfectly adequate system for dealing with the
water which they had accumulated in the tanks , and they could not be said to have caused the entry of the
effluent into the river merely because the pumps had failed and thus had proved ineffective to contain the
water in the tanks. In the House of Lords the overwhelming opinion of their Lordships was that whatever
else 'causing' might or might not involve, it did involve some acti ve operation as opposed to mere tacit
standing by and looking on. At [1972] 2 All ER 479 , [1972] AC 834 Lord Wilberforce said 'causing' must
involve ' some active operation or chain of operations involving as the result the pollution of the stream.' At
[1972] 2 All ER 489 , [1972] AC 846 Lord Cross of Chelsea said that a man cannot be guilty of causing
polluting matter to enter a stream ' unless at the least he does some positive act in the chain of acts and
events leading to that result. ' At [1972] 2 All ER 488 , [1972] AC 845 Lord Pearson said of the activities of
the appellants, 'Those were positive activities and they directly brought about the overflow. What other
cause was there? '
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industrial company to pass on to his land and be dispersed. The amount of effluent
increased and, with the consent of the appellant, two lagoons were built by the company
on the appellant's land to contain the effluent. Subsequently, a district pollution
prevention officer of the river authority found two cracks in the walls of the lagoons
which had allowed the effluent to escape into a nearby river. The appellant was convicted
of causing poisonous, noxious or polluting matter to enter the river, contrary to section
2(1) of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951 of England. This provision, as far
as is material, is in the following terms: ' Subject to this Act , a person commits an offence
punishable under this section - (a) if he causes or knowingly permits to enter a stream
any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter .... ' On appeal, it was held that the offence of
causing polluting matter to enter a river requ ired some positive act on the part of the
accused and not merely a passive looking on. The effluent had come on to the appellant's
land and passed from there into the river by natural forces without any positive act by the
appellant. It could not therefore be said that the appellant had caused the polluting matter
to enter the river. Accordingly the appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.i'"
It is doubtful whether it is proper to adopt the approach in Price v Cromack to the
interpretation of 'causes' in section 64(1) of NAPWA. For one thing, the statutory
offence in that case was stated in terms of causing or permitting, the obvious effect of
which was to exclude omissions from the ambit of 'causes' as they were taken care of by
the word 'permits.,219 In section 64(1) ofNAPWA the offence is only stated in terms of
218 See also Wychavon District Council v National Rivers Authority [1993] 1 WLR 125. This case together
with Price v Cromack were criticised by subsequent judges. In National Rivers Authority v Yorkshire Water
Services Ltd [1995] I AC 444 at 452 Lord Mackay of Clashfem LC said that he regarded those cases as
tuming on their own facts and that the word 'cause' should be used in its ordinary sense and that 'it is not
right as a matter of law to add further requirements.' In Attorney General's Reference (No. J of J994)
[1995] I WLR 599 at 615 Lord Taylor of Gosforth Cl said that the insistence in Price v Cromack and
Wychavon District Council v National Rivers Authority on a positi ve act as the immediate cause of the
escape was a 'further requirement' which should not have been added. The only question was whether
something which the defendant had done, whether immediately or antecedently, had caused the pollution.
2 19 In Environment Agency v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1998] 2 WLR 350 at 354 Lord Hoffmann
considered the effect of the structure of a similarly worded statutory provision on the meaning of 'cause'.
He said: ' Putting the matter shortly, if the charge is "causing," the prosecution must prove that the pollution
was caused by something which the defendant did, rather than merely failed to prevent. It is, however, very
important to notice that this requirement is not because of anything inherent in the notion of "causing." It is
because of the structure of the subsection which imposes liability under two separate heads: the first limb
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causing; there is no reference to permitting. The section does not contain any express
exclusion of omissions from the ambit of 'causes' . In the circumstances it is suggested
that 'causes' in section 64( 1) should be regarded as expressing the common sense idea of
bringing about a result. 22o It should not matter whether the result (in this case, the fire) is
brought about by way of an act or omission.v" As long as the act or omission brings
about the fire, that should be enough to constitute the requisite actus reus of this
offence. 222
simply for doing something which causes the pollution and the second for knowingly failing to prevent the
pollution. The notion of causing is present in both limbs: under the first limb, what the defendant did must
have caused the pollution and under the second limb, his omission must have caused it. The distinction in
[the section in question] between acts and omissions is entirely due to the fact that Parliament has added the
requirement of knowledge when the cause of the pollution is an omission. Liability under the first limb,
without proof of knowledge, therefore requires that the defendant must have done something.'
220 In F J H Wrothwell Ltd v Yorkshire Water Authority (1983) The Times 3 I October McCullough J said
(on the meaning of 'cause' in various statutes) : "The word ' cause' is to be given its ordinary common sense
meaning and any attempt to introduce refinements is to be deprecated": quoted in Francis Bennion
Statutory Interpretation London: Butterworths 1984 at 267 .
221 Bringing about the fire by way of omission only becomes relevant where the offender was under an
appropriate duty. This is so because under Malawian law (based on English law) omissions do not
generally create criminal liability: Smith and Hogan op cit at 48; Glanville Williams [1982] Crim LR 773.
222 The recent decision in Environment Agency v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1998] 2 WLR 350,
[1999] 2 AC 22 should be understood on the background of the wording of the statutory provision. In this
case the appellant maintained a diesel tank in a yard which was drained directly into a river. The tank was
surrounded by a bund to contain spillage, but the appell ant had overridden that protection by fixing an
extension pipe to the outlet of the tank so as to connect it to a drum standing outside the bund. The outlet
from the tank was governed by a tap which had no lock . On 20 March 1995 the tap was opened by a person
unknown and the entire contents run into the drum, overflowed into the yard and passed down the drain
into the river. The appellant was charged with caus ing polluting matter to enter controlled waters contrary
to section 85(1) of the Water Resources Act 1991 which reads: 'A person contravenes this section if he
causes or knowingly permits any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter or any solid waste matter to enter
any controlled waters.' The appellant was convicted and it appealed to the House of Lords. The appeal was
dismissed. Delivering the majority judgment of the court, Lord Hoffmann at [1998] 2 WLR 362
summarised the law in the following terms:
(1) Justices dealing with prosecutions for ' causing' pollution under section 85(1) should first require
the prosecution to identify what it says the defendant did to cause the pollution. If the defendant
cannot be said to have done anything at all, the prosecution must fail: the defendant may have
"knowingly permitted" pollution but cannot have caused it.
(2) The prosecution need not prove that the defendant did something which was the immediate cause
of the pollution: maintaining tanks , lagoons or sewage systems full of noxious liquid is doing
something, even if the immediate cause of the pollution was lack of maintenance, a natural event
or the act of a third party.
(3) When the prosecution has identified something which the defendant did, the justices must decide
whether it caused the pollution. The y should not be diverted by questions like "What was the
cause of the pollution?" or "Did something else cause the pollution?" because to say that
something else caused the pollution (like brambles clogging the pumps or vandalism by third
parties) is not inconsistent with the defendant having caused it as well.
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The word 'causes' has also been considered in the arena of the mental element - mens
rea. Conflicting decisions have been delivered on the question whether 'causes' imports
mens rea. On the one hand, in Harrison v Leaper223 it was held that 'cause' implied the
requirement of mens rea. In that case Harrison was the owner of a portable steam
threshing engine and used to let it out to farmers who hired it. One day he sent his servant
with it to a farm on hire. At the instruction of the farmer, the servant fixed it in the yard
within twenty-five yards of the highway. Under section 70 of the Highway Act 1835 it
was an offence to cause a steam engine to be erected within that distance. Harrison was
not aware of what the servant had done. Harrison was charged with contravening section
70 of the Highway Act. It was held that as Harrison had no knowledge that the engine
was being so placed, he could not be said to have caused it to be erected within the
(4) If the defendant did something which produced a situation in which the polluting matter could
escape but a necessary condition of the actual escape which happened was also the act of a third
party or a natural event, the justices should consider whether the act or event should be regarded as
a normal fact of life or something extraordinary. If it was in the general run of things a matter of
ordinary occurrence, it w111 not negative the causal effect of the defendant's acts, even ifit was not
foreseeable that it would happen to that particular defendant or take that particular form. If it can
be regarded as something extraordinary, it will be open to the justices to hold that the defendant
did not cause the pollution.
(5) The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary is one of fact or degree to which the justices
must apply their common sense and knowledge of what happens in the area.
At [1998] 2 WLR 362 - 363 Lord Clyde added: 'A contravention of section 85(1) occurs where a person
"causes or knowingly permits" a pollutant to enter controlled waters. The context gives some guidance
towards the identification a/what is meant by "cause". It must involve some kind of active operation by
the defendant whereby, with or without the occurrence of other factors, the pollutant enters the controlled
waters. If the defendant has simply stood back and not participated to any extent at al1, although he might
have been guilty of knowingly permitting it, but he w111 not have caused the pol1utant to enter the waters. It
is sufficient that his activity has been a cause; it does not require to be the cause. Moreover, it is not
necessary for the prosecution to prove knowledge, foreseeability, negligence or intention.... Furthermore,
in determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant caused the pol1utant to enter the
waters account has to be taken of natural forces , acts of God and the actions of third parties, if the evidence
justifies taking such considerations into account either as contributing causes or even as excluding any
operation of the defendant as a causative factor . The action of a third party may in some cases be merely
one of the concurrent causes. Alternatively it may in other cases be so far out of the ordinary course of
things that in the circumstances any active operations of the defendant fade into the background.'
[Emphasis supplied] .
The case of Express Ltd (tla Express Dairies Distribution) v Environment Agency [2003] 2 All ER 778 may
also be explained on the basis of the wording of the statutory provision under consideration in that case.
223 (1862) 5 LT 640; 14 English and Empire Digest (Replacement Volume) at 43.
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proscribed distance. Similarly, in Hardcastle v Bielby224 a cart was damaged through
contact with a heap of stone which had been allowed to remain after nightfall upon a
highway. The stones had been laid there by a carter who acted under the orders of a
person to whom a surveyor had given general directions as to repairing the road, but the
surveyor did not himself know that the stone had been laid on the road. The surveyor was
charged with causing to be laid on the highway a heap of stone, contrary to section 56 of
the Highway Act 1835. It was held that the surveyor was not guilty of the offence
charged as he did not know that the carter was going to and did lay the stones in the way
he did.
On the other hand, there are decisions which hold that 'cause' does not import mens rea.
In Sopp v Long225 the defendant was the licensee of a number of railway station
refreshment rooms at one of which a barmaid, in selling whisky by measurement to a
customer, delivered a short measure. The defendant was charged with 'causing' to be
delivered to the customer a lesser quantity than that purported, contrary to section 24(1)
of the Weights and Measures Act 1963. The defendant had never met the barmaid, nor
visited the refreshment room, and had delegated his authority to supervise such
establishments to a general manager, then to a district manager and finally to the
manageress of the refreshment room. He had drafted instructions to managers and
manageresses of all refreshment rooms of which he was licensee, with the object of
ensuring strict compliance with the law. It was held that knowledge or prior authorization
was not an essential ingredient of the offence of causing a short measure to be delivered;
that it was the defendant, as licensee, who had sold the short measure, and by the sale,
conducted through his servant, the barmaid, he had 'caused ' it to be delivered; and that,
accordingly, he was guilty of the offence. Similarly, in Alphacell Ltd v Woodward226 the
appellants were charged with causing polluting matter to enter a river, contrary to section
2(1) of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951. They contended, inter alia, that an
224 [1892] 1 QB 709. See also Lovelace v Director a/Public Prosecutions [1954] 3 All ER 481 , [1954] 1
WLR 1468.
225 [1970] I QB 518 , [1969] 1 All ER 855.
226 [1972] AC 824.
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overflow of the polluting matter had taken place without their knowledge and without
negligence on their part and so they could not be convicted of the offence. The House of
Lords held that the concept of mens rea was inapplicable and so the applicants were
guilty of the offence even in the absence of knowledge or negligence.
Of the foregoing two approaches it is submitted that the latter is to be preferred. The
word 'cause' should be regarded as being neutral on the question of mens rea; it should
not be taken as importing mens rea. A person may cause something to happen
intentionally or negligently or inadvertently without negligence and without intention.
For instance, a person may intentionally smash a china flower vase; he may handle it so
negligently that he drops and smashes it; or he may without negligence slip or stumble
against it and smash it. In all these examples he has caused the destruction of the flower
vase even though in the last example he did not have what is generally known as mens
rea. 227
In light of the foregoing, it is submitted that the word 'causes' in section 64( 1) of
NAPWA does not import mens rea. However, an element of mens rea is introduced in the
offence by the words 'for the purpose of hunting, taking or assisting another to hunt or
take any wild animal or plant.' These words introduce a kind of ulterior intent. The nature
of this ulterior intent may be likened to that in the offence of burglary in which the
offence is only committed upon entry with intent to commit a felony therein.228 Even
without reference to burglary, it may be observed that 'purpose' and 'intent' are
synonyms in common parlance.v" In Chandler v Director ofPublic Prosecutions23o the
House of Lords considered the meaning of 'purpose' in an English statute which
prohibited the entry into a prohibited place for 'a purpose prejudicial to the safety or
227 This is essentially the argument of Lord Salmon in Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824 at 847.
228 Section 309 of the Penal Code; Smith and Hogan op cit at 71.
229 See, for example, the definition of 'intent' in the South African Concise Oxford Dictionary.
230 [1962] 3 All ER 142; J C Smith and B Hogan Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 3ed London:
Butterworths 1986 at 51 - 54.
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interests of the State.' The appellants had planned by non-violent action to immobilize
the aircraft at an airforce station for a space of six hours with a view to demonstrate their
opposition to nuclear weapons. Lord Reid said:
"The first word in the section that requires consideration is 'purpose'. One can
imagine cases where this word could cause difficulty but I can see no difficulty
here. The accused both intended and desired that the base should be immobilized
for a time, and I cannot construe purpose in any sense that does not include that
state of mind."
On his part Lord Devlin said:
"I shall begin by considering the word 'purpose,' for both sides have relied on this
word in different senses. Broadly, the appellants contend that it is to be given a
subjective meaning, and the Crown an objective one. I have no doubt that it is
subjective. A purpose must exist in the mind. It cannot exist anywhere else. The
word can be used to designate either the main object which a man wants or hopes
to achieve by the contemplated act, or it can be used to designate those objects
which he knows will probably be achieved by the act, whether he wants them or
not. I am satisfied that in the criminal law in general, and in this statute in
particular, its ordinary sense is the latter one. In the former sense it cannot in
practice be distinguished from motive which is normally irrelevant in criminal
law. Its use in that sense would make this statute quite inept.'
The general purport or effect of these statements from Lord Reid and Lord Devlin is that
in appropriate cases purpose may mean intention. It is submitted that such is the case here
in the offence of using fire for the purpose of hunting. In addition it must be noted that
the requirement of ulterior intent is not satisfied by proof of recklessness, that is to say, it
is not sufficient to prove that the accused was reckless whether the fire would be used for
hunting or taking or assisting another to hunt or take any wild animal or plant. 231
231 Cf Rv Belfon [1976] 3 All ER 46 at 49; Smith and Hogan op cit at 71.
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Before moving on to the next offence, two things must be noted about the offence of
causing fire for the purpose of hunting or taking. The first relates to an exception and the
second relates to sentence. With regard to the former, not everyone who causes a fire for
the purpose of hunting or taking or assisting another to hunt or take commits an offence.
The owner of private land and any person acting on his authority may cause fire upon his
land for the stated purpose without incurring any liability. The private land in issue
excludes land held under lease?32 As to the question of sentence, it all depends on the
type of wild animal or plant to be hunted or taken. If the wild animal is game species, the
offender is liable to a fine ranging from MWK50 (US $0.38) to MWK2 000 (US $15)
and imprisonment for one year. 233 If the wild plant is protected species, the penalties
prescribed under section 110 of NAPWA apply. If the wild animal or wild plant is not
protected species, then the general penalty set out in section 108 of the Act is applicable.
4.3.16 Hunting of dependent young
It is an offence to hunt any dependent young or any female accompanied by dependent
young of any protected species.v'" The elements of this offence are: (a) hunt; (b)
dependent young or female accompanied by dependent young; and (c) of any protected
species. The operative word in this offence is 'hunt'. As demonstrated above, hunt is an
inchoate offence under the Act, namely, an attempt to take. As shown above, this imports
mens rea. So mens rea is an element of the offence of hunting dependent young. By
'dependent young' is meant any juvenile animal patently depending on an adult of the
. 1: • 235 h dsame species 10r sustenance or protection, T e ependent young must belong to
232 Section 64(2) of NAPWA. According to the same section, this proviso to the offence does not absolve
the owner of the private land or any person acting on his authority from any offence or other forms of
liability under NAPWA or any other Act or law arising from the spread of fire or the movement of any
animal to adjoining land or lands .
233 Section 109 ofNAPWA.
234 Section 65 ofNAPWA.
235 Section 2 ofNAPWA.
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protected species. As discussed earlier on, 'protected species' includes both animals and
plants, but the context of this offence suggests that the reference is to animals only, that
is, game species. This is so because the definition of dependent young excludes plants
and because it does not make sense to talk in terms of dependent young of plants -
actually young plants do not generally depend on old plants for growth, sustenance or
protection.
The hunting of dependent young is not an offence in certain circumstances. It is permitted
under a special licence for the purpose of scientific research or the furtherance of
scientific research relative to the species, and for the purpose of scientific or educational
or other proper use of the species in zoological institutions, botanical gardens,
educational institutions, museums, herbalia and like institutions.v'" Hunting of dependent
young is also permitted for purposes of killing where human life or property is threatened
by the animals.237
Offenders under this offence are liable to a minimum fine of MWK50 and to a maximum
fine of MWK2 000, and to imprisonment for one year.238 Stiffer penalties in that range
are imposed where the offence was committed in a national park, wildlife reserve and
forest reserve. 239
4.3.17 Prohibited acts in relation to killing protected species, etc
Section 66 of NAPWA sets out a number of acts which it declares to be offences. The
section is in the following terms:
236 Section 65 as read with section 53 of NAPWA.
237 Section 65 as read with section 73 of NAPWA.
238 Section 109 ofNAPWA.
239 Section 109 of NAPWA as read with the definition of protected area in section 2.
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'66 - (1) Except as may be authorized by the conditions contained in any licence
issued under this Act, any person who -
(a) for the purpose of or in connexion with hunting or taking of protected
species, possesses, prepares, makes , buys, sells or uses any poison,
birdlime, trap, net, snare or similar substance or device capable of killing,
capturing or wounding any protected species ;
(b) makes, prepares or uses any excavation, fence, enclosure or any device
fixed to the ground or upon plants , capable of killing, capturing or
wounding, any protected species,
shall be guilty of an offence.
(2) The onus of proving that an act under this section was done lawfully
shall lie on the accused person. '
Theoretically, the introductory words 'except as may be authorized by the conditions
contained in any licence issued under this Act' mean that the prohibited acts listed in the
section may be done without incurring criminal liability as long as a licence permits
them. In practice this is generally not possible, a notable exception being the professional
hunter's licence. The Act provides for six classes of licences: bird licence, game licence,
hunting licence, special licence, visitor's licence and professional hunter's licence. 24o All
these licences are required to be issued in the prescribed form. 241 The said prescribed
forms are contained in the Schedule to the National Parks and Wildlife (Miscellaneous
Forms) Regulations.r''' A perusal of the forms reveals that none of them authorize the
acts forbidden in section 66(1). Actually these forms (except that for the professional
hunter's licence) do not leave room for adding special terms in appropriate
circumstances. It is only the form for the professional hunter's licence that has spaces for
inserting appropriate conditions. It may therefore be concluded that it is only under a
professional hunter's licence that the acts proscribed in section 66(1) may be authorized.
240 Sections 48(1) and 92 ofNAPWA.
241 Sections 48(4) and 123(b) ofNAPWA.
242 G N 88/ 1994.
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The phrase 'for the purpose of introduces an element of mens rea as argued earlier on,
but the phrase 'in connexion with' is neutral. Since these phrases are in the alternative,
the result is that some of the offences under this section appear to be crimes of strict
liability while others seem not to be, depending on which phrase is used together with the
prohibited act. But few would be the cases where one of the prohibited acts would be
done 'in connexion with' taking in the absence of mens rea. The better view is that all the
acts listed in section 66(1)(a) must be accompanied with the requisite mens rea for them
to amount to criminal offences. It seems that the appropriate mens rea in these offences is
kn 1 d
. . 243ow e ge or intention.
Section 66( 1)(b) is not introduced by the abovementioned phrases. As such there is a
possibility that mens rea is not an ingredient of the offences listed therein. As for the term
'protected species', it refers to game species in the context of this section, as the purpose
of the Part of the Act under which this section falls is to regulate methods of hunting and
taking of animals.244
Section 66(2) contains a reverse onus . The accused is required to prove that an act done
under section 66 was done lawfully. This reverse onus is certainly a limitation or
restriction on the accused's right to be presumed innocent and the right to remain silent.
By carving careful arguments this reverse onus provision may be justified under section
44 of the Constitution. Admittedly this is an uphill task and there is no decision from
Malawian courts on the point so far. To avoid the risk of having this reverse onus
provision struck down by the courts, it is suggested that it be amended by the introduction
of the words 'there is a reasonable possibility that' between the word 'and' and the word
'an'. The amendment is intended to transform the reverse onus into an evidentiary
presumption which is more readily accepted by the courts. When the suggested
amendment is effected, section 66(2) will read: 'The onus of proving that there is a
243 Cf Chandler v Director ofPublic Prosecut ions [1962] 3 All ER 142.
244 Section 63 ofNAPWA .
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reasonable possibility that an act under this section was done lawfully shall lie on the
accused person. '
Offenders under section 66 are liable to the penalties prescribed under section 109 of the
Act as these offences relate to game species.245
4.3.18 Offences against weapons regulations
The Minister may from time to time, on the recommendations of the Wildlife Research
and Management Board or the CPWO, make regulations specifying the types, sizes and
calibers of weapons which may lawfully be used for hunting any protected species. A
person who contravenes any of the provisions of these regulations commits an offence.246
The Minister has made the regulations. The National Parks and Wildlife (Hunting
Weapons) Regulations'" provide that the weapon to be used in hunting 'protected
species' is a rifle. 248 The hunting of 'game species' may only be done using a rifle which
has a calibre of more than 0.22 or a shotgun, provided that no person shall hunt
crocodiles using a rifle which has a calibre of less than 0.375 or a shotgun.i''" When
hunting 'protected species' the rifle is required to be of at least 0.375 calibre and of at
least 4 000 foot pounds muzzle energy.250 Hunting with a rifle that does not meet these
specifications is an offence.
It must be noted that the regulations contain new definitions of the terms 'protected
species' and 'game species'. Under NAPWA (the principal Act) protected species include
245 Section 109 ofNAPWA.
246 Section 67 of NAPWA.
247 G N 83/1994; G N 70/1997.
248 Regulation 3 of the National Parks and Wildlife (Hunting Weapons) Regulations.
249 Regulation 4 of the National Parks and Wildlife (Hunting Weapons) Regulations .
250 Regulation 5 of the National Parks and Wildlife (Hunting Weapons) Regulations.
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both plants and animals'" whereas under the regulations protected species mean buffalo,
crocodile, elephant or hippopotamus.Y' Similarly, under NAPWA game species are
animals that have been declared protected species253 whereas under the regulations game
species exclude birds. 254 In effect the regulations have narrowed down the scope of
protected species and game species. Essentially the regulations have created three groups
of animals in relation to hunting weapons. In the first group, there are buffalo, crocodile,
elephant and hippopotamus. Hunting of these may only be done with a rifle of at least
0.375 calibre and of at least 4 000 foot pounds muzzle energy. The second group consists
of wild animals that have been declared protected species under section 43 of NAPWA
other than those in the first group and birds. In other words, game species under section
44 of NAPWA excluding birds, crocodiles, elephants, buffalos and hippopotamuses.
These may only be hunted using a rifle which has a calibre of more than 0.22 or a
shotgun. The third group comprises of birds which are game species under section 44 of
NAPWA. The regulations have not specified any weapon for the hunting of these birds.
By implication it may be argued that any weapon may be used in the hunting of birds.
It may therefore be concluded that the offence against weapons regulations is only in
respect of the first two groups of animals. In order to prove the offence the prosecution
must show: (a) that the accused hunted; (b) any of the animals specified in the first and
second groups; and (c) using a weapon contrary to the rifle specified. Since hunting is a
crucial element of the offence and since NAPWA defines it in terms of attempt, it
follows, as demonstrated above, that mens rea is also an ingredient. The mens rea here is
a specific intent (or a decision) to take any of the animals listed in the first and second
groups using a weapon other than the rifle specified.
251 Section 2 ofNAPWA.
252 Regulation 2 of the National Parks and Wildlife (Hunting Weapons) Regulations. According to this
regulation ' crocodile' does not include a crocod ile on a wildlife ranch .
253 Section 44 ofNAPWA.
254 Regulation 2 of the National Parks and Wildlife (Hunting Weapons) Regulations.
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The punishment for offences against weapons regulations is provided for in section 109
of NAPWA as these offences involve hunting of species of wild animals that have been
declared protected species under section 43 ofNAPWA.
4.3.19 Hunting during hours of darkness
It is an offence for any person, during the hours of darkness, to hunt or assist in the
hunting of any protected species. By 'hours of darkness ' is meant the period between one
half hour after sunset and one half hour before sunrise?55 This understanding of 'hours of
darkness' involves a technical point. In the normal course of events it is not practically
possible for an ordinary citizen to know the exact time of sunrise or sunset. It is the
weather expert who knows more or less exactly the sunrise and sunset times for a
particular place. Thus, it may not be possible for the State or the prosecution to know
without expert advice the times of sunrise and sunset. What the State or the prosecution
can more easily ascertain is the time when the offender was hunting or assisting in
hunting. After ascertaining this, the State or the prosecution must find out from the
weather expert the times of sunset and sunrise for the day(s) in issue. If the ascertained
time is between one half hour after sunset and one half hour before sunrise, the offender
can be said to have hunted or assisted in hunting during 'hours of darkness'. Observably
the task of satisfying the ingredient of 'hours of darkness' is quite involving and it may
delay the process of prosecution. It is suggested that proof of this ingredient could be
simplified by defining 'hours of darkness ' in terms of specific clock times. For example,
it may be defined as the period between 1830 hrs and 0630 hrs. The disadvantage of
specifying clock times is that it overlooks the different times at which the sun may set or
rise and as such there is a possibility that in some parts of the year a portion of the period
between the specified clock times may not be dark in the real sense of the word and yet
the Act would describe even that portion as 'hours of darkness'. It is submitted that this
objection does not carry much weight. The inconvenience in language is certainly far
outweighed by the delay and cost involved in proving times of sunset and sunrise. A
255 Section 2 ofNAPWA.
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period demarcated by specific clock times is easier to prove or handle. Any Jim or Jack
can simply look at his watch and then compare it to the period demarcated by the clock
times in order to determine whether the hunting or assistance in hunting was done during
the hours of darkness. Another way of dealing with the objection is to do away with the
phrase 'hours of darkness' altogether. The Act could simply provide that any person who,
during the period between 1830 hrs and 0630 hrs, hunts or assists in hunting would be
guilty of an offence.
As stated above, the word 'hunt' introduces a requirement of mens rea. So mens rea in
the form of a specific intent (or a decision) to take protected species must be proved
where the offence alleged to have been committed is that of 'hunting'. If the offence
charged is that of 'assisting' to hunt, there is more to the mens rea. As a preliminary
point, it may be observed that assisting to hunt is strictly speaking in the form of a
secondary or subsidiary offence, the principal offence being the hunting. In this
connection, it may be recalled that the hallmark of aiding and abetting a crime is
assistance, and so the mens rea for aiding and abetting may legitimately be applied to the
offence of 'assisting' to hunt. If this is accepted, the mens rea for assisting will be
knowledge or intention or contemplation.i '"
The phrase 'protected species' has the limited meaning of game species, that is, wild
animals that have been declared protected species. The phrase does not include wild
plants that have been declared protected species. The suggested meaning of protected
species is gathered from the context of the section in which it appears (section 68). The
context of section 68 is Part VIII the declared purposes of which are, inter alia, to
regulate methods of hunting and taking animals and to make available the opportunity to
256 Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544 at 546 per Lord Goddard Cl ; National Coal Board v Gamble [1959]
1 QB 11 at 20 and 23 per Devlin l ; R v Molon ey [1985] AC 905; and R v Hancock [1986] AC 455. See also
Murphy op cit at 71. It must be noted that if 'assisting' is equated with aiding and abetting, the effect will
be that the offence of assisting to hunt becomes the offence of ' aiding and abetting to hunt. ' If ' hunt' is
broken to reveal its meaning, the offence of assisting to hunt becomes ' aiding and abetting an attempt to
take. ' There should be no problem with this as the offence of aiding and abetting an attempt is known to the
law: R v Dunnington [1984] 1 QB 472 ; R v Hopgood and Wyatt (1870) LR 1 CCR 221; S v Robinson 1968
(1) SA 666 (A).
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hunt to as many eligible persons as possiblc.v" From the declared purposes it may be
noted that it is not the concern of this Part of the Act to regulate the taking of plants. So it
is legitimate to cut down the province of 'protected species ' to animals at least in respect
of all sections appearing in this Part of the Act.
The offence of hunting or assisting to hunt during the hours of darkness is subject to one
exception. If the hunting or assistance to hunt during the hours of darkness is authorized
by the conditions of a licence issued under Part VII of the Act, such hunting or assistance
will not amount to an offence.258 As stated earlier on, the licences are required to be in
the prescribed form. The forms that have been prescribed are set out in the National Parks
and Wildlife (Forms) Regulations. These forms do not state any condition relating to the
time period in a day when hunting mayor may not take place. In the premises, the so-
called exception to the offence of hunting or assisting to hunt is worth nothing. It is
therefore suggested that the words 'except as may be authorized by the conditions
contained in any licence issued under Part VII' should be deleted. After deleting the
words, the section will read: 'Any person who, during the hours of darkness, hunts or
assists in the hunting of any protected species shall be guilty of an offence.'
Offenders under section 68 are liable to the penalties set out in section 109 as this offence
involves hunting of protected species.
4.3.20 Use of motor vehicle, aircraft, boat or radio communication
Section 70(1) of NAPWA provides that any person who does any of the following acts
commits an offence:
(a) discharges any weapon at any protected species from or within fifty metres of any
motor vehicle, aircraft or boat;
257 Section 63 ofNAPWA.
258 Section 68 ofNAPWA.
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(b) uses any motor vehicle, aircraft or boat to drive or stampede any protected
species;
(c) uses any aircraft or radio communication system to locate any protected species
for the purpose of hunting it.
Notwithstanding these provisions, it is not an offence to use a motor vehicle, an aircraft
or a boat for the purpose of driving off any wild animal from the land or water upon
which an aircraft is about to land or take off.259 Secti on 70(2) also exempts from liability
any person who performs any of the prohibited acts under the authority of a licence under
the Act. None of the licences issued under Part VII of the Act has conditions authorizing
any of the prohibited acts. It is only under Part X that such conditions may be found in a
licence. Section 92 under Part X of the Act provides for the issuing of a professional
hunter's licence. The prescribed form for this licence (Form 10)260 gives the CPWO a
discretion to impose appropriate conditions and these conditions, it is arguable, may
authorize the performance of any of the proscribed acts. However, it is submitted that the
CPWO should be slow to insert conditions that have the effect of authorizing acts which
the Act has expressly prohibited. The CPWO should do so only where he has
environmentally cogent reasons for doing so.
For reasons advanced in the discussion of the last preceding offence (hunting during
hours of darkness) the phrase 'protected species' relates to game species only. The
reference to 'boat' is necessary as two of Malawi's national parks have water systems in
them: Lake Malawi National Park is largely under water, being part of Lake Malawi; and
Liwonde National Park has a portion of Shire River in it. The words 'radio
communication system' arguably include cell phones and walkie-talkie systems.
The offence of discharging a weapon at protected species does not expressly require any
state of mind - perhaps mens rea is not needed. However, it seems that the other offences
259 Section 70(2) of NAPWA.
260 See the Schedule to the National Parks and Wildlife (Miscellaneous Forms) Regulations (G N 88/1 994).
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under section 70(1) definitely have mens rea as an ingredient. In section 70(1)(b) the
words 'to drive or stampede any prot ected species' suggest that the use of the motor
vehicle, aircraft or boat must be performed with the intention of driving or stampeding
protected species. Of course this does not mean that the offender must necessarily desire
the driving or stampede. It is enough if he can foresee that his use of the motor vehicle,
aircraft or boat will have the driving or stampede as a byproduct thereof. The foresight
here is that of a virtual certainty or at least a very high degree of probability.i'" In the
same vein, the words 'to locate any protected species for the purpose of hunting it'
indicate the need for mens rea to accompany the use of the aircraft or radio
communication system, but it must be noted that there are two parts to this mens rea. In
terms of the first part, the words ' to locate any protected species' signify a general
intention to locate the protected species: a desire to locate protected species or foresight
that location of protected species will be a byproduct of the use of the aircraft or radio
communication system. With regard to the second part , the words 'for the purpose of
hunting it' import the requirement of an ulterior intent , the intent to hunt the located
protected species. Both parts of the mens rea (that is, the general intention and the ulterior
intent) must be proved for this offence to be made out.
Generally the punishment for offences under section 70( 1) is prescribed by section 108
(the general penalty clause). Exceptions to this may be two. First , where the offence of
discharging a weapon at protected species involves molesting the protected species, the
appropriate penalties are those set out in section 109. Second, where the offence of using
aircraft or radio communication system to locate protected species involves hunting, the
applicable penalties are also those prescribed by section 109.
4.3.21 Use of domestic animals in hunting
The Minister may from time to time, on the recommendations of the Wildlife Research
and Management Board, make regulations prohibiting the use of any domestic animal as
261 R v Bowden [1993] Crim LR 379 ; R v Woollin [1999] AC 82.
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an aid to hunt any protected species, or specifying the conditions under which any
domestic animal may be used to hunt any protected species. Any person who contravenes
the provisions of any of these regulations commits an offence.262 By domestic animal is
meant any animal which is sufficiently tame to serve some purpose for the use of man,
whether or not such use is utilitarian, and includes individual animals which were once
tamed or which are in the process of being tamed?63 For reasons given when discussing
the offence of hunting during hours of darkness, the words 'protected species' here refer
to game species.
To the knowledge of the present researcher, the Minister has not promulgated any
regulations prohibiting or regulating the use of domestic animals as an aid in hunting
protected species. Nevertheless the punishment for offences under the yet-to-be
promulgated regulations should be in line with section 109 of NAPWA as such offences
will involve hunting of protected species.
4.3.22 Use of substances or devices in hunting
The Minister may from time to time, on the recommendations of the Wildlife Research
and Management Board, make regulations:
(a) prohibiting or controlling the use of baits, decoys, calling devices, hides, blinds,
stands, or any other substances or devices to bring protected species into closer
range of hunters;
(b) specifying the conditions under which any substance or device may be used to
hunt any protected species;
(c) prohibiting or controlling hunting in the vicinity of salt licks, water holes or
isolated watering places used by wild animals; or
262 Section 71 ofNAPWA.
263 Section 2 of NAPWA.
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(d) specifying procedures which any hunter may be required to follow after killing
any protected species.
Any person who contravenes the provisions of any of these regulations commits an
offence.264
The Minister has promulgated regulations on some of these matters. No regulations have
been promulgated in respect of procedures which any hunter may be required to follow
after killing any protected species.
The National Parks and Wildlife (Use of Substances or Devices In Hunting)
Regulations'f? provide for a number of offences in two regulations. Regulation 2
proscribes the possession of or use of a gin trap in hunting any animal.i'" Possession
involves the actus reus of physical possession and a mental element (the animus
possidendij.r" In the offence under discussion (especially in relation to possession) the
actus reus consists in a measure of control over the gin trap in hunting any animal.
Regulation 3 provides that no person shall:
(a) use or have in his possession for the purpose of hunting any animal, any net, trap,
pitfall, snare or similar appliance;
(b) use, together with any firearm, any light, lamp or flare for the purpose of hunting
any animal.i'"
(c) use any bait, decoy or calling device or any other substance or device to bring
protected species into closer range for hunting;
264 Section 72 ofNAPWA.
265 G N 80/1994 .
266 According to regulation 2(2) this proscription does not apply to an officer while acting in the
performance of his duties under the Act.
267 Murphy op cit at 64.
268 This proscription does not apply to any person lawfully hunting crocodiles: proviso to regulation
3(1 )(b).
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(d) use hides, blinds or stands in hunting;
(e) hunt any animal in the vicinity of salt licks, water holes or isolated watering
places used by wild animals; or
(f) discharge any weapon at any protected species from or within fifty metres of any
hi I . ~ b 269motor ve IC e, aircratt or oat.
There are two qualifications to the offences under regulation 3. In the first place, the
proscribed acts may be done with the written permission of an officer, in which case no
criminal liability will be incurred. The only rider to this qualification is that such written
permission is not necessary where a snare, pitfall or trap is used on or immediately
adjacent to cultivated land.27o In the second place, the offences cannot be committed by
an officer while acting in the performance of his duties under NAPWA because
regulation 3 does not apply to such an officer. i "
The offence in regulation 3(a) above can be committed in one of two ways: it may be
committed either by use or by possession. Apart from the mens rea inherent in
possession, the ulterior intent to hunt any animal must be proved. It must be noted that
the ulterior intent to hunt is in respect of 'any animal,' not just game species. Similarly
the offence in regulation 3(b) above requires that the ulterior intent to hunt any animal be
proved. In the same vein, the offence in regulation 3(c) demands proof of the ulterior
intent to bring protected species272 into closer range for hunting. As for the offence in
regulation 3(e), what was said above on the actus reus and mens rea for 'hunt' applies,
only that in the present offence the reference will be taking any animal in the vicinity of
salt licks, water holes or isolated watering places used by wild animals. The offence in
regulation 3(t) is essentially identical to the offence in section 70(1)(a) of NAPWA, the
269 This proscription does not fully apply to a person lawfull y hunting crocodiles. Such a person may
discharge a weapon from a boat.
270 Regulation 3(1)(a) .
271 Regulation 3(2).
272 For reasons advanced in the discussion of the offence of hunting during hours of darkness, the phrase
' protected species ' refers to game species only.
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only difference being that in the former there is a proviso permitting a person lawfully
hunting crocodiles to discharge a weapon from a boat. This proviso is not of much
consequence. Accordingly what has been said above in relation to section 70(1)(a) of
NAPWA applies to the offence in regulation 3(f).
Of the acts proscribed under the Regulations it is only those in regulations 3(1)(c) and
3( 1)(f) which are specifically related to protected species. The rest of the proscribed acts
relate to 'any animal,' which arguably includes species of wild animals other than
protected species. Consequently, the punishment for offences under regulations 3(1)(c)
and 3(1)(f) is prescribed under section 109 of NAPWA since these offences involve
hunting or molesting of game species. The rest of the offences in the Regulations are
punishable under both section 109 and section 108. They are punishable under section
109 where the animal involved is protected species. They are punishable under section
108 where the animal involved is not protected species.
Apart from the penalties prescribed under section 108 and section 109, section 112 states
that the court shall, in addition to those penalties, order the device to be destroyed or
obliterated in such manner as the court may specify, and any expenditure incurred, if any,
shall be recoverable from the offender as a civil debt owed to the government. This
additional penalty is applicable only where the offence was in respect of an excavation,
fence, enclosure or any other device fixed in or on the ground or upon vegetation, which
the offender made, used or had in his possession for the purpose of hunting.
4.3.23 Failure to report killing in self-defence of protected animal and to hand over
carcass
This offence is provided for in section 76 of the Act. It is inextricably related to sections
74 and 75. Section 74 permits the killing of any protected animal in defence of oneself or
of another person or any property, crop or domestic animal if immediately and absolutely
necessary. Section 75 allows any person to kill or attempt to kill any game animal which
is causing material damage to any land, crop, domestic animal, building or equipment of
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which the person is either the owner or the servant of the owner acting on his behalf in
safeguarding the property. Section 76 deals with the position after the protected animae
73
has been killed. It says that the killing of the protected animal shall not be deemed to
transfer ownership of the carcass thereof to any person. Up to this stage, there is little, if
anything, in section 76 in the nature of an 'offence' . It is suggested that the matters that
follow are what constitute the offence under section 76.
Any person who kills the protected animal is required, as soon as practicable, to report
the facts to any officer and, unless otherwise entitled to retain the same under the
conditions of any licence issued under Part VII of the Act, to hand over the carcass or
such parts thereof as the officer may direct.274 Failure to do so amounts to an offence.275
The punishment for this offence is provided for under section 109 as this offence involves
the taking of game species.
4.3.24 Failure to report killing of protected animal through error or accident and to
hand over carcass
If any person kills any protected animal through accident or error, he is required as soon
thereafter as may be practicable, to report the facts to an officer and to hand over the
carcass or such parts thereof as the officer may direct. It is an offence to fail to report or
hand over as described.Y'' This offence is punishable under section 109 as it involves the
273 Section 74 refers to 'protected animal ' and section 75 refers to ' game animal.' Section 76 refers to the
animal in section 75 as ' protected animal'. The terms 'protected animal ' and 'game animal' have not been
defined in the Act. Whether they are meant to be distinguished from 'protected species' and 'game species'
is not entirely clear. However, it appears to be in order to regard 'protected animal' as being identical to
'protected species', and 'game animal' as being identical to 'game species'.
274 Section 76(2) ofNAPWA.
275 Section 76(3) of NAPWA. As suggested in the text, the failure to report and to hand over the carcass is
what amounts to an offence in this section. This is so even though section 76(3) appears to suggest that
contravention of everything in the section amounts to an offence. It is difficult to see how the non-deeming
provisions of section 73( I) can be contravened.
276 Section 78( I) and (3) of NAPW A. According to section 78(2) this offence does not apply to any person
who is entitled under any licence issued under Part VII to hunt a protected or game animal of that species
and sort, in the circumstances under which he killed such animal.
182
taking of game species. The difference between this offence and the offence under
section 76 lies in the circumstances of the killing. The killing in the present offence is
effected through error or accident whereas in the offence under section 76, the killing is
effected in defence of person or property. In both offences the report is to be given to an
officer. By 'officer' is meant the CPWO or any officer subordinate to the CPWO and
appointed under the Act to be responsible for the administration of the Act.277
Compliance with this reporting duty may be difficult if the animal is killed at a place far
from the offices of such an officer. However, this difficulty may not necessarily lead to
breach of the duty as the report is required to be made 'as soon as practicable'. An
examination of what transpired after the killing and generally the circumstances attending
the aftermath should indicate whether it was ever practicable to report the killing.
4.3.25 Wounded protected animals
A number of offences may be committed in relation to wounded protected animals. First,
any person who wounds any protected animal and fails without reasonable cause to use
all reasonable endeavours to kill such animal at the earliest opportunity, commits an
offence.278 It appears that the wounding of the pro tected animal may be intentional,
reckless, negligent or even inadvertent. However, the failure to use all reasonable
endeavours seems to require negligence. In other words, it must be determined what
endeavours a reasonable man would have taken to kill the animal after wounding it. If the
accused failed to take such endeavours without reasonable cause, he is guilty of this
offence. In this regard, it must be remembered that 'the reasonable man is not a timorous
faintheart always in trepidation lest he or others suffer some injury,' nor is he 'given to
anxious conjecture and morbid speculation. , 279 The words ' reasonable cause' signify the
277 Section 2 as read with section 5 ofNAPWA.
278 Section 79(2) says that this offence should not be construed as authorizing any person to folIow any
wounded animal - (a) into a national park or wildlife reserve, unless the person holds a licence authorizing
him to hunt the animal in the national park or wildlife reserve; or (b) onto private land upon which the
person has no permission to enter.
279 Per Hancke J in S v Dlulani 1991 (1) SACR 158 (TK) at 159 - 160, quoting Herschel v Mrupe 1954 (3)
SA 464 (A) at 490 and South African Railways and Harbours v Reed 1965 (3) SA 439 (A) at 443.
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existence of a possible excuse. Again, for such an excuse to exculpate a person who has
failed to use all reasonable endeavour, it (the excuse) must be of a quality that can
objectively be regarded as a proper excuse, using the standard of a reasonable man. It
follows that an honest but unreasonable excuse does not suffice.
Second, any person who believes that he has wounded any protected or game animal
which in such wounded condition has entered a national park or wildlife reserve is
required to immediately report the facts to an officer who shall, as he sees fit, decide
whether or not the animal should be killed and shall issue instructions accordingly.
Failure by the person to report the facts is an offence.28o It must be noted that the person's
belief is unqualified and so it may be inferred that the belief here is subjective. As long as
he believes the wounding, he is required to report the facts immediately. It may further be
noted that the report here is supposed to be immediate. This requirement of prompt
reporting is perhaps justified on the ground that in almost every national park and wildlife
reserve there are officers and that the wording of the offence suggests wounding the
animal in the vicinity of a national park or wildlife reserve. It is therefore not necessary
for the person to report 'as soon as practicable ' as demanded under the offences of failure
to report killing in self-defence and failure to report killing through error or accident. In
these other offences there is no suggestion that the offence is committed in the vicinity of
a national park or wildlife reserve.
Third, any person who believes that he has wounded any protected or game animal which
in such wounded condition has entered private land upon which he has no permission to
enter, is required to immediately report the facts to the owner of the land. Failure to
report the facts to the landowner is an offence. i'" Upon receipt of the report, the
landowner must decide whether or not the person making the report is to be permitted to
enter his land for the purpose of hunting the animal.
280 Section 79(3) as read with section 79(6) of NAPWA .
281 Section 79(4) as read with section 79(6) of NAPWA.
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All these three offences involve the taking of protected animals (game species). As such
offenders are liable to the penalties prescribed under section 109.
4.3.26 Wounded dangerous animals
Any person who, in any circumstances whatsoever, wounds any dangerous animal and
fails to kill or capture it within 24 hours after its wounding is required to immediately
report the facts to an officer. Failure to report the facts is an offence.282 The Act defines
dangerous animal as including hyena, lion, leopard, hippo, elephant, rhinoceros, buffalo
or crocodile?83 It appears that the report is not requ ired to be made immediately after
wounding the dangerous animal, but rather after the expiry of the 24 hours. It seems that
after wounding the animal, the person must endeavour to kill or capture it for a period of
24 hours. If he fails to kill or capture it and at the expiry of the 24 hours, he must report
the facts to the officer.284 This endeavour may involve pursuing the dangerous animal. If
the dangerous animal enters private land, the person may enter such land in pursuit of the
animal without obtaining consent from the landowner to enter the land, provided that as
soon as practicable thereafter he reports the facts to the landowner. Failure to report to the
landowner is arguably another offence?85 The penalties for these offences are set out in
section 109 because these offences involve the taking of protected species of wild
animals (that is, game species).
282 Section 80(1) as read with section 80(4) ofNAPWA.
283 Section 20fNAPWA.
284 According to section 80(2) of NAPW A any officer who receives a report is required to take immediate
steps to locate the wounded animal, assess its condition and decide, as he sees fit, whether or not to kill it
and must either carry out the act himself or give instructions accordingly. If the dangerous animal enters a
national park or wildlife reserve, the officer is required to decide, as he sees fit, whether or not the animal
should be killed and then issue instructions accordingly.
285 Section 80(3) as read with section 80(4) of NAPWA. It must be noted that section 80(3) makes
reference to 'provisions of section 79(1) in respect to private land. ' There is an obvious error here as
section 79(1) does not provide for private land; actually section 79(1) does not mention private land at all.
It is sections 79(4) and 79(5) that have provisions in respect of private land.
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4.3.27 Molesting or provoking animals
It is an offence, wilfully and without just excuse or cause, to molest or provoke any
protected or game animal in a manner which results or is likely to result in its destruction.
It is further an offence, wilfully and without just excuse or cause, to molest or provoke
any wild animal in a manner which results or is likely to result in the provocation,
harassment or destruction of any protected or game animal.286 These are essentially two
ways of committing one offence, the offence of molesting or provoking animals. These
ways are similar in many respects. For example, in both there must be molesting or
provoking; in both the molesting or provoking must be done wilfully and without just
excuse or cause; and in both destruction of a protected or game animal must be a result or
a likely result,287 The major differences in the two ways of committing the offence relate
to the object of the molesting or provoking. In the first way, the object of the molesting or
provoking is any protected or game animal whereas in the second way the object of the
molesting or provoking is any wild animal. Having said that, it must be pointed out that
the apparent objective of the offence of molesting or provoking animals is to prevent the
harassment and destruction of protected or game animals in the absence of valid grounds.
The word 'wilfully' imports mens rea in the form of intention or recklessness.i'" So proof
of this offence demands satisfying the court that the molesting or provoking was done
intentionally or recklessly. The words 'without just excuse or cause' create room for the
applicability of a defence excluding liability. The defence is in the nature of valid,
286 Section 82 ofNAPWA.
287 The second mode of committing the offence does not always require that the molesting or provoking
must result or must be likely to result in destruction. It is sufficient if the molesting or provoking results or
is likely to result in the provocation or harassment of the protected or game animal.
288 R v Sheppard [1981] AC 394; R v Newington (1990) 91 Cr App R 247; Chimwemwe Gulumba v
Republic Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 51 of 2003 (unreported but copy available on
http://www.judiciary.mw when accessed in January 2005) . See also the detailed discussion of the meaning
of ' wilfully' under segment 4.3.2 (obstruction of officers and information to officers).
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acceptable grounds justifying the molesting or provocation. It has actually been said that
'just cause' means reasonable cause or probable cause? 89
Section 109 prescribes the penalties for the offence of molesting animals whereas section
108 provides for the penalties for provoking animals. This distinction is necessary
because not every instance of provoking will lead or amount to molesting. Since section
109 deals with offences involving molesting (and not provoking), it is legitimate to
restrict the applicability of the section 109 penalties to molesting, leaving the provoking
to be punished under the general penalties laid out in section 108.
4.3.28 Causing unnecessary or undue suffering to wild animals
It is an offence to cause unnecessary or undue suffering to any wild animal, whether the
animal lives in the wild or is being kept in captivity.i'" For the meaning of 'cause'
reference must be made to the elaboration of its meaning under the offence of using fires
for hunting. Briefly, it expresses the common sense idea of bringing about a result. So
any act or omission that brings about unnecessary or undue suffering to any wild animal
causes that suffering. In addition, the word 'cause' does not import mens rea. Offenders
who cause the proscribed suffering are liable to the penalties under section 108 because
no other penalties are provided for this offence.
4.3.29 Possession, sale or purchase of specimens of protected species
It is an offence to possess, buy or sell or attempt to possess, buy or sell any specimen of a
protected species.i'" Specimen is defined as any wild plant or animal, alive or dead,
whether or not native to Malawi, or any readily recognizable part or derivative of such
289 0 dsgoo e v Nelson (1872) LR 5 HL 636; John B Saunders (general ed) Words and Phrases Legally
Defined 2ed Vol 3 London: Butterworths 1969 at 115. The related phrase 'lawful excuse' was considered
by the English Court of Appeal in R v Smith [1974] 1 All ER 632.
290 Section 83 ofNAPWA.
291 Section 86 ofNAPWA.
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plant or animal. 292 The word 'sell' has attracted a substantial amount of discussion in the
courts. It has a meaning under the law of sale of goods, but it also has a popular meaning.
Under the law of sale of goods, the word ' sell ' is defined in terms of 'a contract of sale '
in which the property in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer. This is
distinguished from 'an agreement to sell ' which is regarded as a contract in which the
transfer of the property in the goods is to take place at a future time or subject to some
condition to be fulfilled later. Thus, according to the law of sale of goods, a person 'sells'
a commodity when the property in the commodity is transferred from the seller to the
buyer. 'Sell' involves both a contract and a conveyance whereas the' agreement to sell'
involves only a contract.293 This legal sense of ' sell ' must be contrasted with the popular
meaning of 'sell'. In the popular sense 'sell' is not construed with reference to the
niceties of the law of contract of sale, or to the distinction between a sale and an
agreement to sell, or to the question whether the property in the goods has passed. In the
popular sense 'sell' is what an ordinary man would say amounts to 'sell'.294 It may
therefore encompass an agreement for sale as would popularly be called a sale, although
the property does not pass by it.295
Of the two meanings of 'sell' it is suggested that the popular meaning is to be preferred in
the offence under discussion as this conduces to what the citizen will think of upon
seeing the prohibition against sale of the specimens. If such a citizen enters into an
agreement for the sale of a specimen, his liability should certainly not depend on minute
distinctions about property passing, when he clearly understands that what he has done is
to 'sell' the specimen.i'"
292 Section 2 ofNAPWA.
293 Lambert v Rowe [1914] 1 KB 38 at 47 per Scrutton J; Mischeff v Springett [1942] 2 KB 331 at 336; H G
Beale (general ed) Chitty on Contracts 2ged Vol 11 London: Sweet & Maxwell 2004 at 1295 para 43-009.
294 Lambert v Rowe [1914] 1 KB 38 at 44 per Ridley J.
295
Lambert v Rowe [1914] 1 KB 38 at 49 per Scrutton J.
296 Cfibid.
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The mens rea for possession and attempt has been discussed above. The same applies
here. As for 'buy' or 'sell', it appears that the mens rea required is intention. With regard
to punishment, offenders are liable to the penalties set out under sections 109 and 110. If
the offence is committed in respect of game species, the penalties are those in section 109
as this section punishes offences involving the possession of, selling, buying, transferring
or receiving in transfer, any specimen of game species . Where the offence is committed
in respect of wild plants that have been declared protected species, the applicable
penalties are those in section 110 as this section punishes the possession of, selling,
buying, transferring or accepting in transfer, any specimen of protected species other than
game species.
The present offence does not apply to possession of any specimen lawfully acquired on
the authority of a licence under Part VII of the Act by a person who is in possession of a
valid certificate of ownership.i'" The certificate is issued by the CPWO upon application
by such a person.298
4.3.30 Offences against regulations for controlling trade or dealings in protected
animals
The Minister has power to make regulations from time to time, on the recommendations
of the Wildlife Research and Management Board, in respect of the following matters:
(a) the control of trade in live animals of such species as the Minister prescribes in
the regulations and the control of trade in the carcasses, meat and skins of such
animals;
(b) the control of industry engaged In the manufacture of articles derived from
protected animals;
(c) the control of the taxidermy industry; and
297 Section 86(2) ofNAPWA.
298 Section 88(1) and (3) ofNAPWA.
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(d) the issue of permits to persons engaged in the foregoing occupations and fees
payable for such permits.
. he rezulati h . ff 299 I .Contravention of any of t e regu auons on t ese matters IS an 0 rence, t IS necessary
to examine these regulations to determine the nature of the offences provided for therein.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that the Minister has not promulgated regulations on
all the matters specified. For example, there are no regulations on the control of the
taxidermy industry. In the following few paragraphs the regulations that have been
promulgated will be examined with a view to identifying the offences that emanate
therefrom.
The National Parks and Wildlife (Control of Trade in Live Animals) Regulations'i'"
proscribe the carrying on of trade in live wild animals unless the person involved is in
possession of a live wild animal dealer's permit.301 There is no other offence in these
regulations. The punishment for the outlined offence is prescribed under section 108 and
section 109 of NAPWA depending on whether the wild animal involved is game species
or not.
The National Parks and Wildlife (Wildlife Ranching) Regulationsv" contain a number of
sections but it is arguable that not all of these can amount to offences upon contravention.
It is submitted that only five of these contain matters contravention of which may
constitute an offence. First, regulation 3(1) states that no person shall operate a wildlife
299 Section 87 of NAPWA.
300 G N 81/1994.
301 Regulation 2. The permit is required to be in the form set out in the First Schedule to the Regulations,
and it is issued subject to the payment of a MWK5 000 (US $46) fee. The permit demands that an
indication be made of the wild animals which the dealer is permitted to domesticate and the conditions for
such domestication. The conditions must also include an indication of how the animals are to be obtained.
These matters are clear from the prescribed fonn of the permit. The fee for the issue of the permit is set out
in the Second Schedule to the Regulations.
302 G N 82/1994. There is an indication beneath the heading (title) of these regulations that these regulations
were promulgated under section 87 of NAPWA, but it is difficult to see the matter under which they fall in
section 87(1).
190
ranch unless he has a wildlife ranching permit,303 Second, regulation 5 declares that
harvesting on wildlife ranches must be done with the approval of the CPWO. Third,
regulation 6 requires a person operating a wildlife ranch on which crocodiles are raised to
make available to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife for release into the wild
at least ten per cent of the hatchlings of each egg collection effort after rearing to a length
of at least one metre. Fourth, regulation 8 requires a person operating a wildlife ranch to
keep and maintain records of stock levels; to submit to the CPWO a return of the stock
levels and of the sales of specimens; to submit data on sales on an annual basis; and to
give officers access to the wildlife ranch for collection of biological data. Fifth,
regulation 9 proscribes the killing of an animal on a wildlife ranch in any manner other
than by shooting it with a firearm. The punishment for contravention of any of these
regulations is either in section 108 or section 109. Offences based on regulation 3(1) and
regulation 8 are punishable under section 108.304 Offences based on regulation 6 are
punishable under section 109 as such offences involve transferring or possession of
specimens of game species. Offences based on regulation 5 and regulation 9 are
punishable under section 109 if the offence involves taking of game species and under
section 108 if the offence involves species of wild animals other than game species.
303 The permit must be in the prescribed form set out in the First Schedule to the Regulations and it is
issued subject to the payment of a fee of MWK5 000 set out in the Second Schedule to the Regulations.
The matters specified in regulation 3(2) cannot amount to offences if they are transgressed. Regulation 3(2)
states: 'A permit shall not be issued to any applicant unless -
(a) the applicant has no record of previous conviction under the Act;
(b) the applicant has title documents for landownership or use;
(c) the area for the proposed wildlife ranch is wholly fenced;
(d) the applicant has carried out an appropriate study on the numbers, species of animals, and
suitability of the habitat;
(e) the applicant has produced a management plan for the proposed wildlife ranch; and
(t) the Chief Parks and Wildlife Officer has approved the study carried out pursuant to paragraph (d)
and the management plan produced pursuant to paragraph (e). '
It is arguable that where any of these matters has not been satisfied, the penalty for that is not the criminal
sanction , but rather denial of the permit.
304 There is scope for arguing that any person who is convicted of operating a wildlife ranch without a
wildlife ranching permit is liable to pay a fine and to be imprisoned as specified under section 109 as long
as the operation of the wildlife ranch involves possession of, selling, buying, transferring or receiving in
transfer any specimen of game species.
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Other regulations promulgated under section 87 of NAPWA are the National Parks and
Wildlife (Control of Trophies and Trade in Trophies) Regulations.i'" Just like in the
regulations relating to trade in live animals, the regulations on trophies and trade in
trophies contain only one regulation which can properly be described as constituting an
offence once it has been contravened.r'" Regulation 3 states that no person shall carry on
a trade in trophies or manufacture articles from trophies for sale unless he is in possession
of a trophy dealer's permit.i'" Arguably transgression of this prohibition constitutes an
offence punishable under section 109 as such trade or manufacture involves possession
of, selling, buying, transferring or receiving in transfer specimens of game species.
Trophy is defined by regulation 2 as ivory and the whole or any part of the horn, head,
tusk, bone or skin of any protected species and includes the eggs, eggshells, nests or
plumage of any protected bird, but does not include any article manufactured from any
trophy. Ivory is defined as a tusk of an elephant or any part thereof.
4.3.31 Offences relating to certificate of ownership of specimen of protected species
Any person who, under a licence issued under Part VII of the Act, takes possession of a
specimen of protected species other than specimen for human consumption, is required,
within fourteen days, to present the specimen together with his licence to the CPWO and
if he wishes to retain the specimen he may apply in writing or in a prescribed form, if
305 G N 86/1994.
306 The regulations contain five provisions. Regulation I contains the citation. Regulation 2 contains the
interpretation of terms. Regulation 3 deals with trading in trophies. Regulation 4 provides as follows:
'Where any person has brought to an officer a rhinoceros horn or other ivory which under section 90 of the
Act is a government trophy, or has given information to any officer leading to the recovery of a rhinoceros
horn or other ivory, the Chief Parks and Wildlife Officer may, subject to the directions of the Minister, pay
a reward at 50 per cent of the value of ivory or, in the case of rhinoceros horn, K200 per kg.' Regulation 5
is in the folIowing terms: 'The officer to whom a rhinoceros horn or other ivory is produced shalI cause it
to be weighed and indelibly marked with the particular mark alIocated to the district as shown in the Third
Schedule, the year of registration, and a serial number and shall enter such particulars in a register which
shalI be in the form set out in the Fourth Schedule.' It is clear from a reading of regulations 4 and 5 that
they contain directions to the officer and not to the citizen. There is therefore no possibility that these
regulations can amount to criminal offences capable of being committed by the citizen.
307 The trophy dealer's permit is required to be in the prescribed form set out in the First Schedule to the
Regulations and it is issued subject to the payment of a fee of MWK 100 (US $0.92) prescribed in the
Second Schedule to the Regulations.
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any, to the CPWO for a certificate of ownership in respect thereof. It is an offence to fail
to present the specimen together with the licence.i'" It is suggested that failure to apply
for the certificate of ownership is not an offence because at this stage the specimen has
already been presented to the CPWO and the person's failure to apply for the certificate
does not affect the specimen negatively in any way; the failure simply deprives him of
the opportunity to own the specimen. The penalty for the failure to present the specimen
together with the licence is prescribed under sections 109 and 110 as this offence
involves possession of specimens of protected species. If the specimen is game species,
section 109 applies. If the specimen is species of wild plants that have been declared
protected species, section 110 applies.
Where the CPWO is satisfied that the applicant for a certificate of ownership is in lawful
possession of the specimen, he may issue the certificate of ownership. If the certificate is
issued through fraud, misrepresentation or error, the CPWO may revoke it and the person
to whom the certificate was issued is required forthwith upon demand by the CPWO to
surrender it to him for cancellation.309 A person who, without valid reason, fails so to
surrender the certificate commits an offence. The penalty for this offence is also set out
under sections 109 and 110 as long as the offence is committed in such a way that it
involves possession of protected species. It is possible for the offence of failure to
surrender the certificate to be committed in the absence of possession. For example, it
may happen that through error the CPWO issues a certificate of ownership to a person
who at all material times had no possession of a specimen of protected species. If, upon
demand by the CPWO, that person fails to surrender the certificate, he commits the
308 Section 88(1) and (2) ofNAPWA.
309 According to section 88(5) to (7) ofNAPWA any person aggrieved by the cancellation of a certificate of
ownership may, within thirty days of its cancellation, appeal in writing to the Minister. In determining the
appeal the Minister may hear the views of the CPWO, and may uphold the decision of the CPWO or
instruct him to reissue the certificate of ownership. The decision of the Minister is said to be final. The
finality of the Minister's decision is open to challenge as it ousts the jurisdiction of the court. Section
103(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi gives the judiciary jurisdiction over all issues of a
judicial nature and exclusive authority to decide whether an issue is within its competence. It is therefore
up to the judiciary to decide whether it can hear an appeal against or a review of the Minister's decision. It
does not lie in the 'mouth ' of the Legislature to say that the judiciary has no right to question or review the
Minister's decision .
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offence of failure to surrender the certificate even though possession of a specimen of
protected species is absent. That person will not be punished under section 109 or section
110 as there is no possession. Instead he will be punished under section 108 (the general
penalty clause).
4.3.32 Offences in respect of transfer of ownership of specimen
NAPWA provides that any person who contravenes its section 89 shall be guilty of an
offence. 31O That section states, inter alia, that any person who transfers or purports to
transfer ownership of any specimen of a prescribed species, whether by gift, sale or
otherwise, shall, at the time of the transfer or purported transfer, be in possession of a
certificate of ownership in respect of the specimen. Upon the transfer of any specimen,
the transferor shall surrender the certificate to the CPWO who shall thereupon issue a
new certificate to the new owner but the CPWO shall retain the certificate surrendered to
him. The transferee is required, at the time of the transfer, to 'obtain from the transfer or
in respect of the specimen a certificate of ownership endorsed pursuant to [section 89]
subsection (2).'
Obviously not all matters specified in section 89 can amount to offences upon breach. It
appears that the section can only be contravened in three ways. First, where a person
transfers or purports to transfer ownership without possessing a certificate of ownership
in respect of the specimen. Second, where upon transfer the transferor fails to surrender
the certificate to the CPWO. Third, where the transferee fails to obtain a certificate at the
time of the transfer. A few comments will now be made on these three. For ease of
reference, they will be referred to as first contravention, second contravention and third
contravention respectively.
3 10 Section 89(4) ofNAPWA.
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It is clearly stated that the word 'transfer' does not include any transfer of ownership
occasioned by operation of law. 3 ! ! The first contravention may be committed in respect
of either a transfer or a purported transfer whereas the second contravention and third
contravention may be committed in respect of only a transfer. The word 'purported'
signifies that which resembles the real thing (in this case, the transfer) but which in fact is
false or defective. In R v Keith 3! 2 Coleridge J said, "An instrument purports to be that
which, on the face of the instrument, it more or less accurately resembles. The definition
of 'purporting' is the same whether applicable to the whole or to a part of an instrument.
There must be a resemblance more or less accurate." Accordingly, the actions of a person
with defective title to a specimen, who tries to transfer the specimen, will amount to a
purported transfer. Similarly a transfer which is defective in other respects may amount to
a purported transfer. If at the time of such purported transfer that person does not have a
certificate of ownership in respect of the specimen, he commits an offence. The
justification for criminalizing the absence of a certificate of ownership at the time of a
purported transfer seems to be along the lines of the justification for criminalizing
attempts. A purported transfer is an incomplete, invalid transfer, just like an attempt to do
something criminal is an incomplete execution of the deed.
The subject matter of the transfer or purported transfer is a specimen of a 'prescribed
species'. The Act does not define 'prescribed species'. The phrase arguably does not
mean protected species generally because the change of language suggests a change in
meaning. Possibly the phrase means species specifically set out by the Act for the
purposes of section 89. If this is so, it may be observed that the Act has not prescribed
such species. It is therefore necessary for Parliament or whoever is responsible to
prescribe the relevant species. It is, however, suggested that the better approach to
solving the current difficulty is to substitute the term 'prescribed species' with the term
'protected species'. The suggested amendment is consonant with the subject matter of a
311 Section 89(5) ofNAPWA.
312 24 L J M C 110 quoted in John S. James (ed), Stroud's Judicial Dictionary oJ Words and Phrases 4ed
Vol 4 London: Sweet & Maxwell 1974 at 2214. The dictionary continues to say that the case of R v Keith
sho~s that proof that a forged engraving 'purports' to be what it is not is furnished by comparing it with a
genuine one.
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certificate of ownership under the Act: according to section 88(1) of the Act certificates
of ownership are issued in respect of specimens of protected species.
The third contravention is based on failure at the time of the transfer to 'obtain from the
transfer or in respect of the specimen a certificate of ownership endorsed pursuant to
subsection (2)' [Emphasis added]. It is difficult to attach a meaning to the quoted
component of the third contravention. In terms of ordinary English usage, the conjunctive
word 'or' is used to link alternatives or to introduce a synonym or explanation of a
preceding word or phrase. It may also be used in place of 'otherwise ' or 'either' .313 None
of these usages of 'or' provides an acceptable meaning of the quoted component of the
third contravention. In its present state the third contravention may have the effect of
imposing a duty on the transferee to obtain 'from the transfer' a certificate of ownership
endorsed pursuant to section 89(2) or to obtain 'in respect of the specimen' a certificate
of ownership endorsed pursuant to section 89(2). The problem with this is that section
89(2) does not require the certificate to be endorsed ; it requires a new certificate to be
issued and the old certificate to be retained by the CPWO. So the phrase 'endorsed
pursuant to subsection (2)' is, strictly speaking , meaningless in the context of section 89.
Perhaps the word 'or' that appears in the quoted component of the third contravention is
out of place. It is also possible that the quoted component (which actually is part of
section 89(3)) has a typographical error in it in the sense that the typist inadvertently put a
space between 'transfer' and 'or' instead of typing the one word 'transferor'. If this
typographical error is corrected, the quoted component (that is, section 89(3)) will read:
'obtain from the transferor in respect of the specimen a certificate of ownership endorsed
pursuant to subsection (2).' The general effect of the suggested correction in light of the
provisions of section 89(2) and (3) is that at the time of the transfer, the transferee must
obtain from the transferor in respect of the specimen a certificate of ownership endorsed
pursuant to subsection (2). The difficulty with this is that the certificate cannot be
obtained from the transferor firstly because he does not have any certificate that he can
313 The South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2002).
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give to the transferee upon transfer as he (the transferor) is required to surrender the old
certificate to the CPWO, and secondly because it is the CPWO (and not the transferor)
who issues the new certificate. In the face of the foregoing difficulties in construing
section 89(3), it is submitted that the best way out is to amend this provision by
substituting the words 'transfer or' with the words ' Chief Parks and Wildlife Officer';
substituting the words 'at the time of with the word 'upon' ;314 substituting the words
'prescribed species' with 'protected species' ; and deleting the words' endorsed pursuant
to subsection (2).' After effecting these changes, section 89(3) will read as follows: 'Any
person who receives by transfer the ownership of any specimen of a protected species
shall, upon the transfer, obtain from the Chief Parks and Wildlife Officer in respect of the
specimen a certificate of ownership.'
Section 89(1) and section 89(3) refer to transfer of ownership of a specimen whereas
section 89(2) refers to transfer of specimen. There is no convincing reason for omitting
the word 'ownership' from section 89(2). It is therefore suggested that for the sake of
uniformity of language, section 89(2) should be amended by the insertion of the words
'ownership of between the words 'of and 'any'. Section 89(2) will therefore read:
'Upon the transfer of ownership of any specimen, the transferor shall surrender the
certificate to the Chief Parks and Wildlife Officer who shall thereupon issue a new
certificate to the new owner but the Chief Parks and Wildlife Officer shall retain the
certificate surrendered to him.'
The penalties for all the three contraventions are set out in section 109 and section 110
because these offences involve possession of, selling, buying, transferring, receiving in
transfer or accepting in transfer, protected species. Where the protected species involved
is game species, the applicable section is 109. Where the protected species is any wild
plant that has been declared protected species , section 110 applies.
314 The substitution of 'at the time of' with 'upon ' is meant to streamline the language of section 89(3) with
that of section 89(2) .
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4.3.33 Failure to report or deliver government trophy
Government trophy is any specimen of a protected species the absolute ownership of
which has not passed to any person under the provisions ofNAPWA. 315 Any person who
obtains a government trophy by any means is required, as soon after obtaining it as may
be practicable, to report the facts to an officer and, if required, to deliver up the trophy to
the officer. Failure to report the facts is an offence. It is also an offence to fail to deliver
up the trophy if required to do SO.316 The punishment for failure to do either act is
prescribed under sections 109 and 110 as these offences involve possession of protected
species. They may also involve taking, hunting or reducing into possession any protected
species; selling, buying, receiving in transfer or accepting in transfer specimens of
protected species. If the failure to report or deliver is in respect of game species, section
109 applies, but if it is in respect of protected species of wild plants, section 110 will
apply.
4.3.34 Dealings in government trophy
It is an offence to unlawfully possess or to purport to buy, sell or otherwise transfer or
deal in any government trophy. The elements of this offence are: (a) unlawfully possess,
or (b) purport to buy, sell, transfer or deal in; and (c) a government trophy. The actus reus
and mens rea for possession have been discussed above. To that discussion must be
added a specific requirement under the present offence. It is required, for present
purposes, that the accused must 'unlawfully' possess. In Albert v Lavin 317 Hodgson J
said: 'In defining a criminal offence the word "unlawful" is surely tautologous and can
add nothing to its essential ingredients.' This view was disapproved in R v Kimber318
where the court said: 'We cannot accept that the word "unlawful" when used in a
315 Section 90(1) ofNAPWA.
316 Section 90(2) and (3) ofNAPWA.
317 [1981] 1 All ER 628 at 639.
3 18 [1983 ] 3 All ER 316 at 320 .
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definition of an offence is to be regarded as "tautologous". In our judgment the word
"unlawful" does import an essential element into the offence.' From this and other
authorities it is now settled that the word 'unlawfully' means without lawful justification
or excuse. 319
Proof of this offence is made easier by the presence of an evidentiary or factual
presumption. Section 91(2) of NAPWA provides that possession by any person of a
specimen of a protected species without a certificate of ownership shall, for the purposes
of the offence under discussion, be prima facie evidence of the specimen being a
government trophy and of unlawful possession thereof by such person. This evidentiary
or factual presumption does not violate the accused's right to be presumed innocent since
it does not shift the burden of proof. 32o It does , however, infringe the accused's right to
remain silent and not to testify during trial, as the accused is required to adduce evidence
raising a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the presumed facts that the specimen in
his possession is a government trophy and that his possession thereof is unlawful. Such
infringement is justifiable under the limitations clause since the presumed facts are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused - the accused knows or ought to know the
justification for his possession of the specimen without a licence. He also knows or ought
to know the circumstances in which he obtained possession of the specimen. In the
premises, there is 'nothing unreasonable, oppressive or unduly intrusive' in asking the
accused to adduce evidence in order to set aside the presumed facts.
This evidentiary or factual presumption is subject to the provisions of section 90 because
the presumption is introduced by the words 'except as otherwise provided by section 90.'
Of the four subsections of section 90 only subsection (2) is relevant. It states that any
319 P J Richardson (ed) Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice London: Sweet and Maxwell
2004 at para 17-44; R v Williams (G) 78 Cr App R 276, [1984] Crim LR 163. In Republic v Komihiwa 7
Malawi Law Reports 325 at 326 Jere AgJ stated that the word 'unlawfully' in the phrase 'unlawfully sets
fire to any building or structure whatever' means that 'the accused set fire to the property without
justification e.g that the property was his own, or excuse, e.g. mistake. ' See also Republic v Metani 7
Malawi Law Reports 341 at 343 per Chatsika AgCJ.
320 Johan de Waal , lain Cunie and Gerhard Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 4ed Lansdowne: Juta
200 1 at 632 .
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person who obtains a government trophy by any means shall, as soon thereafter as may
be practicable, report the facts to an officer and, if required, shall deliver up the trophy to
the officer. From this subsection it seems that the delivery of the government trophy is
only necessary where it is specifically required. It appears that if no one requires delivery
up of the trophy, the person is entitled to keep it. Thus possession is automatically
granted where delivery up is not required. This finding must be considered in light of the
provisions of section 88. This section provides that a person who, under a Part VII
licence, takes possession of a specimen of a protected species other than specimen for
human consumption, may apply for a certificate of ownership if he wishes to retain the
specimen. It must be noted that the obligation to apply for a certificate of ownership in
section 88 is in respect of specimens of protected species obtained under a Part VII
licence. It is submitted that the effect of this restriction to specimens obtained under a
Part VII licence is that where the specimen is obtained otherwise (but lawfully), the
person in possession of the specimen need not apply for a certificate of ownership.
Transporting this analysis to section 90(2), it appears that where a person has possession
of a specimen of protected species that is also a government trophy, he is required to
apply for a certificate of ownership in order to retain the trophy if he obtained the trophy
under a Part VII licence, but such a person is not required to apply for a certificate of
ownership in order to retain the trophy if he lawfully obtained the trophy otherwise than
under a Part VII licence; he may simply retain the trophy until he is required to deliver it
up. It may therefore be concluded that it is not in respect of every trophy delivery up of
which has not been demanded that possession can be maintained without more.
Possession may be maintained without more (in the absence of a delivery up demand)
only where the trophy was lawfully obtained otherwise than under a Part VII licence.
From the foregoing, it is clear that a person may lawfully possess a specimen of a
protected species without a certificate of ownership. This is only possible where the
specimen is a government trophy which was lawfully obtained otherwise than under a
Part VII licence. Such possession without a certificate of ownership does not constitute
prima facie evidence of unlawful possession. If the words ' except as otherwise provided
by section 90' had not been included, the effect of the evidentiary or factual presumption
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would have been to make such possession without a certificate of ownership evidence of
unlawful possession.
The penalties for offences emanating from dealings in government trophy are set out in
sections 109 and 110 depending on whether the trophy involved is game species or
protected species of wild plants.
4.3.35 Offences by non-professional hunters
Any person who is not a licensee under a valid professional hunter's licence who does
any of the following acts commits an offence. The prohibited acts are:
(a) conducting business as a professional hunter;
(b) advertising himself as a professional hunter;
(c) soliciting any contract or commission under which or for which he is to act in the
capacity of a professional hunter; or
(d) for gain or reward, assisting any other person to hunt any protected or game
animal except as a guide, tracker, porter or in some other like capacity.Y'
The person who has a professional hunter's licence is required to abide by certain
conditions. The person who does not have the professional hunter's licence does not
operate under such conditions and may not be aware of their existence; as such he may
cause environmental damage that could be avoided. It is therefore justifiable that such
person should be punished under the present offence. The penalties include a minimum
fine of MWK200 (US $1 .50) , a maximum fine of MWK1 000 (US $8) and imprisonment
for a term of up to six months.322 Comment will now be made on the prohibited act
marked (d) above.
32 1 Section 93 of NAP WA .
322 Section 108 ofNAPWA.
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It is clear that assisting323 any other person to hunt a protected or game animal is not
always an offence. Such assistance can be rendered without incurring criminal liability
under the present offence as long as the person assisting is doing so in the capacity of a
guide, tracker, porter or in some other like capacity. The terms 'guide, tracker, porter,324
are not defined anywhere in the Act. As a result they may be construed widely or
narrowly. A wide construction has the effect of allowing any person who, for a fee or
some consideration, assists another in hunting protected species, to claim that he was
simply assisting as a guide, tracker or porter, so as to avoid liability. For example, a
poacher may be accompanied by a number of individuals in his exploits. These
individuals may be assisting him for gain or reward as guides, trackers or porters. If a
wide construction is adopted, such individuals will be classified as guides, trackers or
porters and so not liable to prosecution under section 93(d). This finding is
environmentally unacceptable. These individuals must certainly be liable as aiders and
abettors in their roles as guides, trackers or porters. In the circumstances it is suggested
that the wide construction should be abandoned in favour of a narrow construction that
takes into account other provisions of the Act. In this regard, it may be recalled that a
licensee under Part VII of the Act has a right to employ or use another person to assist
him as a guide, tracker or porter in hunting protected species, but such assistants (not
being themselves licensees) are not permitted to chase, drive or employ any weapon
against any protected species.325 It is submitted that the 'guides, trackers, porters' under
section 93(d) should be restricted to the guides, trackers or porters of licensees under Part
323 The word 'assisting' has not been construed narrowly in drug related offences in England. It has actually
been held that it must be construed as an ordinary English word and, in practice, it is accorded a wide
interpretation: R v Vickers [1975] 1 WLR 811; R v Evans (1977) 64 Cr App R 237; and R v Panayi (1987)
86 Cr App R 261; and Murphy op cit at 765. This wide interpretation may also be adopted for purposes of
section 93(d) subject to the inbuilt limitations.
324 In discussing these terms, the appropriate terms ought to include 'some other like capacity' but the
words 'some other like capacity' have been left out for the sake of neatness and ease of reference. In any
case the meaning of the words 'some other like capacity' is governed by the terms 'guide, tracker, porter'
under the ejusdem generis rule, and so discussion of the terms 'guide, tracker, porter' inevitably brings into
light the meaning of the words 'some other like capacity.' On how the ejusdem generic rule operates, see
Monteiro v Acme Construction Company Limited and Insurance Company of North America 1923 - 60
ALR Mal 862.
325 Section 62 of NAPWA. Please note that a licensee under Part VII of the Act does not include a
professional hunter. Professional hunters are licensees under Part X of the Act.
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VII of the Act. This will obviate the possibility of the poacher's assistants escapmg
liability for being willing parties to their master's depredations.
While a court may have liberty to adopt the suggested narrow construction, there is no
guarantee that a court will not adopt the meaning from the wide construction. Actually a
court that is obsessed with the presumption in favour of a strict construction of penal
statutes - that is, the principle that where there is real doubt, the accused must be given
the benefit of that doube26 - is likely to dismiss the meaning from the narrow
construction and prefer the one from the wider construction as the latter is more lenient.
So leaving the matter entirely in the hands of the courts may not be an environmentally
safe move. It is proposed that section 93(d) be amended in order to do away with the
possible reign of the meaning from the wider construction. The amendment should be
effected by removing the comma between 'tracker' and 'porter'; inserting the word 'or'
between 'tracker' and 'porter'; deleting the words 'or in some other like capacity'; and
inserting after the word 'porter' the following words: ' employed by a licensee under Part
VII of this Act.' What section 93(d) will look like after these changes is shown below.
It will be noted that the suggested amendment omits the words 'or in some other like
capacity.' Section 62(1) does not contain these words. Since the suggested amendment
links section 93(d) to section 62( 1), it will be anomalous to have these words in one of
the two. Either the words must be available in both sections or they must be absent from
326 The presumption in favour of a strict construction of penal statutes was expressed by Lord Esher in Tuck
& Sons v Priester (1887) 19 QBD 629 at 638 as follows : 'If there is a reasonable interpretation which will
avoid the penalty in any particular case, we must adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable
constructions we must give the more lenient one . That is the settled rule for construction of penal statutes.'
In Re H P C Productions Ltd [1962] 2 WLR 51 Plowman J declared: 'If the language of the statute is
equivocal and there are two reasonable meanings of that language, the interpretation which will avoid the
penalty is to be adopted.' See also the Malawian case of Isaac v R 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 724 at 726 per
Spencer-Wilkinson CJ. Glanville Williams is quoted by Francis Bennion Statutory Interpretation London:
Butterworths 1984 at 385 as having said: 'The ancient rule was that penal statutes are to be construed
strictly - that is, in favour of the defendant and against the prosecution - on the theory that the legislature
must make its intention clear if it proposes to have people punished. The rule was important at a time when
many crimes were punishable by death , but it has not necessarily lost all its value in these more lenient
days.' John Cyril Smith 'Evasion of Liability by Deception' [1983] Crim LR 470 at 472 wrote: ' Though
Hp-service is from time to time paid to the principle that a penal statute must be construed strictly in favour
of the accused, in practice that approach is out of fashion . Even where a statute is wholly unambiguous and
in favour of the defendant, it may be construed to his disadvantage as in Duncalf[ 1979] 2 All ER 116.'
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both. The choice made here is that they must be absent from both because this is more in
line with the purposes of the Act: the fewer the persons exempted from liability under the
Act, the more protection wildlife will enjoy.
The last comment on section 93(d) relates to the words 'protected or game animal'. The
Act makes reference to protected species of wild animals and says that these are to be
known as game species.327 It is debatable whether protected species of wild animals are
the equivalent of protected animals or whether game species is the equivalent of game
animal. The change of language in section 93(d) suggests a rejection of possible
equivalence: it suggests a different meaning. It may be that 'protected animal' is meant to
include protected species of wild animals (and consequently game species) but that 'game
animal' encompasses species of wild animals that have not been declared protected
species, but the latter term is unnecessarily confusing if the suggested meaning is
accepted, since it is semantically difficult to distinguish it from 'game species'. It is
suggested that the language should be streamlined with that of section 62(1). Instead of
the words 'protected or game animal, ' section 93(d) should reflect the words 'protected
species' .
When all the suggested amendments are taken into account, section 93(d) will read as
follows: '(d) for gain or reward, assists any other person to hunt any protected species
except as a guide, tracker or porter employed by a licensee under Part VII of this Act.'
4.3.36 Importation, exportation and re-exportation contrary to customs
requirements
It is an offence to import, export or re-export or attempt to import, to export or to re-
export any specimen of a protected species or a listed species except through a customs
post or port. It is also an offence to import, export or re-export or to attempt to import, to
export or to re-export any specimen of a protected species or a listed species without
327 Sections 43 and 44 of NAPWA.
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producing to a customs officer a valid permit to import, to export or to re-export the
. 328specimen.
By way of background it may be pointed out that the CPWO is empowered to issue to
any person a permit in the prescribed form to import, to export or to re-export any
specimen of a protected species or listed species. In the case of a protected species, the
CPWO first requires the applicant to produce a valid certificate of ownership in respect
thereof. In the case of a listed species, the CPWO first requires the applicant to produce
evidence of compliance with the requirements of regulations made pursuant to section 99
ofNAPWA, or the requirements ofNAPWA or the requirements of any other regulations
made under NAPWA.329 According to section 2, by ' listed species' is meant plant or
animal species listed under any international, regional or bilateral agreement to which
Malawi or the Government is a party, and under regulations made pursuant to section 99
ofNAPWA.
Offenders under this offence are liable to the penalties prescribed by section III of
NAPWA. These penalties are a fine of MWKl 0 000 (US $75) and imprisonment for a
term of five years, and in any case the fine shall not be less than the value of the
specimen involved in the commission of the offence. These penalties are the same as
those provided for under section 110 and even the wording of the sections in respect of
the penalties is identical. Accordingly, the comments made above on the penalties under
section 110 apply to the penalties under section Ill. For the same reasons given for the
amendment of section 110 (see detailed discussion in segment 4.3.8 above), it is
suggested that section III ofNAPWA be amended by omitting the reference to MWKIO
000, that is, leaving out the words 'of K10 000'. If this is done, the section will read:
'Any person who is convicted of an offence under section 98 or under regulations made
pursuant to section 99 shall be liable to a fine and to imprisonment for a term of 5 years,
328 Section 98 ofNAPWA.
329 Section 97 ofNAPWA.
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and in any case the fine shall not be less than the value of the specimen involved in the
commission of the offence.'
4.3.37 Offences against regulations imposing additional restrictions on imports,
exports or re-exports of specimens
The Minister may, after consulting the Minister responsible for Trade and Industry, make
regulations imposing additional restrictions on imports, exports or re-exports of
specimens of a protected species or listed species and for the purposes of such regulations
the Minister may incorporate the requirements under any international, regional or
bilateral agreement to which Malawi or the Government is a party.330 Any person who
contravenes such regulations commits an offence and is liable to the same penalties as
those imposed for the offence of importation, exportation and re-exportation contrary to
customs rcquirements.r" In addition to those penalties, the court may declare any
specimen, domestic animal or article used in connection with the commission of the
offence, forfeited to the Government.332
The phrase 'agreement to which Malawi or the Government is a party' requires some
elaboration. Should any significance be attached to the separate listing of 'Malawi' and
'Government'? It appears that Parliament is recognizing a distinction between
agreements to which Malawi is a party and agreements to which the government is a
party. Parliament seems to suggest that agreements to which the government is a party
may not necessarily be agreements to which the State is a party. This apparent distinction
is not acceptable in international treaty law. A State becomes a party to an international
agreement by signing and ratifying the agreement or by acceding to the agreement. If
'Government' is understood in its usual political sense of the governing power in a State
or the body of persons charged with the duty of governing, it is generally settled that it is
330 Section 99 of NAPWA. To the knowledge of the present researcher, the Minister has not promulgated
the regulations imposing the additional restrictions .
331 Section III ofNAPWA.
332 Section 113(2) ofNAPWA.
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the government that bears the responsibility of signing, ratifying or acceding to a treaty,
but that responsibility or action does not make the government a party to the agreement;
it is the State that becomes a party to the agreement. However, after ratification or
accession, the government is responsible for spearheading domestic implementation of
the treaty where applicable or necessary.r' '' In Attorney General for Canada v Attorney
General for Ontario and Others 334 Lord Atkin, delivering the Opinion of the Privy
Council, puts the point in the following terms :
' It will be essential to keep in mind the distinction between (1.) the formation, and
(2.) the performance, of the obligations consti tuted by a treaty, using that word as
comprising any agreement between two or more sovereign States. Within the
British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of a treaty is an
executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of
the existing domestic law, requires legislative action. Unlike some other
countries, the stipulations of a treaty duly ratified do not within the Empire, by
virtue of the treaty alone, have the force of law. If the national executive, the
government of the day, decide to incur the obligations of a treaty which involve
alteration of law they have to run the risk of obtaining the assent of Parliament to
the necessary statute or statutes. '
In the premises, it was not necessary to include in section 99 the words 'or the
Government'. It is suggested that these words be deleted.
333 Thomas Trier Hansen 'Implementation of International Human Rights Standards through the National
Courts in Malawi' [2002] 46 Journal ofAf rican Law 31; Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa ' Democratisation in
Malawi 1994 - 2002 : Completing the Vicious Circle?' (2003) 19 SAJHR 316 at 327 - 328; and Danwood
Mzikenge Chirwa ' A Full Loaf is Better than Half: the Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in Malawi ' [2005] 49 Journ al ofAfrican Law 207 at 233 .
334 [1937] AC 326 at 347.
207
4.3.38 Offences against regulations relating to protected areas
Section 123 of NAPWA empowers the Minister to make regulations for carrying the Act
into effect. It appears that under this power the Minister made the National Parks and
Wildlife (Protected Areas) Regulations.r''' It may also be that the Minister made the
regulations under section 41 of the Act.336 Regulati on 18 declares that any person who
contravenes the provisions of the regulations commits an offence and is liable, in the case
of a first offence, to a fine of not less than MWK200 (US $1.50) but not more than
MWK500 (US $4) and to imprisonment for a term of three months. In the case of a
second or subsequent offence, the person is liable to a fine of not less than MWK500 but
not more than MWKl 000 (US $8) and to imprisonment for a term of six months.
Regulation 18 is therefore at the same time a general criminalization clause and a general
penalty clause. The difficulty with its operation as a general criminalization clause is that
it can hardly be said that all the provisions of the regulations are proscriptions
contravention of which will amount to an offence. 337 A perusal of the regulations reveals
335 GN 87/1994 and GN 73/1997. The set of these regulations anne xed to the main Act does not indicate
under which section of the main Act the regulations have been promulgated. Bearing in mind that the stated
purposes of the main Act include conservation and protection of wildlife (section 3), that one way of
conservation and protection of wildlife is through proper and effective management of protected areas, and
that the regulations on protected areas deal with proper and effective management of protected areas, it is a
reasonable inference that the regulations on protected areas were promulgated in the interest of 'carrying
the Act into effect.' It is on this basis that it has been said in the text that the Minister promulgated the
regulations on protected areas under section 123 of the Act.
336 Section 41 of the Act provides that the Minister may make regul ations specifying the conditions under
which any person, vehicle, boat or aircraft may enter, travel through, reside in, or be kept in a national park
or wildlife reserve and the efficient management of a national park or wildlife reserve. The regulations on
protected areas define 'protected area' in terms of a national park or wildlife reserve. So these regulations
meet the description of the kind of regulations the Minis ter is empowered to make under section 41. In
essence the regulations could be renamed 'National Parks and Wildlife (Parks and Reserves) Regulations.'
It must be noted in this connection that the definition of 'protected area' under section 2 of NAPWA is
wider than national parks and wildlife reserves; it includes forest reserves. This wide meaning is generally
not adopted under the regulations on protected areas.
337 The South African approach to this problem was stated as follows by J R L Milton and M G Cowling
South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol III 2ed Kenwyn: Juta 1988 (Service No. 7, 1995) at para
1-16 : "On occasions the crirninalization clause will take the form of a ' blanket ' or 'umbrella' provision that
purports to criminalise each and every contravention of the legislation in question. Such clauses are by no
means impermissible and provide a simple and easy method for creating offences. ... The approach
adopted by the courts in such cases has been to disregard the literal meaning of the blanket clause and to
approach the matter on the basis that it must ascertain, by ordinary techniques of construction of statutes,
whether the legislature had intended that disobedience to a particular command or direction should attract
the criminal sanction." In support of this approach, two quotations from two cases are cited. The first
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that not all the provisions of the regulations are such proscriptions. In the following few
paragraphs, provisions of the regulations which qualify as proscriptions the contravention
of which amounts to an offence will be identified.
It is an offence to enter a protected area with or in a motor vehicle unless there is a valid
permit in respect of that motor vehicle. 338 Regulation 2 defines 'protected area' as a park
or wildlife reserve declared to be a national park or wildlife reserve under section 28 of
NAPWA and includes any bridge, culvert, crossing or drift, but does not include a public
road. The valid permit in respect of the motor vehicle is a permit issued under the
regulations and not under the Road Traffic legislation.r'"
It is an offence for a person to camp or remain on a camping site during the hours of
darkness unless he has paid the prescribed fee. A person may so camp or remain on the
camping site without payment of the fee only if he has the written permission of the
CPWO. 340 The term 'camping site' is defined as any site within a protected area which
has been declared as such by the CPWO. 34 1 The phrase 'hours of darkness' is not defined
quotation is from R v Bornman 1912 TPD 66 at 68 where Wessels J said: 'If we look through the
regulations it is clear that the Legislature could never have contemplated that [the blanket clause] should
apply to contravention of any and every section of the regulations, because in many cases it would be
manifestly absurd to think that it could apply. That being so, we must start with the proposition that the
Court will have to select and say in what cases it thinks that the Legislature intended that the penalty
provided for by [the blanket clause] should apply to the contravention of a particular section of the
regulations.' The other quotation comes from R v Mgibantaka 1934 CPD 121 at 126: 'The words of [the
blanket clause] are wide and general but it is quite obvious that they cannot be construed in their literal
sense. If they were, then everyone on whom a duty is laid in the Regulations who fails to perform it is
guilty of a criminal offence. For instance there are all kinds of administrative duties imposed upon the
Registering Officer and if he fails to perform them he would be guilty of a criminal offence. That could not
have been intended and the Court therefore has in each case to examine the particular provision of the Act
under which a charge is laid to ascertain whether the legislating authority intended to impose a duty upon
the accused person and further whether it intended a breach of that duty to be a criminal offence.'
338 Regulation 3(1).
339 The permit is required to be in Form 1 set out in the First Schedule to the Regulations. According to
regulation 3(4) and (5) a permit is not required for a motor vehicle which is in the protected area for transit





by the regulations but it is likely to carry the same meaning as that under section 2 of
NAPWA.342
Where, on the authority of the CPWO , any part of a protected area or of a road has been
closed to the public or to any kind of traffic or to any class of vehicles, it is an offence for
any person to travel in or on such part or cause the prohibited kind of traffic or the
prohibited class of vehicle to travel in or on such part.343 For reasons set out in segment
4.3.15 the word 'cause' signifies the common sense idea of bringing about a result. That
result may be brought about by way of an act or omission. Again for reasons stated in that
segment, the word 'cause' does not import mens rea.
Regulation 6 as read with regulation 18 provides that, except with the written permission
of the CPWO or a Wildlife Officer, it is an offence to:
(a) enter or leave a protected area other than at a place designated by the CPWO as an
entrance or exit;
(b) enter a protected area (other than Liwonde National Park and Lake Malawi
National Park) otherwise than in a motor vehicle having four or more wheels;
(c) enter or remain within water areas of Liwonde National Park and Lake Malawi
National Park;
(d) enter a protected area by means of an aircraft unless the aircraft is authorized so to
enter and to land at an authorized landing ground;
(e) be within a protected area unless he is within 25 metres of motor vehicle or boat
or is in an observation place ;
(f) knowingly alight from a vehicle in a protected area within 200 metres of any live
animal (other than an insect or bird) unless he is in an observation place;
342 Section 2 of NAPWA defines 'hours of darkness ' as the period between one half hour after sunset and
one half hour before sunrise.
343 Regulation 5(2). According to regulation 5(3) a part of the protected area or of a road shall be deemed
clo~ed if; on the authority of the CPWO or a Wildlife Officer, there has been placed with respect thereto a
notice, SIgn , mark, fence , gate , barricade or line of stones, indicating that it has been closed to the public or
to any kind of traffic or class of vehicles.
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(g) exceed a speed of 40 kilometres per hour in a motor vehicle within a protected
area;
(h) sound a motor horn within a protected area;
(i) cut or remove any vegetation in a protected area or damage or remove any object
[of] geological, prehistoric, archaeological, historical or scientific interest in a
protected area;
(j) remove from a protected area any animal or vegetation whether alive or dead
other than animal or vegetation lawfully introduced into a protected area by the
person removing it;
(k) in case of the Nyika National Park, drive any vehicle on those parts of the M9
road (Mphora - Kaperekezi) and S103 road (Chilinda tumoff - Kasaramba)
which are inside the boundary of the said national park, between the hours of 6.00
p.m. and 6.00 a.m.;
(1) in the case of Nkhotakota Wildlife Reserve, drive any vehicle on the section of
the M10 road (Mbobo - Wozi) which is within the boundary of the said wildlife
reserve, between 6.00 p.m. and 6.00 a.m.; or
(m)be allowed to enter Nyika National Park or Nkhotakota Wildlife Reserve after
4.00 p.m. and before 6.00 a.m.
Some of the acts proscribed under regulation 6 are similar or identical to offences
discussed above. So no more comment will be made on them. The prohibition in
regulation 6(b) against entry into a protected area otherwise than in a motor vehicle
having four or more wheels excludes Liwonde National Park and Lake Malawi National
Park because significant parts of these parks are made up of water and so entry is
necessarily made by boat which is not a motor vehicle having four or more wheels. By
'observation place' in regulation 6(e) and (t) is meant, in relation to a protected area, a
place which has been declared by the CPWO as the place for public observation of
wildlife in that protected area.344 As for the meaning of 'knowingly' in regulation 6(t),
344 Regulation 2.
211
the meaning is the same as that discussed above.345 In regulation 6(i) the word between
'object and 'geological' is 'or', but the provision does not make sense when the word 'or'
is maintained. It is arguable that the 'or' is a typographical error and that the correct word
is 'of. It is likely that courts, upon being asked to construe this provision, will read out
the 'or' and read in the 'of. With regard to regulation 6(m), the purport or effect of the
provision is not entirely clear. The exact wording of part of it is 'no person shall be
allowed to enter'. This kind of wording suggests that apart from an offence being
committed by the person who enters , an offence may also be committed by the person
who allows the other to enter.
Except with the permission of the CPWO , it is an offence, while within a protected area,
to molest, provoke, feed or disturb any animal. For this purpose, any person who
approaches or follows any animal, or makes any sudden movement or noise, or flashes a
light or intentionally does something to cause an animal to move away from where it is,
to change its direction of travel, to increase its pace or speed, to become frightened or to
stampede, is deemed to have disturbed the animal. 346 It is noteworthy that the permission
of the CPWO need not be in writing: the regulation under discussion simply requires 'the
permission' of the CPWO to do the prohibited acts if a person is to avoid incurring
criminal liability under the regulation. The penalties for molesting an animal under this
offence are, as indicated earlier on, a minimum fine of MWK200 (US $1.50), a maximum
fine of MWK1 000 (US $8) and imprisonment for a maximum period of six months.
These penalties may be compared with the penalties for molesting game species in a
protected area under section 109 of NAPWA, which are a minimum fine of MWK800
(US $6), a maximum fine of MWK2 000 (US $15) and imprisonment for a term of one
year. There is therefore an inconsistency between the punishments for molesting. This
inconsistency may be resolved by restricting section 109 penalties to the molesting of
game species only. Since the molesting under the regulations is in respect of 'any
animal,' it may be construed as molesting any animal other than game species, so as to
345 Segment 4.2.4.
346 Regulat ion 7.
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avoid the apparent inconsistency. Thus, molesting game species In a protected area
should be punished under section 109 of NAPWA whereas molesting any animal other
than game species in a protected area should be punished under regulation 18.
It is an offence, except with the written permission of the CPWO, to intentionally
discharge any weapon or release any appliance so that a projectile therefrom passes over
any portion of, or falls within, a protected area.347 Unlike most of the other offences, this
offence has mens rea in the form of intention as one of its ingredients.
It is an offence, except with the written permission of the CPWO or the Wildlife Officer,
while within a protected area, to: (a) light a fire or cause a fire to be lighted; (b) leave any
fire which has been lighted, or which he has caused to be lighted, unextinguished; or (c)
discard any burning object. 348 Aspects of this offence are similar to the offence of use of
fires for hunting discussed above in segment 4.3.15; recourse must therefore be had to
that segment.
Regulation 10 proscribes the display of any notice or advertisement within a protected
area or at any entrance to or on the boundary of a protected area. It also proscribes the
collection of any money from members of the public, the selling of any goods, the
offering of any goods for sale or the carrying on of any trade, within a protected area.
Nevertheless these acts may be done without incurring criminal liability if the CPWO or
Wildlife Officer permits them in writing.
Any person who places, erects, damages, moves, loosens, alters, breaks, cuts, destroys or
in any way interferes with fencing, fence post, gate, beacon or boundary of a protected
area, commits an offence. Similarly any person who places, erects, marks, spoils,
damages, disfigures, alters, bends, covers, moves or removes any sign board, notice board




an offence. No offence in these respects is committed if the CPWO or a Wildlife Officer
. h . .. 349permits t e acts In wntmg,
It is an offence to drive a public service motor vehicle within a protected area, except
under and in accordance with a permit issued under the regulations. A bona fide tourist
driving himself or being driven in a motor vehicle hired for visiting a protected area is
exempted from criminal liability under this offence.35o
It is an offence, unless in an emergency, to land any aircraft in a protected area except at
an airfield at which landing of aircraft has been generally authorized by an order of the
CPWO.35 1 It is also an offence, except for the purpose of landing or taking off or in an
emergency, to fly in a protected area an aircraft at an altitude of less than five hundred
metres above the ground.352
Regulation 14(1) provides that any person, other than an officer, who makes use of or
wears any badge, uniform or emblem authorized to be worn by an officer of a protected
area, commits an offence. Regulation 14(2)(a) provides as follows: 'No person shall
make use of or wear any badge, uniform or emblem or nearly resembling a badge,
uniform or emblem authorized to be worn by an officer of a protected area.' It may be
observed that as it stands, regulation 14(2)(a) is not entirely clear in its purport or effect.
If the words coming before the third occurrence of 'or' in the sentence are read on their
own, they give the impression that the wearing of any badge, uniform or emblem is
prohibited. Of course such a prohibition would be irrational. Taking into consideration
the provisions of regulation 14(1), it seems that the unclear language of regulation
349 Regulation 11.
350 Regulation 12(1). The permit is issued by the CPWO or a Wildlife Officer in Forrn 11 set out in the First
Schedule to the Regulations.
351 Regulation 13(a). According to this regulation, no offence is committed if the prohibited acts are done
with the written permission of the CPWO.
352 Regulation 13(b). No offence is committed if the prohibited acts are done with the written permission of
the CPWO.
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14(2)(a) may be clarified by omitting the words 'or nearly ' that appear immediately after
the first mention of 'emblem'. When that is done , regulation 14(2)(a) will read: 'No
person shall make use of or wear any badge, uniform or emblem resembling a badge,
uniform or emblem authorized to be worn by an officer of a protected area.' This
amendment fits in nicely with regulation 14(1) in the sense that regulation 14(1) prohibits
the use or wearing of an officer's badge, uniform or emblem whereas regulation 14(2)(a)
prohibits the use or wearing of any badge, uniform or emblem resembling an officer's
badge, uniform or emblem.
Unlawfully holding oneself out as being an officer is also an offence. The offence of
holding oneself out is similar to the common law offence of personation. One type of
personation is personation of a juror in which it is not necessary to prove that the
personator had any corrupt motive or anything to gain by his conduct or any specific
intention to deceive other than that which is involved in his doing those things required of
a juror; and it is no answer that he did not know that he was doing wrong. 353 In the
absence of words importing mens rea and taking into account the effect of the word
'unlawfully, ,354 it is suggested that in the offence of holding oneself out as being an
officer, it is not necessary to prove that the person holding himself out had any corrupt
motive or anything to gain by his conduct or any specific intention to deceive other than
that which is involved in engaging in the relevant conduct of an officer as long as he (the
person holding himself out) had no lawful justification or excuse in engaging in that
conduct.
The foregoing examination of the provisions of the regulations on protected areas has
dealt with the following clauses as containing criminal offences: 3(1), 4, 5(2), 6, 7(1), 8,
9, 10, 11, 12(1), 13 and 14. Each of these must be read together with regulation 18 as
regulation 18 is the criminalization clause and penalty clause. It is arguable that the rest
353 P J Richa rdson (ed) Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice London: Sweet and Maxwell
2004 at para 22-6 1; R v Clark (1918 ) 26 Cox 138; R v Wakefield [1918] 1 KB 216 .
354 The word ' unlawfully' means without lawful justification or excuse: P J Richardson (ed) Archbold:
Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practic e London: Sweet and MaxweIl 2004 at para 17-44; R v Williams
(G) 78 Cr App R 276 ; R v Kimber [1983] 3 AIl ER 316 at 320.
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of the clauses cannot constitute criminal offences as they are more In the nature of
advisory provisions.
4.3.39 Additional penalties for offences under NAPW A
Upon the conviction of any person of an offence under NAPWA, the court is empowered,
where it considers forfeiture355 to be necessary, to declare any specimen, domestic animal
or any firearm or other weapon, trap , net, poison, material or any motor vehicle, aircraft,
boat, or any other article taken by or used in connex ion with the commission of the
offence to be forfeited to the government.t" The court may do so 'subject to the
provisions of section 108,' ' in addition to any other penalty imposed,' and
'notwithstanding any other written law.,357 The phrase ' subject to the provisions of
section 108' seems to have the effect of cutting down the scope of the court's powers of
forfeiture. It may be recalled that section 108 is the general penalty clause: it prescribes
the punishment for offences under the Act for which no other punishment is provided.
355 The literature on the subject of forfe iture reveals that there are two types of forfeiture: criminal
forfeiture and civil forfeiture. Aaron Larson http: //www.expertlaw.com/librarY/Criminallforfeiture.html
(acceSSedOn21JU1Y2005)WritesthatCriminalforfeitureisthetakingOfPropertYbytheState.It 'occurs
when, after the owner is convicted of a crime, and where forfeiture is allowed under the laws of the
prosecuting jurisdiction, it is demonstrated that the property has a sufficient relationship to the criminal
activity to justify depriving the owner of his property rights. ' He continues to say that ' Civil forfeiture is
similar in many ways to criminal forfeiture. However, while criminal forfeiture means to impose an
additional penalty upon the owner of property for his wrongful conduct, a civil forfeiture action is brought
against the property itself.... For criminal forfeitur e to result, the owner of the property must be convicted
of a crime, whereas civil forfeiture can occur even if the owner is acquitted. In some cases the property
owner won't even be charged with a crime.' Andrew R Mitchell , Susan M E Taylor and Kennedy V Talbot
Confiscation and the Proceeds of Crime 2ed London: Sweet & Maxwell 1997 at 205 - 206 draw similar
distinctions between forfeiture in criminal cases and forfeiture in civil cases. From these expositions it is
clear that the forfeiture in issue in the text is crimina l forfeiture. See also generally Leonard W Levy A
License to Steal: the Forfeiture of Property Chapel Hill , NC: Uni versity of North Carolina Press 1996
passim; http: //www.guestia.com/library/sociology-and-anthropology/ci vil-and-criminal-forfeiture.jsp
(accessed on 21 July 2005) and http: //www.law.comell. edu/background/forfeiture/ (accessed on 21 July
2005).
356 Forfeiture is a common sanction in Mala wian criminal law and it has been the subject of discussion in
many cases. See , for example, R v Khanyisi 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 418 ; R v Sande 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 419;
R v Mwale 1961 - 63 ALR Mal 483 ; Republic v Sande 1968 - 70 ALR Mal 199; Republic v Brown 8
Malawi Law Reports 190; Republic v Sichinga 10 Malawi Law Reports 126 and Republic v Thomas and
Issa 10 Malawi Law Reports 117.
357 Section 113(1) ofNAPWA.
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The words 'subj ect to' suggest that the provisions of section 108 take precedence over the
court's powers of forfeiture.Y'' So in offences where section 108 applies, it appears that
the court does not have liberty to impose forfeiture in the same way it would in offences
where section 108 does not apply. As much as pos sible the provisions of section 108
must reign in those offences to which it applies.359
The phrase 'in addition to any other penalty imposed' does not merit further discussion: it
simply classifies forfeiture as an additional penalty, but more must be said on the phrase
'notwithstanding any other written law. ' The latter phrase suggests superiority of the
court's powers of forfeiture over 'any other written law.' This superiority may readily be
accepted but there are two enactments against which the superiority must be tested: the
Environment Management Act 1996 (EMA) and the Constitution of the Republic of
Malawi.
EMA was enacted after NAPWA and it contains a clause declaring that any written law
on the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources which is inconsistent
with EMA shall be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.Y" A perusal of EMA
reveals that EMA does not make provision for forfeiture: EMA neither encourages it nor
forbids it. It follows that the question of inconsistency does not arise. The court's powers
of forfeiture can therefore be exercised without transgressing the spirit and intendment of
EMA.
358 In Akistan Apena ofIpord v Akinwande Thomas [1950] AC 227 the words ' subj ect to' were construed as
the equivalent of ' without prejudice to.'
359 It may be observed that section 108 states that its provisions are 'subject to the provisions of this Act'
which certainly include section 113(1). In other words, the provisions of section 108 are subject to the
provisions of section 113(1). In turn section 113(1) says that the court 's powers of forfeiture are subject to
section 108. These two sections are therefore throwing the ball at each other. Since the 'subject to' clause
of section 108 is more general, it may be that it does not subject its provisions to section 113(1) which has a
specific 'subject to' clause. [Cfthe applicability of the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant - general
words do not derogate from special words - in The Vera Cruz (1884) 10 App Cas 59 at 68]. Perhaps a way
of avoiding the difficulty created by the existence of two ' subj ect to ' clauses is to do away with one of
them especially the one in section 113(1) so that the court can freely exercise its discretion in imposing
forfeiture as an additional remedy in potentially all offences.
360 Section 7 of EMA.
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As stated above, the other enactment against which the superiority must be tested is the
Constitution. It is trite that any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution is invalid to the extent of such inconsistency.t'" So it is necessary to
determine whether the court's powers of forfeiture are inconsistent with any provision of
the Constitution. In this regard, the most pertinent provisions of the Constitution are those
relating to property and punishment (sections 44(4),28(2) and 19(2)). Section 44(4) deals
with expropriation of property. It states that expropriation is permissible only when done
for public utility, only when there has been adequate notification and appropriate
compensation. The definition of expropriatiorr'V is such that it does not amount to
forfeiture as understood under NAPWA. So the question of forfeiture infringing section
44(4) of the Constitution does not arise. As for section 28(2) of the Constitution, it
provides that 'no person shall be arbitrarily deprived of property.' It must be noted that
the Constitution does not prohibit deprivation of property per se. What the Constitution
proscribes is arbitrary deprivation. The question is: what is arbitrary deprivation? It has
been suggested that an arbitrary deprivation is one which is 'dependent simply on the will
of the party effecting the deprivation' and that even though Parliament has general
constitutional authority to enact laws , it cannot 'make laws which capriciously interfere
with property rights or which authorize such interference by executive organs of the
State. ,363 It is therefore necessary to determine whether the court's powers of forfeiture
amount to arbitrary deprivation. Certainly the court's exercise of its powers of forfeiture
is not dependent simply on its will: these powers are only exercised upon conviction of
the accused. In addition the court's discretion is obviously exercised in accordance with
361 Section 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 1994.
362 Johan de Waal, lain Cunie and Gerhard Erasmus The Bill ofRights Handbook 3ed Kenwyn: Juta 2000
at 386 - 388. Expropriation of property is distinguished from deprivation of property: Matthew Chaskalson,
Janet Kentridge, Jonathan Klaaren, Gilbert Marcus, Dereck Spitz and Stuart Woolman (eds) Constitutional
Law ofSouth Africa Kenwyn: Juta 1996 (Revision Service 5, 1999) at 31-14 para 31.6; M Chaskalson 'The
Property Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution' (1994) 10 SAJHR 131 at 134 - 135. See also R Lyster
"'Protected natural environments": difficulties with environmental land use regulation and some thoughts
on the property clause' 1994 27 De Jure 136 at 147 - 152; A J van der WaIt 'Notes on the interpretation of
the property clause in the new constitution ' 1994 (57) THRHR 181 at 195 - 199.
363 Matthew Chaskalson, Janet Kentridge, Jonathan Klaaren, Gilbert Marcus, Dereck Spitz and Stuart
Woolman (eds) Constitutional Law ofSouth Africa Kenwyn: Juta 1996 (Revision Service 5,1999) at 31-13
para 31.5.
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the law, taking into account only relevant factors. The problem which the court has to
grapple with in the process of exercising its powers is to guard against the possibility that
the forfeiture may amount to unfair , excessive additional punishment, or to use the
language of section 19(2) of the Constitution, cruel punishment. The court may do this by
employing proportionality jurisprudence 'to indicate whether it is reasonable and
justifiable to forfeit the property in question, given the court's findings on the facts, the
nature of the property forfeited, the guilt of the defendant and the sentence already
imposed. ,364 Such forfeiture is likely to be justifiable under the limitations clause in the
Constitution 'due to the public interest involved in ensuring that articles used in the
commission of crime are removed from the offender. , 365 It may therefore be concluded
that the court's powers of forfeiture are consistent with the Constitution.
Apart from forfeiture, NAPWA provides for another additional penalty, namely surrender
of licence, permit or certificate. Section 116 states that if any holder of a licence, permit
or certificate issued under the Act is convicted of an offence under the Act involving the
licence, permit or certificate, the court shall, in addition to any other penalty imposed,
order the person to surrender it forthwith to the CPWO.
4.4 General Observations
A number of critical general observations may be made in respect of the offences
analysed in the present chapter. However, since these observations also apply to other
offences analysed in the next chapter, the observations will be deferred to the end of the
next chapter.
364 A J van der Wait 'Civil forfeiture of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime and the constitutional
property clause' (2000) 16 SAJHR 1 at 7. See also Stefan D Cassella 'The development of asset forfeiture
law in the United States' [2003] Acta Juridica 314 at 335 - 336 for the US position. See also generally L
Jordaan 'Confiscation of the proceeds of crime and the fair-tri al rights of an accused person' (2002) 15
SACJ 41. The application of the proportionality inquiry under NAPWA's forfeiture is made possible by the
wording of section 113 ofNAPWA, for it is clear that the court is given a real discretion in the matter.
365 Michael A Kidd 'The Protection of the Environment through the Use of Criminal Sanctions: A
Comparative Analysis with Specific Reference to South Africa' unpublished PhD Thesis , University of
Natal 2002 at 101. See also Peter Alldridge Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil
Recovery, Criminal Laundering and Taxation ofthe Proceeds ofCrime Oxford: Hart Publishing 2003 at 59
- 63 where the author considers the justifications for and objections to forfeiture.
219
CHAPTER FIVE
ANALYSIS OF CRIMES IN MALAWI'S
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION: PART TWO
5.1 Introduction
Environmental crimes from 18 Malawian statutes will be analysed in the present chapter.
This analysis concludes the detailed discussion of these crimes started in the previous
chapter. In this connection, it must be noted that some statutes analysed in the current
chapter may be regarded by some scholars as lying on the periphery of environmental
law, for instance the Mines and Minerals Act 1 of 1981 and the Petroleum (Exploration
and Production) Act 2 of 1983. These statutes are included due to the impact their subject
matter or exploitation thereof may have on environmental protection. This treatment is in
line with the classification of environmental laws set out in segment 1.3.3 in Chapter 1
hereof. It may be recalled that in that segment statutes of this type were classified as
environmental laws under the category of legislation incidentally containing
environmentally specific norms.
5.2 Forestry Act 11 of 1997
5.2.1 General
The Forestry Act 11 of 1997 was passed with a view to provide for participatory forestry,
forest management, forestry research, forestry education, forest industries, protection and
rehabilitation of environmentally fragile areas and international cooperation in forestry. 1
Its declared purposes include the identification and management of areas of permanent
forest cover as protection or production forest in order to maintain environmental
I Long title of the Act.
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stability, to prevent resource degradation, and to increase social and economic benefits.
Another purpose is to promote community involvement in the conservation of trees and
forests in forest reserves and protected forest areas in accordance with the Act.
2
The Forestry Act has fourteen parts. Half of these parts have specific purposes. Part X
sets out most of the criminal offences and penalties in the Act. Section 63 declares that
the purpose of Part X is to define offences against the Act and to provide for penalties.
Despite this declaration some offences or parts thereof are found in other parts of the Act.
Each of the offences in the Act will now be analysed.
5.2.2 Conveyance into or possession or use within a forest reserve or protected forest
area of any weapon, etc
Section 43 states that it is an offence to convey into , or possess or use within any forest
reserve' or forest protected area4 any weapon, trap, explosive, poison or hunting animal.'
2 Sections 3(a) and (c) of the Forestry Act. According to section 3 other purposes of the Act include: (i) to
augment, protect and manage trees and forest on custom ary land in order to meet basic fuelwood and forest
produce needs of local communities and for the conservation of soil and water; (ii) to empower village
natural resources management committees to source financial and technical assistance from the private
sector, non-governmental organisations and other organisations ; (iii) to promote sustainable utilisation of
timber, fuelwood and other forest produce; (iv) to promote optimal land use practices through agroforestry
in smallholder farming systems; (v) to upgrade the capability of forestry institutions in the implementation
of their resource management responsibilities and in development of human resources in forestry; (vi) to
control trafficking in wood and other forestry produce including exportation and importation; (vii) to
protect fragile areas such as steep slopes , river banks , water catchment and to conserve and enhance
biodiversity; (viii) to provide guidelines in planning and implementation of forestry research and forestry
education; (ix) to establish a forestry administration ; and (x) to promot e bilateral, regional and international
cooperation in forestry augmentation and conservation.
3 The term 'forest reserve' is not defined in the Act. However, sections 22 and 23 provide for the
establishment of forest reserves. Section 22 states that the Minister responsible for forestry may, after
consultation with the Minister responsible for land matters , by order published in the Gazette, declare any
public land not already reserved for another public purpose to be a forest reserve. Section 23 adds that any
area of land proposed for a forest reserve and which is not public land shall first be acquired in accordance
with the provisions of the Land Act 25 of 1965 and the Land Acquisition Act (cap 58:04 of the Laws of
Malawi).
4 Acco rding to section 2 of the Forestry Act, a protected forest area is an area declared as such under
sect ion 26 of the Act . Section 26 states that where the Minister finds that the protection of soil and water
resources, outstanding flora and fauna requires that any area of land be maintained or established as a
forest, the Minister may, by order in the Gazette, after consultations with the Minister responsible for land
matters, the Minister responsible for agriculture, the Minister responsible for irrigation and water
development, the owner or occupier and, in case of custom ary land, the traditional authority, declare such
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The section does not apply to any officer acting in the performance of his duties." The
terms 'convey', 'possess' and 'use' were explained in segment 4.3.6 in Chapter 4 hereof.
Their import in the present statute is similar.
The penalties for the offences of conveyance, possession and use are set out in two
conflicting clauses of the Act. On the one hand, section 67 provides as follows: 'Any
person who knowingly contravenes the provisions of section 43 of this Act shall be guilty
of an offence and liable upon conviction to a fine of K10, 000 and to imprisonment for a
term of five years.' On the other hand, section 71 states:
'(1) Any person who contravenes the provisions of section 43 shall be guilty of an
offence and liable upon conviction to a fine of K20, 000 and to imprisonment for
a term of ten years.
(2) This section shall not apply to any officer acting in the performance of his
duties. '
It may be observed that both section 67 and section 71 refer to contravention of section
43 and yet they prescribe different penalties for that contravention. Of course section 67
demands that the contravention should have been done knowingly; there is no similar
requirement for the contravention in section 71. It is suggested that this difference does
not justify or explain adequately the difference in sentences. In order to deal with the
current difficulty, it is submitted that section 67 must be read as making reference to
section 42, and not section 43. Three reasons may be advanced in support of this position.
In the first place, if Parliament intended to punish the person who contravenes section 43
differently from the person who knowingly contravenes section 43, it could do so in one
land to be a protected forest area. Where the Minister considers that land which requires protection as a
forest reserve or protected forest area, is liable to serious degradation if not immediately protected, the
Minister may declare such land to be a protected forest area for such period not exceeding one year as may
be necessary to complete the consultations required by section 22 or section 26(1) of the Forestry Act.
s Section 43(1) of the Forestry Act. The process of establishing forest reserves is provided for in sections 22
and 23 whereas that for protected forest areas is provided for in section 26.
6 Section 43(2) of the Forestry Act.
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section; there is no reason for Parliament to do so in two separate sections. Even if it is
supposed that Parliament intended to do so in two sections, it would generally make the
sections run one after the other for ease of comparison. There is no rational basis for
separating the sections widely, with three intervening and independent sections dealing
with different offences, between them.
In the second place, reference to section 42 in section 67 agrees with the sequence of
offences. A perusal of the Act reveals that the criminalization of acts set out in the Act is
done in ascending order. For example, section 26 pro vides for protected forest areas and
then section 64 provides for offences relating to protected forest areas; section 39
prohibits fires and then section 65 provides for offences relating to fires; section 44
prohibits deposition of litter or waste and then section 72 provides for offences relating to
deposition of litter or waste; section 47 deals with permits for exportation, importation
and re-exportation of forest produce and then section 73 provides for offences relating to
export, import and re-export of forest produce. Thus, the general provisions setting out
the acts are sections 26, 39, 44 and 47 whereas the criminalization clauses are sections
64, 65, 72 and 73 respectively. It follows from this ascending sequence of numbering that
section 42 would fit as containing the general provision with section 67 providing the
criminalization clause. Similarly section 43 would fit as containing the general provision
with section 71 providing the criminalization clause. If we add the suggested four
sections to the sequence, the sequence of general provisions will be 26, 39, 42, 43, 44 and
47 whereas the sequence of corresponding criminalization clauses will be 64, 65, 67, 71,
72 and 73. From this it is arguable that if section 67 is to fit nicely in the scheme of the
Act, its corresponding general provision must be section 42 and not section 43.
In the third place, guidance on the connection between section 67 and section 42 may be
obtained from the side-notes (marginal notes). In this regard, it must be noted that courts
have held that side-notes cannot be used as an aid to the construction of a statute. i
7 In Republic v Banda (J) 7 Malawi Law Reports 55 at 63 Chatsika J stated that 'marginal notes are not part
of the section and do not therefore afford much assistance to the construction of the section.' Similarly in
Chandler v Director ofPublic Prosecutions [1964] AC 736 at 789 Lord Reid said: ' In my view side-notes
cannot be used as an aid to construction. They are mere catch-words and I have never heard of it being
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However, this position has not been religiously followed. Two cases illustrate the point.
In Director ofPublic Prosecutions v Schildkamp" Lord Reid said:
'But it may be more realistic to accept the Act as printed as being the product of
the whole legislative process, and to give due weight to everything found in the
printed Act. I say more realistic because in very many cases the provision before
the court was never mentioned in debate in either House, and it may be that its
wording was never closely scrutinized by any member of either House. In such a
case it is not very meaningful to say that the words of the Act represent the
intention of Parliament but the punctuation, cross-headings and side-notes do not.'
In the same vein, Upjohn LJ in Stephens v Cuckfield RDc! stated:
'While the marginal note to a section cannot control the language used in the
section, it is at least permissible to approach a consideration of its general purpose
and the mischief at which it is aimed with the note in mind.'
From these quotations it is clear that a judge is not entitled to ignore the side-note; on the
contrary, he may use it in determining the purpose of the provision in issue.l'' Applying
this finding to the marginal note of section 67, it will be noted that the marginal note
supposed in recent times that an amendment to alter a side-note could be proposed in either House of
Parliament. Side-notes in the original Bill are inserted by the draftsman. During the passage of the Bill
through its various stages amendments to it or other reasons may make it desirable to alter a side-note. In
that event I have reason to believe that alteration is made by the appropriate officer of the House - no doubt
in consultation with the draftsman. So side-notes cannot be said to be enacted in the same sense as the long
title or any part of the body of the Act.' See also Republic v White 8 Malawi Law Reports 340 at 342 per
Jere J.
8 [1971] AC 1 at 10.
9 [1960] 2 QB 373 at 383.
10 John Bell and George Engle (eds) Cross: Statutory Interpretation 2ed London: Butterworths 1987 at 130
write: '[E]ven if it is the case that side-notes cannot be called in aid in order to resolve doubts, it can hardly
be the law that they are to be disregarded by the judge when he is perusing the Act with a view to
ascertaining whether he has any doubts. No judge can be expected to treat something which is before his
eyes as though it were not there.' See generally Bilika H Simamba 'Should Marginal Notes be Used in the
Interpretation of Legislation? (2005) 26(2) Statute Law Review 125.
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reads: 'Offences relating to forest pests and diseases,' and therefore it may be concluded
that the purpose of section 67 is to provide for offences relating to forest pests and
diseases. The general provision that deals with forest pests and diseases is section 42 and
so it follows that the reference to a section in section 67 should be a reference to section
42 and not section 43. An amendment of section 67 along these lines is hereby
recommended.
For the foregoing reasons the penalties prescribed in section 67 will not be dealt with in
the present segment: they will be considered in the next segment when dealing
substantively with section 42. As for the penalties for the offences of conveyance,
possession or use, section 71 applies: offenders are liable to a fine of MWK20 000
(US$150) and to imprisonment for a term of ten years.
5.2.3 Offences relating to forest pests and diseases
Any person who knowingly contravenes the provisions of section 42 of the Act!'
commits an offence and is liable upon conviction to a fine of MWK10 000 (US$75) and
to imprisonment for a term of five years.!2 Section 42 states that, notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in the Act, the Minister may authorise the Director of
Forestry to do the following:
(a) order the spraying or clearing of a compartment of a plantation or of a whole
plantation for the purpose of controlling the spreading of pests and diseases;
(b) control movement of timber and other forest produce through issue of permits
as the pest and disease situation may demand;
(c) issue silvicultural notes and technical orders for purposes of controlling pests
and diseases;
11 Section 67 actually refers to section 43. For the reasons stated in the previous segment (5.2.2), the
reference has been changed to section 42.
12 Section 67 of the Forestry Act.
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(d) suspend further planting of tree species which are susceptible to pests and
diseases;
(e) provide for control of vermin causing excessive damage beyond economic
threshold in forest reserves; and
(f) provide for effective phytosanitation for all forest produce and all parts of the
tree in accordance with the Plant Protection Act 13 and to regulate importation
of tree seed and other wood and forestry produce for purposes of pest and
disease control.
One impression section 42 creates (as read with section 67) is that upon failure to do any
of the listed acts, the Director of Forestry may be convicted of contravening the section.
This, however, cannot generally be the case as the Director (or any other officer) is
immune in respect of the exercise or non-exercise in good faith of the powers vested in
him under the Act. 14 From the look of things it appears that section 42 will principally be
contravened through disobedience to the actions of the Director. For instance, any person
who infringes the Director's order to spray or clear a plantation in terms of section 42(a)
commits an offence. Similarly any person who continues to plant tree species which are
susceptible to pests and diseases, after the Director has suspended further planting,
commits an offence.
5.2.4 Offences relating to forest reserves and protected areas
Section 64 of the Forestry Act provides that any person who -
(a) fells, cuts, takes, destroys, removes, collects, uproots any indigenous tree or
forest property in a forest reserve or protected area;
13 Cap 64:01 of the Laws of Malawi .
14 Section 84 of the Forestry Act.
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(b) connives with or causes another person to fell, cut, take, destroy, remove,
collect, uproot any indigenous tree or forest property in a forest reserve or
protected area;
(c) squats, resides, erects a building, hut, livestock enclosures or any structure in a
forest reserve or protected area;
(d) clears, cultivates, digs or breaks up land for any road or for any purpose
whatsoever and grazes livestock in a forest reserve or protected area,
shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of MWK5 000 (US$38) and to
imprisonment for a term of two years.
Several things may be noted about this section. In the first place, the proscribed acts may
be done without incurring liability if the person doing them has authority under the Act to
do them. 15 Such authority may arguably be in the form of a permit or licence. For
example, a person may obtain a licence to fell, cut, take, destroy, remove, collect, uproot
forest produce from a forest reserve or protected area. 16 Doing any of those acts does not
generally attract liability on account of the licence. In the second place, the section uses
the term 'forest property'. This term is not defined in the Act, but the Act defines 'forest
produce' as including trees, timber, firewood, branch wood, poles, bamboos, chips,
sawdust, plants, grass, reeds, peat, thatch, bedding, creepers, leaves, moss, fruits, seed,
galls, slabs, roots, bark, rubber, gum, resin, sap, flowers, fungi, honey, wax, earth, water,
soil, stones, vertebrates, invertebrates, wild animals, hides, horns, bones, ivory, meat and
such other produce as the Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, declare to be forest
produce.!" The listed matters seem to be capable of being described as 'forest property'.
It is not clear why Parliament decided to use two different terms: forest property and
forest produce. It seems that the use of only one of these terms is sufficient for purposes
of the Act.
15 The introductory clause to section 64 makes this point clear.
16 Section 46(a) of the Forestry Act.
17 Section 2 of the Forestry Act.
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In the third place, the section employs the term 'protected area'. Related terms used are
'forest reserve' and 'protected forest area'. In environmental law the term 'protected
area' is wider than forest reserve or protected forest area. It includes national parks,
wildlife reserves, world heritage sites, national botanic gardens, national monuments,
natural heritage sites, transfrontier parks, etc." The question is whether the use of the
term in the section was meant to encompass all these other areas. This question must be
answered in the negative especially in cases where there is dedicated legislation dealing
with the management and protection of the area . It is likely that the term was used to
encompass protected forest areas and other areas which are the concern of the Forestry
Act, for example, forestry-relevant fragile areas such as steep slopes, river banks and
water catchment areas. 19
In the fourth place, the words 'connives with' in section 64(b) require some clarification
or comment. Conniving may take the form of feigning ignorance of or failing to take
measures against a wrong, implying tacit encouragement or consent/" For instance, a
forest guard who shuts his eyes to the unlawful felling of trees by people in a forest
reserve may be said to be conniving. Such forest guard may be convicted of an offence
under section 64(b). Conniving may also involve cooperating secretly in an illegal
action." It is arguable that such cooperation may amount to conspiracy and so the law
relating to conspiracy may come into play. This is so because cooperation may
sometimes involve agreement and an intention to be party to the agreement. These two
factors (agreement and intention) are elements of conspiracy. It is settled that the
18 Jan Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa 2ed Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths 2005 at 325
lists over thirty terms used to describe protected areas. He quotes the following definition of protected area
from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (lUeN): 'An area of
land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of
natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective means.'
19 Section 3(i) of the Forestry Act states that one of the purposes of the Act is to protect fragile areas such
as steep slopes, river banks and water catchment, and to conserve and enhance biodiversity, It may be
observed that these areas are forestry-relevant in the sense that their degradation may be caused by
deforestation .
20 http ://www.dictionary.com (Accessed on 13 August 2005); Oxford English Dictionary.
21 http: //www.dictionary.com (Accessed on 13 August 2005).
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hallmark of conspiracy IS the agreement. Nothing need be done in pursuit of the
agreement; repentance, lack of opportunity and failure are all irnmaterial.v' Mens rea is
an essential ingredient of conspiracy only to the extent that there must be an intention to
be a party to an agreement to do an unlawful act.23 The effect of this position is that in
appropriate circumstances agreement (accompanied by the requisite mens rea) to fell, cut,
take, destroy, remove, collect, uproot any indigenous tree or forest property in a forest
reserve or protected area, is an offence regardless of the absence of any action to put that
agreement into effect. Thus conniving does not necessarily involve any act of felling,
cutting, etc. This must be contrasted with 'causing another person' to fell, cut, etc, which
evidently requires that there must be an act of felling , cutting, etc by the other person if
the accused is to be convicted of 'causing' that other person to do those things.i"
5.2.5 Offences relating to fires
It is an offence to light or cause to be lit a fire in a forest reserve, protected forest area or
village forest area25 in contravention of section 39.26 The said section 39 prohibits
22 P J Richardson (ed) Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice London: Sweet and Maxwell
2004 at 2770 para 34-4. See also the leading case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Dr Hastings
Kamuzu Banda and Others MSCA Criminal Appeal No. 21 of 1995 (commonly known as "the Mwanza
Murders Case") (copy of the judgment was available on http ://www.judiciary.mw when accessed on 03
October 2005) where the court, among other things, said: 'At law, each of the four persons who initially
hatched the plot and agreed to kill the four victims would have committed the crime known as
"conspiracy". The crime would be complete as soon as the agreement was reached.'
23 P J Richardson (ed) Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice London: Sweet and Maxwell
2004 at 2772 para 34-12. In R v Anderson [1986] AC 27 at 39 Lord Bridge of Harwich said: 'But, beyond
the mere fact of agreement, the necessary mens rea of the crime is, in my opinion, established if, and only
if, it is shown that the accused, when he entered into the agreement, intended to play some part in the
agreed course of conduct in furtherance of the criminal purpose which the agreed course of conduct was
intended to achieve. Nothing less will suffice; nothing more is required.' Similarly in Yip Chiu-Cheung v R
[1995] 1 AC III at 118 Lord Griffiths (delivering the judgment of the Privy Council) said: 'The crime of
conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act with the
intention of carrying it out. It is the intention to carry out the crime that constitutes the necessary mens rea
for the offence.' The foregoing two quotations seem to suggest that all persons in a conspiracy must intend
to play an active part in the agreed course of conduct, but this is not so. A person who organizes a crime
and engages others to carry it out is equally guilty of conspiracy whether or not he intends to play an active
role in it thereafter: per O'Connor LJ in R v Siracusa 90 Cr App R 340 at 349 .
24 For the meaning of ' cause' reference must be made to segment 4.3.15 in Chapter 4 hereof.
25 According to section 2 of the Forestry Act a village forest area is an area of customary land established as
such by an agreement under section 30 of the Forestry Act. The said section 30 states that, notwithstanding
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lighting a fire or causing a fire to be lit in any forest reserve or protected forest area
except in places designated for that purpose or as otherwise authorised by an officer.27
The designated place may be closed by order of an officer and no person shall during
such closure permit a fire to be lit in such place. The section further prohibits lighting fire
or causing fire to be lit in any village forest area except with the authorisation of a
management authority'' subject to the provisions and conditions of a forest management
agreement/" All these offences springing from section 39 are punishable by a fine of
MWKIO 000 and imprisonment for a term of five years.i"
It is also an offence to permit a fire to bum out of control in, or to spread to, a forest
reserve or village forest area.31 It is noteworthy that protected forest areas are not
included in this offence. The effect of this omission is that a person may not incur
criminal liability under the Act if he permits a fire to bum out of control in, or to spread
to, a protected forest area. There is no satisfactory reason for this omission. In the
circumstances it is suggested that an amendment be effected to insert the words
anything contained in the Act, a village headman may, with the advice of the Director of Forestry,
demarcate on unallocated customary land a village forest area which shall be protected and managed in the
prescribed manner for the benefit of that village community. Section 31 instructs the Director of Forestry to
enter into a forest management agreement with a management authority for the proper management of the
village forest area. By 'management authority' is meant a person designated as the management authority
pursuant to the agreement establishing the village forest area: section 2 of the Forestry Act.
26 Section 65(1) of the Forestry Act.
27 By ' officer ' is meant the Director of Forestry and any officers subordinate to him, who are responsible
for the administration of the Act: section 2 as read with section 4 of the Forestry Act.
28 As stated above, 'management authority' is a person designated as the management authority pursuant to
an agreement establishing the village forest area.
29 According to section 31(I) the forest management agreement must provide for: (a) the specifications of
the nature of the forestry and other practices to be followed; (b) the assistance to be provided by the
Department of Forestry and provision for use and disposition of the produce and revenue therefrom; (c)
allocation of land to individuals or families for afforestation and revocation of such allocation if applicable
provisions of the agreement are not adhered to by the occupier of the land so allocated; (d) formation of
village natural resources management committees for the purposes of managing and utilising village forest
areas. By 'village natural resources management committee' is meant a committee elected by stakeholders
of the village forest areas : section 2.
30 Section 65(1) of the Forestry Act.
31 Section 65(2) of the Forestry Act.
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'protected forest area' in section 65(2) between the words 'reserve' and 'or'. After this
amendment section 65(2) of the Forestry Act will read as follows: 'Any person who
permits to bum out of control in, or to spread to, a forest reserve, protected forest area or
village forest area shall be guilty of an offence and liable upon conviction to a fine of
K10,000 and to imprisonment for a term of five years. '
In addition an officer may require any person to assist in averting or extinguishing any
fire threatening a forest reserve, protected forest area or village forest area.32 Refusal,
without reasonable cause." to render such assistance is an offence punishable by a fine of
MWK2 000 (US$15) and imprisonment for a term of one year.34
5.2.6 Offences relating to wildlife
Section 66 provides that, subject to the provisions of the Act, any person who-
(a) pursues, kills, hunts, molests, captures or injures any animal, bird, fish or
reptile; or
(b) collects eggs or spawns from a forest reserve, protected forest area or village
forest area,
commits an offence and is liable upon conviction to a fine of MWK10 000 and to
imprisonment for a term of five years.
Two observations may be made about this section. Firstly, the animal, bird, fish or reptile
referred to in section 66(a) need not be in a forest reserve, protected forest area or village
forest area; it may be outside these areas. Secondly, it appears that the words 'subject to
the provisions of this Act' do not have much significance, for the Act does not make
32 Section 41 of the Forestry Act.
33 For the meaning of 'reasonable cause', see segment 4.3.25 in Chapter 4 hereof.
34 Section 65(3) of the Forestry Act.
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provision for pursuing, killing, hunting, molesting, capturing or injuring any animal, bird,
fish or reptile outside a forest reserve, protected forest area or village forest area. So in
respect of animals, birds, fish or reptiles outside these areas, the words 'subject to the
provisions of this Act' have no effect at all. For those animals, birds, fish or reptiles
inside the areas, the words have significance in so far as the animals, birds, fish and
reptiles are considered to be forest producer" A number of provisions in the Act deal
with forest produce and such provisions include sections 45 and 46 which permit the
taking, collection and removal of forest produce from a forest reserve and protected forest
area under the authority of a licence. A person having such licence who pursues, kills,
hunts, molests, captures or injures any animal, bird, fish or reptile will not incur criminal
liability partly because of the operation of the ' subject to' clause in section 66. With
regard to section 66(b), it may be observed that eggs and spawns" do not fall within the
definition of forest produce and there is no provision of the Act dealing with them. The
result of this is that the 'subject to' clause does not have significance in relation to section
66(b).37
5.2.7 Offences relating to possession or trafficking of forest produce
It is an offence to knowingly'" receive forest produce illegally. It is also an offence to be
found in possessiorr" of forest produce without a permit. In addition, any person who
35 The definition of forest produce in section 2 of the Act arguably encompasses 'any animal, bird, fish or
reptile' as it includes vertebrates, invertebrates and wild animals.
36 The meaning of 'spawn' adopted in the argument in the text is the minute eggs of fishes and various
other oviparous animals. The argument does not apply to the other meaning of 'spawn' which is the young
brood hatched from such eggs of fishes and oviparous animals, while still in an early stage of development.
The young brood certainly qualify as forest produce as defined in section 2 of the Act and so those
provisions relating to forest produce would affect them.
37 If 'spawns' are regarded as the young brood of fishes and other oviparous animals and consequently part
of forest produce, the 'subject to' clause does have significance in relation to section 66(b) much in the
same way as the ' subj ect to' clause has significance in respect of animals, birds , fish and reptiles inside
forest reserves, protected forest areas and village forest areas as explained when discussing section 66(a).
38 For the meaning of 'knowingly', reference must be made to segment 4.2.4 in Chapter 4 hereof.
39 For an explanation of the effect of 'possession ' , see segment 4.3.6 in Chapter 4 hereof.
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trafficks40 in forest produce without a licence commits an offence.4 1 Any person who is
convicted of any of these offences is liable to a fine of MWK20 000 and to imprisonment
f 42for a term 0 ten years.
5.2.8 Offences relating to obstruction of officers
Any person who obstructs or hinders any officer in the performance of his functions
under the Act commits an offence.43 Similarly any person who wilfully or recklessly
gives to any officer false or misleading information which the officer is entitled to obtain
under the Act is guilty of an offence.44 Further, any person who refuses to furnish to any
officer on request, particulars or information which the officer is entitled to obtain under
the Act, commits an offence.V All these persons are liable upon conviction to a fine of
MWKIO 000 and to imprisonment for five years."
5.2.9 Offences relating to official documents or stamps
Section 70 provides that it is an offence, without lawful authority -
(a) to counterfeit or alter any licence, permit or pass required under the Act;
(b) to alter or deface any prescribed document issued under the Act; or
40 For the ordinary meaning of 'trafficking', reference must be made to segment 4.2.7 in Chapter 4 hereof.
41 Section 68(1) of the Forestry Act.
42 Section 68(2) of the Forestry Act.
43 Section 69(a) of the Forestry Act. For the meaning of ' obstruct', see segment 4.3.2 in Chapter 4 hereof.
44 Section 69(b) of the Forestry Act. For an explanation of this offence, reference must be made to the
discussion of a similar offence under segment 4.3.2 in Chapter 4 hereof. The meaning of 'recklessly' is set
out in segment 4.1 in Chapter 4 hereof.
45 Section 69(c) of the Forestry Act. This offence is similar to the offence in section 15(b) of the National
Parks and Wildlife Act (NAPWA) discussed in segment 4.3.2 in Chapter 4 hereof. Reference must be made
to that segment.
46 Section 69 of the Forestry Act.
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(c) to make upon or affix to any forest produce a mark used in connection with
47
forest produce by the Department of Forestry.
These offences are punishable by a fine of MWK20 000 and imprisonment for a term of
ten years.
5.2.10 Deposition of litter and waste
It is an offence to deposit litter or noxious waste in forest reserves, protected forest areas
and village forest areas.48 Such deposition may, however, be permitted under a licence. 49
Offenders are liable to a fine of MWK5 000 and to imprisonment for a term of two
years.i''
5.2.11 Offences relating to import, export and re-export of forest produce
It is an offence to import, export or re-export or to attempt to import, export or re-export
any forest produce - (a) through any place other than a customs post or port; or (b)
without producing to a customs officer a valid licence to import or export or re-export the
forest produce as the case may be. Any person found guilty of this offence is liable to a
fine ofMWKlO 000 and to imprisonment for a term of not less than five years."
In many ways this offence is similar to the offence created by section 98 of NAPWA,52
the major difference between the two offences being the penalties prescribed. In many
47 It appears that the marks referred to here are those prescribed in regulations for use by officers in
connection with forest produce. The Minister is empowered to promulgate the regulations prescribing such
marks: section 86(h) of the Forestry Act.
48 Section 44 as read with section 72 of the Forestry Act.
49 Ibid.
50 Section 72 of the Forestry Act.
51 Section 73 of the Forestry Act.
52 For a discussion of this offence, see segment 4.3.36 in Chapter 4 hereof.
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offences including that created by section 9853 one of the penalties is stated as
'imprisonment for a term of X years '. It is settl ed in Malawian criminal law that this
wording allows the court discretion to impose a term of imprisonment less than X years. 54
It is arguable that this discretion is not available where the penalty is stated as
'imprisonment for a term of not less than X years ' as provided for in section 73 (the
present offence). This wording suggests that the court is bound to impose the X years as
the minimum. Accordingly the minimum term of imprisonment for the offences relating
to import, export or re-export of forest produce is five years.
5.2.12 Additional penalties or orders
The Forestry Act provides that upon conviction of any person of an offence under the
Act, the court may, in addition to any other penalty imposed by the Act , order:
(a) that any forest produce which has been used in the commission of the offence
be forfeited to the Government;
(b) that where any forest produce has been damaged, injured or removed in the
commission of the offence, the person convicted pay compensation equivalent
to the value of the forest produce so damaged, injured or removed;
(c) that the person convicted pay ten times the amount of any royalties and other
fees which, had the act constituting the offence been authorised, would have
been payable in respect thereof;
(d) the demolition and removal of any building, enclosure, hut, kraal, structure or
anything erected, standing or being in the area in contravention of the Act;
(e) the destruction, uprooting or removal of any crop standing or being in the area
in contravention of the Act ;
53 The penalties for the offence created by section 98 of NAPWA are set out in section III of NAPWA.
54 Joseph Kungwezo Banda v Republic Crim inal Appe al No. 134 of 1996 (unreported but copy available on
http://www.judiciary.mw whenaccessedon030ctobe r2005).This case involved the offence of unlawful
wounding contrary to section 241 of the Penal Code.
235
(f) the seizure of any carrier or vehicle which has been used in committing the
offence.55
It is noteworthy that the word employed in the order numbered (a) is 'used' which is
arguably narrower than 'involved'. The forest produce to be forfeited is that 'used' in the
commission of the offence. This arguably excludes forest produce that is concerned or
involved in the commission of the offence, short of being used. It is possible for forest
produce to be 'involved' in the commission of an offence while not being 'used' in the
commission of the offence. For instance, the clearing of land in a forest reserve - an
offence under section 64(d) of the Forestry Act - may involve forest produce but such
clearing may not use forest produce: a bulldozer clearing the land does not use forest
produce, but its actions may affect or involve forest produce.
The order numbered (b) has the potential to take away from the offender the profits of the
crime. In this way offenders are likely to learn that crime under the Act does not pay. The
order may also assist government in the rehabilitation of the damaged or injured forest
produce.
The order numbered (c) makes reference to royalties and other fees. The rates and
manner of payment of these royalties and fees are required to be prescribed in regulations
promulgated by the Minister. 56 In this connection, it may be noted that the Director of
Forestry may direct in writing that any royalties or fees be waived in whole or in part for
a specified period.i" The effect of this is that order (c) may not be made by a court if it
can be shown that the offence was committed at a time when a full waiver of royalties
and fees was in place.
55 Section 74 of the Forestry Act.
56 Section 86(c) of the Forestry Act.
57 Section 49 of the Forestry Act.
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In orders numbered (d) and (e) the demolition, destruction, uprooting and removal are
restricted to things in an area in contravention of the Act. This restriction takes
cognizance of the fact that some things may be in the area on the authority of a licence or
other permission granted by law.
The provision for seizure as an additional remedy or punishment in order numbered (f)
raises one difficulty relating to disposal of the carrier or vehicle. In general terms seizure
involves taking possession of a thing.58 Disposal of the thing seized is beyond the scope
of seizure. On most occasions legislation provides for seizure before court proceedings
begin or at least before conviction of the accused. Contrary to this general practice, the
provision for seizure in order numbered (f) above allows the court to order seizure of a
carrier or vehicle after conviction. The difficulty is that section 74(1)(t) - which contains
the provision for seizure - does not state what should happen to the carrier or vehicle
after the seizure. Will the carrier or vehicle be returned to the owner after some time?
Will the carrier or vehicle be forfeited to the Government? Will the carrier or vehicle be
sold? The lacuna is glaring and there is need to fill it.
In the absence of clear guidance on the matter, it is possible that a court faced with the
difficulty may resort to those provisions of the Act that deal with seizures outside court
and disposal of things seized outside court. These provisions" state that any officer or
police officer may seize, inter alia, any article which the officer or police officer
reasonably suspects of having been used in committing an offence under the Act. 60 The
58 It is clear from the literature that seizure may involve detention of individuals. It may also involve
obtaining possession of contraband, fruits, instrumenta1ities and evidence of crime: Miche1e G Hermann
Search and Seizure Checklists 2ed New York: Clark Boardman 1982 at 2 - 3; Richard Stone Entry, Search
and Seizure: A Guide to Civil and Criminal Powers ofEntry 2ed London: Sweet and Maxwell 1989 at 275
- 276; John Wesley Hall Jr. Search and Seizure New York: Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co 1982 at
10; Roger E Salhany The Police Manual ofArrest, Seizure and Interrogation 4ed Toronto: Carswell 1988
at 99; Polyvios G Po1yviou Search and Seizur e: Constitutional and Common Law London: Duckworth
1982 at 20 - 93. See also generally James A Fontana The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada 2ed
Toronto: Butterworth 1984.
59 Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Forestry Act.
60 .According t.o section 9(3) of the Forestry Act a village natural resources management committee may
seize and detam any forest produce or article which the village natural resources management committee
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seized article is required to be kept safely in the custody of an officer until the case in
connection with which the article was seized has been tried and concluded or a decision
not to prosecute has been made. Where the person has been tried and convicted, the
article is to be disposed of at the disc retion of the Director of Forestry." Drawing upon
these provisions the court may perhaps order that upon seizure of the carrier or vehicle, it
should be disposed of at the discretion of the Director of Forestry. It is likely that such an
order will be challenged on a number of grounds. For example, it may be contended that
this being the end of the criminal process, it is wrong for the court to pass a sentence (that
is, the order of seizure and then disposal by the Director) which gives a discretion to a
non-judicial officer regarding sentence, a development which may ultimately lead to
further court proceedings or even inju stice. In light of this and other possible challenges,
it is suggested that the best way out of the difficulty is to amend section 74(1)(f) with a
view to introduce an indication as to what shou ld happen to the carrier or vehicle after the
seizure ordered by the court. In this regard, it is suggested that the section should
empower the court to order a return of the carrier or vehicle after a period of time, or to
order that the carrier or vehicle be sold and the money paid into the Forest Development
and Management Fund,62 depending on the seriousness of the offence.Y Returning the
carrier or vehicle after a period of time after seizure has the effect of punishing the
offender through deprivation of use between the date of seizure and the date of return.
Selling the carrier or vehicle is the more serious pen alty and should be reserved for the
reasonably suspects of having been obtained or remo ved from the village forest area in contravention of
rules made by such village natural resources management committee.
6 1 These provisions also relate to seized forest produc e. Further, the forest produce or article may also be
kept by a village natural resources management comm ittee. In that event the forest produce or article may,
upon conviction of the person , be disposed of at the discreti on of the village natural resources management
committee according to its rules: see sections 10 and 11(2)(a) of the Forestry Act.
62 The Forest Development and Management Fund is established under section 55 of the Forestry Act. The
objects of the Fund are the conservation, augmentation and management of forest resources and forest
land~ in Malawi and it may be applied to, among other things , the inculcation of the twin concepts of
mult iple purpose management and sustainability in forestry into local communities: sections 58 and 59 of
the Forestry Act.
63 The question whether penalties like these may amount to cruel punishment has been considered under
segment 4.3.39 in Chapter 4 hereof. Reference must therefore be made to that segment.
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worst of offences. The suggested amendment may be effected by adding after the word
'offence' in section 74(1)(t) the following words:
'and the return of the carrier or vehicle at the expiry of a specified period or the
sale of the carrier or vehicle, provided that -
(i) in the event of seizure and subsequent return, the carrier or vehicle shall be
kept at the Department of Forestry, a police station or any other proper
place; and
(ii) in the event of seizure and sale, the proceeds of such sale shall be paid into
the Fund. ,64
The suggestion that the proceeds of the sale should be paid into the Fund requires a
complementary amendment of section 55(2) of the Forestry Act so that the proceeds can
legally be paid into the Fund. In the present state of the Act, it is not possible for such
payment to be made. The amendment of section 55(2) should be by way of adding
another paragraph, that is paragraph (g) which should read as follows: '(g) payments
made into the Fund under section 74(1)(t)'.
5.2.13 Compounding offences
Instead of clinging to criminal prosecution on all occasions, the Director of Forestry may
authorise any officer not below the rank of Principal Forestry Officer to compound an
offence against the Act by charging a sum of money not exceeding one and half the
maximum fine prescribed for the offence and from that moment no further court
proceedings shall be taken. The Director of Forestry may give such authority only where
he is satisfied that an offence against the Act has been committed, and the person who
has committed the offence consents in writing to compounding.f It appears that the
64 It is provided by section 74(2) that where an order is made in terms of section 74(1) in respect of forest
produce from a village forest area, the forest produce or article ordered to be forfeited and the amount
ordered to be paid shall be forfeited and paid to the management authority in respect of that area.
65 Section 75(1) of the Forestry Act.
239
Director cannot give authority to compound generally whenever an appropriate case
arises; he is required to give the authority when 'an offence against this Act has been
committed'. Every time an offence is committed and the accused consents to compound,
the Director must authorise an appropriate officer to go ahead to compound. The
advantage of this procedure lies in the fact that the Director is in effect in control of the
compounding. There is scope for the Director to refuse compounding where he is
convinced that the best way of handling the case is by way of criminal prosecution. It is
suggested that a good example of a situation where the Director should refuse
compounding is where the accused is a repeat offender (recidivist) and payment of fines
or money does not seem to deter him and the Director feels that the State should ask the
court to sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment.
Several other things must be noted about compounding. First, where a prosecution is
actually pending in respect of an offence, compounding may only be done with the
consent of the court presiding over the prosccution.P" Second, if an article was seized in
connection with the offence compounded, the officer compounding the offence is
required to return the article to the owner.l" Third, any money received from
compounding an offence in respect of forest produce from a village forest area is required
to be paid to the management authority in respect of that area." The Act also provides in
section 75(4) that 'any article confiscated under [section 75(1) or (2)] in respect of forest
produce from a village forest area shall be paid to the management authority of that
area. ,69 A perusal of section 75(1) reveals that it does not provide for confiscation of any
article and so the reference in section 75(4) to section 75(1) does not have any effect. It is
section 75(2) which provides for articles seized (confiscated). The problem with the
reference in section 75(4) to section 75(2) is that the articles are required to be 'paid' to
the management authority. Certainly it is semantically wrong to talk in terms of 'paying
66 Section 75(3) of the Forestry Act.
67 Section 75(2) as read with section 11(1)(b) of the Forestry Act.
68 Section 75(4) as read with section 75(1) of the Forestry Act.
69 Section 75(4) of the Forestry Act.
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an article' to the management authority. Even if the word 'paid' was to be construed as
'given' in respect of the article, the difficulty will not be cleared since the giving of the
article to the management authority does not fit in the scheme of disposals of seized
articles provided for under section 11 of the Act. In the circumstances it is suggested that
the reference to 'article' in section 75(4) should be deleted in order to streamline the
language and content of the provision. To this end, it is proposed that the words 'and any
article confiscated' and 'or (2)' should be deleted from the section. After effecting these
changes, section 75(4) will read: '(4) Any money rece ived under subsection (1) in respect
of forest produce from a village forest area shall be paid to the management authority in
respect of that area. '
Lastly, in the case of money received from compounding offences other than offences in
respect of forest produce from a village forest area, the Act does not indicate where the
money is to be paid. It is suggested that such money should be paid into the Forest
Development and Management Fund in order to prevent misuse of the money at
departmental level. However, it is not possible at present for such money to be paid into
the Fund as such money does not fall into any category of funds permitted or required to
be paid into the Fund. It is therefore necessary to amend section 55(2) of the Act to allow
the money from compounding to be paid into the Fund. The amendment should be by
way of adding a new paragraph to section 55(2). In view of the amendment to section
55(2) suggested under segment 5.2.12 hereof, it is proposed that the new paragraph
should be numbered (h). The amendment should be in the following terms: '(h) such
sums as may be received from compounding offences other than offences in respect of
forest produce from a village forest area.'
5.3 Plant Protection Act 11 of 1969
5.3.1 General
The Plant Protection Act 11 of 1969 ("PPA") is one of the few environmental statutes
that were enacted by independent Malawi in the first five years after the end of political
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colonialism in the country. Its declared purpose or objective is to provide for the
eradication of pests and diseases destructive to plants and to prevent the introduction and
spread of pests and diseases destructive to plants.i" It has twelve sections and only one of
these (section 11) provides for criminal offences. These offences are wide-ranging and
they cater for wrongs under both the principal Act and subsidiary legislation. More will
be said about these offences in the discussion that follows.
5.3.2 Resisting or obstructing inspector
It is an offence to wilfully resist, obstruct, impede or hinder an inspector in the exercise
of his powers or the performance of his duties under the PPA or any regulations made
under it.71 The inspector referred to here is appointed by the Minister under the Act72 and
is empowered, among other things, to enter upon and inspect at all reasonable times any
land, premises, buildings, vehicles or vessels on or in which growing media73 or plants
may be found, or on or in which he reasonably suspects that a pest may be found. He may
declare any plants, growing media or containers to be infested with a pest and then order
the destruction at any time of the plants so declared or any host plants.i" If he reasonably
suspects the presence of a pest on land, premises or in a building, he may declare the area
in which the land, premises or building is situated to be an infested area." and in writing
prohibit for a period not exceeding fourteen days, the removal from the land, premises or
building of growing media, plants, containers or other things whatsoever capable of
spreading a pest. An inspector may also order the seizure, detention and destruction
70 Long title of the Act.
71 Section 11(1)(a)ofthePPA.
72 Section 3 of the PPA.
73 Section 2 of the PPA defines growing medium as a medium, including soil, capable of being used for the
propagation or culture of plants .
74 According to section 2 of the ppA, a host plant is a plant capable of being the host of a pest.
75 Section 2 of the PPA defines infested area as any area or place in which a pest exists.
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without compensation of any imported growing medium or plant or injurious organism76
or invertebrate, together with the container thereof, which is imported in contravention of
the Act, regulations under it or a permit to import issued under the Act or regulations and
which is not at the time of importation accompanied by a certificate of origin,
phytosanitary certificate." or other prescribed document." Resisting, obstructing,
impeding or hindering an inspector in the exercise of any of these powers is an offence. It
must be noted, however, that the proscribed conduct is required to be 'wilful'. For the
meaning of 'wilful,' reference must be made to segment 4.3.2 in Chapter 4 hereof.
5.3.3 Contravention of Act or regulations
It is an offence to contravene or fail to comply with any of the provisions of the PPA or
regulations made under it or any order or direction made under the ppA or the regulations
with which it is one's duty to comply.f" This offence contains a general criminalization
clause and for reasons stated in segment 4.3.38 in Chapter 4 hereof, the literal meaning of
this offence must be disregarded. Instead a court must engage in a pick and choose
exercise aimed at identifying the provisions of the Act and regulations which qualify as
proscriptions the contravention of which amounts to a criminal offence. It is suggested
that, on account of the peremptory or imperative language used and/or the other ways in
which they are couched, the following are some of the provisions the contravention of
which will amount to an offence.
76 An injurious organism is defined by section 2 of the PPA as any organism or like agent including a virus
which is: (a) inimical to the growth or existence of living plants; (b) injurious to plants or plant products; or
(c) capable of producing a disease.
77 By phytosanitary certificate is meant a certificate issued by an officer of the plant protection service of
Malawi, or of any other country concerned, as to the health of a plant or a growing medium: section 2 of
the PPA.
78 Section 5 of the ppA. These are not the only powers of an inspector. Other powers of an inspector are set
out elsewhere in the PPA (for instance in section 4) and in the regulations (for example in regulation 8 of
the Plant Protection (Import) Regulations (GN 107/1969).
79 Section I 1(1)(b) of the PPA.
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An owner of land or prermses is required to take such measures as are reasonably
necessary for the eradication, reduction or prevention of the spread of a pest or disease
which an inspector may in writing order him to take. 8o An owner of land, premises, a
building, vehicle or vessel, or of a growing medium or plant, and the agent of such owner
is required to give such information and provide such labour and facilities as the
inspector may require for the purposes of carrying out an inspection under the Act.
8I
No
person is allowed to export or cause to be exported any plants from Malawi without
having applied for and obtained a phytosanitary certificate relating to such plants.
82
Further, no person is permitted, save as is otherwise provided, to import any vegetative
material, mushroom or other fungi, spawn, seeds or any unmanufactured plant product, or
any rooting composite, soil or other growing media, unless a permit authorizing such
importation is submitted.t' In addition, no person may import the following things
without the written consent of the Minister:
(a) any plant packed in soil which is not the product of a nursery approved by the
Permanent Secretary and bearing a label certifying such origin;
(b) fresh fruits from Asia or the Pacific Islands;
(c) any plant or part of a plant specified in the First Schedule to the regulations;
80 Section 4(1) of the PPA.
81 Section 6 of the PPA. This section also demands that such owner must afford an inspector access to the
land, premises, etc. Failure to grant such access arguably falls under the offence of resisting or obstructing
an inspector. Accordingly, it has not been included in the present list of proscribed acts.
82 Regulation 4(1) of the Plant Protection (Export) Regulations (GN 106/1969 and GN 32/1982).
83 Regulation 4( 1) of the Plant Protection (Import) Regulations (GN 107/1969). The words 'save as is
otherwise provided' suggest that in some circumstances the listed items may be imported lawfully without
an import permit. Such exemption is exemplified by regulation 7 of the Plant Protection (Import)
Regulations which lists a number of plants or plant associated items which may be imported without a
permit. However, it must be noted that some things do not enjoy such exemptions, for instance any live
insect or other invertebrate and any plant pathogen: importation of these may only be done with a permit -
regulation 4(2) of the Plant Protection (Import) Regulations. It must further be noted that ' submit' is
defined in regulation 2 of the Plant Protection (Import) Regulations as meaning, in relation to a permit or a
phytosanitary or other certificate relating to a consignment of growing media, injurious organisms,
Invertebrates or plants, the submission of the permit or certificate to an inspector at the place of inspection
or port of entry of the consignment.
244
(d) any gram, pulse or similar produce unless it is accompanied by a
phytosanitary certificate stating that it has been fumigated in an approved
manner not more than fourteen days prior to entry into Malawi;
(e) rooted vegetative material of any plant, unless it is certified as having been
rooted in a sterile medium, from any country outside eastern and southern
Africa;84 and
(f) vegetative material of any plant species or cultivar from any country outside
eastern and southern Africa.85
With regard to fumigation, it is declared that no person shall commence any fumigation
unless he has in his possession a Record of Fumigation Form and a Certificate of
Clearance Form.86 It is suggested that contravention of any of these provisions amounts
to an offence in terms of section 11(1)(b) of the ppA.
5.3.4 Contravention of conditions of a permit or other document
It is an offence, without reasonable cause, to contravene or fail to comply with any of the
conditions of a permit or other document issued in accordance with the Act or its
regulations.V The term 'reasonable cause ' has been discussed in Chapter 4 hereof
(especially in segment 4.3.25) and so reference must be made to that chapter. As for the
rest of the offence, it may be noted that the Act and its regulations require that certain
acts be performed under the authority of permits, certificates or other documents.
Proceeding with the acts in the absence of the permit, certificate or other document
constitutes an offence. Such offence is partly the subject of the immediately foregoing
84 Regulation 2 of the Plant Protection (Import) Regulations states that by 'eastern Africa' in the regulations
is meant Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, and by ' southern Africa ' is meant Angola, Botswana, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Rhodesia (that is, Zimbabwe), South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia.
85 Regulation 10(1) of the Plant Protection (Import) Regulations .
86 Regulation 4 of the Plant Protection (Fumigation) Regulations (ON 114/1973). The Record and
Certificate are set out in the Second Schedule to the Regulations .
87 Sect ion 11Cl )(c) of the PPA.
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segment (5.3.3). The concern in the present offence is not on the failure to obtain any of
those documents but rather on contravention of or failure to adhere to the conditions set
out in the document. The significance and scope of the word 'conditions' was dealt with
in segment 4.3.12 in Chapter 4 hereof.
5.3.5 Introducing a pest in Malawi
It is an offence to maliciously introduce a pest on to land or premises in Malawi. 88 The
word 'maliciously' has been considered in a number of cases. In a nutshell, it means 'an
actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that was in fact done, or recklessness as
to whether such harm should occur (i. e. the accused has foreseen that the particular kind
of harm might be done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it): it is neither limited to
nor does it require any ill will towards the person injured. ,89 As for the word 'pest', it
takes a specialized meaning. Section 2(1) of the PPA defines it as an injurious organism
which has been declared to be a pest under section 2(2) of the PPA. The latter subsection
provides that for the purposes of the Act, the Minister may, by notice, declare any
injurious organism to be a pest either generally or in respect of a particular type of plant
and either with a view to its control or the prevention of its introduction or spread, or for
some other purpose. The effect of these provisions is that not everything known as a pest
in common parlance qualifies as a pest under the Act. It is only those organisms -
whether known as pests in common parlance or not - which have been declared to be
pests by the Minister that will qualify as pests under the Act. It is the introduction of such
'declared pests' that is proscribed under the present offence.
88 Section 1I(l)(d) of the PPA.
89 P J Richardson (ed) Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice London: Sweet and Maxwell
2004 at para 17-45. Archbold continues to say that in R v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 and R v Lawrence
[1982] AC 510 it was laid down that foresight that the prohibited harm may occur is not an essential
ingredient of recklessness in general, but that those decisions, however, do not affect the more restricted
meaning of 'recklessly' which forms part of the definition of 'maliciously' . In support of this Archbold
cites a number of cases including W (a Minor) v Dolb ey 88 Cr App RI , DC; R v Morrison (L.A.) 89 Cr
App R 17, CA and R v Savage ,' DPP v Parm enter [1992] 1 AC 699, HL. See also R v Cunningham [1957]
2 QB 396 and Rv Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421.
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5.3.6 Failure to produce permit or other document
It is an offence for any person to fail or refuse to produce to an inspector (on being
required to produce) a permit, certificate or other document which he is required to have
in accordance with the Act or any of the regulations made under it.9o It must be noted that
the essence of this offence is the failure or refusal to produce the document and not
necessarily the absence of the document. It is possible for a person to have the document
but, on being called upon to do so, to fail or refuse to produce the document: even though
that person has the document, he will still be convicted of this offence. The words 'which
he is required to have in accordance with this Act, or any regulations made thereunder'
are merely describing the document at stake; they are not meant to introduce absence of
the document as a necessary element of the offence. This offence may be likened to the
offence of failure to produce a driving licence upon being required to do so by a traffic
officer: the motorist may have the driving licence at home and yet his failure to produce it
will amount to an offence.
5.3.7 Failure to give information
Any person who fails or refuses without reasonable cause to give information to an
inspector when required to do so in accordance with the Act or knowingly gives false or
incomplete information, commits an offence.91 It is clear that there are two ways in which
the offence may be committed. Firstly, it may be committed by failing to give
information. To this limb of the offence a 'reasonable cause' defence may be raised, that
is, proof that there was reasonable cause for the failure or refusal to give the information
will defeat a criminal case based on this limb. Secondly, the offence may be committed
by knowingly giving false or incomplete information. It is suggested that whether the
offender gave the false or incomplete information 'knowingly' depends on the facts as
the offender believed the information to be. If the offender believed that the information
90 Section 11(1)( e) of the ppA.
91 Section 11(1)(f) of the PPA.
247
was true or complete, although in fact it was false or incomplete, the offender cannot be
found to have knowingly given false or incomplete information.
92
5.3.8 False declaration or statement
It is proscribed for any person:
(a) to make a declaration or statement wh ich he knows to be false In any
particular or does not know or believe to be true; or
(b) to knowingly make use of a declaration, statement or document containing the
same.
Doing any of these acts is an offence if the purpose for doing it is to obtain for himself or
any other person, the issue of a permit, certificate or other document. 93
5.3.9 Penalties for offences under the PPA
Section 11(1) of the PPA prescribes the penalties for the offences discussed above. It
states that a person convicted of maliciously introducing a pest on to land or premises in
Malawi is liable to a fine of £400 and imprisonment for four years. It further states that
the penalties for the other offences are a fine of £100 and imprisonment for six months.
The reference to pounds (£) and not Malawi Kwacha is a vestige of colonialism. As
stated above in the introduction to the PPA (segment 5.3.1) the PPA is one of the first
few statutes enacted by independent Malawi. At the time of enacting the PPA it appears
that the colonial currency (the pound) was still being used as the currency of the country.
Having changed the currency to Malawi Kwacha, it is not justifiable to maintain this
reference to pounds. In the premises it is suggested that the reference to pounds should be
deleted and replaced with a reference to Malawi Kwacha. It is further suggested that the
92 R v TaafJe [1984] AC 539 at 546. More on this issue is discussed in segment 4.2.4 in Chapter 4 hereof.
93 Section 11(l )(g) of the PPA .
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amounts of the fine (400 and 100) should be changed to appropriate amounts that reflect
the current value of the Malawi Kwacha and that take into account the amounts of fines
prescribed under the Environment Management Act 1996 (EMA). In this regard, the
offence of contravention of the Act or regulations (discussed under segment 5.3.3 above)
should be punishable by a fine of not less than MWK1 0 000 and not more than MWK500
000 (US$3 759) and imprisonment for five years" The penalties for the offence of
maliciously introducing pest should be a fine of not less than MWK20 000 and not more
than MWK1 000 000 (US$7 519) and imprisonment for ten years. 95 The offences of
resisting or obstructing an inspector (segment 5.3.2 above), contravention of conditions
of a permit or other document (segment 5.3.4 above) , failure to produce permit or other
document (segment 5.3.6 above), failure to give information (segment 5.3.7 above) and
false declaration or statement (segment 5.3.8 above) should be punishable by a fine of not
less than MWK5 000 and not more than MWK200 000 (US$l 504) and imprisonment for
two years. 96
5.4 Waterworks Act 17 of 1995
5.4.1 General
The Waterworks Act 17 of 199597 was enacted with a view to provide for the
establishment of Water Boards and water-areas, for the administration of such water-
areas, for the development, operation and maintenance of waterworks and waterbome
94 This is in line with the penalties for the general offence created under section 61 of the EMA. It may be
noted that the ppA's offence of contravention of the Act or regulations is also in the nature of a general
offence.
95 The idea is to achieve uniformity of punishment between this offence and the EMA's pollution offences
(section 67 of the EMA). It is arguable that the PPA's offence of introducing pest is akin to the EMA's
pollution offences as both are based on the introduction into the environment of something that is
environmentally unacceptable.
96 Most of these offences relate to actions taken by inspectors. Under section 62 of the EMA such offences
are punishable by a fine from MWK5 000 to MWK200 000 and imprisonment for two years. The
suggestion in the text is meant to align the penalties for the offences under the PPA with the penalties for
similar offences under the EMA.
97 ON 68/1996.
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sewerage sanitation systems in Malawi and for related matters.98 By 'water-area' is meant
an area declared as such by the Minister.99 As for 'waterworks', section 2 of the Act
defines it as all reservoirs, dams , weirs , tanks , cisterns, tunnels, boreholes, filter beds,
conduits, aqueducts and all other structures or appliances used or constructed for the
obtaining, storage, conveyance, supply, measurement or regulation of water which are so
used or capable of use by or on behalf of a Water Board, and includes any land occupied
by, or under the control of, the Water Board for the purposes of such structures or
1" 100app lances.
The Waterworks Act repealed the former Waterworks Act , the Blantyre Waterworks Act
(cap 72:02 of the Laws of Malawi) and the Lilongwe Waterworks Act 19 of 1986.
In the process of making provision for the vanous matters specified above, the
Waterworks Act creates a number of environmentally relevant criminal offences. The
discussion will now focus on these offences.
5.4.2 Passing prohibited matter into sewers or drains
It is an offence to throw, empty, turn ,1 01or suffer or permit to be thrown or emptied or to
pass, into any public sewer or into any drain or private sewer communicating with a
public sewer, any of the following matters:
98 Long title of the Act.
99 Section 2 of the Waterworks Act.
100 Section 2 of the Waterworks Act states that the term ' waterworks ' does not include any service. It
defines service as all pipes, valves, cisterns, casks, fittings and other appliances through which water flows
or is intended to fl.ow after leaving the meter on any premises, and which are intended for the supply of
water to such premises only.
101 The word ' turn: here must be understood in the sense of pouring, letting fall or otherwise releasing
(contents) from or Into a receptacle: http://www.dictionary.com (accessed on 23 August 2005). The other
meanings of ' turn ' do not make much sense in the context of this offence.
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(a) any matter likely to injure the sewer or drain , or to interfere with the free flow
of its contents, or to affect prejudicially the treatment and disposal of its
contents;
(b) any chemical refuse or waste steam, or any liquid of temperature higher than
forty-three degrees celcius , being refuse or steam which, or a liquid which
when so heated, is, either alone or in combination with the contents of the
sewer or drain , dangerous or the cause of a nuisance, or prejudicial to health;
or
(c) any petroleum spirit or carbide of calcium.
Offenders under this offence are liable to a fine of MWK200 and to a further fine of
MWK100 for each day on which the offence continues after conviction. 102 The prohibited
acts are essentially aspects of pollution. In the Environment Management Act 1996
offences relating to pollution are punishable by a fine of not less than MWK20 000 and
not more than MWK1 000 000 and imprisonment for ten years.l '" It is suggested that in
order to conform with the flagship environmental statute in the country, the penalties
under the present offence must be repealed and replaced by those in the Environment
Management Act.
5.4.3 Communication of drains or private sewers with public sewers
Section 33 of the Waterworks Act provides for the procedure for making communication
with public sewers. It states that if a person wishes or is required to have his drains or
private sewers made to communicate with a public sewer, he must give to the relevant
Water Board notice of his proposal in writing in such manner as may be prescribed. The
Board may refuse to make the communication on the grounds specified in the section.l'"
102 Section 29 of the Waterworks Act.
103 Section 67 of the EMA.
104 The grounds are: Cl) where it appears to the Board that the mode of construction of the drain or private
sewer is not in conformity with the rules in force governing the same ; and (2) where the condition of the
drain or private sewer or the matter carried or to be carried thereby is such that the making of the
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If the Board does not refuse , it must, with all reasonable dispatch, cause the
communication to be made by means of a lateral drain to the public sewer but it is not
obligatory on the Board to make the communication until the estimated cost of the work
has been paid to it or security for payment has been given to its satisfaction. If and so far
as the expenses reasonably incurred by the Board in the execution of the work are not
covered by the payment made to it, the Board may recover the expenses or balance
thereof, from the person for whom the work was done. On this background it is provided
in section 33(6) that any person (other than a person lawfully acting on behalf of the
Board) who causes a drain or sewer to communicate with a public sewer commits an
offence. It is further stated that any person who fails to comply with or acts in
contravention of any of the provisions of the section commits an offence. Offenders are
liable to a fine of MWK400 (US$3)
The first offence created by section 33(6) is obviously meant to prevent unprofessional or
unqualified persons from effecting the communication. Excluding such persons from this
work is likely to reduce incidents of burst or malfunctioning sewers or connecting pipes.
The second offence created by section 33(6) is general in nature. From a perusal of
section 33 it appears that a person will commi t this general offence if he does any of the
following:
(i) upon being required to do so, the person fails to take the necessary steps to
have his drains or private sewers made to communicate with a public
sewer;
(ii) the person fails or refuses to lay the drain or private sewer open for
inspection by the Board; or
(iii) the person maintains, repairs or renews from time to time a lateral drain
which is supposed to be maintained, repaired or renewed by the Board.
communication would be prejudicial to the sewerage system of the Board : section 33 of the Waterworks
Act.
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5.4.4 Offences relating to audit
A Water Board is required to keep a true account of its financial transactions during each
financial year. 105 An auditor appointed by the Board is required to audit the accounts of
the Board from time to time. 106 The auditor may in writing require the production of all
books, deeds, contracts , vouchers, receipts and other documents relating to the accounts
and investments of the Board which he may deem necessary for the purpose of the audit.
He may in writing summon all such persons as he may think proper to appear before him
personally at the offices of the Board at a time to be fixed in such summons, for
examination in connection with any documents or matter relating to the audit. For the
purpose of such examination, the auditor may administer oaths and take evidence on
oath. Any person who without just cause fails or refuses to produce any document the
production of which has been duly required by the auditor, commits an offence. In
addition, it is an offence, having been so summoned, to neglect or refuse to comply with
the summons without just cause. It is also an offence, having appeared before the auditor,
to refuse without just cause to be examined on oath or to take such oath. It is further an
offence, having taken such oath, to refuse without just cause to answer such questions
pertaining to the audit as are put to him. Conviction for any of these offences attracts a
penalty of MWK500 (US$4) and, in default of payment, imprisonment for three
months. 107
105 Section 44(1) of the Waterworks Act.
106 Section 45 of the Waterworks Act.
107 Section 46 of the Waterworks Act. The sect ion expressly states that conviction for any of the offences in
it,does not exempt,the person convicted from liability to do or perform the act, matter or thing required of
hIm, under the sectIOn: So, for ex~mple, after conviction for refusing to answer questions pertaining to the
audit, the person convicted may still be required to answer such questions.
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5.4.5 Damage to waterworks, etc and pollution of waterworks, etc
It is an offence to wilfully and negligently cause damage to any waterworks, public
fountains, public sewers, services or meters.i'" As demonstrated in segment 4.3.2 in
Chapter 4 hereof, the word 'wilfully' denotes both intention and recklessness. The word
'negligently' expresses 'a failure to comply with the standards of the reasonable man.' 109
It has been suggested that a person acts negligently ' if he fails to exercise such care, skill
or foresight as a reasonable man in his situation would exercise.' 11 0 It must be noted that
according to the Act the damage must be caused both wilfully and negligently. So it must
be proved that the accused caused the damage intentionally and negligently or recklessly
and negligently. It seems too much to demand proof of both intention and negligence or
both recklessness and negligence. Actually there is scope for contending that the
existence of intention negatives negligence. Similarly there is room for convincingly
arguing that the existence of recklessness (as understood in present-day courts) negatives
negligence. If such arguments are accepted, the conclusion will be inescapable that it was
not necessary for Parliament to require that the damage should be caused both wilfully
and negligently. In the premises it is suggested that to avoid difficulties in the application
of this offence, the words 'wilfully' and 'negligently' should be alternative requirements.
To that end, the word 'and' that joins those words should be changed to 'or'.
It is also an offence to unlawfully draw off, divert or take water from 'the same' or from
any streams or waters by which the waterworks are supplied or to pollute any such water
or allow any foul liquid, gas or other noxious or injurious matter to enter into the
108 Section 50 of the Waterworks Act. The term 'public fountain' is defined by section 2 of the Act as
including any fountain, standpipe, valve, tap or appliance used or intended to be used for, or in connection
with, the supply of water to the public from the waterworks erected by the Board and which is the property
of the Board. 'Meter' is defined by the same section 2 as any appliance used to measure or ascertain the
amount of water taken or used from the waterworks by means of any service.
109 Peter Murphy (ed) Blackstone 's Criminal Practice London: Blackstone Press 2000 at 28.
no P J Richardson (ed) Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice London : Sweet and Maxwell
2004 at para 17-43.
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waterworks, public sewers or any services connected therewith.111 It is arguable from the
context that the words 'the same' refer to waterworks , public fountains, public sewers or
services. Meters are excluded from this list as they cannot keep water which can be
drawn off, diverted or taken. It must further be observed that the word 'unlawfully' only
qualifies the drawing off, diversion and taking; it does not qualify the polluting. The
meaning and significance of 'unlawfully' has been discussed elsewhere. 112
Any person convicted of an offence under the present segment is liable to a fine of
MWK2 000 (US$15) and to a further penalty of MWK500 (US$4) for each day during
which the offence continues.
5.4.6 Misusing or wasting water
Any person who wilfully or negligently misuses or wastes or causes or allows to be
misused or wasted any water passing into, through or upon or near any premises from any
waterworks commits an offence and is liable to a fine of MWK2 000. 113 Liability to such
fine does not prejudice the Board's powers to diminish , withhold, suspend, stop, turn off
or divert the supply of water either wholly or in part. 114
5.4.7 Failure to give notice of change of occupancy
Every change of occupancy of premises is required to be notified to the Board. It is the
responsibility of the new occupier to make such notification within seven days after
going into occupation. Failure to give such notification amounts to an offence and the
offender is liable to a fine of MWK200. 115
111 Section 50 of the Waterworks Act.
112 Segment 4.3.34 in Chapter 4 hereof.
113 Section 51 of the Waterworks Act.
114 Section 51 as read with section 16 of the Waterworks Act.
115 Section 52 of the Waterworks Act.
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5.4.8 Fraudulent measurements
It is an offence to alter or cause or permit to be altered, any service with intent to avoid
the accurate measurement or register of water by means of any meter, or to obtain a
greater supply of water than he is entitled to and to avoid payment therefor or to wilfully
or negligently cause damage to any meter. The puni shment for this offence is a fine of
MWK2 000. The Board may replace or repair the altered service or damaged meter at the
expense of the person convicted, and the cost of replacing or repairing any such service
or meter may be recovered upon the order of a magistrate in the same manner as any
penalty provided for under the Act may be recovered upon conviction. 116 It must be noted
that the words 'wilfully or negligently' describe only the causing of damage to a meter;
they do not qualify the alteration of a service. The effect of this is that the mens rea for
causing damage to a meter is contained in the words 'wilfully or negligently' whereas the
mens rea for alteration of a service is partly introduced by the words 'with intent to ... '
5.4.9 Foul accumulation of earth or other matter
It is an offence to put or accumulate or allow to be put or to remain or to accumulate, on
any premises occupied or owned by a person or his servants, any foul, noisome or
injurious matter or any earth, deposit or excavated material in such manner or place that it
may be washed, fall or be carried into the waterworks or the gathering grounds thereof. It
is also an offence not to remove or cause to be removed or take such steps as may be
necessary to prevent, upon notice in writing from the Board, any foul, noisome or
injurious matter or any earth, deposit or excavated material in such manner or place that it
may be washed, fall or be carried into the waterworks or the gathering grounds thereof.
These offences are punishable by a fine of MWK2 000 and, for each day during which
such matter, earth, deposit or excavated material remains unremoved after notice in
writing from the Board requiring the same to be removed, a further penalty of MWK500.
116 Section 53 of the Waterworks Act.
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It appears that the additional penalty of the MWK500 may also be imposed for each day
during which the offence continues. I 17
The section is poorly worded especially on the penalty side. It partly reads' ... liable to a
fine of K2,000 and for each day during which such matter, earth deposits or excavated
material remains unremoved after notice in writing from the Board, requiring the same to
be removed, to a further penalty of K500 for each day during which the offence
continues.' If the section stopped at 'K500', the section would be fine grammatically. The
words which come after the 'K500' are grammatically inconsistent with some of the
words that come before the 'K500'. This difficulty may be resolved by cutting all the
words that come after 'K500' and pasting them after the words 'K2,000 and' and then
inserting the word 'or' after the pasted words. After effecting these changes, the section
will partly read as follows: ' ... liable to a fine of K2,000 and for each day during which
the offence continues, or for each day during which such matter, earth deposits or
excavated material remains unremoved after notice in writing from the Board, requiring
the same to be removed, to a further penalty ofK500.'
5.4.10 Unauthorised building over or near pipes, etc
Any person who, without the consent of the Board (which consent shall not be
unreasonably withheld), knowingly causes any building, works or construction of any
kind whatsoever to be erected, performed or carried out, over, abutting or adjoining any
pipe or other equipment, the property of the Board, commits an offence and is liable to a
fine of MWK2 000 and a further fine of MWK500 for each day during which the offence
continues after written notice has been served on such person by the Board. 118
117 Section 54 of the Waterworks Act. The extension of the additional penalty of MWK500 to 'each day
during which the offence continues' is merely a suggestion as the position is not clear in the Act. The next
paragraph in the text suggests amendments which will make the extension legally acceptable beyond all
doubt.
118 Section 55 of the Waterworks Act.
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5.4.11 Contravention of regulations
The Board has power, subject to the approval of the Minister (which approval is required
to be given within a reasonable time) to make bylaws for such matters or things as may
be found necessary for the proper carrying out of the Act and more especially for, among
other things, the regulation of the use and the prevention of pollution, misuse, waste of,
or any interference with, any water supplied by or under the control of the Board, or the
prevention of pollution of gathering grounds, the waterworks and the water therein. Such
bylaws may provide for a penalty for the breach of any of their provisions as follows:
(a) upon first conviction, a fine of up to MWKl 000 or imprisonment for up to
one month;
(b) on a subsequent conviction, a fine of up to MWK2 000 or imprisonment for
up to three months; and
(c) in the case of a continuing offence, a fine of up to MWK200 in respect of each
day on which the offence continues. I 19
From the various contexts in which the term 'gathering grounds' is used in the Act, it
appears that it refers to a place where water collects, and which water may be used in the
waterworks. Section 2 does not define the term but it defines the term 'fathering ground'
as 'any natural or artificial surface which collects the rainfall or which contains any
spring, well or stream from which water is or is intended to be drawn for the purpose of a
waterworks.' This definition is more or less the same as the definition for 'gathering
grounds' as gleaned from the aforementioned contexts. A perusal of the Act reveals that
the term 'fathering ground' is not used elsewhere apart from the definition section. It is
therefore likely that there is a typographical error or some other error in the Act relating
to these two terms. In order to do away with this error, it is suggested that instead of the
term 'fathering ground' section 2 should contain the term 'gathering ground'. The latter
term is preferred because it accords with common sense: a person reading the term
119 Section 56 of the Waterworks Act.
258
'gathering ground' is likely to understand it as a place (grounds) where something (in this
case water) collects or gathers. So an ordinary citizen is likely to understand the term
'gathering ground' without even having recourse to section 2 of the Act. The term
therefore commends itself to usage in the Act. Such commendation is absent when
considering possible usage of the alternative term 'fathering ground'.
5.4.12 General provisions on criminal liability
Several sections of the Act contain general provisions relating to criminal liability and
penalties. Firstly, it is stated that all penalties under the Act may be recovered on
summary conviction, and they are said to be in addition to any other remedy or
proceeding, whether civil or criminal, taken pursuant to any other law in force in the
country.V" Secondly, any complaint or information in pursuance of the Act is required to
be made or laid within three months from the time when the matter of such complaint or
information arose and not afterwards. 121 Thirdly, when any person is summoned or
otherwise dealt with in any proceedings as the occupier of premises, if he alleges that he
is not the occupier of such premises, he thereupon bears the burden of proving such
allegation. 122 For reasons stated in segment 3.3 in Chapter 3 hereof, this presumption and
the shift in the burden of proof may be justifiable. Although the Act does not say it, it is
almost certain that the standard of proof to be used in discharging the burden is the
balance of probabilities. Lastly, it is provided that one half of all the fines imposed by a
competent court for the contravention of the Act or the bylaws made by the Board shall
be paid to the Board. Such fines become part of the annual revenue of the Board. 123
120 Section 57 of the Waterworks Act.
121 Section 58 of the Waterworks Act.
122 Section 59 of the Waterworks Act.
123 Section 37 of the Waterworks Act.
259
5.5 Water Resources Act 15 of 1969
5.5.1 General
The Water Resources Act 15 of 1969 ("WRA") makes provision for the control,
conservation, apportionment and use of the water resources of Malawi. 124 It vests
ownership of all public water in the State President and prohibits use of such public water
except in accordance with a water right granted under the ACt. 125 However, the use of
public water for domestic purposes does not require a water right. 126 By 'domestic
purposes' is meant household and sanitary purposes including the watering and dipping
of stock. 127
'Public water' is defined widely. It means all water flowing over the surface of the
ground or contained in or flowing from any river, spring or stream or natural lake or pan
or swamp or in or beneath a watercourse and all underground water but excluding any
stagnant pan or swamp wholly contained within the boundaries of any private land.128
The effect of this definition is that all water except the stagnant pan or swamp wholly on
private land is subject to control under the Act and use thereof for purposes other than
domestic purposes may only be done on the authority of a water right.
The WRA creates only five criminal offences. In the next few paragraphs these offences
will be set out.
124 Long title of the WRA.
125 Section 3(1) and section 5(1) of the WRA. It must be noted that what is vested in the State President is
only ownership of the public water. According to section 3(2) of the Act the control of public water is
vested in the Minister and such control is required to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the
Act. It must further be pointed out that in terms of the proviso to section 5(1) of the Act, the taking of
public water for fighting fires does not require a water right.
126 Section 6(1) of the WRA.
127 Section 2 of the WRA.
128 Section 2 of the WRA .
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5.5.2 Use of water without lawful authority
It is an offence to divert, dam, store , abstract or use public water or, for any such purpose,
construct or maintain any works 129 except under and in accordance with the provisions of
the Water Resources Act and any other written law.l3 O The words ' in accordance with the
provisions of the Water Resources Act' call for an examination of the WRA to see what
the Act says are the requirements for diversion, damming, storage, abstraction or use of
public water. Breach of any of those requirements would be an offence. For example, one
requirement mentioned above is that the person using the water must have a water right
granted under the Act. Use of water without such a right constitutes an offence. Similarly
the reference to ' any other written law' requires a perusal of other laws with a view to
ascertaining what those laws require in respect of the diversion, damming, storage,
abstraction or use of public water. If any of such requirements is not met, an offence is
committed. The penalties for these offences are a fine of MWK 1 000 and imprisonment
for one year. l3 1
5.5.3 Failure to comply with a mitigation notice
Where in the opmion of the Water Resources Board l3 2 the use of public water for
domestic purposes at any place is causing dama ge to the natural resources' < of the area
129 The term ' works ' , according to section 2 of the WRA, includes canals, channels, reservoirs ,
embankments, weirs, diversions, dams, wells (other than hand operated wells) , boreholes, pumping
installations, pipelines, sluice gates , filters , sedimentation tanks or other works constructed for or in
connection with the impounding, storage, passage, drainage, control, use or abstraction of public water , or
the development of water power, or the filtration or purification of public water, or the protection of rivers
and streams against erosion or siltation , or the protection of any work or in connection with or for flood
control or the conservation of rain water.
130 Section 5(2) of the WRA.
131 Section 25(1) of the WRA.
132 The Water Resources Board is established in terms of section 4 of the WRA . It exercises various powers
and performs various duties specified in the Act. It is subject to any special or general directions of the
Minister and the Minis ter may, for the better carrying out of the purposes of the Act, delegate additional
powers and duties to it: section 4 of the WRA.
133 By 'natural resources ' is meant land, soil and water in their physical aspects together with the natural
vegetation associated therewith, and the norm al balance between them: section 2 of the WRA.
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in the vicinity of that place, it may, by notice in writing served on any person making use
of the water at that place, direct that such person takes such measures as may be specified
in the notice for the purpose of avoiding or mitigating such damage.l " The notice may,
among other things, direct that any user of water at any place shall not water more than
the number of stock specified in the notice or that no more than a stated number of stock
may be watered at that place or that not more than a stated gallonage may be
abstracted.Y" Failure to comply with the notice constitutes an offence. l3 6 Any person
convicted of such offence is liable to a fine of MWK500 and to imprisonment for a
period of six months. 137
5.5.4 Interference with or pollution of public water
It is an offence, save under the authority of the WRA or any other written law, to
interfere with or alter the flow of any public water , or to pollute or foul any public
water. l3 8 For the purposes of this offence, polluting or fouling public water means the
discharge into or in the vicinity of public water or in a place where public water is likely
to flow, of: (a) any matter or substance likely to cause injury whether directly or
indirectly to public health, livestock, animal life, fish, crops, orchards or gardens which
are irrigated by such water, or any product in the processing of which such water is used;
or (b) any matter or substance which occasions, or which is likely to occasion, a
nuisance. 139 Any person found guilty of this offence is, in terms of the WRA, liable to a
fine of MWK500 and to imprisonment for a period of six months. 140
134 Section 6(2) of the WRA.
135 Section 6(3) of the WRA.
136 Section 6(4) of the WRA.
137 Section 25(2) of the WRA .
138 Section 16(1) of the WRA.
139 Section 16(2) of the WRA.
140 Section 25(2) of the WRA.
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This offence must be considered in the light of section 67 of the Environment
Management Act 1996 ("EMA") which provides for offences relating to pollution. There
is scope for the offence of polluting public water under the WRA to qualify as an offence
under section 67 of the EMA. In that event there will be a conflict of penalty provisions
as the WRA and the EMA specify different penalties for such offence. This conflict will
have to resolved in favour of the EMA since, according to section 7 of the EMA, any
written law on the protection and management of the environment which is inconsistent
with any provision of the EMA is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. Thus, the
applicable penalties for the offence of polluting public wat er under the WRA are a fine of
not less than MWK20 000 and not more than MWKl 000 000 and imprisonment for ten
years.
5.5.5 Failure to comply with demolition or modification notice
The Water Resources Board may by notice in writing require certain persons mentioned
below to modify, demolish or destroy specified works within such period, not being less
than thirty days, as may be set out in the notice. The aforementioned persons include a
person who has constructed or extended, or caused to be constructed or extended, any
works contrary to any provisions under which such person was required or authorised to
construct or extend the same or cause them to be constructed or extended. The
aforementioned persons also include a person whose water right in respect of which any
works are in existence has been determined under the provisions of the WRA or has
otherwise come to an end.l"' The Water Resources Board may issue the said notice to any
of these persons. If these persons fail to comply with the notice, they commit an
offence 142 and are liable to a fine of MWK500 and to imprisonment for six months. 143
141 Section 20(1) of the WRA.
142 Section 20(3) of the WRA .
143 Section 25(2) of the WRA. Apart from criminal izing the failure to compl y with the notice, section 20 of
the WRA provides that if the person fails to comply with a notice served on him, the Board may cause such
works to be modified, demolished or destro yed and recover the cost of the modification, demolition or
destruction from the person in default by civil suit.
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5.5.6 Interfering with or damaging hydrometeorological stations or works
The Water Resources Board may at all reasonable times enter upon any land for the
purpose of making such investigations and surveys as the Board considers necessary in
the interest of the conservation and best use of water in Malawi, and may establish and
maintain or cause to be established and maintained on any such land, without other
authority than the WRA, hydrometeorological stations and other works for the purpose of
obtaining and recording information and statistics as to the hydrometeorological
conditions of Malawi. 144 Any person who interferes with or damages any such station or
works commits an offence. 145 This offence is punishable by a fine of MWK500 and by
., .c:' h 146imprisonment tor SIX mont s.
5.6 Inland Waters Shipping Act 12 of 1995
5.6.1 General
The Inland Waters Shipping Act 12 of 1995 ("IWSA") provides for the survey,
registration, licensing and safety of all vessels 147 used on the inland waters 148 of Malawi.
It also provides for the safety of passengers and cargo, and for the competency of masters
144 Section 21(1) of the WRA.
145 Section 21(3) of the WRA.
146 Section 25(2) of the WRA.
147 Section 2 of the IWSA defines 'vessel' as a ship, drilling rig, production platform, sea plane and any
vessel, lighter, tug, barge, structure or launch , however propelled, used or intended for use in navigation or
mining.
148 According to section 2 of the IWSA the term ' inland waters ' means such waters as may be declared to
be inland waters under section 42 of the Act. The said section 42 provides that the Minister may, by notice
published in the Gazette: (a) declare any lake or river or area of water or port thereof to be inland waters for
the purposes of the IWSA; (b) designate places or areas of inland waters or land as harbours; (c) make
regulations for the management, control and safety of any such inland waters and harbours and of vessels
and persons and cargo within them , the powers of persons to effect such control and the payment of fees for
services within such harbours; and (d) after consultation with the Minister for the time being responsible
for matters of the environment, make regulations for the prevention and control of pollution of the marine
environment.
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and crews. It creates numerous offences but only few of these are environmentally
relevant. The most important of them is the prohibition against improper carriage of
dangerous goods. This offence will now be analysed.
5.6.2 Improper carriage of dangerous goods
Section 146(1) of the IWSA states that any person who sends by any vessel, or not being
the owner or master of any vessel carries on the vessel, any dangerous goods without
distinctly marking their nature on the outside of the package containing the goods
commits an offence. The section also states that any person who sends by any vessel, or
not being the owner or master of the vessel carries on the vessel, any dangerous goods
without, at or before the time of sending the goods to be shipped or taking them on board
the vessel, giving written notice to the owner or master of the vessel of the nature of the
goods and the name and address of the sender or carrier of the goods, commits an
offence. It is further an offence for any person to knowingly send or carry in any vessel
any dangerous goods under a false description, or to falsely describe the sender or carrier
of any such goods.l'" Any person found guilty of any of these offences is liable to a fine
not exceeding MWK600 (US$5) or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two
years. ISO
The term 'dangerous goods' in respect of any vessel is defined by the Act. The definition
has two limbs. In the first limb dangerous goods mean explosives, gases whether
compressed, liquefied or dissolved under pressure, inflammable liquids, inflammable
solids, or substances liable to spontaneous combustion, inflammable acids, or substances
which when in contact with water emit inflammable gases, oxidizing substances, organic
peroxides, poisonous toxic substances, infectious substances , radioactive substances and
149 Section 146(2) of the IWSA.
150 Section 189(1) of the IWSA.
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corrosives. In the second limb dangerous goods mean any other goods classified as
dangerous in the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code.15I
It may be noted that the essence of the IWSA offences under discussion is mislabelling or
failure to give notice of the nature of the dangerous goods. Since most of the dangerous
goods are hazardous, the importance of proper labelling and notification of the nature of
the goods cannot be overemphasized.
5.7 Noxious Weeds Act 17 of 1936
5.7.1 General
The Noxious Weeds Act 17 of 1936 ("NWA") is a colonial statute enacted to assist in the
eradication of noxious weeds. By 'noxious weed ' is meant any plant declared as such by
the Minister. l s2 The Act empowers the Minister, at any time by notice published in the
Gazette, to declare any plant to be a noxious weed, either throughout the whole of
Malawi or in one or more districts or portions of districts of it, and, by like notice, to
remove any plant from the list of plants declared noxious weeds .l s3 It is clear from the
declared purpose of the Act that protection of the 'noxious weed' is none of its business.
The Act therefore offends one basic tenet of environmental legislation: the conservation
and sustainable utilisation of natural resources. Consequently it may be argued that the
Act is not an environmental statute and so it does not merit discussion in the present
discourse. The argument is undoubtedly weighty but it overlooks the fact that
characterization of a statute as environmental is based not only on the purpose of the
legislation but also on the subject matter of the legislation. Proceeding on the subject
matter approach, it will be easy to see that the Act is devoted to plants and as such can
151 Section 145 of the IWSA.
152 Section 2 of the NW A.
153 Section 15 of the NWA. According to this section , the Minister is required, by publication in the Gazette
and in the local press, to signify his intention of declaring a plant to be a noxious weed. The notice must be
given at least thirty days before the Min ister makes the declaration .
266
properly be categorised as an environmental statute. The Act may be regarded as
environmental in another sense. A look at the list of plants declared noxious weeds
reveals that some of the plants (for example, water hyacinth) are prejudicial to the
survival of other living organisms (for example, fish). So exterminating them from some
areas complies with the basic tenet of conservation of those other living organisms.
Accordingly, in respect of those other living organisms, the Act is certainly
environmental.
The discussion will now focus on the offences provided for in the NWA.
5.7.2 Failure to execute duty to clear or report
It is the duty of every 'person responsible'P" under the Act to clear l 55 or cause to be
cleared any noxious weeds growing or occurring on the land in respect of which he is
responsible. It is further the duty of any person to report forthwith to the nearest known
weed inspector'P" the occurrences of any noxious weeds on any land in respect of which
such person is responsible. Failure to execute any of these duties amounts to an offence
and offenders are liable to a fine of £10 or, in default of payment, to imprisonment for a
term of one month. 157
154 Section 2 of the NWA provides that 'person responsible', in relation to land, means: (a) the occupier of
land, or in the case of unoccupied land, the registered owner thereof; (b) in the case of a mining location,
the holder of such location; Cc) in the case of public land or customary land over which grazing or other
rights have been granted, the holder of such rights; (d) in the case of land in customary land, the occupier or
person who has the use of such land, or the Chief who has jurisdiction thereover, or all or any of the
inhabitants of the nearest village; and (e) in the case of commonage or town lands or roads or other areas,
the Municipal Council or Town Council under whose control or within whose jurisdiction such land, road
or other area is situate.
155 By the word 'clear' is meant to dig up or pull up or burn noxious weeds , or to employ other means of
destruction authorised by the Minister: section 2 of the NWA.
156 According to section 2 of the NWA 'weed inspector' means any person authorised by the Minister to
perform the duties of an inspector under the Act. Magistrates, District Commissioners, Assistant District
Commissioners, and all members of the police force are ex officio weed inspectors for the purposes of the
Act.
157 Section 3 of the NWA .
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Two observations may be made about the offences under discussion. First, they can only
be committed by persons who satisfy the definition of 'p erson responsible' in the Act.
Second, the amount of the fine in pounds is anachronistic. It is suggested that the amount
should be changed to an appropriate amount in Malawi Kwacha.
5.7.3 Failure to comply with notice to clear noxious weeds
If a weed inspector finds any noxious weed growing or occurring upon land, he may by
notice in writing to the person responsible require him to clear such land within a
reasonable time to be specified in the notice, and it is the duty of the person responsible
to do so. The notice is required to indicate the particular noxious weed occurring upon the
land and as nearly as practicable the portion or portions of the land on which the noxious
weed occurs. 158 Any person responsible who fails to comply with such notice is liable to
a fine of £25 or, in default of payment, to imprisonment for three months.159
5.7.4 Obstruction of weed inspector
It is an offence to obstruct or hinder a weed inspector in the exercise of his duty under the
Act. Any person convicted of this offence is liable to the same penalties as those
prescribed for failure to comply with notice to clear noxious weeds.i'"
5.7.5 Wrongful dispo sal of noxious weed
No person is allowed to throw any noxious weed or the seed of such noxious weed into
any river or stream, or on to any road or land. Contravention of this prohibition
158 Section 5 of the NWA .
159 Section 7 of the NWA. The suggestion to change the amount of the fine into Malawi Kwacha applies
here too.
160 Section 9 of the NWA. For more on the offence of obstruction, see segment 4.2 .3 in Chapter 4 hereof.
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constitutes an offence and offenders are liable to the penalties prescribed for failure to
I . h h . I . d 161comp y WIt t e nouce to c ear nOXIOUs wee s.
5.7.6 Selling plant that may spread noxious weeds
It is an offence to knowingly sell or offer or expose for sale, any plant, seed or grain
which is likely to propagate or spread the growth of noxious weeds. The penalty for this
offence is a fine of £25 or, in default of payment, imprisonment for three months. 162
5.7.7 Contravention of regulations
Section 16 of NWA provides that the Minister may make, alter and amend regulations,
'not inconsistent with this Act', prescribing the measures to be taken to prevent the
introduction and spread of noxious weeds, the authority and duties of weed inspectors
and generally for the better carrying out of the objects and purposes of the Act. The
penalty for contravention of any of these regulations is a fine of £25 or, in default of
payment, imprisonment for three months. 163 It may be observed that the words 'not
inconsistent with this Act' do not add anything to the section as no Minister or person or
body is entitled under the general law to make regulations under a statute contrary to that
statute. It is settled that regulations made under a statute must fall within the confines of
the statute if they are to be valid. Otherwise they will be ultra vires.
16 1 Section 10 of the NWA .
162 Section 12 as read with section 7 of the NW A.
163 As read with section 7 of the NW A.
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5.8 Protection of Animals Act 16 of 1944
5.8.1 General
The Protection of Animals Act 16 of 1944 ("PAA") is another statute that has its origins
in the colonial era. It makes provision for the protection of animals.i'" By 'animal' is
meant any domestic animal165 or captive animal.l '" This Act is of limited use in
environmental protection as it focuses only on animals kept by man. It leaves out of its
reach numerous species of wildlife. Its principal concern is to prevent cruelty to the
aforementioned animals. Despite its limited use the Act has provisions relating to costs
which could be modelled on by the main environmental statutes in Malawi. These
provisions relating to costs will be set out after discussing the offences created by the
Act.
5.8.2 Offences of cruelty
It is an offence: (i) to cruelly beat, kick, ill-treat, override, overload, torture, infuriate or
terrify any animal, or (ii) to cause or procure or, being the owner, permit any animal to be
so used, or (iii) by wantonly or unreasonably doing or omitting to do any act or causing
or procuring the commission or omission of any act , to cause any unnecessary suffering
or, being the owner, permit unnecessary suffering to be so caused to any animal. 167
164 Long title of the PAA.
165 Section 2 of the PAA defines 'domestic animal ' as any horse , ass , mule, bull, sheep, pig, dog, cat, fowl ,
or any other animal of whatsoever kind or species, and whether a quadruped or not , which is tame or which
has been or is being sufficiently tamed to serve some purpose for the use of man.
166 According to section 2 of the PAA 'captive animal ' means any animal (not being a domestic animal) of
whatsoever kind or species, and whether a quadruped or not , including any bird , fish or reptile, which is in
capti vity or confinement, or which is maimed, pinioned or subjected to any appliance or contrivance for the
purpose of hindering or preventing its escape from capti vity or confinement.
167 Section 3(1)(a) of the PAA.
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It is also an offence to conveyor carry, or cause or procure, or, being the owner, permit to
be conveyed or carried, any animal in such a manner or position as to cause that animal
any unnecessary suffering.P" It is further an offence to cause, procure or assist at the
fighting or baiting of any animal; or to keep, use, manage or act or assist in the
management of, any premises or place for the purpose, or partly for the purpose, of
fighting or baiting any animal; or to permit any premises or place to be so kept, managed
or used; or to receive or cause or procure any person to receive, money for the admission
of any person to such premises or place.l'"
Any person who wilfully, without any reasonable cause or excuse, administers or causes
or procures or, being the owner, permits such administration of any poisonous or
injurious drug or substance to any animal, or who wilfully, without any reasonable cause
or excuse, causes any such substance to be taken by any animal, commits an offence.l/''
Similarly any person who subjects, or causes or procures, or, being the owner, permits to
be subjected, any animal to any operation which is performed without due care and
humanity, commits an offence. 171
Here and there in these offences 'owner' is mentioned in connection with the proscribed
acts or omissions. The PAA states that such owner is deemed to have permitted cruelty
within the meaning of the Act if he has failed to exercise reasonable care and supervision
in respect of the protection of the animal from the cruelty. Where the owner is convicted
of so permitting cruelty, he may not be sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a
fine. In No such restriction exists in the punishment for the other offences of cruelty. As
168 Section 3(1)(b) of the PAA.
169 Section 3(1)(c) of the PAA.
170 Section 3( 1)(d) of the PAA.
171 Section 3(1)(e) of the PAA.
172 Section 3(2) of the PAA.
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for these other offences, the penalties are generally a fine of £25 and imprisonment for
six months. 173 The following are additional penalties prescribed under the PAA:
(a) If the offender is the owner of the animal , the court may deprive him of the
hi f h . 1 174owners rp 0 t e amma .
(b) If the court directs destruction of the animal, the court may order the owner to
pay the reasonable expenses incurred in destroying the animal. 175
(c) If damage or injury is caused to any animal , person or property, the court may
order compensation of up to £10 to be paid to the person aggrieved. 176
Apart from the additional penalties, the PAA makes provision for the payment of costs by
the convict and the awarding of a portion of the fines paid under the Act to a private
prosecutor or some other person. As for the former, the PAA states that in all cases of a
conviction for an offence under the Act , the court may order the convict to pay all or any
part of the costs and expenses of his prosecution.lf The court may order the whole or a
portion of the costs and expenses recovered from the convict to be paid to the prosecutor
or complainant. 178 As for the latter, it is provided that where in any proceedings under the
Act any fine is imposed, the court may award any sum or sums not exceeding half the
173 Section 3(1) of the PAA. It must be noted that section 10 of the PAA makes provision for an offence
other than the offence of cruelty and then prescribes its punishment. The offence is to the effect that where
proceedings are instituted under the Act against the driver or conductor of any vehicle, the court may issue
a summons directed to the employer of the driver or conductor, as the case may be, requiring him, ifit is in
his power so to do, to produce the driver or conductor. If the owner or employer fails to comply with the
summons without satisfactory excuse, he commits an offence. Similarly where proceedings are instituted
under the Act , the court may issue a summons directed to the owner of the animal requiring him to produce
either at, or at any time before, the hearing of the case , as may be stated in the summons, the animal for
inspection of the court, if such production is poss ible without cruelty. If the owner fails to comply with the
summons, he commits an offence. The penalties for these offenc es are a fine of £5 for the first occasion or
£10 for the second or subsequent occasion on which he so fails , and may be required to pay the costs of any
adjournment rendered necessary by his failur e.
174 Section 5 of the PAA.
175 Section 4 of the PAA .
176 Section 6 of the PAA.
177 Section 11(1) of the PAA .
178 Section 11(2) of the PAA .
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total fine to the person, not being a police officer, who complained and prosecuted or to
some other person or society as the court thinks fit. 179
5.9 Control and Diseases of Animals Act 41 of 1967
5.9.1 General
The Control and Diseases of Animals Act 41 of 1967 ("CADA") is one of the few early
environmentally relevant statutes that were enacted in the Kamuzu Banda administration.
It provides - as its name suggests - for the control of the diseases of animals and control
of diseases generally. By 'animal' is meant domestic animals and certain wild animals. ISO
The wild animals covered under the term 'animal' are those which fall under the
expression 'game' or 'game animal' contained in the repealed Game ACt.ISI Such wild
animals include male bushbuck, warthog, common duiker, anthropoid ape, any animal in
a game reserve lS2 and others. IS3 The CADA imposes a number of duties on specified
persons in the event of a suspected disease or of an outbreak of disease. Those who do
179 Section 12 of the PAA.
180 Section 2 of the CADA states that ' animal ' means 'any bull , cow, ox, heifer, calf, sheep, goat, horse,
mule, donkey, pig, domestic fowl and any game animal as defined in the definition of the expression
"game" or "game animal" contained under the Game Act, any wild carnivore tamed and kept as a pet,
guinea fowl, pigeon, pea-fowl, dog, cat and any other creature which the Minister has, by order under
section 4, declared to be an animal for the purposes of this Act.'
181 Act 26 of 1953. The Game Act has been repealed by section 124(1)(a) of the National Parks and
Wildlife Act 1992.
182 The name 'game reserve' has been phased out of Malawian environmental law. All nature sanctuaries
previously known as 'game reserves' have been renamed 'wildlife reserves'.
183 Section 2 of the Game Act provides that 'game' and 'game animal' mean any animal specified in any of
the first three Schedules of the Act and, during a close season , any animal which is forbidden to be hunted
during such season. The Schedules referred to list a number of animals. Apart from those mentioned in the
text above, the animals include blue duiker, buffalo, bushbuck (not being a male bushbuck), cheetah,
colobus monkey, eland, elephant, hartebeest, hippopotamus, impala, klipspringer, kudu, leopard, lion,
Livingstone 's suni, nyala , oribi , puku, reedbuck, red duiker, rhinoceros, roan, sable , Sharpe's steinbuck,
waterbuck, wildebeest, zebra and blue (Nchima) monkey.
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not carry out their duties are punished through the criminal sanction. The following are
the most environmentally relevant offences in the Act. 184
5.9.2 Offences relating to infected areas
It is an offence for any person:
(a) to remove any animal from anyone place in an infected area 185 to any other
place therein without a written permit to do so from an inspector;
(b) to remove any animal from any place in the infected area to any place outside
without a written permit to do so from an inspector;
(c) to fail to comply with the conditions stated in a permit;
(d) if he is the holder of a permit, to fail to produce the same for inspection on
demand by an inspector, police officer above the rank of sergeant or any other
person duly authorised by an inspector or such police officer; or
(e) to leave the infected area without having complied with such reasonable
precautions for preventing the spread of disease as may be required by an
inspector. 186
It is also an offence for the owner of any animals liable to be affected by the named
diseases in the infected area to fail to herd or keep them as far as reasonably practicable
from any public road. An owner of any animal within the infected area also commits an
offence where he fails, when required by an inspector, to isolate such animal from other
animals or to remove it from the infected area. It is further an offence for the owner of an
animal dying from disease to fail to forthwith cause the carcass either to be buried at a
184 Due to the fact that the CADA is not a core environmental statute, only offences in the principal statute
wiII be set out here.
185 According to section 4 of the CADA, the Minister, the Chief Veterinary Officer or any person duly
authorised in writing by either of them, may at any time by order declare any area within Malawi to be an
infected area as regards any disease named in such order.
186 Section 5(l)(a),(b),(c),(d) and (g) of the CADA as read with section 5(2) of the CADA.
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depth of not less than four feet below the surface of the ground, or to be totally destroyed
b b . 187Y urmng.
A person found guilty of any of the foregoing offences relating to infected areas is liable
to a fine of MWK200 and to imprisonment for six months, and any animal or carcass in
respect of which such offence has been committed may be forfeited. 188
5.9.3 Disposal of carcasses
The carcass of any animal slaughtered under the Act is required to be buried or sold or
otherwise disposed of, under such conditions as an inspector directs. This requirement is
'subject to any rules made by the Minister.' 189 Anyone who fails to comply with the
inspector's direction commits an offence and is liable to a fine of MWK200 and to
imprisonment for six months. In addition the carcass may be forfeited. 190
The words 'subject to any rules made by the Minister' suggest that the Minister's rules
take precedence over the inspector's direction. So if a person obeys any rule of the
Minister in disposing of the carcass and in the process fails to comply with the
inspector's direction, that person will not be guilty of the offence under discussion.
5.9.4 Obstruction of inspector or police officer
It is an offence to obstruct or impede, or to attempt to obstruct or impede, an inspector or
a police officer in the execution of his duty under the Act. 191 The penalties for this
offence include a fine of MWK200 and imprisonment for six months. If the offence is
187 Section 5(1)(e),(f) and (h) of the CADA as read with section 5(2) of the CADA.
188 Section 22 of the CADA.
189 Section 10(1) of the CADA .
190 Section 10(2) as read with section 22 of the CADA.
191 Section 15 of the CADA. For more on the offence of obstructing, see segment 4.2.3 in Chapter 4 hereof.
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committed in respect of any animal, carcass, litter, dung or fodder, such animal, carcass,
litter, dung or fodder may be forfeited. 192
5.9.5 Complaints relating to dogs
Section 18(1) of the CADA provides that if a dog is dangerous, not under proper control
or a nuisance by reason of its barking or otherwise, any person may complain to a court
about it. On such complaint the court may issue a summons directed to the owner calling
upon him to show cause why the dog should not be kept under proper control, or, if
dangerous or a nuisance, destroyed. On the return of such summons, unless cause be
shown to the contrary, the court may order that the dog be kept under proper control or
destroyed. If the owner of the dog fails to comply with the order of the court, he is liable
to a fine of MWKI0 (US$O.08) .1 93 It is significant that the Act does not declare the non-
compliance with the order a criminal offence . All the Act says is that the non-compliance
attracts a fine. In a sense the non-compliance amounts to contempt of court. It is
necessary to determine whether this contempt is civil or criminal. That determination will
enable us to categorise the non-compliance as civil or criminal. In Scott v Scott 194 Lord
Atkinson (quoting Lord Moulton in the Court of Appeal in the same case) said:
'An order of the Court in a civil action or suit creates an obligation upon the
parties to whom it applies, the breach of which can be and in general will be
punished by the Court, and in proper cases such punishment may include
imprisonment. But it does no more. It does not make such disobedience a criminal
act.'
It is clear from this statement that a fine and/or imprisonment may be imposed in civil
contempt. Lord Atkinson also said:
192 Section 22 of the CADA.
193 Section 18(2) of the CADA .
194 [1913] AC 417 at 462 .
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'[I]f a person be expressly enjoined by an injunction, a most solemn and
authoritative form of order, from doing a particular thing, and he deliberately, in
breach of that injunction, does that thing , he is not guilty of any crime whatever,
but only of a civil contempt of Court.' 195
In Hon J Z U Tembo and Hon Kate Kainja v Attorney GeneraZ196 a unanimous Malawi
Supreme Court of Appeal cited with approval Lord Atkinson's statements and held that
the appellants' failure to comply with an injunction constituted civil contempt. The court,
among other things, stated that:
, ... civil contempt is a species of contempt of Court which generally arises from a
wilful failure to comply with an order of Court such as an injunction as contrasted
with criminal contempt which consists of contumelious conduct in the presence of
the Court. Punishment for civil contempt may be a fine or imprisonment, the
objective of such punishment being compliance with the order of the Court. Such
contempt is committed when a person violates an order of Court which requires
that person in specific and definitive language to do or refrain from doing an act
or a series of acts.'
From this it can be concluded that since breach of an injunction - a most solemn and
authoritative order - amounts only to civil contempt (and not to a crime), it follows that
breach of a similar or less solemn or less authoritative form of order should also amount
to civil contempt only (and not to a crime). Accordingly, since the subject of the non-
compliance under section 18 is arguably an order similar to or less solemn than an
injunction, it may rightly be concluded that the non-compliance amounts to civil
contempt. It is therefore submitted that section 18 of the CADA should not be treated as
containing a criminal offence despite its mention of a fine.
195 [1913] AC 417 at 456 .
196 MSCA Civil Appeal No. 27 of 2003 (unreported but copy available on http://www.judiciary.mw when
accessed on 02 September 2005) .
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5.9.6 Forfeiture when offender not found and disposal of forfeited animals
Section 17 of the CADA makes provision for two matters. First, the forfeiture of animals
when the offender is not found, and second, disposal of forfeited animals. With regard to
the former, it states that when it is reported to a court that an animal has been seized and
detained under section 16,197 but that the person who is alleged to have committed an
offence in respect of such animal is unknown or cannot be found, the court may order
such animal to be forfeited. The court may only order the forfeiture if it is satisfied by
evidence on oath that there is reason to believe that an offence against the Act has been
committed in respect of the animal. As to the disposal of such forfeited animals and
animals forfeited under the offences created by the Act described above, the section states
that the animals are to be sold by auction unless the Chief Veterinary Officer directs that
they be slaughtered.
5.10 Fertilizers, Farm Feeds and Remedies Act 12 of 1970
5.10.1 General
The Fertilizers, Farm Feeds and Remedies Act 12 of 1970 ("FFFRA") was passed at a
time when there was global alarm in respect of environmental degradation. Specifically
the Act came at a time when the evils of persistent pesticides like DDT had been
chronicled by a number of persons including Rachel Carson in her book Silent Spring. 198
It is therefore not surprising that the FFFRA seeks to regulate the use of pesticides. It
does so under the term 'remedy'. It also regulates, inter alia, the sale of fertilizers, farm
feeds and certain remedies.
197 Section 16 of the Act provides that an inspector or police officer may seize any animal in respect of
which he has reason to suspect that an offence against the Act is being committed, and remove any such
animal to any pound, enclosure or other place selected by an inspector, and there detain such animal,
subject to the orders of a court.
198 Rachel Carson Silent Spring London: Hamish Hamilton 1963. In a more recent article P D Glavovic
' Persistent Pesticides: Elixirs of Death or Boon to Mankind?' 1985 102 SALl 674 documents or comments
on some of the adverse effects of the use of pesticides.
278
By 'remedy' is meant any substance which is intended or offered for the destruction of
any noxious plant or insect; or in regard to poultry, domestic animals, livestock or plants,
for the prevention, treatment or cure of any disease, infestation or other unhealthy or
unfavourable condition, or for the maintenance of health, but does not include any
substance prescribed by a veterinarian for a specific patient or group of patients.i "
The following are the crimes created by the Act.
5.10.2 Non-compliance with registration condition
The Act requires that a remedy or sterilizing plant200 be registered under the Act. 20 1 An
application for registration is made to the Registrar202 for consideration by a relevant
committee established by the Minister. If the committee is satisfied that the remedy or
sterilizing plant in question is suitable and sufficiently effective for the purposes for
which it is intended and complies with the prescribed requirements, it may register such
remedy or sterilizing plant. The committee may impose such conditions in regard to the
registration as it thinks fit. 203 These conditions may be amended by the Minister.204 It is
an offence to fail to comply with any of the conditions in their original format or as
amended. Any person convicted of this offence is liable to a fine of MWK10 000 and to
imprisonment for a period of twelve months.205
199 Section 2 of the FFFRA.
200 Section 2 of the FFFRA defines 'sterilising plant' as a plant used for the sterilising of bones or other
substances derived from an animal carcass.
201 Sections 3(a) and 4 of the FFFRA.
202 The Registrar is a public officer serving in the Ministry of Agriculture and appointed by the Minister to
perform certain duties under the Act: section 7 of the FFFRA.
203 Section 8(4) of the FFFRA.
204 Section 1O(2)(b) of the FFFRA.
205 Section 8 of the FFFRA.
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5.10.3 Contravention of a provision of the Act
Section 13(1) of the FFFRA states that any person 'who contravenes any provision of this
Act' commits an offence and is liable to a fine of MWK200 and to imprisonment for a
period of six months. This offence is too wide in scope and as observed elsewhere.i'" it
cannot be taken on face value. There is need to go through the Act to identify those
provisions contravention of which constitutes an offence. In this regard, it is suggested
that sections 3 and 4 may qualify as such provisions. Accordingly, it is an offence to
import, sell or distribute any remedy:
(a) if it is not registered under the Act ;
(b) if it is not packed in the prescribed manner;
(c) if the container in which it is sold does not comply with prescribed
requirements and is not branded, labelled, marked or sealed in the prescribed
manner;207 and
(d) if it is not of the composition, efficacy, fineness and purity specified in the
application for its registration, and does not possess all other properties
specified in such application.
Similarly it is an offence to use any sterilizing plant for the sterilizing of bones or other
substances derived from an animal if such plant has not been registered.i'"
It must be noted that a special defence is available to a person who is charged with selling
any remedy that is not of the composition, efficacy, fineness and purity specified in the
application for its registration, and that does not possess all other properties specified in
such application. Section 15 of the FFFRA states that it is a sufficient defence for such
person to prove to the satisfaction of the court:
206 Segment 4.2.2 in Chapter 4 hereof.
207 Section 3 of the FFFRA.
208 Section 4 of the FFFRA.
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(a) that he purchased the remedy under a registered name or brand as being the
same in all respects as the article which he purported to sell;
(b) that he had no reason to believe at the time of the sale that it was in any
respect different from such article;
(c) that he sold it in the original container and in the state in which it was when he
purchased it; and
(d) that the container thereof was branded, labelled, marked or sealed In the
prescribed manner.
Section 15 further states that the defence is also available where the offence is 'the sale of
fertilizer, farm feed ... in contravention of section 3(d)'. This portion of section 15 is
problematic as the reference to section 3(d) does not make sense, for section 3(d) deals
with remedies only; it does not say anything about fertilizers or farm feeds. It is therefore
suggested that section 15(1) be amended by deleting the phrase 'fertilizer, farm feed or'
from the two places in which that phrase occurs.
5.10.4 Obstruction of inspector, analyst or other officer
It is an offence to obstruct or hinder any inspector, analyst or other officer in the exercise
of his powers or the performance of his duties under the Act.209 The penalties for this
offence are the same as those for the immediately foregoing offence.
5.10.5 Tampering with sample
An inspector or any specially authorised officer may take samples of any farming
requisitev'" in such quantities as may be necessary for the purpose of examination or
209 Section 13(2) of the FFFRA. For an analysis of the offence of obstructing an officer, see segment 4.2.3
in Chapter 4 hereof.
210 According to section 2 of the FFFRA, a farming requisite is any fertilizer, farm feed or remedy or any
substance used in the manufacture of fertilizer, farm feed or remedy.
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analysis under the ACt.211 Any person, who with fraudulent intent tampers with any such
sample, commits an offence and is liable to a fine of MWK200 and to imprisonment for a
period of six months.212 The meaning of the words 'with fraudulent intent' is arguably the
same as the meaning for the phrase 'with intent to defraud. ,213
5.10.6 Improper use of certificate, invoice or other document in respect of any
fertilizer, farm feed or remedy
It is an offence to make use in connection with any ferti lizer, farm feed or remedy of any
certificate, invoice or other document issued in respect of any other fertilizer, farm feed
or remedy. The penalties for this offence are the same as those for the offence of
. . h I 214tampenng wit samp e.
5.10.7 False or misleading statements
Any person who makes a false or misleading statement in connection with any remedy in
the appl ication for registration, or in connection with any fertilizer, farm feed or remedy
in any advertisement thereof or in the course of the sale thereof, commits an offence and
is liable to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offence of tampering with
sample.i"
2 11 Section 12(l)(d) of the FFFRA.
2 12 Section 13(l)(c) of the FFFRA.
213 For the meaning of the phrase ' with intent to defraud ' , see segment 4.2.5 in Chapter 4 hereof.
214 Section 13(l)(d) of the FFFRA.
215 Section 13(l )(e) of the FFFRA.
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5.10.8 Illegal sale of fertilizer, farm feed or remedy
It is an offence to sell any fertilizer, farm feed or remedy upon the container of which a
false or misleading statement in connection with the contents is printed or written.i'" It is
also an offence to sell or supply any farming requisite which is not of the kind, nature,
composition, strength, potency or quality described or represented when so sold or
supplied. Offenders in both of these offences are liable to a fine of MWK200 and to
.• .c. . d f . h 217impnsonment tor a peno 0 SIX mont s.
5.10.9 Forfeit ure as an additional penalty
The court convicting a person of an offence under the Act may, upon the application of
the prosecutor, declare any farming requisite in respect of which the offence has been
committed, and all farming requisites in respect of which such person has been convicted,
and of which such person is the owner or which are in his possession, to be forfeited.2 18
5.10.10 Presumptions
Section 14( 1) of the FFFRA makes provision for three presumptions relevant in the
process of proving some of the offences under the Act. The first presumption is to the
effect that any quantity of a farming requisite in or upon any premises, place or vehicle at
the time a sample thereof is taken under the Act shall, unless the contrary is proven, be
deemed to be of the same composition, to have the same degree of efficacy and to
possess in all other respects the same properties as that sample. The second presumption
is that any person who is proved to have tampered with any sample shall be deemed to
have acted with fraudulent intent unless the contrary is proved. In the third presumption a
certificate stating the result of an analysis or test of a sample and purporting to be signed
216 Section 13(1)(f) of the FFFRA .
217 Section 13(1)(g) of the FFFRA.
2 18 Section 13(2) of the FFFRA .
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by the analyst who carried out such analysis or test shall be accepted as prima facie proof
of the facts stated in it.
The third presumption appears to be an evidential or factual presumption and so courts
may readily accept it as constitutionally valid. The first and second presumptions seem to
be reverse onus presumptions. As stated elsewhere.r' " it is possible that Malawian courts
may not regard such reverse onus presumptions as constitutionally valid. It is therefore
suggested that the first and second presumptions be amended in such a way that they are
turned into evidential or factual presumptions.
5.10.11 Offences under regulations
The FFFRA empowers the Minister to make regulations for the proper carrying out of the
purposes and provisions of the Act,220 a task which he has executed considerably. One set
of these regulations is known as the Fertilizers Regulations.Y' Regulation 16 thereof
states that any person not complying with any of the requirements of the regulations
commits an offence and is liable to a fine of MWKl 000 and to imprisonment for six
months. This is a species of a general offence. It requires a perusal of the regulations to
identify the requirements. In common parlance a requirement is something that is
obligatory. Of course not everything in a statute may qualify as a requirement. It is
suggested that the following are 'requirements' in the Fertilizers Regulations, the breach
of which amounts to an offence:
(a) Fertilizers listed in the Third Schedule must have the specified composition
set out in relation to such fertilizer in the Third Schedule;
(b) Fertilizers in the Fourth Schedule must comply with the minimum fineness
requirements listed in relation to such fertilizer in the Fourth Schedule;
219 Segment 4.3. 12 in Chapter 4 hereof.
220 Section 16(1) of the FFFRA.
22 \ GN 142/1970, GN 123/1985 and GN 64/1996 .
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(c) No product may be imported, sold or distributed as fertilizer if such product is
contaminated with heavy metal or other substance that would be harmful to
the soil or the environment or public health;
(d) The container in which a fertilizer is sold must be duly and legibly marked or
labelled in English with the relevant information set out in the Third Schedule,
and any figures or numerals used for representing the chemical composition of
a fertilizer must be preceded or followed by the appropriate sYmbo1.
222
Apart from the foregoing, it may be observed that the penalties prescribed for the general
offence are inconsistent with the penalties prescribed by the principal Act. Under section
16(3) of the FFFRA it is provided that regulations may prescribe penalties for any
contravention thereof but not exceeding a fine of MWK200 and imprisonment for six
months. Regulation 16 and section 16(3) therefore prescribe conflicting fines. In these
circumstances it is trite that the fine prescribed by section 16(3) takes precedence over the
other. The MWK1 000 is ultra vires the principal Act, although it appears to be a more
fitting penalty than the MWK200.
Regulation 13 of the Fertilizers, Farm Feeds and Remedies (Remedies) Regulationsr''
("the Remedies Regulations") states that any person who fails to comply with the
provisions of the regulations commits an offence and is liable to a fine of MWK200 and
imprisonment for six months. Again this offence is general in character. A court called
upon to interpret this section will have to go through the regulations to determine which
provisions thereof are capable of constituting offences upon breach. It is suggested that
only regulations 5, 7 and 8 are such provisions. Regulation 5 states that no person, except
an approved research institution, shall import into Malawi any experimental rernedy'"
unless he is authorised in writing on the prescribed form by the registering officer to do
222 Requirements (a) to (c) are from regulation 3 of the Fertilizers Regulations. Requirement (d) is from
regulation 6 of the Fertilizers Regulations.
223 ON 94/1989.
224 Regulation 2 of the Remedies Regulations defines ' experimental remedy' as a chemical to be assessed in
Malawi for primary biological activity, and not available to the public as a remedy.
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so. Further, any person who imports an experimental remedy shall, within seven days of
the arrival of the remedy in Malawi , complete a prescribed form and forward it to the
registering officer. No experimental remedy shall be offered to any person other than a
person approved by the registering officer to participate in the experimentation.v'''
Regulation 7 deals with the labelling of containers: it forbids the sale of any remedy
unless the label is securely affixed to the container and states a number of specified
matters. Except with the permission of the registering officer, no label shall contain any
information other than that provided for in regulation 7, and no label approved by the
registering officer shall be altered without the written approval of the registering officer.
Regulation 8 prohibits the sale, transportation or storage of a remedy unless the
registering officer is satisfied that the container in which the remedy is packed or to be
packed is of sufficiently durable construction and material. Further, no remedy is
permitted to be packed in a container that resembles a container of a consumabler"
product.
5.11 Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1983
5.11.1 General
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1983 ("PEPA") provides for the
searching for and production of petroleum. It vests in the State President on behalf of the
people of Malawi the entire property in, and control over, petroleum in land in Malawi.227
It then sets out a scheme of licences and provisions relating to protection of the
225 Regulation 5 contains more stuff than that stated in the text. It is the view of the present researcher that
there is nothing in the matters left out that can amount to a criminal offence.
226 That is, eatable or edible.
227 Section 2(1) of the PEPA . This section refers to ' Life President' and not 'State President'. The PEPA
was passed at a time when Malawi had a Life President. The office of a Life President was abolished on the
advent of multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. Since 1994 the country has had a State President in
terms of the Constitution. The section also uses the word ' land ' . According to section 3(1) of the PEPA the
word 'land' includes land beneath water. So even petroleum beneath water vests in the State President.
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environment and other matters. Enforcement mechanisms provided for in the Act include
criminal sanctions. The following are the crimes created by the Act.
5.11.2 Exploration or production of petroleum without a licence
It is an offence to carry on in Malawi exploration or production operations except under
and in accordance with a licence.228 There are two facets to this offence. In the first place,
the words 'except under ... a licence' signify that the absence of a licence constitutes an
offence. In the second place, the words ' in accordance with a licence' signify that even if
one has a licence he may commit an offence ifhe does not comply with the conditions or
generally what is stated in the licence. Any person who is convicted of either of these
offences is liable, in the case of an individual, to a fine of MWKl 000 or to imprisonment
for a term of two years or to both, or, in the case of a body corporate, to a fine of
MWK50 000 (US$376).229
5.11.3 Disclosure of information
It is an offence to disclose, except with the consent of the licensee, information furnished,
and information in a report submitted, pursuant to the Regulations by a licensee.v'" The
regulations do require, among other things, that certain information be given upon
renewal of a petroleum production Iicence.r" However, no offence is committed if the
disclosure is made: (a) for or in connection with the administration of the Act; (b) for the
purpose of any legal proceedings; or (c) to any consultant to the Government, or to any
public officer who is approved by the Commissioner for Petroleum Exploration and
Production ("the Commissioner") as a proper person to receive the information.Y'
228 Section 2(2) and (3) of the PEPA.
229 Section 2(3) of the PEPA.
230 Section 7(1) of the PEPA.
231 Regulation 5 of the Petroleum (Applications) Regulations (GN 48/1984).
232 Section 7(2) of the PEPA.
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Offenders under this offence are liable to a fine of MWKl 000 and to imprisonment for a
233term of two years, or to both.
5.11.4 Non-disclosure of information
Section 40(1) of the PEPA states that where the Minister has reason to believe that a
person is capable of giving information or producing or making available data234 relating
to exploration or production operations or petroleum obtained or its value, he may, by
notice in writing, require that person:
(a) to furnish him that information or data within the period and in the manner
specified in the notice;
(b) to attend before him or a person identified in the notice, at such time and place
as is specified in the notice, and there to answer questions relating to those
operations or petroleum obtained or the value thereof; or
Cc) to furnish to a person identified in the notice, at such time and place as is
specified in the notice, data in his custody or power relating to those
operations or petroleum obtained or the value thereof.
It is an offence for any person to refuse or fail to comply with the requirement in the
abovementioned notice from the Minister to the extent to which that person is capable of
complying with it. It is also an offence to knowingly or recklessly furnish information or
data that is false or misleading in a material particular, in purported compliance with a
requirement referred to in paragraph (a) above. Further, it is an offence, when attending
before the Minister or any other person under a requirement referred to in paragraph (b)
above or when furnishing any data to any person under a requirement referred to in
paragraph Cc) above, to knowingly or recklessly make a statement or produce any data
233 Section 7(3) of the PEPA.
234 For purposes of section 40, the word 'data ' includes books , documents, tapes, diagrams, profiles and
charts : section 40(5) of the PEPA.
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that is false or misleading in a material particular. Any person found guilty of any of
these offences is liable to a fine of MWKl 0 000.
5.11.5 Non-compliance with direction on good oilfield practices
The Minister may, by notice in writing served on a Iicensee.v" give to the licensee a
direction, consistent with good oilfield practices, as to any matter with respect to which
regulations may be made under section 78 of the Act. A licensee who fails or neglects to
comply with the direction commits an offence and is liable to a fine of MWKl 0 000.236
By 'good oilfield practices' is meant all those things that are generally accepted as good,
safe and efficient in the carrying on of exploration for petroleum or of operations for the
production ofpetroleum.237
The accused under this offence has a due diligence defence. He can exonerate himself by
proving that he promptly took all reasonable steps to comply with the direction.i"
5.11.6 Non-compliance with work practice requirement
It is an offence for a holder of a licence to contravene a requirement of section 48 of the
PEPA. Offenders are liable to a fine of MWK50 000 (US$376).239 A perusal of section
48 reveals that the holder of a licence is required to do a number of things. There are two
general requirements and eight particular requirements. The general requirements are to
carry out exploration and production operations in the exploration or production area in a
proper, safe and workmanlike manner and in accordance with good oilfield practices; and
235 According to section 3(1) of the PEPA 'licensee' means the holder ofa petroleum exploration licence or
a petroleum production licence, or both.
236 Section 35(1) and (2) of the PEPA.
237 Section 3( 1) of the PEPA.
238 Section 35(3) of the PEPA.
239 Section 48(6) of the PEPA.
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to take all reasonable steps necessary to secure the safety, health and welfare of persons
engaged in those operations in and about the exploration or production area. The
particular requirements are:
(a) to control the flow and prevent the waste or escape in the exploration or
production area of petroleum, gas (not being petroleum) or water;
(b) to prevent the escape in the exploration or production area of any mixture of
water or drilling fluid and petroleum or any other matter;
(c) to prevent damage to petroleum bearing strata in any area in respect of which
the licence is not in force;
(d) to keep separate in the prescribed manner -
(i) each petroleum reservoir discovered In the exploration or
production area; and
(ii) such of the sources of water (if any) discovered in the exploration
or production area as the Commissioner directs by notice in writing
served on the licensee;
(e) to prevent water or any other matter entering any petroleum reservoir through
the wells in the exploration or production area except when required by and in
accordance with good oilfield practices;
(t) to prevent the pollution of any aquifer, estuary, harbour, lake, reservoir, river,
spring, stream, water-well , and all other areas of water by the escape of
petroleum, drilling fluid, chemical additive, gas (not being petroleum), or any
waste product or effluent;
(g) to furnish to the Commissioner, prior to the drilling of any well, a detailed
report on the technique to be employed, an estimate of the time to be taken,
the material to be used and the safety measures to be employed, in the drilling
of the well; and
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(h) to furnish to the Commissioner reasonable notice of his intention to abandon
any well and to close or plug any well with the prior consent in writing of the
Commissioner and in a manner approved by the Commissioner.240
As stated above, contravention of any of these requirements is an offence. Apart from the
generally available defences, the accused may raise a due diligence defence: it is a
sufficient defence if he proves that he promptly took all reasonable steps to comply with
h I . 241t ere evant requirement.
5.11.7 Failure to maintain structures, equipment and other property
A licensee who fails to maintain in good condition and repair all structures, equipment
and other property in the area subject to the licence and used in connection with the
operations in which he is engaged, commits an offence. Similarly, a licensee commits an
offence by failing to remove from that area all structures, equipment and other property
that are not either used or to be used in connection with those operations. The licensee
also commits an offence if he fails to take reasonable steps to warn persons who may,
from time to time, be in the vicinity of any such structure, equipment or other property of
the possible hazards resulting therefrom. The penalty for any of these offences is a fine of
MWKI0000.242
5.11.8 Non-compliance with a direction relating to drilling near boundaries
A licensee is not allowed to drill a well any part of which is less than one kilometre from
a boundary of the area subject to the licence except with the consent in writing of the
240 Requirements (a) to (g) are based on section 48(2) of the PEPA and requirement (h) is based on section
48( 5) of the PEPA.
241 Section 48(7) of the PEPA.
242 Section 49 of the PEPA. This section continues to say that there is no offence if the structure, equipment
or other property was not brought into the area subject to the licence by or with the authority of the
licensee.
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Commissioner and in accordance with such conditions, if any, as are specified in the
instrument of consent. Where the licensee goes ahead to drill without the consent or in
contravention of the conditions of the consent, the Commissioner may, by notice in
writing, direct the licensee to plug the well and/or close off the well and/or comply with
specified directions relating to the drilling or maintenance of the well within a specified
period. A person who fails or neglects to comply with the direction commits an offence
and is liable to a fine of MWKIO 000.243 Although the offence refers to 'a person', the
context suggests that the term should be restricted to a licensee under the Act, for the
notice containing the direction is directed to licensees only. There is therefore no
justification for extending liability to persons other than licensees.
5.11.9 Non-compliance with a direction relating to cancellation or expiration of a
licence
Where a licence has been cancelled or has expired or has ceased by relinquishment to
include any area, the Minister may by written notice direct the person who is or was the
holder of the licence, within a specified period, to make provision for the conservation
and protection of the natural resources in any area that was but is no longer subject to the
licence; to plug or close off all wells made in that area by any person engaged or
concerned in those operations; and to remove or cause to be removed from that area all
property brought into the area by any person engaged or concerned in the operations
authorised by the licence, or to make arrangements that are satisfactory to the Minister. 244
It is an offence to refuse or fail to comply with the Minister's direction within the period
specified in it. Offenders are liable to a fine of MWK5 000.245
243 Section 50 of the PEPA.
244 The plugging or closing off of wells and the provision for natural resource conservation and protection
are also required to be done to the satisfaction of the Minister: section 51Cl )(b) and (c) of the PEPA.
245 Section 51(3) of the PEPA. Section 51(2) expressly states that nothing in the section or in the Minister's
direction should be construed as requiring any person who is or was the holder of a licence to do anything
which is not in accordance with good oilfield practices or to refrain from doing anything which is in
accordance with good oilfield practices.
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5.11.10 Failure to take out compulsory insurance against liability for pollution
If petroleum is discharged during production operations, the licensee carrying on those
operations is generally liable to reimburse any person who suffers damage caused directly
by contamination following the discharge. He is also liable for the cost of any measures
reasonably taken after the discharge for the purpose of preventing or reducing any such
damage. He is further liable to reimburse any person who suffers damage caused directly
by any measures so taken.246 From these provisions it is clear that the liability of the
licensee is considerable. In order to take care of eventualities or risks, the Act requires
that the licensee takes out insurance or other security to cover the liability. Specifically
section 61(1) prohibits any licensee from carrying on production operations unless there
is in force in respect of the liability discussed above a contract of insurance or other
security satisfactory to the Minister, in an amount determined by the Minister. A licensee
who fails to take out such insurance or other security commits an offence and is liable to
a fine of MWK5 000 for each day during which the offence continues.f'"
5.11.11 Failure to give notice of discovery of mineral
When a significant discovery of any minerae48 is made in an exploration area or a
production area, the licensee is required, within thirty days after the date of discovery, to
furnish to the Minister particulars in writing of the discovery. Failure to do so constitutes
an offence punishable by a fine of MWK5 000. 249 It appears that it is not necessary for
246 Section 55(1) of the PEPA.
247 Section 61(2) of the PEPA .
248 Mineral here is required to be understood as defined in section 4 of the Mines and Minerals Act 1 of
1981: section 69( 1) of the PEPA. The Mines and Minerals Act defines ' mineral' as any substance, whether
in solid, liquid or gaseous form , occurring naturally in or on the earth , formed by or subject to a geological
process, but does not include: (a) water, not being wate r taken from a borehole, well , excavation or natural
saltpan for the extraction therefrom of a substance in solution therein and of commercial value; or (b) soil ,
not being soil taken from the earth for the extraction therefrom of a substance of commercial value
contained therein or for the manufacture there from of a product of commercial value; or (c) petroleum as
defined in section 3 of the PEPA .
249 Section 69 of the PEPA.
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the discovery to be made by the licensee. It seems that the discovery may be made by
someone else in the licensee's exploration or production area and then the licensee may
get to know of it. Upon acquiring that knowledge, the licensee must report it to the
Minister, failing which he may be found guilty of the offence. This interpretation is
possible on account of the way the offence has been formulated, for it does not require
the discovery to be made by the licensee. It follows that if the discovery is made by the
licensee and he fails to report it to the Minister, the licensee is a fortiori guilty of the
offence.
5.11.12 Hindering officer and false statements
The Act gives to the Commissioner and authorised officers various powers relating to the
exploration for or production of petroleum. Any person who, without reasonable excuse,
obstructs, molests or hinders the Commissioner or authorised officer in the exercise of his
powers, commits an offence. It is also an offence to knowingly or recklessly make a
statement or produce a document that is false or misleading in a material particular to the
Commissioner or an authorised officer engaged in carrying out his duties and functions
under the Act. The penalties for these offences are a fine of MWK500 and/or
•• .c: f . h 250imprisonment tor a term 0 SIX mont s.
5.11.13 Offences relating to removal of petroleum
Petroleum is required to be removed from any land from which it has been recovered or
disposed of by a licensee for the purpose of sampling or analysis; by a licensee in
accordance with the terms of the licence concerned; or as otherwise permitted by PEPA.
In the case of removal from any land of samples of petroleum, the written consent of the
Commissioner must be obtained. It is an offence to contravene any of these removal
requirements. The penalties for this offence depend on the nature of the person who has
committed the offence. If the offender is a natural person, the penalties are a fine of
250 Section 70 of the PEPA.
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MWK500 and/or imprisonment for a term of six months. If the offender IS a body
corporate, the penalty is a fine of MWK5 000.251
5.11.14 Obstruction of licensee
It is an offence, without reasonable cause, to obstruct or hinder a licensee from doing any
act which that licensee is authorised to do by PEPA. Any person convicted of this offence
is liable to a fine of MWKl 000 or to imprisonment for a term of two years, or to both?52
5.11.15 Miscellaneous offences
Of these miscellaneous offences two relate to the giving of false or misleading
information. The remaining two offences relate to doing something with a view to
mislead any person as to, inter alia, the existence of a petroleum reservoir. The offences
in the first category are as follows. Firstly, it is an offence to knowingly or recklessly give
information which is false or misleading in a material particular in or in connection with
any application under PEPA or in response to any invitation or requirement of the
Minister or Commissioner under the Act. Secondly, it is an offence to knowingly or
recklessly include or permit to be included in any report, return or affidavit submitted in
pursuance of any provision of the Act , any information which is false or misleading in a
material particular.v'''
The other two offences are in the following terms. It is an offence to place or deposit or
to be accessory to the placing or depositing of, any petroleum or substance in any place
with the intention of misleading any other person as to the possibility of a petroleum
reservoir existing in that place. It is also an offence to tamper with samples of minerals,
rock or petroleum taken in the course of exploration or production operations by adding
251 Section 71 ofthePEPA.
252 Sect ion 74 of the PEPA .
253 Section 76(a) and (b) of the PEPA .
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to or taking from any such sample any substance, or by in any way modifying the
physical or chemical properties of any such sample, with the intention of misleading any
h . f 1 . 254person as to t e existence, extent or content 0 a petro eum reservoir.
The penalty for any of these offences depends on the nature of the offender. If the
offender is a natural person, the penalty is imprisonment for a period of two years. If the
offender is a body corporate, the penalty is a fine of MWK20 000? 55
5.11.16 Contravention of regulations
The Minister is empowered to make regulations necessary or convenient to be prescribed
under or for giving effect to the Act. Such regulations may make provision for, among
other things, the prevention of pollution and measures to be taken for the purpose of
preventing or reducing damage from pollution; the underground disposal of petroleum,
water and other substances produced in associa tion with exploration for or production of
petroleum; and safety standards and the health, safety and welfare of persons employed in
or in connection with exploration for, or production or conveyance of, petroleum.P" The
regulations may provide for penalties for their contravention. The penalties are a fine not
exceeding MWK2 000 and/or imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months. 257 In
this connection, it is worth noting that the regulations that have so far been made by the
Minister do not make provision for criminal sanctions?58
254 Section 76(c) and (d) of the PEPA .
255 Section 76(e) and (t) of the PEPA.
256 Section 78(1) of the PEPA.
257 Section 78(3) of the PEPA.
258 The following regulations have been made: Petroleum (Applications) Regulations, GN 48/1984;
Petroleum (Constitution of Blocks) Regulations , GN 40/1984; Petroleum (General Provisions) Regulations,
GN 39/1984; Petroleum (Prescribed Fees and Annu al Charges) Regulations, GN 53/1984; Petroleum
(Records, Reports and Accounts) Regulations, GN 42/1984 ; and Petroleum (Registration and Transfer of
Licences) Regulations , GN 41/1984.
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5.11.17 Imputation of offence committed by body corporate to director, manager,
secretary or other similar officer
When an offence which has been committed by a body corporate is proved to have been
committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be attributable to any neglect on the
part of, a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate, or
any person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he as well as the body
corporate is guilty of that offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished
accordingly.P"
5.12 Petroleum Act 1 of 1951
5.12.1 General
The Petroleum Act 1 of 1951 is a colonial statute. It is very brief, containing only five
sections. Although the long title states that the Act was meant to regulate the storage of
petroleum,26o it is clear from the Act's content that it has a broader purpose that may be
summarised as proper handling of petroleum and its products. Three of the five
sections'" in the Act deal with regulations. They give the Minister power to make
regulations for, inter alia, regulating the transportation of petroleum by railway, road or
inland navigation, the storage of petroleum and the importation or exportation of
petroleum. The regulations may provide that any person who commits an offence against
such regulations shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £50 and/or imprisonment not
259 Section 75 of the PEPA.
260 The Act defines petroleum as including the liquids commonly known as rock oil, Rangoon oil, Burma
oil , kerosene, paraffin oil, petrol , gasoline, benzoline, benzene, naphtha or any like inflammable liquid,
whether a natural product or one that is made from petroleum, coal, schist, shale or any other bituminous
substance, or from any products thereof.
26\ Sections 3, 4 and 5.
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exceeding three months. The Minister has promulgated the Petroleum (Storage)
Regulations.v ' These regulations provide for offences discussed in the next paragraph.
5.12.2 Miscellaneous offences
It is an offence to store on any premises petroleum exceeding four hundred litres without
being in possession of a valid licence. The licence is issued by the District Commissioner
of the district where the petroleum will be stored. The licence may contain conditions. It
is an offence to contravene any such condition.v''
Storage tanks are required to be made of mild steel or other approved material and to be
designed and protected according to British standards or other standards approved by the
Chief Inspector of Factories or any other authorised public officer.i'" The tanks, whether
below or above ground, must meet certain requirements.P" Storage sheds are required to
be constructed entirely of non-inflammable material and to meet other specifications.i'"
Storage areas are required to be operated in a certain way. Conditions applicable to the
operation or management of storage areas include prohibition of any act which tends to
cause fire and which is not reasonably necessary.i'" On this background it is provided
that it is an offence to fail to comply with any condition applying to the construction or
maintenance of any tank or storage shed or to the operation or control of any storage area
. hi . 268In IS occupation.
262 GN 20/1960, GN 195/1961, GN 22/1963, GN 109/1982. The regulations came into force on 19 February
1961.
263 Regulation 3(1) and regulation 22(1)(a) and (c) .




268 Regulation 22(1 )(b).
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It is an offence to obstruct the District Commissioner or other authorised officer in the
exercise of the powers conferred upon them by the regulations. It is also an offence to
store any petroleum exceeding twenty litres in any building which, or part of which, is
used as living accommodation or a place of habitual public resort. It is further an offence
to endanger the life or safety of any person or property by any other contravention of the
regulations.v"
A person convicted of any of the foregoing offences under the regulations is liable to a
fine of MWK100 (US$l approximately). In addition the offender may be required to
repay any expenses incurred in consequence of the breach of the regulations constituting
the offence he stands convicted.i"
It must be noted that the accused has a special defence to the offences created by the
regulations. The accused has a good defence if he can prove that the act or omission
complained of was done or occurred without his knowledge and that he took all
reasonable precautions to prevent the doing of such act or the occurrence of such
. . 271
omission.
5.13 Mines and Minerals Act 1 of 1981
5.13.1 General
The Mines and Minerals Act 1 of 1981 ("MIMA") makes provision for the searching for
and mining of minerals. It replaced three statutes.272 It vests in the State President on
behalf of the people of Malawi the entire property in and control over minerals in
269 Regulation 22(1)(d), (e) and (f).
270 Regulation 22(2) .
271 Proviso to regulation 22(1).
272 Mining Act (cap 61:01 of the Laws of Malawi); Mining Regulation (Oil) Act (cap 62:01 of the Laws of
Malawi); and Radioactive Minerals Act (cap 62:02 of the Laws of Malawi).
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Malawi.273 It then prohibits the carrying on of reconnaissance, prospecting or mining
operations except under and in accordance with a relevant authorisation. The MIMA
prescribes a number of enforcement tools. Some of these are criminal sanctions which
will now be discussed.
5.13.2 Engaging in operations without authorisation
It is an offence to carry on in Malawi reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations,
except under and in accordance with a Mineral Right, a non-exclusive prospecting
licence, a claim or a mineral permit.i" By 'Mineral Right' is meant a reconnaissance
licence, an exclusive prospecting licence or a mining licence.275 Any person convicted of
this offence is liable, in the case of a natural person, to a fine of MWKl 000 and/or to
imprisonment for two years. If the convict is a body corporate, it is liable to a fine of
MWK20 000.276
This offence is subject to sections 115 and 116 of MIMA. The former states that a citizen
may, without an authorisation, take minerals of any kind from customary land, to the
extent and in the manner which custom permits, and from which it has been customary to
take minerals of that kind. It further allows the taking of building and industrial minerals
for the purpose of construction in certain circumstances without an authorisation. The
latter states that the Commissioner for Mines and Minerals ("the Commissioner") may
give written consent to the carrying on by any person of reconnaissance or prospecting
operations in the course of a scientific investigation with respect to the geology or
mineral resources of Malawi. The effect of these two sections is that it is not an offence
to take minerals from customary land or to engage in reconnaissance, prospecting or
mining operations in respect of building and industrial minerals without or contrary to a
273 Section 2(1) of the MIMA.
274 Section 1(3) and (4) of the MIMA.
275 Section 3( 1) of the MIMA.
276 Section 2(4) of the MIMA.
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Mineral Right, a non-exclusive prospecting licence, a claim or a mineral permit.
Similarly it is not an offence to engage in reconnaissance or prospecting operations in the
course of the stated scientific investigation without or contrary to any of the listed
authorisations.
5.13.3 Prohibition against disclosure of information
It is an offence to disclose information furnished, or information in a report submitted, by
the holder of a Mineral Right for as long as the Mineral Right has effect. No offence is
committed if the disclosure is made with the consent of the holder of the Mineral Right.
Offenders are liable to a fine of MWK1 000 and/or imprisonment for a term of two
years?77
5.13.4 Offences relating to registration
The Commissioner is required to record in a Register every Mineral Right granted and
any dealings with or affecting a Mineral Right. When a Mineral Right is granted, the
grantee's name is required to be recorded in the Register as the registered holder of the
Mineral right. 278 The offences in the next paragraph are created on this background.
It is an offence to wilfully make or cause to be made or concur in making a false entry in
the Register. It is also an offence to wilfully produce or tender in evidence a document
falsely purporting to be a copy of or extract from an entry in the Register or of or from an
277 Section 7(1) and (3) of the MIMA. According to section 7(2) of the MIMA the prohibition against
disclosure of information mentioned in the text does not operate to prevent the disclosure of information
where the disclosure is made: (a) for or in connection with the administration of the Act; (b) for the purpose
of any legal proceedings; (c) for the purpose of any investigation or inquiry conducted under the Act; or (d)
to any consultant to the Government, or to any public officer , who is approved by the Commissioner as a
proper person to receive the information.
278 Section 58 of the MIMA.
301
instrument lodged with the Commissioner.Y' Any person found guilty of this offence is
liable to a fine of MWK250 (US$2) and/or to imprisonment for a term of six months.28o
5.13.5 Failure to give information, and false information
Where the Minister has reason to believe that a person is capable of giving information or
producing or making available books or documents relating to minerals obtained or the
value of minerals obtained, he may, by written instrument , order that person to furnish to
him any such information, to attend before him or a specified person to answer relevant
questions, or to produce or make available to a specifi ed person relevant books or
documents in his custody, power or contro1.281 Any person who fails to comply with the
Minister's requirement to the extent to which he is capable of complying with it, commits
an offence. It is also an offence, in purported compliance with such a requirement, to
knowingly furnish information that is false or misleading in a material particular. It is
further an offence, when attending before the Minister or another person in pursuance of
such a requirement, to knowingly make a statement or produce a document which is, or
produce books which are, false or misleading in a materi al particular. In addition, when
making available books or documents in pursuance of such a requirement, it is an offence
to knowingly make available books which are, or a document which is, false or
misleading in a material particular.282 Th e pen alti es for these offences are a fine of
MWKI 000 and/or a term of imprisonment for two years?83
279 The 'instrument' referred to here is a written document by which a legal or equitable interest in or
affecting a Mineral Right is created, transferred, assigned, effected or dealt with : Section 59( I) of the
MIMA .
280 Section 65 of the MIMA.
28 1 Section 92(1) of the MIMA .
282 Section 92(4) and (5) of the MIMA.
283 Section 92(5) of the MIMA.
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5.13.6 Non-compliance with conditions of Mineral Right for environmental
protection
There may be included in a Mineral Right conditions with respect to the prevention,
limitation or treatment of pollution, and with respect to the minimization of the effects of
mining on adjoining or neighbouring areas and their inhabitants.i'" In addition, a
prospecting or mining licence may contain conditions relating to the reinstatement,
levelling, re-grassing, reforesting and contouring of any part of the prospecting or mining
area that may have been damaged or deleteriously affect ed by prospecting or mining
operations; and relating to the filling in, sealing or fencing off, of excavations, shafts and
tunnels.285
Where a Mineral Right over any land is wholly or partly determined or cancelled, or
expires, the Minister may, by notice served on the person who is or was the last holder of
the Mineral Right, direct him to take such steps within a specified period of time as to
give effect, in relation to the land which is no longer subject to the Mineral Right, to any
of the above conditions included in the Mineral Right. Any person to whom a direction is
given who, without reasonable excuse, fails or negl ects to comply with the direction,
commits an offence. The penalties for this offence depend on the nature of the offender.
If the offender is a natural person, the punishment consists of a fine of MWKl 000 and/or
imprisonment for a term of two years. If the offender is a body corporate, the punishment
is only a fine of MWK20 000.286
284 Section 95(1) of the MIMA.
285 Section 96(1) of the MIMA.
286 Section 97(1) and (2) of the MIMA .
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5.13.7 Possessing or buying reserved minerals without authorisation
It is an offence for any person to possess any reserved minerals287 unless they were
obtained by him pursuant to the exercise of rights under a Mineral Right, a non-exclusive
prospecting licence or a claim, of which he is the holder; or unless he is the holder of a
reserved minerals licence authorizing him to buy the mineral concerned or an employee
of any such holder duly authorised and acting as such. It is also an offence for any person
to buy reserved minerals unless he is the holder of a reserved minerals licence authorizing
him to buy the minerals.288 The penalties for these offences are the same as those for the
offence of non-compliance with conditions of a Mineral Right for environmental
protection.
5.13.8 Buying reserved minerals from unlicensed person
It is an offence for the holder of a reserved minerals licence to buy any reserved minerals
from any person unless that person is entitled under Part VIII of the MIMA to possess
those reserved minerals.289 Under Part VIII of the MIMA a person is entitled to
possession of reserved minerals if they were obtained by him under a Mineral Right, a
non-exclusive prospecting licence or a claim of which he is the holder. A person may also
be entitled to possess reserved minerals if he is the holder of a reserved minerals licence
authorizing him to buy the mineral concerned or if he is an employee of such holder. 29o
Offenders under this offence are liable to the same penalties as those for the offence of
non-compliance with conditions of a Mineral Righ t for environmental protection.i'"
287 Section 98 of the MIMA states that 'reserved minerals ' are precious metals, precious stones and any
other mineral which may be prescribed.
288 Section 99( I) as read with section 101 of the MIMA .
289 Section 100(3) as read with section 101 of the MIMA .
290 Section 99(1)(a) of the MIMA.
29 1 Section 101 of the MIMA.
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5.13.9 Obstruction of officers, and false statements
It is an offence, without reasonable excuse , to obstruct, molest or hinder the
Commissioner or an authorised officer in the exercise of certain powers. 292 It is also an
offence to knowingly or recklessly make a statement or produce a document that is false
or misleading in a material particular to the Commissioner or an authorised officer
engaged in carrying out certain duties and functions .293 Any person convicted of this
offence is liable to a fine of MWK500 and/or imprisonment for a term of six months.i'"
5.13.10 Removal of minerals
It is an offence to remove minerals from any land from which they have been obtained, or
to dispose of minerals in any manner except:
(a) by the holder of a Mineral Right, a non-exclusive prospecting licence or a
claim for the purpose of sampling or analysis and such a holder must have the
written consent of the Commissioner to send out of the land samples of the
mineralsr"
(b) by such a holder in accordance with the terms of the Mineral Right, non-
exclusive prospecting licence or claim concerned; or
(c) as otherwise permitted by the MIMA.296
292 These powers are listed in section 117 of the MIMA.
293 Section 117(7) of the MIMA states that the duties and functio ns are those prescribed under section 117
of the MIMA.
294 Section 117(7) of the MIMA.
295 Section 118(1)(a) and (2) of the MIMA.
296 Section 118 of the MIMA.
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It appears that it is a separate offence if the holder of a Mineral Right, a non-exclusive
prospecting licence or a claim takes or sends out of any land samples of minerals without
the written consent of the Commissioner.297
The penalties for these offences are, in the case of a natural person, a fine of MWK500
and/or imprisonment for a term of six months. In the case of a body corporate, the penalty
is a fine ofMWKlO 000.298
5.13.11 Exporting minerals without a permit
The Minister may grant to any person a permit to export minerals from Malawi on
conditions determined by the Minister and specified in the permit. Any person who
exports any mineral from Malawi otherwise than under and in accordance with such a
permit is guilty of an offence and liable, in the case of a natural person, to a fine of
MWKl 000 and/or to imprisonment for a term of two years. In the case of a body
corporate, the punishment is a fine of MWK20 000.299 However, it must be noted that this
offence cannot be committed in respect of certain minerals.l'"
5.13.12 Failure or neglect to produce documents
The Minister may direct the holder of a Mineral Right or a claim, at a reasonable time
and place specified in the direction, to make available to, or produce for inspection by,
the Commissioner or an authorised officer, any books, accounts, vouchers, documents or
records of any kind, concerning the Mineral Right or claim. If the holder fails or neglects
to do so, he commits an offence and is liable to a fine of MWKl 000.30 1
297 Section 118(2) and (3) of the MIMA.
298 Section 118(3) of the MIMA.
299 Section 119 of the MIMA.
300 Section 119(3) of the MIMA.
301 Section 121 oftheMIMA.
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5.13.13 Non-compliance with removal of property direction
Where a Mineral Right has been wholly or partly dete rmined or cancelled, or has expired,
the Minister may, by notice served on the person who is or was the holder of the Mineral
Right, direct that person to remove or cause to be removed from the relinquished area
concerned, all property brought into that area by any person engaged or concerned in the
operations authorised by the Mineral Right, or to make arrangements that are satisfactory
to the Minister with respect to that property. Refu sal or failure to comply with the
direction constitutes an offence punishable by a fine of not more than MWKS 000. 302
5.13.14 Obstruction of holder of authorisation
It is an offence, without reasonable excuse, to obstruct, molest, hinder or prevent the
holder of a Mineral Right, a non-exclusive prospecting licence or a claim, in or from
doing any act which that holder is authorised to do by the MIMA. Offenders are liable to
a fine ofMWKl 000 and/or to imprisonment for a period of two years. 303
5.13.15 Miscellaneous offences
It is an offence to knowingly or recklessly give information which is false or misleading
in a material particular, in or in connection with any application under the MIMA or in
response to any invitation or requirement of the Minister or Commissioner under the
MIMA.304 It is also an offence, in any report, return or affidavit submitted under the Act,
302 Section 123 of the MIMA. Section l23(1) of the MIMA states that the Minister's power to issue a
direction is 's ubject to any relevant agreement of a kind referred to in section 10.' The said section 10 deals
with the entry into an agreement by the Minister with any person with respect to, inter alia, the conditions
to be included in the Mineral Right. It seems that the effect of this is that the Minister's powers to issue a
direction may be curtailed or generally affected by the terms of a particular agreement.
303 Section 125 of the MIMA.
304 According to section 127(a) of the MIMA, the invitation or requirement in issue here is that which does
no t arise from the powers of the Minister or Commissioner provided for in section 117 of the MIMA. The
offence for non-compliance with an invitation or requirement that arises from the powers of the Minister or
Commissioner under section 117 has been discussed under segment 5.13.9 hereof.
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to knowingly or recklessly include or permit to be included any information which is
false or misleading in a material particular.
It is further an offence to place or deposit, or to be accessory to the placing or depositing
of, any mineral or substance in any place with the intention of misleading any other
person as to the mineral possibilities of that place. In the same vein, it is an offence to
mingle or cause to be mingled with any sample of ore any substance which will enhance
the value or in any way change the nature of the ore with the intention to cheat, deceive
or defraud.
A person convicted of any of these offences is liable, in the case of a natural person, to
imprisonment for a term of two years; or, in the case of a body corporate, to a fine of
MWK30 000.305
5.13.16 Imputation of offence committed by body corporate to a director, manager,
secretary or other similar officer
Section 126 of the MIMA states that when an offence committed by a body corporate is
proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be attributable to
any neglect on the part of, a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the
body corporate, or any person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he, as well
as the body corporate, is guilty of that offence and liable to be proceeded against and
punished.
5.13.17 Offences under regulations
Several sets of regulations have been promulgated under the MIMA. Of these only the
Mines and Minerals (Claims) Regulations ("the Claims Regulations") and the Mines and
Minerals (Non-exclusive Prospecting Licence) Regulations ("the NEPL Regulations")
305 Section 127 of the MIMA.
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contain clear provisions on criminal sanctions. The discussion will now focus on these
criminal sanctions, beginning with those in the Claims Regulations.
It is an offence for any person to take forcible possession of the whole or any part of a
claim area306 or to commence to work the same when his right to take possession of it or
to work it is in dispute. This offence is punishable by a fine not exceeding MWKIOO and
by forfeiture of all right and title to possession of the claim. 307
Any person who abandons his claim or whose claim expires or has been forfeited is
required to fill up, fence or secure to the satisfaction of the Commissioner or an
authorised officer all shafts, pits, holes and excavations in such manner as to prevent
persons or stock inadvertently entering them. He is also required to remove all location
beacons and all boundary posts thereon. Failure or neglect to do these things constitutes
an offence and the offender is liable to a fine not exceeding MWK250 or to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding six months. In addition he is liable to pay such sum as the
Commissioner may certify to be the estimated cost of doing the thing(s) which ought to
have been done by him (the offender).308
The holder of a non-exclusive prospecting licence is requ ired, himself or by his agent, to
be present and in control at the place at which prospecting work is being carried out
under the authority of the licence. He is also required to produce his licence to the
Commissioner, an authorised officer or a police officer when required to do so. If he fails
or neglects to be so present and in control, and to so produce, he is guilty of an offence
and liable to a fine ofMWK250.309
306 By 'claim area' is meant an area ofland subject to a cla im: section 3(1) of the MIMA.
307 Regulation 12 of the Claims Regulations.
308 Regulation 13 of the Claims Regulations.
309 Regulation 7 of the NEPL Regulations.
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5.14 Land Act 25 of 1965
5.14.1 General
The Land Act 25 of 1965 regulates certain land matters. It classifies land into three
groups: public land ,31 0 private land''!' and customary land.312 It vests public land and
customary land in the State President. It provide s for user, acquisition and disposal of
land and conversion of some of these groups of land into another group of land. It
criminalizes certain actions by way of enforcement. In the following few paragraphs
crimes created under the Act will be outlined.
5.14.2 Unlawful use of public land
It is an offence to use or occupy any public land without being entitled to such use or
occupation by virtue of a valid gran t, lease or other disposition made by the Minister
under any law for the time being in force at the date of such grant, lease or disposition.
Offenders are liable to a fine of £100 and to imprisonment for six months, and, in the
case of a continuing offence, to a furth er fine of £5 in respect of every day during which
the offence continues.313
3 10 Public land is defined by section 2 of the Land Act as all land which is occupied, used or acquired by the
Government and any other land , not being customary land or private land , and includes: (a) any land held
by the Government consequent upon a reversion thereof to the Government on the termination, surrender or
falling-in of any freehold or leasehold estate there in pursuant to any covenant or by operation of law ; and
(b) any land which was , immediately before the coming into operation of the Land Act , public land within
the meaning of certain Orders.
3 11 Section 2 of the Land Act defines private land as all land which is owned, held or occupied under a
freehold title or a leasehold title or a Certifi cate of Claim or which is registered as private land under the
Registered Land Act 6 of 1967.
3 12 According to section 2 of the Land Act, customary land means all land which is held , occupied or used
under customary law, but does not include any public land.
3 13 Section 10 of the Land Act.
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5.14.3 Failure to give notice of intention to sell, etc, private land
Any person who intends to offer for sale or otherwise to convey, lease, transfer or assign
any private land is required to give written notic e of his intention to the Minister. He
must give the notice not less than thirty days before he makes such offer or otherwise
conveys, transfers or assigns the private land.314 Any person who acts or attempts to act
in contravention of this requirement commits an offence punishable by a fine of MWK1
000 and imprisonment for a term of twelve months.315
5.14.4 Contravention of direction or regulation on user of land
The Minister may, by order under his hand and published in the Gazette or by regulations
or by written directions or instructions in any individual case , make provision for
regulating, managing and controlling the user of all land other than public land or private
land situated in a municipality or township . The order, regulation, direction or instruction
may make provision for, inter alia, regulating and controlling the use to which land may
be put, the maintenance of proper drainage of such land, the preservation and protection
of the source, course and banks of streams and generally the good management and
conservation of the soil , water, woodland, pasture and other natural resources thereof.
Contravention of such order, regulation, direct ion or instruction constitutes an offence
punishable by a fine of MWK200 and imprisonment for six months, and, in the case of a
continuing offence, by a further fine of MWK1 0 (US$0.08) for every day during which
the offence continues.i'"
314 There are four exceptions to this requirement of notice. The exceptions are set out in section 24A(3) of
the Land Act.
315 Section 24A(l) and (2) of the Land Act.
316 Section 31 of the Land Act. In exercising his powers in respect of the orders , regulations, directions or
instructions, the Minister is required to consult with and have regard to the views of the Minister for the
time being responsible for the administration of the Town and Country Planning Act 26 of 1988: proviso to
section 31(l) of the Land Act.
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It must be noted that the Minister has made numerous orders. These orders take the
general format of specification of an area of land and prohibition against making a new
garden, planting a tree or shrub and erecting a building, within the specified land unless
the person doing so has obtained the prior written consent of the Minister or his
authorised representative.Y' In line with what has been said above, contravention of any
of these orders is an offence.
5.14.5 Obst ruction of person exercising powers
It is an offence to obstruct or impede any person lawfully exercising any powers or
performing any functions or duties conferred or imposed upon him by or under Part VI of
the Land Act. 318 A look at the content of the said Part VI reveals that the persons who
may exercise powers or perform functions or duties conferred by or under it are the
Minister and an authorised officer. The Minister's powers relate to the issuing of orders,
regulations, directions and instructions. The authorised officer's powers include entry
upon land for the purpose of ensuring that Part VI is complied with.319 So obstructing the
Minister or the auth orised officer in the exercise of those powers is an offence. The
penalties for this offence are the same as those for the offence discussed in the
immediately preceding segment.Y''
5.14.6 Offences against regulations
The Minister is empowered to make regulations for any of the purposes of the Act and to
give effect to them. In particular, the Minister may by such regulations prohibit the
unlawful or unauthorized use or occupation of land and may prescribe as penalties for
317 One excepti on to this general format is the Control of Land (Hara Irrigation Project) Order (ON
170/1969) which creates a criminal offence straight away.
318 Section 34 of the Land Act.
319 Section 33 of the Land Act.
320 Section 34 of the Land Act.
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breach of such regulations a fine not exceeding MWK200 and/or imprisonment for a term
not exceeding six months. In the case of a continuing offence, a further fine of not more
than MWKI0 for every day during which the breach continues, may be imposcd.i'" In
exercise of these powers the Minister has made the Land (Trespass, Encroachment or
Unlawful Occupation) Regulations.Y' Regulation 2(1) of these regulations creates an
offence punishable by a fine of MWK200 and imprisonment for six months. The first
element of this offence is trespassing or encroaching upon any public land, private land
or customary land, or being (or being deemed to be) in unlawful use or occupation of any
such land. The second element is couched in incoherent language: it appears that some
words are missing and so the second element does not make sense. In order to deal with
this problem, it is suggested that this element - regulation 2(1)(c) - be recast to clarify its
meamng,
5.15 Town and Country Planning Act 26 of 1988
5.15.1 General
The Town and Country Planning Act 26 of 1988 ("TACPA") regulates certain aspects of
the development of land in Malawi. In particular it makes provision for town and country
planning and related matters. It creates a number of criminal offences.
5.15.2 Miscellaneous offences
Section 72 of the TACPA provides that any person who does or fails to do certain acts or
omissions without lawful or reasonable excuse commits an offence. The acts or
omissions are as follows:
321 Section 39 of the Land Act.
322 GN 165/1965 and GN 215/1965 .
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(a) failing to carry out any work or action required by an enforcement notice;323
(b) obstructing or impeding an authorised officer or any member of the Town and
Country Planning Board or any member of a Planning Committee, lawfully
exercising a power of entry onto land or building, from entering any land or
any building;
(c) failing to comply with any order, direction, notice or instruction lawfully
given by an authorised officer exercising any powers conferred by the Act;
(d) failing to give information on any matter in respect of which one has been
lawfully required to do so;
(e) tearing down, defacing or otherwise marking or interfering with any notice
lawfully affixed to any building or placed upon a board specially erected for
that purpose in connection with the administration of the Act;
(f) failing to comply with a condition subject to which a grant of development
permission was made;
(g) subdividing, or entering into a subdivision agreement with respect to any land
or a portion thereof within any area in which such subdivision or subdivision
agreement is prohibitedr'i"
(h) commencing any development without a grant of development perrmssion
where such permission is required;
(i) displaying an advertisement without a grant of development permission where
such permission is required; or
(D ignoring a stop notice. 325
323 Enforcement notices are provided for under section 45 of the TACP A. They are issued by a responsible
authority in any case where the authority considers that unauthorized development has taken place. The
enforcement notice requires the owner or occupier of the land or building to which the notice relates, to
take specified action.
324 The terms 'subdivision' and 'subdivision agreement' are defined in section 2 of the TACPA.
Subdivision means the division of any piece of land for the purpose of parting with possession or of
disposing of any portion thereof, either by way of lease or sale or for the erection of a building upon any
portion. Subdivision agreement is defined as including any agreement whereby any person is given: (a) any
right whether vested or contingent to acquire, lease or obtain possession of any portion of land, whether
immediately or upon fulfilment of any condition or upon the happening of any event, or after the lapse of
any time, or upon the exercise of any option or upon the payment of any sum, whether by instalments or
otherwise; or (b) a right to erect a building on any portion ofland belonging to some other person.
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The penalties for any of these offences are a fine of MWK5 000 or imprisonment for a
term of twelve months together with, in the case of a continuing offence, a further fine of
MWK100 for every day during which the offence continues after conviction.Y"
5.16 Monuments and Relics Act 16 of 1990
5.16.1 General
The Monuments and Relics Act 16 of 1990 ("MARA") makes provision for the
conservation, preservation and study of, among other things, places of distinctive natural
beauty. The definition it offers for monument is wide: it includes graves, buildings,
inscriptions and many other things. Of particular relevance for present purposes is the
part of the definition which says that a monument is an area of land which has distinctive
scenery or which contains rare or distinctive vegetation.327 In the following discussion of
offences created by the Act, references to monument are confined to the last-stated
meaning.
5.16.2 Alteration or damage to a monument
It is an offence, without the prior written consent of the Minister, to make any alteration
to, or to destroy or damage, any monument or any part of it. It is also an offence, without
the prior written consent of the Minister, to carry out any cultivation or mining project or
other work so as to cause, or to be likely to cause, damage or disturbance to any protected
monument. 328
325 According to section 49( 1) of the TACPA, where a responsible authority is of the opinion that a person
is carrying out unauthorized development, the authority may serve a stop notice requiring that person to
cease the activity or such portion of it as may be specified in the stop notice.
326 Section 72 of the TACP A.
327 Section 2 of the MARA.
328. ~ection 13 of the MARA. A 'protected monument ' is a monument which has been declared by the
M1TI1ster to be a protected monument: section 11(1) of the MARA.
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5.16.3 Demolition, alteration or extension of listed monument without or contrary to
consent
Any demolition, alteration or extension of a listed rnonumenr" is required to be
undertaken only with the written consent of the Minister which may be granted subject to
such conditions as the Minister may impose. It is an offence to engage in such
demolition, alteration or extension without the written consent or in contravention of any
condition of the consent.330
Any person accused of this offence has a defence. He can free himself from liability by
proving that the unauthorized works of demolition, alteration or extension were urgently
required in the interest of health and safety and that the Minister was notified as soon as
was reasonably practicablc.v"
5.16.4 Engaging in archaeological excavations for monuments without authorisation
Archaeological excavations for monuments may be undertaken only by the Chief
Antiquities Officer and organisations or individuals holding a valid excavation permit
issued by the Minister. Any person, other than these , who excavates on any land
including his own for monuments, commits an offence.332
329 The Minister is required to compile a list of national monuments (other than protected monuments) of
exceptional or special interest or of particular importance. In addition a local authority may compile a list
of monuments of local importance. A monument included in either list is known as a listed monument
(sections 2, 22 and 23 of the MARA).
330 Section 24(1) and (5) of the MARA.
33 1 Section 24(6) of the MARA.
332 Section 28( 1) and (2) of the MARA.
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5.16.5 Failure to restore or repair excavation site
The Minister may cancel an excavation permit In certain circumstances.v':'
Notwithstanding the cancellation, the Minister may require the permit holder to restore or
repair the excavation site and the most important findings (e.g. monuments) that it
contains in such a way as to indicate the stratigraphy of the site. Failure to comply with
such a requirement from the Minister amounts to an offence.334
5.16.6 Trading in a monument without a licence
It is an offence for any person to trade in any monument, whether or not such monument
is registered, unless he is the holder of a valid licence under the ACt,335
5.16.7 Prohibition of fraud in monuments
It is an offence to do any of the following things without the written consent of the
Minister:
(a) to reproduce, retouch, rework or forge any monument deriving its principal
value from a monument which is twenty-five or more years old, or any
monument which is less than twenty-five years old but deemed by the
Minister to be of national importance or interest;
(b) to make any object, whether copied or not , or to falsely label, describe,
identify or offer for sale or exchange any object, with the intention to
represent the same to be an original and genuine monument;
333 According to section 34(1) of the MARA, the circumstances are: (a) where the holder of the permit
suspends excavation or is otherwise inacti ve without reasons accepted as valid by the Minister; (b) where
the holder of the permit fails to comply with the requirements of the Act; and (c) where the Minister
considers it in the public interest so to do.
334 Section 34 as read with section 31(n) of the MARA.
335 Sect ion 36 of the MARA.
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(c) to offer for sale or exchange any object with the knowledge that it has
previously been collected or excavated in contravention of the Act;
(d) being a licensed dealer in monuments, to encourage any other person to
J:: • h .,. d d h A 336excavate ror monuments WIt out an excavation permit Issue un er t e et.
5.16.8 Illegal exports of monuments
A person, who exports any monument without a valid licence or otherwise In
contravention of Part VIII of the MARA, commits an offence.33?
5.16.9 General offences
It is an offence, without authority, to knowingly alter, destroy, deface, damage, demolish,
remove from the original site, or reproduce a protected monument or a listed monument
whether in the possession of the government or a private organisation or an individual. It
is also an offence to possess an unregistered monument without having shown it to the
Minister for registration. Further it is an offence for any person, in any application to the
Minister under the Act, to make any statement which he knows or ought reasonably to
know to be false in any material respect. It must be noted that all these offences are
introduced by the words' Save as is provided in this Act'. These words suggest that the
Act may authorise the performance of the proscribed acts without incurring criminal
liability.338
336 Section 39 of MARA .
337 Section 47 of the MARA.
338 Section 55 of the MARA.
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5.16.10 Penalties for offences under the MARA
All offences under the MARA are punishable by a fine of MWK10 000 and
., .c th 339imprisonment tor ree years.
5.17 Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997
5.17.1 General
The Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997 ("FCMA") provides for the
regulation, conservation and man agement of fisheries in Malawi. 34o It repeals and
replaces the Fisheries Act 16 of 1973. It creates a number of offences which will now be
analysed.
5.17.2 Fishing without registration and licence
Every owner of a local registrable fishing vessel34 1 who intends to use it for fishing is
required to register the vessel with the Director of Fisheries.342 It is prohibited to use a
local registrable fishing vessel for fishing in the fishing waters343 unless it is so registered
and the person using the vessel (or a person working on his behalf) is authorised so to
339 Section 56 of the MARA .
340 Long title of the FCMA .
341 Section 2 of the FCMA defines a ' local fishing vessel' as any fishing vessel (a) wholly owned by one or
more persons ordinarily resident in Malawi; or (b) wholly owned by a company, society or association of
persons incorporated in or established under the laws of Malawi and controlled by one or more persons
ordinarily resident in Malawi. By ' registrable vessel' is meant a vessel that is required to be registered
under the Act.
342 Section 10(1) of the FCMA .
343 According to section 2 of the FCMA ' fishing waters ' means: (a) all waters within the land borders of
Malaw i capable of supporting fish ; and (b) those parts of Lake Malawi over which Malawi exercises
sovereignty. The limitation specified in (b) is necess ary because Lake Malawi is shared by Malawi and
Mozambique.
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fish by a licence. 344 A licence is required only in respect of commercial fishing. Use of a
local registrable fishing vessel for commercial fishing without the registration or the
licence constitutes an offence punishable by a fine not exceeding MWK50 000 (US$376)
and imprisonment for ten years and a further fine of MWK200 per day for each day that
the offence continues after conviction. The persons upon whom the prescribed
punishment may be imposed are the master, owner, charterer or hirer of the vessel.
345
5.17.3 Fishing without a licence by foreign fishing vessel
No foreign fishing vessel 346 may be used for commercial fishing in the fishing waters
unless the owner or charterer thereof is authorised to fish by a licence. Where this
prohibition is contravened, the master, owner and charterer may be convicted of an
offence and sentenced to a fine of not less than MWK20 000 and not more than MWKl
000 000, imprisonment for ten years and a further fine of MWK200 per day for each day
that the offence continues after conviction.Y
5.17.4 Failure to give notice of fish on foreign fishing vessel
The master of a foreign fishing vessel that has fish on board is required to notify a
fisheries protection officer of the amounts and descriptions of the fish on board the
vessel. He must give that notification prior to entry of the vessel into the fishing waters or
prior to the vessel leaving an area of the fishing waters in which the owner or charterer is
344 Section 11(1) of the FCMA.
345 Section 11(2) of the FCMA. Actually the section states that the listed persons are the ones who would be
guilty of the offence under the section.
346 P: 'foreign fishing vessel' is defined by section 2 of the FCMA as any fishing vessel other than a local
fishing vessel or a convention fishing vessel.
347 Section 12 of the FCMA .
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licensed to fish. Failure to give the notification amounts to an offence punishable by a
fine not exceeding MWK50 000 and imprisonment for ten years.
348
5.17.5 Prohibition of commercial fishing without a licence
A person who desires to engage in commercial fishing is required to apply to the Director
of Fisheries for a licence. The grant of the fishing licence is in the discretion of the
Director and the licence may authorise fishing generally or may confer limited authority
by reference to the area in which fishing is authorised; the period, times or particular
voyages during which fishing is authorised; the quantities, description and size of fish
which may be taken; or the method of fishing. The fishing licence may specify the fishing
gear that is permitted to be used for fishing by or on behalf of the licensee, and may
authorise fishing either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as may appear to the
Director to be necessary or expedient for the regulation of fishing, the conservation or
management of fisheries in the fishing waters or for the economic benefit of Malawi.349
Any person who engages in commercial fishing in the fishing waters not under the
authority of a licence commits an offence and is liable to a fine of MWK20 000 and to
imprisonment for four years. 350 Where a licence was granted but a condition thereof is
contravened, the licensee or the master, as the case may be , of the fishing vessel
concerned in such contravention commits an offence and is liable to a fine of MWK20
000 and to imprisonment for four years .35 1
348 Section 13 of the FCMA. Subsection (3) of section 13 states that the notification does not of itself
constitute a defence to a prosecution for the offence of illegal holding of fish under section 16 of the Act.
349 Section 15 of the FCMA. The conditions may relate to the landing of fish caught under the authority of
the li~ence, the use to which the fish may be put, the marking of fishing vessels used by the licensee, the
marking of fishing gear , the records of fishin g operations that must be kept on board fishing vessels, the
navigation equipment and charts to be carried on board fishing vessels, and the place or places where the
licensee may carry out transhipment of fish: secti on 15(2) of the FCMA .
350 Section 14 of the FCMA .
351 Section 15(2) of the FCMA.
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5.17.6 Illegal holding of fish
Section 16(1) of the FCMA provides that no master shall take or allow remaining on
board a fishing vessel, within the fishing waters, fish which has not been taken under the
authority of and in accordance with a fishing licence or other licence provided for under
the Act. It may be observed that this provision does not declare the prohibition therein to
be an offence nor does it specify a penalty for contravention of the prohibition. It is
arguable, however, that this prohibition is a criminal offence. Support for this position
emanates from section 13(3), section 16(2) and section 45 of the FCMA. Section 13(3)
provides that the giving of notification of fish on board a fishing vessel does not
constitute a defence to 'a prosecution for an offence under section 16.' Section 16(2)
states that it shall be a defence to 'a prosecution for an offence arising under' section
16(1) if the person charged satisfies the court that the fish was not taken or caught in the
fishing waters. Thus section 13(3) and section 16(2) suggest that an offence is created
under section 16(1). In addition section 45 declares that any person who contravenes any
provision of the Act 'for which no offence is specifically provided' shall be guilty of an
offence. It is arguable that section 16(1) is a provision ' for which no offence is
specifically provided' and so contravention thereof amounts to an offence.
The penalties for illegal holding of fish are arguably MWK20 000 and imprisonment for
four years. These are the penalties prescribed under section 45(2) for offences under the
Act for which no penalty is specifically provided. It may be recalled that section 16(1)
does not specify the penalty for the offence created under it and so may qualify for the
penalties under section 45(2).
5.17.7 Improper stowage of gear
Where a fishing vessel is in an area of the fishing waters and the person using the vessel
is prohibited under the FCMA from fishing in that area or is permitted by fishing licence
or otherwise to fish only for certain species or descriptions of fish in that area, it is
required that fishing gear of the fishing vessel or so much of the gear as is not required
322
for permitted fishing, should be stowed in such manner that it is not readily available for
use for fishing or in such manner as may be prescribed. Contravention of these
requirements is an offence and the master of the vessel concerned may be convicted
thereof and sentenced to a fine of MWKl 0 000, imprisonment for two years and a further
h ff . f .. 352fine of MWK200 per day for each day that t e 0 rence contmues a ter conviction.
5.17.8 Aquaculture offences
Any person interested in establishing or operating an aquaculture establishment is
required to obtain from the Director of Fisheries an aquaculture permit before such
establishment or operation. The aquaculture permit, inter alia, confers on the permit
holder exclusive rights to harvest the products of the aquaculture establishment within the
area specified in the permit. The permit is subject to such conditions as appear to the
Director to be necessary or expedient for the regulation of aquaculture, the management
of fisheries or for the economic benefit of Malawi.353 Any person who establishes or
operates an aquaculture establishment otherwise than under the authority of, and in
accordance with the conditions of, an aquaculture permit, commits an offence and is
liable to a fine of MWK20 000 and imprisonment for four years .354
Apart from obtaining the aquaculture permit, the person must also have obtained rights to
use water for the aquaculture establishment under the Water Resources Act 15 of 1969.355
352 Section 17 of the FCMA.
353 Section 21 of the FCMA.
354 Section 20 of the FCMA. It must be noted that not every aquaculture establishment requires the
obtaining of an aquaculture permit or water right. These requirements only apply to such aquaculture
establishments as are prescribed by the Minister by notice published in the Gazette: section 20(3) of the
FCMA.
355 Se~tion 20(1)(b) of the FCMA . The Water Resources Act 15 of 1969 ("WRA") prohibits the diversion,
damming, storage, abstraction or use of publ ic water except in accordance with a water right (section 5 of
the WRA) . An application for the grant of a water right is required to be made to the Water Resources
Board which forwards it together with its recommendations to the Minister. It is the Minister who grants
the water right in his discretion (section 10 of the WRA).
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Failure to have the water right renders the establishment or operation of the aquaculture
. h . hose ci ff 356estabhs ment In t ose circumstances an 0 rence.
It is also an offence to harvest the products of an aquaculture establishment without the
authority of the owner thereof. 357 This offence must be understood in the context of what
an aquaculture permit confers, that is, the exclusi ve right to harvest the products of the
aquaculture establishment,358 Unlawful harvests are punishable by the same penalties as
those for the establishment or operation of an aquaculture establishment without an
1 . l' 359aquacu ture perrrut or icence.
5.17.9 Offences against convention enforcement powers of officers
Section 30 of the FCMA lays down the general powers of fisheries protection officers
36o
relating to fishing vessels in the fishing watcrs .i'" By section 36 of the FCMA the
exercise of these powers is extended to a convention fisheries officer
362
(in relation to a
356 Section 20 of the FCMA. The person who establ ishes or operates an aquaculture establishment without a
water right may be prosecuted under this section of the FCMA or under section 5 of the WRA, but the
penalties under the latter are low: only MWK 1 000 fine and one year' s imprisonment (section 25 of the
WRA). Until these penalties are amend ed upwards , it is recommended that prosecutors should prefer
prosecutions under section 20 of the FCMA.
357 Section 20(2) of the FCMA .
358 Section 2l(2)(b) of the FCMA.
359 Section 20(2) of the FCMA.
360 'Fisheries protection officer' means the Directo r of Fisheries , fisheries officers in the Department of
Fisheries, members of the Malawi Police Force, forest officers , wildlife officers , environmental officers,
persons in command or in charge of any vessel, aircraft or hovercraft of the armed forces of Malawi or of
the Government of Malawi , such other public officers as the Minister may designate by notice published in
the Gazette, and any person authorised by or acting under the orders of any of the aforementioned persons
except the Director of Fisheries: sections 2 and 3(7) of the FCMA.
361 Generally the powers are required to be exercised within the fishing waters. However, where a fisheries
protection officer has reasonable grounds for belie ving that an offence has been committed against the
FCMA using or in relation to a foreign fishin g vessel, he may stop , board and search such vessel outside
the fishing waters: section 30(2) of the FCMA.
362 A convention fisheries officer is a person appointed by the government of another country to enforce, or
having power under the laws of another country to enforce, a convention that provides for the safeguarding
or conduct of fishing operations or operations ancill ary thereto to which Malawi is a party: section 2 of the
FCMA.
324
convention fishing vessel)363 and to a fisheries protection officer (in relation to a local
fishing vessel or a foreign fishing vessel) anywhere within a convention area.
364
This has
been done for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of any convention with respect to
the conduct or safeguarding of fishing operations to which Malawi is a party. On this
background section 36(3) provides that any person who, on any fishing vessel within the
fishing waters or on a local fishing vessel outside fishing waters, does any of the
following commits an offence:
(a) failing without reasonable excuse to comply with any requirement imposed or
to answer any question asked by a fisheries protection officer;
(b) preventing or attempting to prevent any other person from complying with
any requirement imposed or answering any question asked by a fisheries
protection officer; or
(c) obstructing any fisheries protection officer while exercising any of the powers
conferred on him here or wilfully obstructing such officer in the exercise of
any of those powers.
The foregoing provisions of section 36(3) also apply in relation to things done on a local
fishing vessel in a convention area outside the fishing waters by or in relation to a
convention fisheries officer who is exercising powers to enforce the provisions of a
convention relating to that area as they apply in relation to things done on any fishing
vessel within those limits by or in relation to a fisheries protection officer. 365
The punishment for any of these offences is a fine of MWK20 000 and imprisonment for
four years. 366
363 A convention fishing vessel is a fishing vessel registered in a country which is a party to a convention to
which Malawi is also a party: section 2 of the FCMA.
364 By 'convention area' is meant, in relation to any bilateral or multilateral convention, the area to which
the convention relates: section 2 of the FCMA.
365 Section 36(4) of the FCMA .
366 Section 36(3) of the FCMA .
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5.17.10 Transfer, stocking and introduction of fish
It is an offence, without a permit, to stock any water with fish or to introduce into any
water any fish not indigenous thereto. It is also an offence, without a permit, to transfer
fish from an aquaculture establishment or any other water to a different aquaculture
establishment or water. 367 The penalties for these offences are the same as those for
offences against convention enforcement powers of officers.368
5.17 .11 Offences relating to fishing methods
It is an offence to use any explosive, device capable of producing an electric current,
poison or other noxious substance for the purpose of killing, stunning, disabling or
catching fish or in any way rendering such fish more easily caught. It is also an offence to
use any other method of fishing or gear that is unlawful. In addition it is an offence to
carry or have in one's possession or control any explosive, device capable of producing
an electric current, poison or other noxious substance, or gear that is unlawful in
circumstances indicating an intention of using such explosive, device, poison, noxious
substance or gear for the purpose of killing, stunning, disabling or catching fish or in any
way rendering such fish more easily caught. 369 If any unlawful explosive, device, etc, is
found on board any vessel or in the possession or control of any person within the
vicinity of any of the fishing waters, it shall be presumed that such unlawful explosive,
device, etc, was intended for the purpose of killing, stunning, disabling or catching fish or
in any way rendering such fish more easily caught.37o For reasons stated in segment 3.3 in
Chapter 3 hereof, this presumption may be constitutionally justifiable.
367 Section 41 of the FCMA.
368 Section 45(2) of the FCMA .
369 Section 42(1) of the FCMA.
370 Section 42(2) of the FCMA.
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Further, any person who lands, sells , receives or is found in possession of fish knowing or
having reasonable cause to believe it to have been taken in contravention of the
prohibitions relating to fishing methods set out in the immediately foregoing paragraph,
. ff 371commits an 0 rence.
The penalties for these offences are a fine not exceeding MWK30 000 and imprisonment
~. 372tor SIX years.
5.17.12 Pollution, etc, of rivers, lakes or other parts of the fishing waters
It is an offence to disturb, injure, poison, kill or detrimentally affect any fish, fish
spawning ground, including any aquatic plant life or food for fish in any river, stream,
lake or other part of the fishing waters by casting, introducing, discharging or allowing to
fall, flow or percolate into such waters any sawdust or sawmill refuse, oil, chlorinated
hydrocarbon, biocide, pesticide, toxic or any other substance, heavy metal or other
material or rubbish which could lie on the bed of such waters.373
For purposes of this offence, section 43(2) of the FCMA sets out a presumption in favour
of the prosecution: a person is considered to discharge any of the aforementioned
substances if he places or discharges or causes or permits to be placed or discharged any
waste or natural water containing waste in a position where that waste or any other waste
emanating as a result of a natural process from that waste is liable to fall or descend into
or be washed or percolate into or to be carried by wind, tide or current into any natural
water. It is arguable that this presumption is consti tutionally defensible on the grounds set
out in segment 3.3 in Chapter 3 hereof.
37 1 Section 42(3 ) of the FCMA .
372 Section 42(3 ) of the FCMA.
373 Section 43(1) and (3) of the FCMA.
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After being convicted of the offence under discussion, the offender may be convicted of
another offence if he neglects or refuses to remove the material in respect of which the
former contravention arose within a reasonable time after having been ordered so to do
by a fisheries protection officer.374
Offenders under these offences are liable to a fine of not less than MWK20 000 and not
exceeding MWKl 000 000 and if the offence is a continuing one, to a further fine of
MWKl 000 per day for each day that the offence continues after conviction.Y"
5.17.13 Offences against the general powers of fisheries protection officers
It is an offence to resist arrest or wilfully' " obstruct a fisheries protection officer in the
exercise of his powers under the FCMA or to refuse or neglect to comply with any order,
requisition, direction or notice lawfully made or given under the FCMA. Further, any
person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to answer any question asked by a fisheries
protection officer or to produce anything required to be produced under the Act, commits
an offence. In addition any person who fails to allow a search or inspection under the Act
or who prevents or attempts to prevent another person from complying with orders,
requisitions or directions or from answering such questions or producing anything or
allowing a search or inspection, commits an offence. These offences attract a fine of
MWK30 000 and imprisonment for six years. 377
5.17.14 False information
It is an offence to provide information which the person providing it knows to be false in
a material particular or to recklessly provide information which is false in a material
374 Section 43(4) of the FCMA.
375 Section 43(5) of the FCMA.
376 For the meaning of ' wilfully' see segment 4.3.2 in Chapter 4 hereof.
377 Section 44(1) of the FCMA.
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particular. Thus the mental element required is either knowledge or recklessness. For
such provision of information to amount to an offence, it must be done either for the
purposes of obtaining any licence, permit or registration, or in purported compliance with
any requirement to provide information under the Act. Offenders are liable to a fine of
MWKIO 000 and imprisonment for two years. 378
5.17.15 Alteration of documents
Any person who, without lawful authority, alters or defaces any registration certificate,
licence, permit, return or other document issued, furnished or kept pursuant to the FCMA
commits an offence and is liable to a fine of MWK5 000 and to imprisonment for one
year. 379
5.17.16 General offence
Section 45(1) of the FCMA states that contravention of any provision of the Act for
which no offence is specifically provided is an offence. As stated elsewhere.F" the
correct approach in interpreting provisions like this is to disregard the literal meaning and
to select and say in what cases the court thinks Parliament intended contravention of a
particular section of the Act to amount to a crime the criminalisation of which is
prescribed in section 45( 1) of the FCMA.
Persons convicted of this offence are liable to a fine of MWK20 000 and to imprisonment
for four years. 381
378 Section 44(2) of the FCMA.
379 Section 44(3) of the FCMA .
380 For example in segment 4.2.2 in Chapter 4 hereof.
381 Section 45(2) of the FCMA.
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5.17.17 Dealing with fish caught or transhipped illegally
It is an offence for any master to tranship, receive on board a fishing vessel, transport or
in any other manner deal with fish caught or transhipped in contravention of the FCMA.
Offenders are liable to the same penalties as those for the offence analysed in the
. . 1 -C'. t 382immediate y toregomg segmen .
5.17.18 Convention offences
The Minister is empowered, by order published in the Gazette, to provide for the
enforcement of any restriction or obligation relating to fishing contained in a convention
to which Malawi is a party. Any person who uses a fishing vessel within the fishing
waters in contravention of such restriction commits an offence and is liable to the same
penalties as those for the offence analysed in the immediately foregoing segment.
383
5.17.19 General matters of criminal liability
The FCMA makes provision for a number of general matters of criminal liability. In the
first place, where a person is convicted of an offence under the Act, the court may, in
addition to any other penalty it may impose, order forfeiture to the Government of any
fishing gear, instrument or appliance or fishing vesse1384 used in the commission of such
382 Section 45(2) and (7) of the FCMA.
383 Section 47 of the FCMA.
384 A court may order forfeiture of a fishing vessel only in the circumstances laid out in section 51 of the
FCMA . This provision states that if any fine or amount of costs is adjudged to be due by the owner, master
or charterer of any fishing vessel in respect of a contravention of any provision of the Act, the court may, if
no security or if it considers that insufficient security has been given to the Government, order that in
default of payment the defendant shall give security for the payment of the amount due and if such security
is not given, the court may order the detention of the fishin g vessel used in the contravention and such
fishing vessel may be detained in Malawi until the amount due is paid or sufficient security is given. If the
fine is not paid or security is not given within 30 days of the order of the court or such longer period as the
court may determine, the court may order that in the case of an offence under sections 11, 12 or 13 any
vessel and equipment used in the commission of the offence be forfeited to the Government and if so
forfeited, be disposed of in such manner as the Director of Fisheries may direct. Section 11 deals with the
control of fishing by registrable local fishin g vessels. Section 12 deals with fishing by foreign fishing
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offence and any fish on board a fishing vessel or the proceeds of sale thereof if already
sold. The court may order that upon forfeiture , the things forfeited be disposed of in such
manner as the Director of Fisheries may direct. 385 The court may also forfeit any licence,
permit or registration granted or made under the Act and any fees paid for that licence,
permit or registration. In addition the convicted person may be ineligible, for a period of
three years from the day of the conviction, to hold any such licence or permit or to be so
registered under the Act. 386
In the second place, section 45 of the FCMA contains two rebuttable presumptions. The
first is to the effect that for the purposes of proceedings under the Act, any fish found on
board a fishing vessel shall be presumed (unless the contrary is proved) to have been
caught: (a) within the fishing waters or in an area where the vessel is required to have a
licence or permit to fish; and (b) within the vicinity of the vessel at the time the fish is so
found where the licence or permit to fish specifying the vessel restricts fishing to a
particular area.387 The second runs like this: a certi ficate signed by the Director or any
officer authorised by him to the effect that on a date specified in the certificate -
(i) a fishing vessel specified in the certificate was not registered, licensed or
specified in a permit under the Act ;
(ii) the accused person or any other named person was not the holder of a licence
or permi t under the Act ; or
(iii) a person was registered as the owner of a vessel or was the holder of a licence
or permit under the Act,
is, in the absence of proof to the contrary, sufficient evidence of the matter stated in the
certificate.388
vessels while section 13 addresses the issue of notification of fish on board a foreign fishing vessel entering
the fishing waters.
385 Section 45(4) of the FCMA.
386 Section 49 of the FCMA.
387 Section 45(5) of the FCMA.
388 Section 45(10) of the FCMA.
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It is arguable that these presumptions are constitutionally justifiable on the basis of the
reasons stated in segment 3.3 in Chapter 3 hereof.
In the third place, secondary offences and attempts to commit offences are deemed
principal offences and full-fledged offences respectively. Specifically, it is provided that
an attempt to commit an offence under the FCMA is itself to constitute an offence and
may be dealt with in like manner as if the attempted offence had been committed.F" With
regard to secondary offences, it is stated that any person who aids, abets, counsels or
procures an offence under the Act shall be guilty of the offence so aided, abetted,
counselled or procured. Further, any person who conspires to commit an offence under
the Act shall be guilty of the offence conspired to be committcd.t'"
5.18 Occupational Safety, Health and Welfare Act 21 of 1997
5.18.1 General
The Occupational Safety, Health and Welfare Act 21 of 1997 ("OSHAWA") is primarily
concerned with the regulation of the conditions of employment in workplaces as regards
the safety, health and welfare of persons employed therein. The most environmentally
relevant part of the Act is the one dealing with hazardous substances and other dangerous
substances. By 'hazardous substance' is meant any matter which by virtue of its
chemical, physical or toxicological properties constitutes a risk to the safety, health or
welfare of persons.i'" The Act creates one general offence that is stated to apply to every
provision of the Act.
389 Section 45(6 ) of the FCMA.
390 Section 45(8 ) of the FCMA .
39 1 Section 2 of the OSHA WA. The term 'dangerous substance' is not defined in the Act.
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5.18.2 General offence
id h . 392 393 fSection 82( 1) of the OSHAWA provi es t at every occupier or owner 0 a
workplace who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of the Act or
regulations made under it shall be guilty of an offence. For reasons stated in segment
4.2.2 in Chapter 4 hereof, this provision should not be interpreted literally. Instead a court
must select and say in what cases it thinks Parliament intended contravention of a
particular provision of the Act to amount to a crime. Following this approach it is
arguable that due to the nature of hazardous substances and other dangerous substances
and taking into account other factors , contraventions of certain provisions of the Act
relating to hazardous substances and dangerous substances constitute offences. It is
suggested that these provisions include parts of section 51 (hazardous substances),
section 52 (vessels containing dangerous substances), section 53 (bulk storage of
dangerous substances) and section 54 (precautions in relation to explosives, etc).
5.18.3 Penalties
Offenders under the OSHAWA are liable to a fine of MWKl 0 000 and if the offence in
respect of which they were convicted continued after the conviction, they are liable to a
further fine ofMWK500 (US$4) for each day the offence continucs.i'" Where any person
dies or suffers bodily injury as a result of the occupier or owner of a workplace having
contravened any provision of the Act , the occupier or owner is, without prejudice to any
other penalty, liable to a fine of MWK20 000 and imprisonment for twelve months, and
the whole or any part of that fine may be applied for the benefit of the deceased person or
the injured person as the court may order. 395
392 By 'occupier' is meant the person in actual occupation of a workplace, whether that person be the owner
of it or not: section 2 of the OSHA WA.
393 Section 2 of the OSHA WA defines 'owner' as the person for the time being recei ving the rents or profits
of the prem ises in connection with which the workplace is used , whether on his own account or as agent or
trustee for any other person , or who would so receiv e the rents if the premises were leased.
394 Section 83 of the OSHA WA.
395 Section 85 of the OSHA WA.
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Where the occupier or owner of a workplace is convicted of an offence under the Act, the
court may, in addition to or instead of a penalty, order the occupier or owner, within the
time specified in the order, to take such steps as may be so specified for remedying the
matters in respect of which the contravention occurred, If after the expiration of the time
specified the order is not complied with, the occupier or owner is liable to a fine of
h 1
· . 396
MWK500 for each day t e non-comp lance continu es.
5.19 Public Health Act 12 of 1948
5.19.1 General
The Public Health Act 12 of 1948 ("PHA") is a colonial statute that has seen numerous
amendments over the years. It is probably Malawi's longest environmentally relevant
statute. It has sixteen parts but only two of them merit consideration here. These are Part
IX (sanitation and housing) and Part X (conveyance, sewerage and drainage). The
following are the major environmental offences under the Act.
5.19.2 Passing prohibited matter into sewers or drains
It is an offence to throw, empty or turn, or to suffer or permit to be thrown or emptied or
to pass, into any public sewer or into any drain or private sewer communicating with a
public sewer, any of the following matters:
(a) any matter likely to injure the sewer or drain, or to interfere with the free flow of
its contents, or to affect prejudicially the treatment and disposal of its contents;
(b) any chemical, refuse or waste steam, or any liquid of a temperature higher than
one hundred and ten degrees Fahrenheit, being refuse or steam, which, or a liquid
which when so heated, is, either alone or in combination with the contents of the
sewer or drain, dangerous or the cause of a nuisance or prejudicial to health; or
396 Section 84 of the OSHAWA.
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(c) any petroleum spirit or carbide of calcium.
Offenders are liable to a fine of £10 and to a further fine of £5 for each day on which the
. ~ ., 397
offence continues alter conviction.
This offence is in many respects similar to the offence of passing prohibited matter into
sewers or drains under the Waterworks Act 17 of 1995 analysed in segment 5.4.2 above,
and the comments and recommendations made there are arguably applicable here.
5.19.3 Making communication with public sewers
A person who wishes or who is required to have his drains or private sewers made to
communicate with a public sewer is required to give to the local authority notice of his
proposals in writing in such manner as may be pres cribed. At any time within 21 days of
the receipt thereof, the authority may by notice to him refuse to make the
communication.Y' If a notice of refusal is not served on the person, the authority is
required, with all reasonable dispatch, to cause the communication to be made by means
of a lateral drain to the public sewer. 399 It is an offence for any person (other than a
person lawfully acting on behalf of a local authority) to cause a drain or sewer to
communicate with a public sewer. 400 It is also an offence to fail to comply with or to act
in contravention of any of the provisions of section 86 of the PHA. 401 It is suggested that
397 Section 82 of the PHA.
398 The permissible grounds for refusing to make the communication are: (I) where it appears to the
authority that the mode of construction of the drain or private sewer is not in conformity with the rules in
force governing the same; and (2) where the condition of the drain or private sewer or the matter carried or
to be carried thereby is such that the making of the communication would be prejudicial to the sewerage
system of the authority: section 86(1) of the PHA.
399 The authority may make the communication in such manner as may be prescribed or as the authority
may decide, but it is not obligatory on the authority to make the communication until the estimated cost of
the work has been paid to it or security for payment has been given to its satisfaction: section 86(2) of the
PHA.
400 Section 86(6) of the PHA.
401 Section 86(6) of the PHA.
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failure to comply with or contravention of the following provisions of section 86
constitutes an offence:
(i) failure to give to the local authority notice of one's proposals in respect of the
communication with a public sewer;
(ii) failure to lay open for inspection a drain or private sewer the mode of
construction and condition of which the authority intends to examine; or
(iii) maintaining, repairing or renewing a lateral drain which is supposed to be
maintained, repaired or renewed by the authority,
The penalty for any of these offences is £20.
It is worth noting that the offences here are in many ways similar to the offences relating
to communication of drains or private sewers with public sewers provided for in section
33 of the Waterworks Act 17 of 1995 and discussed in segment 5.4.3 above. It is
instructive to read these offences together.
5.19.4 Failure to comply with notice other than by execution of works
Where it appears to a local authority that any latrines provided for or in connection with a
building are in such a state as to be prejudicial to health or to be a nuisance, but that they
can without reconstruction be put into a satisfactory condition, the authority is mandated,
by notice, to require the owner or the occupier of the building to execute such works, or
to take such steps by cleansing the latrines or otherwise, as may be necessary for that
purpose. In so far as such a notice requires a person to take any steps other than the
execution of works, he commits an offence if he fails to comply with the notice. This
offence is punishable by a fine of £5 and a further fine of £2 for each day on which the
offence continues after conviction.t'"
402 Section 92 of the PHA. This section continues to say that in any proceedings relating to this offence it is
open to the defendant to question the reasonableness of the authority's requirements, or of its decision to




From the foregoing analysis of crimes in Malawi's environmental legislation (both in the
present chapter and in chapter four) a number of observations may be made. The
presentation of these observations in the current segment will begin with general
comments and will be followed by a note on the strengths and weaknesses of criminal
sanctions. Thereafter a few concluding remarks will be made.
5.20.2 General comments
In the first place, it must be noted that the numb er of statutory provisions devoted to
criminal sanctions in the enforcement of environmental law in Malawi is not matched by
any other sanction. Malawian environm ental legislation places more reliance on the
criminal sanction than any other sanction. This reliance is expressed in two modes:
criminal penalties are applied as a prim ary sanction; and they are also applied as a
subsidiary or supporting sanction. By primary application is meant that the
environmentally prejudicial activity is proscribed directly.t'" An example is section 30 of
the National Parks and Wildlife Act 11 of 1992 which criminalizes the discarding or
depositing of any litter or waste material in a national park or wildlife reserve otherwise
than into a receptacle provided for the purpose.
Use of the criminal sanction as a subsidiary sanction occurs where 'reliance for
compliance with legislative precepts is placed primarily upon administrative control, the
criminal penalty being invoked only if and when such administrative control fails. , 404 An
403 M A Rabie , C Loots , R Lyster and M G Erasmus ' Implementation of Environmental Law' in R F Fuggle
and M A Rabie Environm ental Manag ement in South Africa 120 at 128. See also Simon Ball and Stuart
Bell Environmental Law: the Law and Policy Relating to the Protection of the Environm ent London:
Blackstone 1991 at 85 where they state: 'The criminal law can be used either to provide direct criminal
sanctions for environmental harm , or in a subsidiary and complementary role within a regulatory system. '
404 Rabie et al ibid.
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example is section 6 of the Water Resources Act 15 of 1969. This provision states that
where in the opinion of the Water Resources Board4os the use of public water for
domestic purposes at any place is causing damage to the natural resources
406
of the area
in the vicinity of that place, it may, by notice in writing served on any person making use
of the water at that place, direct that such person takes such measures as may be specified
in the notice for the purpose of avoiding or mitigating such damage.
407
Failure to comply
with the notice constitutes an offence.
Applying the criminal sanction in a subsidiary fashion has several advantages. On many
occasions it is easier to prove the commission of such offence than to prove the
commission of a substantive environmentally prejudicial activity.l'" Further, subsidiary
application allows preventative action to be taken before an environmentally prejudicial
activity occurs.409 Subsidiary application also has its disadvantages. Since the criminal
sanction in this set up rides on the back of administrative controls, its effectiveness
depends on the effective implementation or enforcement of administrative controls.l'" In
a study of institutional capacity Gracian Banda established that administrative bodies in
Malawi do not effectively enforce administrative controls.t!' It follows from this that the
'shortcomings in environmental administration ' will automatically be transferred to
criminal-law enforcement.W In addition, where an administrative body authorizes an
405 The Water Resources Board is established in terms of section 4 of the WRA. It exercises various powers
and performs various duties specified in the Act. It is subject to any special or general directions of the
Minister and the Minister may, for the better carrying out of the purposes of the Act, delegate additional
powers and duties to it: section 4 of the WRA .
406 By ' natural resources' is meant land , soil and water in their physical aspects together with the natural
vegetation associated therewith, and the normal balance between them: section 2 of the WRA.
407 Section 6(2) of the WRA.
408 Rabie et al op cit at 85.
409 Ibid.
4 10 Rabie et al op cit at 129.
411 Gracian Z Banda ' Report on Reform of Environmental Legislation in Malawi: Determining the Scope
and Need for Sectoral Reviews' 1997 (unpublished) at 93.
412 Rabie et al op cit at 129.
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environmentally detrimental activity, there is no room for 'protection by the criminal law,
even if such authorization may be highly questionable from an environmental point of
. ,413
view.
In the second place, it may be noted that the legislation analysed in the present study
makes provision for a range of penalties, fines and imprisonment being the most
common. Additional penalties include forfeiture of instrumentalities and proceeds of
environmental crime,414 surrender or revocation of authorisations.t'" destruction or
removal of any unauthorized building, structure or crop and compensation for damage
caused.t'" The maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years. Fines can go as high as
MWKl 000000.417
In the third place, it may be observed that some of the criminal offences have not been
articulated clearly and others conflict with constitutional provisions. Unclear articulation
will undoubtedly lead to difficulties in the process of interpretation. Conflicting with
constitutional provisions will lead to invalidity of the inconsistent parts of the offences.
The discussion will now focus on the strengths and weaknesses of criminal sanctions in
the enforcement of environmental law in Malawi.
413 Ibid.
414 For example this penalty is provided for under section 113(1) of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 11
of 1992.
415 For example this penalty is provided for under section 116 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 11 of
1992.
416 S c. . .
ee, ror Instance, section 74 of the Forestry Act 11 of 1997.
41 7 Theoretically a fine ~fmore tha~ t~is sum may be ordered where the Act provides that the offender may
be sentenced to a fine without specifying the maximum amount.
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5.20.3 Strengths and weaknesses of criminal sanctions
Writers have identified the strengths and weaknesses of using criminal sanctions In
environmental protection. Most of these are applicable to Malawi. One strength of the
criminal sanction is that it has a stigmatizing quality.418 Another is that it is arguably the
. h ... 41 9
only adequate remedy when it com es to serious offences WhIC ment imprisonment.
Yet another strength is familiarity.Y" State enforcement machinery in Malawi is more
familiar with the use of criminal sanctions than any other sanction. This is evident from
the number of personnel devoted to the use of criminal sanctions as compared to the
numbers devoted to the other sanctions. In every district the machinery for using criminal
sanctions is more available than the machinery for using the other sanctions.
As for the weaknesses, many have been identified but only a few will be set out here.
421
Firstly, the use of criminal sanctions is costly in terms of money, manpower and time.
422
The criminal process demands the employment of various personnel from its inception to
conclusion: police officers, prosecutors, judicial officers and correctional officials are all
involved at various stages. The criminal process also demands considerable amounts of
financial resources. The process may also take years to run its course. Secondly,
418 Michael A Kidd 'The Protection of the Environment through the Use of Criminal Sanctions: A
Comparative Analysis with Specific Reference to South Africa' unpublished PhD Thesis, University of
Natal 2002 at 263. In A P Simester and G R Sulli van Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine 2ed (Revised
2004) Oxford: Hart Publishing 2003 at 22 write: ' Even though alternative methods of regulation , if
practical, should normally be preferred to the criminal law, it is worth noting that there are sometimes
advantages in resorting to the criminal law. Unlike any other area of law, the criminal law systematically
stigmatises activities (through prohibition) and persons (through conviction and punishment. ... Sometimes
that stigmatisation is appropriate.'
419 Cf Kidd ibid.
420 Michael A Kidd 'The Protection of the Environment through the Use of Criminal Sanctions: A
Comparative Analysis with Specific Reference to South Africa' unpublished PhD Thesis, University of
Natal 2002 at 264; M A Rabie 'Legal remedies for environmental protection' (1972) V CILSA 247 at 259.
421 For a comprehensive treatment of this subject, see Michael A Kidd 'The Protection of the Environment
through the Use of Criminal Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis with Specific Reference to South Africa '
unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Natal 2002 at 264 - 276.
422 Michael Kidd 'Environmental crime - time for a rethink in South Africa?' (1998) 5 SAJELP 181 at 189'
Cheryl Loots ' Making environmental law effective ' (1994 ) 1 SAJELP 17 at 17 - 18. '
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, , '1' d kn 1 d 423environmental crimes may sometimes be complex, requmng specia ise ow e ge
which in Malawi is not generally available due to insufficient specialised officials. As a
result the investigation of environmental criminal offences is difficult. The absence of
judicial officers with expert environmental knowledge presents a further difficulty in the
process of adjudication. Thirdly, the criminal law standard of proof - proof beyond
reasonable doubt - is difficult to achieve: this weakness partly follows from the previous
one. To this may be added the difficulty of complying with the due process of law
required in criminal proceedings. Fourthly, criminal sanctions may not stop an on-going
environmentally prejudicial activity.424 Fifthly, there is little public awareness of the
threat to the environment and the public appears generally not to know what constitutes
an environmental offence. Further, policing of prohibited activities is inadequate due to
resource constraints; consequently the chances of discovery (being caught) are
minimal.425 In addition some penalties are low.
5.20.4 Concl uding Observations
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the use of criminal sanctions has more
weaknesses than strengths. This scenario begs the question whether it is necessary to use
criminal sanctions at all or to use them to the extent to which they are currently used. It
also calls for investigation into ways of optimising the use of criminal sanctions. The
answer to the first question is that it is necessary to use criminal sanctions, especially in
serious cases. It has actually been suggested that criminal sanctions should be used
sparingly and that 'rather than being invoked solely to deter, criminal sanctions should be
reserved for conduct that is clearly recognized as criminal. ,426 Another author suggests
423 Kathleen F Brickey 'Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of Environmental and
Criminal Law Theory' (1996) 71 Tulane Law Review 487 at 494 ,495 and 501. See also Judson W Starr
'Countering Environmental Crimes' (1986) 13 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 379 at
381.
424 Cf Fiona Darroch and Peter Harrison Environmental Crime London: Cameron May 1999 at 382.
425 Banda op ch at 93,
426 B . k 'ne ey op cit at 511.
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that 'criminal sanctions should be reserved for the most culpable subset of offences and
not used solely for their ability to deter. ,4 27 In the same vein it has been said in the
context of environmental wrongs that ' criminal sanctions should be reserved for the most
egregious contraventions of environmental law , with other measures being used for less
serious offences. ,428 The present researcher generally agrees with these assertions.
However, the acceptability of these assertions in the Malawi scenario depends on the
availability of the 'other measures ' for use in less serious offences. If the 'other
measures' are not viable options, the logical inference would be to allow the criminal
sanctions to continue their work, only that there may be need to reform them with a view
to strengthening them. In the next chapter the viability in Malawi of the 'other measures'
will be investigated.
427 Richard J Lazarus ' Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the Problem with
Env ironmental Crime' (1994) 27 Loyola Law Review 867 at 883 quoted in Michael Kidd 'Alternatives to
the Crim inal Sanction in the Enforcement of Environmental Law' (2002) 9 SAJELP 21 at 25. Kidd quotes
several other authors who have made similar statements.




ALTERNATIVES TO THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN MALAWI:
MYTHS AND REALITIES
6.1 Introduction
Over the years the traditional way of achieving environmental protection has been
through the use of command and control mechanisms, also called direct regulation.
Legislative prescriptions of what polluters - or potential polluters - should do or not do in
the interest of the environment have been common. Governments took upon themselves
the responsibility to police these 'dos and don 'ts'. A leading South African authority!
writes that at the apex of these command and control mechanisms are criminal sanctions.
He suggests that alternatives to command and control are self-regulatory instruments, eo-
regulatory instruments, information-based instruments and market-based or economic
instruments. He further suggests that at an instrumental level, alternatives to the criminal
sanction include administrative measures and civil measures. i The suggested alternatives
will form the outline of the inquiry in the present chapter. Generally each alternative will
be explained and a determination made as to its applicability to Malawi in its present
circumstances. The discussion assumes knowledge of the socioeconomic status of the
country as set out in Chapter 2 hereof.
I Michael Kidd 'Alternatives to the Criminal Sanction in the Enforcement of Environmental Law' (2002) 9




Sometimes known as environmental voluntarism, self-regulation is a 'strategy of
environmental governance that relies on voluntary action from the private sector."
Private enterprises develop and implement self-regulatory instruments without direct
governmental intervention with a view to maintain 'acceptance in the market place and to
develop a competitive advantage." For self-regulation to work effectively several
essentials must be in place. Jonathon Hankss has identified the following motivations as
necessary if industry is to adopt self-regulatory instruments:
(a) The threat (ultimately) ofstrict government sanction: While the emphasis of self-
regulation is principally on self-monitoring and the use of internal incentives for
enforcement, the statutory and enforcement powers of the government are
necessary as the ultimate sanction; the threat of legislation being passed as
opposed to existing regulations being enforced is itself an incentive, with
companies that are able to pre-empt legis lation often gaining a competitive
advantage.
(b) The implementation of peer pressure: This typically requires the existence of
effective sectoral organisations that have the ability to exert meaningful and
credible sanctions on their members.
(c) The technical and/or marketing benefits associated with participation in
voluntary initiatives: Examples include the marketing benefits associated with
having ISO 14001 certification and the technical assistance offered for example
3 Bruce Pardy ' Asking the Dog to Guard the Puppy Chow: Three Objections to Environmental
Voluntarism' (2003) 12 Journal ofEnvironmental Law and Practic e 129 at 130. There is a general lack of
clarity on the use of these terms: Alastair R Lucas 'Voluntary Initiatives for Greenhouse Gas Reduction:
the Legal Implications' (2000) 10 Journal ofEnvironmental Law and Practice 89 at 93.
4 Jonathon Hanks 'Achieving Industrial Sustainable Development in South Africa: What Role for 'Self-
regulatory' and 'Co-regulatory' Instruments?' (1998) 5 SAJELP 298 at 318. He continues to write that '[i]n
an environmental context, self-regulation is a strategy in terms of which companies or sectors of industry,
responding to various pressures, choose to regulate themselves by setting standards and codes of practice,
introducing monitoring programmes, achieving pollution reduction targets , and so on.'
5 Hanks op cit at 318 - 319 .
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by government or governmental agencies to participants In voluntary
programmes. For such initiatives to be of value there needs to be sufficient
technical capacity within government and/or a willingness to dedicate resources to
access such capacity.
(d) An appreciation of the direct cost-savings associated with environmental
management: Business must appreciate that there are useful cost-savings to be
achieved by implementing cleaner production programmes, as well as
acknowledge that sustainable use of resources is an essential element of
successful long-term business.
(e) The requirement to disclos e environm ental impacts: By publicising emission
levels, business leaders come to appreciate the true level of their business's
environmental impact, as a result of which they may be prompted to improve their
performance, not only to reduce newly recognised costs, but also in response to
both public and peer pressure.
(f) General public pressure: Environmental issues must receive an increasingly high
public profile, to which industries have to respond so as to avoid public loss of
confidence. In this regard an important role is played by public interest groups. To
be effective these groups should be suitably vocal, relatively well informed, and
with access to sufficient financial resources. Similarly consumers need to be able
to exercise the power of choice in their consumption patterns.
In the context of Malawi, acceptance in the market place does not depend on
environmental considerations nor do businesses develop a competitive advantage through
environmental compliance." This is principally due to the low levels of environmental
consciousness in the country. Accordingly the assertion that private enterprises would go
for self-regulation with a view to maintain ' acceptance in the market place and to develop
a competitive advantage' does not have substance in the Malawi scenario.
6 Acceptance on the international market may sometimes depend on environmental considerations and
businesses may develop a competitive advantage on the intern ational market through environmental
compliance. However, most Malawian companies or businesses do not go for the international market. As a
result there is no incentive to engage in environmental compliance on the basis of expected international
performance.
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The threat of strict government sanction referred to in motivation (a) above does not have
as much force as possibly in other countries. The private sector in Malawi has been
around for too long to be deceived about such threats. The private sector knows that
rarely does government implement such threats. To all intents and purposes such threats
are empty. So the private sector cannot be motivated to adopt self-regulation on the basis
of such threats.
Motivation (b) depends on the existence of sectoral organisations that can exert peer
pressure. Industry in Malawi does not have strong sectoral organisations that can impose
meaningful sanctions on their members. As for mot ivation (c) two observations may be
made. In the first place, marketing benefits associated with ISO 14001 certification are
minimal. Success in the local market does not depend on ISO 14001 certification; only
when companies decide to sell their products on the international market does this matter.
In fact only a few companies go for the international market with the result that there is
little interest in ISO 14001 certification. In a recent survey on ISO 14001 certification it
was found that no company had the certification.i In the second place, technical benefits
may not be significantly available. For sure , the EMA does provide for a Technical
Committee on the Environment composed of environmental professionals but it is
essentially an advisory body to government and public organisations'' and may not be
'The ISO Survey of ISO 9001 :2000 and ISO 14001 Certificates 2003'
http://halweb.uc3m.es/esp/docencia/master/CD %20IS0%20survey/surveylindustrial_sectors/countries/mal
awi.html (Accessed 22 December 2005). The survey covered the period up to 31 December 2003. This lack
of interest in ISO certification is in line with recent criticism that ISO 14001 cannot meet the environmental
needs of developing countries: see Christine Mikulich ' ISO 14000 - 14001: The Developing World's
Perspective' (2003) 17 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 117. It must further be noted that this lack of
interest is there despite measures taken by the International Organisation for Standardisation, Malawi
Bureau of Standards and Malawi 's Department of Environmen tal Affairs to encourage the use of
environmental management systems: The Nation 10 February 2003 at 5.
8 The Technical Committee on the Environment is established under sect ion 16 of the EMA. According to
section 17 of the EMA its functions are to: (a) examine any scientific issue which may be referred to it by
the Minister, the Council, the Director or any lead agenc y relating to the protection and management of the
environment and sustainable utilization of natural resources and to recommend to the Minister, the Council
or lead agency, as the case may be, such action as is necessary for achieving the purposes of the EMA; (b)
carry out investigations and conduct studie s into the scientific, social and economic aspects of any activity,
occurrence, product or substance which may be referred to the Minister, the Council, the Director or any
lead agency, and at the completion of the investigation or study, to recommend to the Minister, the Council
or lead agenc y, as the case may be, such action as is necessary for achieving the objectives of the EMA;
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available to offer much technical assistance to the private sector. Apart from the
committee, public servants may provide the technic al assistance, but not many of these
have the technical know-how. It is actually a fact of common notoriety that government
does not have sufficient technical capacity to meet its environmental challenges' All this
boils down to the inference that technical and/or marketing benefits may not attract
Malawian industry into the adoption of self-regulation.
With regard to motivation (d) it is debatable whether Malawian businesses know or
appreciate cost-savings that may be achieved by implementing cleaner production
programmes. It is, however, likely that they are aware that sustainable use of resources is
an essential element of successful long-term business; but it is arguable that the
attractiveness of immediate gain in an impoverished economy may render this awareness
of little environmental consequence. In the present economic hardships in Malawi
characterised by frequent closures of business, it is possible that in the name of survival,
businesses may plunder resources without much environmental consideration in order to
satisfy current demands .
The motivation numbered (e) has no precedent in Malawi. It is noteworthy that this
motivation is in the nature of 'naming and shaming ' (otherwise known as adverse
publicity). Such a practice is non-existent in Malawi. Even if it were to be introduced, it
is unlikely that it would have much environmental impact due to low environmental
awareness. A stronger objection, however, lies in the general lack of measuring devices
to determine emission levels. In the absenc e of such devices the bad publicity cannot be
precise and may therefore not be credible apart from being easy to counter by the
industry itself. In that kind of setup disclosure of environmental impacts may not
influence industry to adopt self-regulation.
and (c) recommend to the Council the criteria, standards and guidelines for environmental control and
regulation, inc luding the form and conten t of environmental impact assessments.
9 Gracian Z Banda and Kenyatta Nyirenda ' Study on Institutional Capacity for Efficient Enforcement of
Environmental Legislation and Convention s ' 1999 (unpublished).
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Similarly general public pressure cannot provide a sound incentive for implementing self-
regulation in Malawi. The nation does have a number of environmental public interest
groups, but many of these are not sufficiently funded. IQ They are also not adequately
vocal. In recent years there have been development projects that have been undertaken
without conducting an environmental impact assessment. This researcher is unaware of
strong advocacy against such projects from any public interest group. I I This state of
affairs must be contrasted with the kind of advocacy that has attended human rights
abuses. Public interest groups have condemned thes e and even taken legal action against
the perpetrators.V It is also debatable whether some of these organisations are well
informed about environmental matters. Perhaps the dearth of meaningful environmental
advocacy on their part may be an indication of ignorance and the consequent fear of
being caught off guard. Further, it is sheer daydreaming to think that environmental
issues in Malawi receive a high profile to which industry has to respond 'so as to avoid
public loss of confidence. ' As far as this researcher knows, there is no such a thing in
Malawi as industry incurring public loss of confidence on account of environmental
matters. Perhaps in the years to come this may be so, but certainly it is not the case now.
In addition, as one of the poorest countries in the world, with most people living below
the poverty line, consumers are unable to exercise the power of choice in their
consumption patterns. In these circumstances it is wishful thinking to suggest that general
public pressure may motivate the private sector to adopt self-regulation.
10 For instance, Greenwigs, an environmental non governmental organisation made up of lawyers, has
perpetually been cash-strapped. It is perh aps the singl e most important organisation that could take up
public interest litigation in environmental matters but it had not done so by the beginning of the year 2004
despite being in existence for many years . I have no information about the acti vities of this organisation
from the second quarter of 2004 onwards.
11 There have certainly been a few noises here and there about environmental issues but these have mostly
been of a common sense nature. For instance, it was reported in the Daily Times 20 January 2003 at 5 that
Acti ve Youth Initiati ve for Social Enhan cement had bemo aned the wanton cutting down of trees and
appealed to people to continue planting more trees.
12 For example, litigation in Registered Trustees of the Public Affairs Committ ee v Attorney General Civil
Cause No . 1861 of 2003 (unreported but copy available on http ://www.judiciary.mw when accessed in
December 2005) was spearheaded by a publi c interest organis ation , the plaintiff.
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Finally, in the context of corporations (which are by far the most significant players in
environmental degradation) two objections may be raised against the adoption of self-
regulation. Firstly, self-regulation may be inconsistent with principles of corporate
governance. In short, directors and officers of companies have no right to put
environmental protection above the best interests of the company. Certainly companies
must comply with environmental laws whatever the cost, but going beyond the law at
financial expense to the company appears to be breach of the duty to act in the best
interests of the company. 13 Secondly, there is much force in the argument that companies
are economically compelled to use environmental resources to the maximum regardless
of the damage they may occasion thereby and that they are 'unable to voluntarily protect
the environment on their own. ' 14 Bruce Pardyl'' fleshes out this argument in the following
terms:
'The tragedy of the commons reveals the choices open to contemporary
commercial enterprises operating in competitive market places. To compete, they
make maximum use of the common resources to keep their costs as low as their
competitors. They must externalise as many costs as possible, not because they
are greedy or uninformed, but because their competitors are doing the same. They
do not have the option of voluntarily reducing environmental impact in a way that
increases costs unless they are a monopoly or control a market in such a way as to
be able to dictate the price of their goods. Industrial manufacturers dispose of
effluent into waterways not because they are evil or stupid but because they must
sell their goods in the marketplace. Those goods must be offered at a competitive
price. If they incur costs to prevent the polluti on of a nearby stream, they increase
the costs of producing their products, costs which their competitors have not
experienced. Like the lone herder [who bears the costs of feeding his own
13 Pardy op cit at 132 - 135.
14 Pard y op cit at 135.
15 Pardy op cit at 136.
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animals], they price themselves out of the market and eventually cause themselves
f busi ,16to go out 0 usmess.
This argument carries a lot of weight in the Malawi scenario. Poverty is rampant and
consequently any goods that are priced even slightly higher than others in the same
category may not find a market. The struggle to keep products as cheap as possible is
therefore the rule of the game. In these circumstances it is unlikely that self-regulation
can work.
From the foregoing, it is arguable that self-regulation currently is not a viable option in
environmental protection in Malawi. Perhaps in futur e it may have the scope for
operation, but as of now the nation is not ripe for the adoption of self-regulation.
6.3 Co-regulation
Related in some ways to self-regulation. l eo-regulation has been defined as 'a form of
environmental regulation in which industry and government work in partnership to
achieve environmental protection. ' 18 On many occasions eo-regulation takes the form of
agreements between industry and government. In the words of Michael Kidd: 'A eo-
regulatory approach involves an interactive relationship, typically an agreement or
covenant between the regulator and the regulated. In this situation, the overall policy
objectives are set by the regulator whilst the details are subject to negotiated agreement
16 Phillip A Wellner 'Effective Compliance Programs and Corporate Criminal Prosecutions' (2005) 27
Cardozo Law Review 497 observes that companies may sometimes implement less-than-ideal internal
environmental compliance programs as a form of window-dressing. In some companies the inclination to
implement even such despicable programs may not be there ; they may simply do nothing positive about
environmental matters.
17 Jody Freeman 'Collaborative Governance in the Administrati ve State' (1997) 45 University ofCalifornia
Law Review 1 at 33 (footnote 84) writes that ' [e]ven ostensibly "self-regulatory" regimes can be viewed as
coregulatory because they emerge in the context of govern ment regulation and rely on government
inter vention when the system breaks down .' Hanks op cit at 319 - 320 appears to be of a similar view when
he writes: 'The issue of free-riding also emphasises the continuing important role of public intervention as
a means of increasing the incentive of firms to comply with any voluntary commitments, and arguably thus
confirms the role of "eo-regulation" as an option that may be of wider and more significant application .'
18 Mikulich op cit at 119.
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between the two parties.' 19 Some authors refer to these agreements as voluntary
environmental agreements (VEAs) 20 while others call them negotiated environmental
agreements (NEAs).21 A further search in the literatu re may reveal more names, but these
names do not add anything of value to the substance of the agreements. According to
John Moffet and Francois Bregha22 the substance of the agreements may be along the
following lines:
• Negotiated compliance or negotiated performance: The agreements may describe
how participants will comply with existing regulatory obligations (negotiated
compliance) or may address as yet unregulated issues (negotiated performance).
• Retroactive or proactive practice: Some agreements address past practice e.g. by
stipulating terms for the resolution of historic contamination problems. Others
deal with obligations to prevent, minimise or reduce the environmental impacts of
on-going and future activities.
• Statutory or non-statutory: The agreement may be codified in legislation.
Otherwise the agreement would be a private law agreement governed by the
general rules of contract law.
• Binding or non-binding: Some agreements Impose only general obligations
regarding environmental objectives without indicating what specific action must
be taken and when, how performance will be measured, or what might occur in
the event of non-performance. Increasingly, however, agreements are designed to
impose binding legal obligations related to clearly defined targets.
• Pre-established goals or negotiable goals: Some agreements are predicated on pre-
established objectives. In other cases the objective of the agreement is negotiated
as part of the agreement.
19 Kidd op cit at 29. A slightly different view on the setting of policy objectives is expressed by other
writers: see the discussion in the text on the substance of the agreements.
20 John Moffet and Francois Bregha 'An Overview of Issues with respect to Voluntary Environmental
Agreements ' (1998) 8 Journal ofEnvironmental Law and Practice 63.
21 Hanks op cit.
22 Moffet and Bregha op cit at 72 - 74.
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• Extent of third party involvement: The role of third parties in the agreements
varies from non-existent to that of key instigator of, and party to, the final
agreement. Some agreements do not include community representatives either in
the negotiations or as parties to the final agreement. Other agreements involve
government, industry and the public.
Co-regulation may benefit both industry and government. Benefits that accrue to industry
include an improved public image, increased regulatory certainty, a new relationship with
government in which they are treated as equals and reduced costs as a result of the
increased flexibility in terms of how and when to address an issuc.v' Benefits to
government include the opportunity to avoid a protracted regulatory development
process, more and better information about the precise nature of the problem, and the
assumption by industry of ownership of the problem, which can result in a more
proactive approach and reduced enforcement costs."
The feasibility of eo-regulation in a particular jurisdiction depends on a number of
factors. Jonathon Hanks25 lists the following as some of the necessary institutional
factors:
(i) Sufficient business and government motivation to use the agreements
(ii) Mutual trust between the partners and other key stakeholders
(iii) High level of political, industrial and social environmental awareness
(iv) Access to adequate baseline data for setting targets
(v) Sufficient ability to control free-riders: credible threat of legal and/or fiscal
sanctions; proactive, well-structured sectoral organisations; active and sufficiently
resourced public interest groups; and existence of consumer pressures.
23 Moffet and Bregha op cit at 74. See also Freeman op cit at 22 - 33.
24 Moffet and Bregha op cit at 75. See also Freeman op cit at 22 - 33.
25 Hanks op cit at 331 - 335. The listing is restricted to institutional factors. Procedural factors have been
omitted .
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(vi) Positive incentive to participate: availability of information and technical
assistance
(vii) Availability of pre-determined goals, preferably as part of a national strategy for
sustainability
(viii) Clarity regarding the costs and financial benefits associated with developing and
administering agreements.
(ix) Existence of credible verification system, including prOVISIon of technical
assistance and mediation service.
(x) Ability to integrate technology innovation requirements with other policy
objectives.
Factors numbered (iii), (v) and (vi) have been dealt with above when considering the
essentials for adopting and implementing self-regulatory instruments. It was argued or
shown that the level of environmental awareness in Malawi is low; that the threat of legal
sanctions is empty or at best weak; that there were no strong sectoral organisations that
could impose meaningful sanctions; that active and sufficiently resourced public interest
groups were generally absent; that consumer pressures were non-existent and that
technical assistance was unlikely to come from government due to severe resource
constraints. These arguments or findings apply with equal force to eo-regulation, The
effect of this is that the factors numbered (iii), (v) and (vi) are generally not available in
Malawi to support the use of eo-regulation in environmental protection.
With regard to factor (i) there are no solid indications of general government motivation
to use agreements in environmental protection in Malawi. The EMA does not expressly
authorise government to enter into such agreements, but it is arguable that government
may enter into such agreements on the basis that they are 'measures [which] are
necessary for preventing the unsustainable use of natural resources and controlling the
generation of pollutants' as provided for under section 31(b) of the EMA. Two sectoral
statutes make provision for the use of agreements. The Forestry Act 11 of 1997 allows
the Director of Forestry to enter into a forest management agreement with a management
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authority in the interest of the proper management of village forest areas.i" The definition
of 'management authority' in the statute arguably excludes industry as the whole scheme
of the forest management agreement is meant to benefit the village communities and not
industry and so industry may not be inclined to act as a management authority.f ' The
Forestry Act also provides for forest plantation agreements. It states that the Minister may
authorise the Director of Forestry to enter into a forest plantation agreement with any
non-governmental organisation or community who may wish to plant trees in forest
reserves, public land, customary land and private land. The purpose of the forest
plantation agreement is to promote tree growing in the specified areas by government,
non-governmental organisations and the community.Y Industry is conspicuously omitted
from the list of possible parties to the forest plantation agreement. The last type of
agreement provided for in the Forestry Act is an international agreement on forestry to
which Malawi is a party" Industry is generally not a party to such international
agreements.
The other sectoral statute that makes prOVISIon for agreements is the Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997. It permits the Director of Fisheries to
26 According to section 31(1) of the Forestry Act 11 of 1997 the forest management agreement may provide
for: (a) the specifications of the nature of the forestry and other practices to be followed; (b) the assistance
to be provided by the Department of Forestry and provision for use and disposition of the produce and
revenue therefrom; (c) allocation of land to individuals or families for afforestation and revocation of such
allocation if applicable provisions of the agreement are not adhered to by the occupier of the land so
allocated; and (d) formation of village natural resources man agement committees for the purposes of
managing and utilising village forest areas. Section 31(2) suggests that such agreement may also provide
for the performance of obligations in favour of third parties.
27 Section 2 of the Forestry Act 11 of 1997 defines 'management authority' in relation to a village forest
area as a person designated as the management authority pursuant to the agreement establishing the village
forest area. And section 30 of the Act states that any village headman may, with the advice of the Director
of Forestry, demarcate on unallocated customary land a village forest area which shall be protected and
managed in the prescribed manner for the benefit of that village community.
28 Sections 35 and 36 of the Forestry Act 11 of 1997. According to section 36, the forest plantation
agreement is required to: (a) provide for the obligation to grow and manage tree species as specified in the
agreement and in accordance with the plantations management plan which shall be approved by the
Director of Forestry; (b) convey the right to harvest the forest plantation in accordance with the terms of the
agreement; (c) provide for advice and assistance from the Department of Forestry in growing and managing
the plantations; and (d) specify obligations of each of the parties to the agreement.
29 Section 80 of the Forestry Act 11 of 1997.
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conclude a fisheries management agreement with a fisheries management authority with
a view to facilitate local community participation in the conservation and management of
fisheries. 3o By 'fisheries management authority' is meant a local community organisation
established for the purposes of promoting local participation in the conservation and
management of fisheries.,31 Arguably industry is not included in this meaning of fisheries
management authority for industry is not established for such purposes. The Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act also provides for international agreements on
fisheries access with foreign states.
From the foregoing description of the kind of agreements specified in current
environmental legislation in Malawi, it is arguable that government has not displayed any
interest in concluding environmental agreements with industry (business). The
indications so far are that government is willing to enter into agreements with community
folk and non-governmental organisations in respect of forestry and fisheries. Such
willingness is evidently narrow in scope and half hearted. Consequently it is foolhardy to
suggest on the basis of such willingness that generally there is sufficient government
motivation to use agreements in environmental protection. The only safe conclusion is
that there is insufficient government motivation to use agreements.
There is still one more aspect of factor numbered (i) that must be dealt with: the question
whether there is sufficient business motivation to use agreements. In the absence of
relevant evidence it is difficult to hazard any conclusions on this question. However, if it
is assumed that such business motivation does exist, factor (i) will still be absent in
Malawi because its second half (government motivation) is missing. In the premises, it
may be concluded that there is insufficient 'business and government motivation' to use
agreements in environmental protection.
30 Sections 7 and 8 of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997. Section 8(1) states that
the fisheries management agreement may provide for a management plan and the assistance to be provided
by the Department of Fisheries.
3 1 Section 2 of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997.
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As for factor (ii), it is doubtful that there is mutual trust between government and
industry. One way in which trust may be drummed up is where there is a display of
honesty in respect of wrongs committed. In this regard, it may be observed that a number
of urban rivers have been polluted by industry but there has generally been no admission
on the part of industry as to the companies responsible. Even in other environmental
sectors industry has not come in the open regarding its adverse environmental activities.
In these circumstances it is unlikely that government may trust industry in environmental
matters.
Access to adequate baseline data for setting targets (factor iv) is arguably an area of
weakness.Y In Malawian environmental circles there is no laudable history of
environmental monitoring and reporting. Accordingly, adequate baseline data is not
available for setting targets. The position is different when it comes to the availability of
predetermined goals (factor vii). In the year 2004 the government adopted the Malawi
National Strategy for Sustainable Development, which may be used as the predetermined
goals necessary for the operation of environmental agreements.
On the issue of costs and financial benefits associated with developing and administering
agreements (factor viii), there is no relevant experience or data in Malawi. Experiences in
other countries suggest that negotiating, implementing, monitoring and reporting on
agreements are costly. The costs have been found to be particularly onerous for small and
medium sized enterprises. As a result small and medium sized enterprises are not keen to
take advantage of the benefits offered by such agreements.r' It is unlikely that Malawi's
small and medium sized enterprises will be in a better position: a boycott of these
agreements is more likely.
With regard to the existence of a credible verification system (factor ix) this requires an
independent body that can conduct regular audits, authenticate reports, give technical
32 Cf Hanks op cit at 334.
33 Moffet and Bregha op cit at 78 - 79.
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assistance and/or provide mediation services.34 In Malawi such an independent body is
non-existent. During the process of enacting the EMA , a suggestion was made to create
an Environmental Protection Agency, an indep endent statutory corporation. The
suggestion was shot down on the basis that there was no guarantee that public bodies and
sectoral government departments would compl y more with the directives of a statutory
corporation than with a government department like the Department of Environmental
Affairs. The suggestion was also rejected on the premiss that it was not desirable as a
nation to create more statutory bodies.f In agreements entered into between government
and industry, it is unacceptable that the work of such an independent body be performed
by one of the contracting parties. All this leads to the inference that in Malawi there is no
credible verification system necessary for the operation of eo-regulatory instruments.
Finally, the operation of environmental agreements requires the existence of an ability to
integrate technology innovation requirements with other policy objectives (factor x).
Hanks states that this may be achieved by the appointment of a lead agent for ensuring
more effective coordination of the activities of various government departments and that
this may also be facilitated by the adoption of well considered and integrated national
objectives as part of national environmental strategi es and action plans.i" It is arguable
that this factor is present in the Malawi scenario: the Department of Environmental
Affairs may undertake coordinating duties and the National Strategy for Sustainable
Development 2004 and the National Environmental Actio n Plan 1994 appear to have the
necessary national objectives.
Having considered all the factors listed above , it may be observed that most of the factors
are absent in Malawi. It is therefore concluded that eo-regulation cannot operate in
Malawi at present. Accordingly, eo-regulation is not available as a viable strategy in
environmental protection in Malawi 's current circumstances.
34 Hanks op cit at 334.
35 Banda and Nyirenda op cit at 20 - 21.
36 Hanks op cit at 334.
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6.4 Information-based instruments
At the heart of information-based instruments are education and training. They are
measures taken to deal with ignorance and increase awareness of environmental matters.
Examples are 'technical assistance programmes, advertising, eco-Iabelling, performance
reporting, group empowerment programmes and small business incentive schemes. ,37
Technical assistance programmes and group empowerment programmes may not be
implemented successfully in Malawi in the short term due to the non-availability of
sufficient technical know-how and resources in government. Similarly eco-Iabelling may
not be a success on account of the low levels of environmental awareness and the general
absence of consumer choice in consumption patterns. Performance reporting is currently
not feasible: if it is done by industry itself, it will face challenges similar to those
encountered by self-regulation. If it is done by government, resource constraints will
prevent meaningful implementation. A different picture emerges when considering
advertising. Many types of advertising are simple to implement and the government has
not had great difficulty in carrying them out.38
Although information-based instruments may be used in respect of companies of all
sizes, empirical evidence suggests that they are crucial when handling small and medium
enterprises (SMEs).39 This is so because most SMEs do not have in-house resources and
inspiration to surmount the environmental challenges they meet. 40 Ignorance is a common
explanation for poor performance in SMEs - SMEs are not aware of many financially
attractive opportunities for environmental improvements; they underestimate the impact
37 Hanks op cit at 309 - 310.
38 In the Daily Times 20 January 2003 at 3 it is reported that Hon Harry Thomson, the then Minister of
Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs, had on Thursday 16 January 2003 officially launched the
"Save the Chambo Awareness Campaign" with a view to saving the chambo fish in Lake Malawi. Chambo
is Malawi 's trademark fish .
39 Neil Gunningham ' Regulating Small and Medium Sized Enterprises ' (2002) 14 Journal of
Environmental Law 3 at 6.
40 Ibid.
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of their activities on the environment and have a narrow view of the connection between
business performance and the environment.41 According to Neil Gunningham42 the
following are critical issues for successful implementation of information-based
instruments in respect of SMEs:
(1) Capitalising on win-win solutions: As a starting point, information dissemination
and education should focus on those circum stances in which good environmental
practice can also be good business pract ice.
(2) Developing industry-government partnerships: Engaging industry in developing
cleaner production strategies tailored to the industry' s circumstances generates
ownership, thus increasing awareness and the level of commitment to their
implementation.
(3) Developing codes of practice: SMEs often require specific guidance on what is
required of them. Codes of practice provide the practical guidance SMEs need on
how to achieve compliance and they may also promote appropriate cleaner
production benchmarks within an industrial sector.
(4) Exploiting third party leverage: Most SMEs have frequent interaction with
professionals (banks, lawyers, insurance companies) and larger companies along
the supply chain, and rely on them as credibl e sources of information. Such
professionals may be used to disseminate information and to exert pressure on
SMEs to pursue opportunities for using environmental improvements to achieve
greater business success. Larger companies may Impose environmental
management system (EMS) requirements.
(5) Integration with other strategies: information and education cannot be relied upon
in isolation. They must be seen as one component of a broader, integrated
preventative strategy.
41 Gunningham op cit at 5 - 6.
42 Gunningham op cit at 6 - 7.
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Most of these issues seem not to present severe feasib ility difficulties in the Malawi
scenario. The only one that may raise problems is the exploitation of third party leverage.
The professionals may not be willing to disseminate the information in the absence of
sanctions or incentives. Similarly the larger companies may not impose the EMS
requirements in the absence of sanctions or incentives . These problems are arguably
addressed by the requirement of integration with other strategies (issue numbered 5).
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that some information-based instruments are
usable in Malawi 's present circumstances while others are not. It is the latter which are
more in number.
6.5 Market-based Instruments (Market Mechanisms)
6.5.1 General
By definition43 market mechanisms are ' economic instruments aimed at implementing
and enforcing environmental objectives. ,44 Economic instruments, as defined by the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), are instruments that
affect costs and benefits of alternative actions open to economic agents, with the effect of
influencing behaviour in a way favourable to the environment.Y In a similar vein, Ball
and Bell define market mechanisms as ' all approaches which seek to use prices or
economic incentives and deterrents to achieve environmental objectives. This could be
done, for example, by encouraging pricing systems that signal the true environmental
43 This is just a working definition. The re appears to be no universally agreed definition of 'market
mechanism' .
44 Klaus Bosselmann and Benjamin J Richardson ' Introduction: New Challenges for Environmental Law
and Policy' in Klaus Bosselmann and Benjamin J Richardson (eds) Environm ental Justice and Market
Mechanisms: Key Challenges f or Environmental Law and Policy The Hague: Kluwer Law International
1999 1 at 5.
45 GECD Environmental Policy: How to Apply Econom ic Instrum ents Paris: GECD 1991 at 10;
Bosselmann and Richardson op cit at 7.
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costs of products to consumers, thereby making environment-friendly items cheaper than
those that pollute or waste natural resources. ,4 6
Market mechanisms are of different types and their content is not entirely clear as is
evident from the many formulations that have been put forward.Y Nevertheless, their
core elements are fairly settled. These instruments seek to reduce the costs of
environmental protection and they generate incentives for continued environmental
improvement and technological innovation; give more flexibility and thereby promote a
broader range of responses from producers and consumers; provide a source of
government revenue; and promote directly the economically efficient allocation of scarce
resources.48
Market mechanisms are not entirely divorced from government direct regulation. Some
of them cannot stand or operate on their own: they need government facilitation. Further,
government retains its role of designing and enforcing environmental standards that can
be used as the operating medium for the market mechanisms. Since the change from
command and control approaches may alter the distribution of the costs and benefits of
environmental protection, government may intervene to make such change more
politically acceptable and address social justice and intra-generational equity issues.49
The continued governmental participation may legitimately be regarded as a new form of
environmental direct re-regulation.50
46 S Ball and S Bell Environmental Law: the Law and Policy Relating to the Protection ofthe Environment
2ed London: Blackstone 1994 at 92.
47 This point is borne out when one compares the exposition of Ball and Bell op cit at 92 - 97 with that of R
Stauth and P Baskind 'Resource Economics ' in R F Fugg1e and M A Rabie Environmental Management in
South Africa Cape Town: Juta 199226 at 40 - 45.
48Bosse1mann and Richardson op cit at 7 - 8; Hanks op cit at 316 - 317.
49Bosse1mann and Richardson op cit at 2, 12 and 13.
50Cf Bosselmann and Richardson op cit at 4.
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In the following paragraphs a number of market mechanisms will be discussed in the
context of Malawi.
6.5.2 Marketable permits (Tradeable rights)
Different expositors offer slightly different views regarding what marketable permits or
tradeable rights are. For present purposes, the OECD's elaboration is adopted:
'Marketable permits are quotas, allowances or ceilings on pollution emISSIOn
levels of specified polluters that, once allocated by the appropriate authority, can
be traded subject to a set of prescribed rules. Hence, marketable permits provide
an incentive for dischargers releasing less pollution than their limits allow, to
trade the differences between actual discharges and allowable discharges to other
dischargers which then have the right to release more than allowed by initial
limits. Under different approaches, these trades can take place within a plant,
within a firm, among different firms, or possibly between countries. The objective
is to reach the overall pollution ceiling with maximum efficiency. Equally,
marketable permits can be used as a device to encourage efficient use of natural
resources such as scarce water supplies. , 51
Essentially, therefore, marketable permits are dealings in pollution rights. Industries are
not banned from engaging in polluting activity but are given a recognizable quasi-
property right to pollute. They can pollute as much as they want as long as they are
within the pollution emission quota allocated to them. The first thing to be done for the
mechanism to come into operation is for the relevant authority to decide the
environmental quality it seeks to achieve. For instance, the Minister of Environmental
Affairs in Malawi may determine the total amount of allowable discharge of pollutants
into the atmosphere for Lilongwe. Thereafter, he may issue permits to the industries in
51 GECD Doe. C (90) 177/FINAL (hereinafter 'GECD Doe ') reprinted in P Sands, R G Tarasofsky and M
Weiss (eds) Documents in International Environmental Law Manchester: Manchester University Press
1994 at 1185 -1197.
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the district, allowing them to discharge pollutants of a specified amount. If one
company's emissions are lower than the specified amount, the industry may sell the
unused part of the quota to an incoming company or the old establishments that need
more room for pollution. By restricting the available emissions, prices would be driven
up and this would compel the major polluting companies to reduce emissions or develop
or acquire less polluting technologies.52
As the GEeD statement above indicates, the strength of marketable permits lies in
encouraging polluters to reduce their emissions of pollutants with a view to profiting
from the sale of the unused part of their quotas. In doing so, environmental protection is
achieved at 'minimum cost to society. Marketable permits are therefore economically
efficient, and they are equitable because the polluter pays for the damage he causes' and
'they generate revenue for, rather than deplete the resources of the environmental
authority.Y' In these days of economic hardship, such generation of income is an
attraction especially to countries like Malawi.
However, marketable permits have several weaknesses. In the first place, the distribution
of emissions may cause unacceptable risks to individuals where there are concentrations
of emissions in one place, the so called 'hot spots.,54 Secondly, tradeable permits
'abandon the dynamic component of the precautionary principle, in that they do not
provide for a permanent or periodic stiffening of performance requirements according to
best available technology. ,55Thirdly , it may not be easy to establish the market in the first
place: the founding distribution of permits may be shrouded in controversy and politics.
There may even be opposition from existing and aspiring polluters.i'' Fourthly, there is
52Ball and Bell op cit at 96.
53Stauth and Baskind op cit at 43.
54 E Rehbinder 'States Between Deregulation and Environmental Responsibility' in Bosselmann and
Richardson op cit 93 at 98.
55 Ibid; S E Gaines and RA Westin (eds) Taxation for Environmental Protection : A Multinational Legal Study New
York: Quorum 199 1 at 6.
56 Stauth and Baskind op cit at 44 .
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danger that the big players in industry may buy up marketable permits in order to put
competitors out of business or prevent new establishments in the relevant category from
h . 57mus roornmg.
In the context of Malawi, marketable permits may not work effectively at present, the
reason being that they need a lot of information about the receiving environment and the
levels of pollution acceptable. This information is generally not available and therefore
the operation of marketable permits may not be effective. Further, it is unlikely that an
efficient market will develop because of the small size of Malawi's industrial and
commercial sectors.58
6.5.3 Pollution charges (Emission or environmental charges)
Pollution charges, also known as emission charges or environmental charges, are
payments on the emission of pollutants into air or water or onto or into soil and on the
generation of noise. 59 Their basis of calculation is quantity and type of pollutant emitted.
Their objective is to internalise the externalities of an activity: the environmental costs of
an activity are taken into account. Society is not left to bear directly the costs of
pollution.l"
The GEeD advises that in choosing what econormc instruments to apply, pollution
charges can be given particular consideration for stationary pollution sources and where
marginal abatement costs vary across polluters (the wider the variation, the greater the
cost-saving potentialj.?'
57 Ibid; Gaines and Westin op cit at 6.
58 Cf Stauth and Baskind op cit at 44 who make a similar point in respect of South Africa.
59 OECD Doe op cit Annex paragraph 2.
6°Ball and Bell op cit at 94; Stauth and Baskind op cit at 42 .
610 ECD Doe op cit Annex paragraph 10.
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A number of advantages attach to the use of pollution charges as a tool of environmental
protection policy. In the first place , they are equitable: in line with that fundamental tenet
in pollution control - the polluter pays principle - those responsible for pollution are made
to pay according to the extent to which they contribute to environmental degradation.
Unlike command and control approaches, which permit pollution at no cost to the point
that the regulatory standard applies, pollution charges have the potential of ensuring that
the full cost of pollution is realized. 62
Secondly, Stauth and Baskind show that pollution charges lead to an economically more
efficient outcome than does direct regulation. They articulate their case in the following
terms:
'Those polluters for whom the cost of pollution is lowest will be the first to limit
their discharges, while those for whom the costs are greater - more than the
charge - will elect to pay the charge. This ensures that a certain amount of control
will be achieved at least cost to society, so freeing resources to satisfy other needs
in the country. Conversely, regulations interfere directly in the internal operations
of the acting party. Control becomes mandatory and in some instances the
necessary equipment is specified - there is no distinction in terms of the relative
costs of control. The envisaged amount of contro l will therefore not be achieved
at minimum cost to the society.,63
Thirdly, pollution charges provide flexibility to polluters. They encourage polluters to
find ways and means of reducing their emissions so that their cost burden may be
lightened. In searching for those ways and means, they may develop new technologies at
their own cost, thus contributing to environmentally beneficial technological
advancement.64




In spite of these strengths, pollution charges have weaknesses. They are open to
opposition from concerned persons especially in the initial stages 'since a previously
'free' activity now carries a cost. , 65 However, they may be welcomed by society in
general and the State. Secondly, pollution charges fix an artificial price on pollution and
it may not be clear from the beginning that the fixed price will influence the behaviour of
polluters. So several reviews of the price may be necessary before the charge achieves the
desired goal. In effecting the adjustments the State may have to incur expense.i"
Just like the tradeable permits, the operation of pollution charges in Malawi will meet the
difficulty of lack of relevant information on the receiving environment. This information
is necessary for the State Authority responsible to set the appropriate charges. Further,
many people in Malawi live below the poverty line. Since the internalization of
environmental costs is likely to cause industry to increase consumer prices in the age old
tradition of passing on costs, the operation of pollution charges is likely to increase the
hardship of the people. The price increases may also result in fall of demand which may
ultimately lead to shrinking of the industry and consequent unemployment."
6.5.4 Subsidies (Financial assistance)
The gist of subsidies is the provision of financial aid to polluters as an incentive to reduce
pollution or to resource users as a way of encouraging sustainable use and management
of scarce resources.f In the area of pollution control, subsidies, with few exceptions."
offend the polluter pays principle. They do not ensure that there is no increase in
65 Ibid.
66Cf Rehbinder op cit at 100.
67Stauth and Baskind op cit at 46.
68 Ball and Bell op cit at 95 state that subsidies must be used with care. Some subsidies on forestry and
agriculture in England have been accused of having detrimental environmental effects because of their
inability to choose between beneficial and non-beneficial projects.
69 GECD states that in a few specific cases, financial assistance may not offend the polluter pays principle,
~or example, when in compliance with the exceptions to the principle as defined by GECD or when applied
In the framework of appropriately designed redistributive charging systems: GECD Doe op cit Annex.
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pollution when the cost of pollution equals the subsidy. It is also possible that parties who
see the possibility of receiving a subsidy may increase pollution with a view to getting it.
After receiving the subsidy, they may use it to maximise profits and in so doing they may
attract others into the polluting activity.i" Further, the funds to be used in the operation of
the subsidies may be obtained from the general fiscus. With the highlighted defects of
subsidies in mind - especially the possibility of increasing pollution - using money from
the general fiscus may result in the public financing their own destruction and the
prejudice of future generations.
Malawi, as a Third World country, is in econormc CrISIS. Its economy depends on
developed countries for investments, trade, finance and technology. I' Former State
President Bakili Muluzi declared in public on numerous occasions that he would continue
begging from the rich countries . Far from being a prophet of doom, Muluzi
acknowledged that faced with a steadily crumbling tobacco crop (the principal foreign
exchange earner) and a global anti-smoking campaign, there was little else he could do in
the short term. The Structural Adjustment Programme, forced on the government by the
International Monetary Fund, compelled the removal of almost every subsidy: not even
the keystone subsidy on fertilizer was spared, making this all-important commodity in an
agrarian economy inaccessible to the many. It was only recently that the current
administration of Dr Bingu wa Mutharika has brought back a limited subsidy on fertiliser.
On this background it is sheer folly to suggest that environmental subsidies be
introduced. They are simply unworkable. The Environmental Fund72 established under
70 Stauth and Baskind op cit at 43.
71 Anon Third World: Development or Crisis? Third World Network and Consumers' Association of
Penang 1985 at 15 -16.
72 The Fund has the potential of being used to finance environmental subsidies. According to section 56 of
the EMA the objects of the Fund are the protection and management of the environment and the
conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources. Section 57(c) of the Act provides that the
Fund may be applied, inter alia , to the cost of any scheme which the Minister considers to be in the interest
of the protection and management of the environment and the sustainable utilization of natural resources.
Section 57(e) allows the Fund to be applied to any purpose which the Minister considers to be in the
interest of the objects of the Fund. It is arguable that these provisions pave the way for the use of the Fund
as a source of environmental subsidies. However, this possibility is ruled out by current state policy as
expounded in the text.
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section 53 of the Environment Management Act 1996 is unlikely to be used for such
purposes. Actually, the Fund is at present a mere paper guarantee.
6.5.5 Environmental bonds
Even though the underlying logic behind environmental bonds and deposit refund
schemes may be the same,73 the former is more complicated and markedly different from
the latter, meriting separate treatment. The latter shall therefore be considered in the next
segment.
An environmental bond is a sum of money ' equal in value to the best estimate of
potential environmental damage in the future,' that is posted by an acting party with
government authorities in an interest-bearing account. The posting is done before
embarking on the proposed activity. If the activity is carried out and there are no
significant negative environmental effects needing rehabilitation, the bond and interest
are paid back to the party. On the other hand, if the potential environmental damage
occurs, the money is used for rehabilitation. In environmental protection terms, it is said
that the hope of getting back the bond is attractive to the acting party and acts as an
incentive to him to adopt environmentally friendly measures to avoid any damage. These
measures may include the development of cost-effective and innovative technologies. i"
Stauth and Baskind suggest that the use of this economic instrument is suitable where the
environmental consequences of production and consumption activities are uncertain or
unknown in advance."
Environmental bonds may stifle development if the bond is set at too high an amount in
the sense that companies not able to pay the bond may not proceed with development
projects. This concern makes more sense in the case of Malawi because of the




underdevelopment of the country. Every possible measure must be taken to encourage
development.76
One major difficulty which the operation of environmental bonds may meet is
government's delay in paying money. It is not uncommon for government to delay for
many years the disbursement of funds to successful litigants against the State. If this
delay occurs in the arena of environmental bonds, potential investors may be unwilling to
post bonds with the government for fear that they may not get back their money in time
or at all. This aside, environmental bonds have room for operation in Malawi: they do not
require any funds from the government and section 3(1) of the Environment Management
Act 1996 requires every person to take measures to protect the environment (which, it
may be observed, a person may do by posting an environmental bond).
6.5.6 Deposit refund systems
In a deposit refund system 'a deposit is paid on the acquisition of potentially polluting
products. When pollution is avoided by returning the products or their residuals, a refund
follows. ,77 The refund acts as an incentive for the return of the products or residuals. The
advantage is that if the purchaser carelessly discards them , some one else is likely to pick
them up and return them to the seller for the refund. Thus, there is some kind of double
protection. This economic instrument is suitable for products or substances which can be
reused, recycled or which should be returned for destruction. OEeD advises that since
some deposit refund schemes may be expensive and complicated to operate, it is
important that products be easy to identify and to handle and that users and consumers
should also be willing to participate in the schcme.i''
76 Environmental bonds are unlikely to offend development in Malawi if they are reasonable in amount.
770 ECD Doe op eit Annex paragraph 6.
78 OECD Doe op eit Annex paragraph 10.
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The usefulness of deposit refund systems in environmental protection was accepted by
the European Court of Justice in EC Commission v Denmark79 ('the Danish Bottles
Case'). The EC Commission impugned the operation in Denmark of a deposit and refund
scheme on beverage containers. In delivering its judgment, the Court stated that a deposit
and return system for empty containers was an indispensable element of a system
intended to ensure the reuse of containers and was necessary to achieve the objective of
environmental protection.
Bohm8o demonstrates that deposit refund systems may provide the same economic
incentives as subsidies and taxes and at the same time avoid some of the weaknesses of
these economic instruments. Some of the strengths of deposit refund schemes he lists are
the following:
• In a deposit refund system the owner of a commodity has an incentive to prove
that the commodity has not been disposed of in an improper fashion; in alternative
systems the owner may have an incentive to hide the fact that it has been
disposed of in an improper fashion.
• In some cases it is simpler and less expensive to administer deposit refund
systems in which one is paid for choosing a certain kind of activity or disposal
than in systems in which one has to pay for alternative kinds of activity or
disposal.
• By paying a deposit or by being told about the refund prospect by the seller as a
sales argument, the buyer or user is informed about the conditional refund and
thus about (maximum) liability; making similar information available and
effective is usually quite costly under alternative systems.
• The collection costs in deposit refund systems may in some cases be lower than
the corresponding costs under a regulatory system or a system of charges that, to
79 [1989] ECR 4627 Judgment of 20 September 1988 reprinted in Sands et al op cit at 1234 et seq.
80 P Bohm 'Deposit-Refund Systems: Theory and Applications to Environmental, Conservation and
Consumer Policy' in Richard L Revesz (ed) Foundations of Environmental Law and Policy London:
Oxford University Press 1997 141 at 142 - 143.
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be effective, may require extensive checking operations, prosecution and so on.
• Deposit refund systems tend to leave the budget intact to the extent that refunds
approach the volume of deposits.
Deposit refund systems are not without their weaknesses. They have the tendency to raise
commodity prices. This may affect adversely people living at or below the poverty line. 81
However, it may be noted that the commodities on which they are often used are not
necessities of life and therefore the impact on the poor is minimal. Further, they may fail
to influence environmentally friendly behaviour on the part of people in the high income
bracket since the refund is negligible to them.
In the context of Malawi the system has been used in the beverage bottle industry. Since
the simpler forms of deposit refund systems operate without government intervention in
any way and if experiences so far are anything to go by, their continued success as tools
of environmental protection is guaranteed.
6.5.7 Environmental taxes (Eco-taxes)
Environmental taxes are of the same genus as pollution (environmental) charges.
However, the latter are distinct from the former in that they do not have to be in the
nature of a tax (as understood in common parlance) to qual ify as economic instruments in
environmental protection policy. Some writers treat environmental taxes and pollution
charges together as falling under the umbrella of fiscal measures or incentives.Y For
present purposes, they are treated separately: poll ution charges have already been
considered above and this section dwells on environmental taxes.
81S ohm op cit at 144.
82 Gaines and Westin op cit at 7 - 10; Paul G W Henderson ' Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection
- Introduction' (1994) 1 SAJELP 49 at 49 - 50.
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Henderson has identified the objectives that underlie environmental taxes. 83 First,
environmental taxes cure market failures caused by the presence of externalities. As
noted earlier on, micro-economic theory does not include the environmental costs of
production in the commodity price. The producer does not pay for the air and water
pollution he causes in the process of production. In order to correct this failure in the
market, a tax is imposed to internalise the environmental costs. A second objective of
environmental taxes is to influence economic behaviour to promote environmental goals.
A tax may be levied on products that are harmful to the environment when used in
production processes, consumed or disposed of. If the tax is of a significant amount, it
will lead to an increase in the product's price. This will cause a fall in demand (if demand
is not inelastic) and trigger reduction in production. In this way the environment is
protected. An example of an environmental tax in this realm is a tax on
chlorofluorocarbons and other ozone depleting substances.
Thirdly, environmental taxes may raise revenue to finance environmental expenditure.
Bubna-Litic and de Leeuw appear to suggest another objective. They contend that eco-
taxes must be introduced to subsidize those industries that are developing more
sustainable practices and products; and that such subsidies will create 'care for our
environment. ,84 It is submitted that on a proper assessment, this suggestion is merely an
extension of the objective of raising revenue to meet environmental expenditure.
In light of the foregoing, the strengths of environmental taxes are three-fold: they cure
market failure; they influence economic behaviour in the interest of environmental
protection; and they generate funds for environmental initiatives. On the other hand,
environmental taxes have weaknesses. In the first place, Rowan-Robinson and Ross
rightly observe that taxation is not an easy alternative to direct regulation for bringing
about behavioural change. For instance, it does not free those subject to the tax from
83 Paul G W Henderson ' Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection - Conceptual Framework' (1995) 1
SAJELP 55 at 57 - 60. As is evident from the title of this article, the objectives he discusses may apply to
'fiscal incentives' in general. However, his concentration is on income tax: see (1994) 1 SAJELP 49 at 50.
84K Bubna-Litic and L de Leeuw 'Can our Taxation System Support "New" Sustainable Industries? The
Argument for Ecotaxes' (1999) 16 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 140 at 140 - 141.
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compliance costs, nor does it dispense with the need for a bureaucracy to implement and
enforce its provisions.f" In the second place , environmental taxes may so greatly burden
industry that economic growth may be hampered. i''
In Malawi section 31(a) of the Environment Management Act 1996 provides that the
Minister responsible for environmental affairs shall , on the recommendation of the
National Council for the Environment and in consultation with the Minister of Finance,
determine such fiscal incentives as are necessary for promoting the protection and
management of the environment and the conservation and sustainable utilization of
natural resources. It is arguable that such fiscal incentives may include environmental
taxes. In this regard, the Minister may recommend the enactment of legislation or the
amendment of existing legislation to introduce environmental taxes. Even though
taxpayers are already burdened, environmental taxes are an attraction as they will assist
the cash-strapped government to engage in meaningful environmental protection projects.
However, industry has for long been complaining about the prohibitive taxes it faces. The
2000 revolutionary tax adjustments brought in by the then Minister of Finance, Dr
Matthews Chikaonda, raised no small alarm across the whole stratum of society. It is
therefore unlikely that environmental taxes will be welcomed.
6.5.8 Observations
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that marketable permits, pollution charges and
subsidies cannot be employed in environmental protection in Malawi at present.
Environmental taxes are also unlikely to be used. Only deposit refund systems and, to a
certain extent, environmental bonds may be used. Thus, most of the market-based
instruments are currently not viable strategies for achieving environmental protection in
Malawi.
85Rowan-Robinson and Ross 'Non-Regulatory Instruments and Public Access to Environmental
Information' in Bosselmann and Richardson op cit 265 at 272.
86 Paul G W Henderson 'Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection - Conceptual Framework' (1995) I




For long, even before the principal envi ronm ental legislation had been passed, civil
litigation was instrumental in curbing pollution. In the present day civil litigation may be
employed by individuals and/or administrative bodies in the enforcement of
environmental protection endeavours. Civil litigation may also bring to the fore issues
that should be solved by legislation. In addition, it may serve a publicity function"
In civil litigation a court may make (a) an order for payment of money; (b) an order
compelling or interdicting the performance of an Act ; and (c) a declaration as to the legal
. h f h . 88ng ts 0 t e parties.
6.6.2 Damages (compensation)
In Malawi damages from civil law may be awarded to a person in respect of
environmental harm where there is proof of the following torts: nuisance, negligence,
breach of statutory duty and Rylands v Fletcher liability."
Any unreasonable interference with a person's quiet enjoyment of his property may be a
private nuisance, and so is any unlawful act or omission which adversely affects a
person's health, comfort, convenience or enjoyment of life. There has to be an
unreasonable and substantial interference for the act or omission to constitute an
87 MA Rabie 'Legal remedies for environmental protection' V CILSA (1972) 247 at 254.
88 Khalidwe Chilibvumbo v GDC Haulage and United General Insurance Co Civil Cause No. 462 of2001 ,
decision of Chimasula Phiri J (14 April 2004); Dr Cassim Chilumpha v Chendawaka Family and Blantyre
Print and Publishing Company Ltd Civil Cause No . 984 of 2004, decision of Chipeta J (26 March 2004);
and Maggie Chimbayo v I & E Mala wi Ltd Civil Cause No. 1635 of 1997 , decision of Kapanda J (16
January 2001). All these decisions are unreported but copies were available on http: //www.judiciary.mw
when accessed on 13 September 2005). Cf C Loots 'Making Environmental Law Effective' (1994) 1
SAJEL P 17 at 27 .
89 Damages may also be awarded in criminal law as an additional remedy (see Chapter 5 hereof) .
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actionable nuisance. Everything has to be considered from a reasonable point of view.
Time and locality are factors to be taken into account. If a person is for some reason
more sensitive than usual to the nuisance, his action will not succeed."
In the tort of negligence the plaintiff is required to prove that there was a duty of care
owed to him by the defendant; that the duty of care has been breached by the defendant;
and that as a result of that breach of duty of care, the plaintiff has suffered loss and
damage." In order to establish a duty of care a number of factors are taken into account:
there must be a foreseeability of damage; the rela tion ship between the parties must be one
of proximity or neighbourhood; and the situation must be one in which the court
considers it fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of a given scope
on one party in favour of the other.92 Breach of duty is established by evidence that the
defendant's conduct falls below the standard required by law, which is the standard of a
reasonable and prudent person.l"
Elements of the tort of negligence may sometimes be found in the tort of breach of
statutory duty but the two torts are different. 94 For a person to succeed in an action for
breach of statutory duty, he must prove that the injury he has sustained is within the
ambit of the statute; that the statutory duty imposes a liability to civil action; that the
statutory duty was not fulfilled; and that the breach of duty has caused his injury.95
90 G Whitehead and A Kadar A Foundation in English Law (1992) 374 - 375.
91 Beston Mikeyasi v Aaron Ching 'amba, Surfacing Enterpris es and National Insurance Company Civil
Cause No. 2726 of 1999, decision of Kapanda J (15 June 2001) (unreported but copy available on
http: //www.judiciary.mw when accessed on 27 December 2005). See also Mwase v Lilongwe City Council
[1991] 14 Malawi Law Reports 327.
92 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 WLR 605 at 617 - 618 per Lord Bridge; Baxall Securities v
Sheard Walshaw Partnership [2001] PNLR 9. See also Michael P Reynolds 'The Rise and Fall of the Atkin
Doctrine: Searching for a Will-O'-the-Wisp ' (2004) 20 Construction Law Journal 105 at 109 - Ill.
93 Margaret R Brazier (general ed) Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 17ed London: Sweet & Maxwell 1995 at para
7-112.
94 Bux v Slough Metals Ltd [1974] I All ER 262 ; Barrett (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 577.
95 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts op cit at para 11-06. See how these princ iples worked out in Bisiketi v Ruo Tea
Estates Ltd [1992] 15 Malawi Law Reports 26 and Kapito v David Whitehead and Sons (Mal) Limited
[1993] 16(2) Malawi Law Reports 541.
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Whether the injury is within the ambit of the statute depends on the interpretation of the
statute. The injury will be outside the ambit where the plaintiff does not come within the
category of persons contemplated or where the type of damage was not that which the
statute was meant to guard against. 96 Again whether the statutory duty imposes liability to
civil action depends on the interpretation of the statute. In the absence of express
provision for civil action, the general rule appears to be that specification of some other
sanction excludes enforcement by way of civil action, but this rule is subject to two
. 97exceptions.
Tort liability based on the rule in Rylands v Fletcher has its origins in that case. The rule
is that 'the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it in at his peril, and if he does
not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence
of its escape. ,98 The rule is restricted to situations where the defendant made a 'non-
natural use' of land. For long the essence of the rule was regarded as the imposition of
strict liability, but this view has been qualified recently. In Cambridge Water Co v
Eastern Counties Leather plc99 the House of Lords said that foreseeability of harm was a
prerequisite of liability under the rule and that the rule was an extension of the law of
nuisance. This stand was confirmed by a later sitting of the House of Lords in Transco
plc v Stockport MBC100 where it was emphasised that the rule was a remedy for damage
96 Wentworth v Wiltshire County Council [1993] 2 All ER 256 ; Hartley v Mayoh & Co [1954] 1 QB 383.
97 Lam-ha v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No. 2) [1982] AC 173. At 185 - 186 the Court said that the exceptions
are: (1) where the obligation or prohibition was imposed for the benefit of a particular class of individuals;
and (2) where a statute provides for a publi c right and an individual member of the public suffers particular,
direct and substantial damage other than and different from that which is common to the rest of the public.
98 Rylands v Fletcher (1866) LR 1 Ex 265 at 279.
99 [1994] 2 AC 264.
100 [2004] 2 AC 1. At 10 Lord Bingham of Cornhill restated the rule as follows: 'The rule in Rylands v
Fletcher is a sub-species of nuisance, which is itself a tort based on the interference by one occupier ofland
with the right in or enjoyment of land by another occupier of land as such. From this simple proposition
two consequences at once flow. First, as very clearl y decided by the House in Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd
[1947] AC 156, no claim in nuisance or und er the rule can arise if the events complained of take place
wholly on the land of a single occupier. Th ere must, in othe r words, be an escape from one tenement to
another. Second, the claim cannot include a claim for death or personal injury, since such a claim does not
relate to any right in or enjo yment of land .' On his part Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough said at 23: 'The
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to land or interests in land, that only those holding proprietary interests in the land
affected by an escape could sue and that the rule was a species of nuisance. 101
It may be observed at this juncture that one thread runs through all the foregoing torts and
this is the requirement that some harm must be occasioned to the plaintiff or his interests.
So any environmentally prejudicial action the plaintiff complains about must not only
harm the environment but it must also harm the plaintiff or his interests. A plaintiff
cannot go to court on the basis of harm to the environment alone. In this lies one
fundamental limitation to the tort-based claims for compensation . No compensation can
be awarded for environmental harm generally. Other limitations are stated below.
The value to society of a compensation judgment lies in the fact that it renders pollution
expensive, and thereby economically motivates polluters and potential polluters to refrain
from such activities. However, compensation has serious limitations in the
environmental sphere. Compensation is often difficult to measure. Pollution damage is
difficult to attribute to a particular defendant and is often diffuse. Further, compensation
does not prevent the continuation of the harmful practice, and so it may be imperative to
complement the compensation with an injunction restraining the continuance of the
polluting activity. 102
salient features of the rule are easily identified: the self interest of the landowner, his conduct in bringing or
keeping on his land something dangerous which involves a risk of damaging his neighbours' property, the
avoidance of such damage by ensuring that the danger is confined to his own property and liability to his
neighbours if he fails to do so, subject to a principle of remoteness. The subsequent complications and
misunderstandings have arisen, not from the original rule and its rationale, but from additional criteria,
often inappropriately expressed, introduced in later cases .'
\0 1 For an excellent analysis of the rule, see Donal Nolan 'The Distinctiveness of Rylands v Fletcher'
(2005) 121 LQR 421 . See also Gerry Cross ' Does Only the Careless Polluter Pay? A Fresh Examination of
the Nature of Private Nuisance ' (1995 ) 111 LQR 445 ; Richard Mullender and Lesley Dolding
' Environmental Law : Notions of Strict Liability' [1995] Journal ofBusin ess Law 93; and John C O'Quinn
' Not-so-strict Liability: A Foreseeability Test for Rylands v Fletcher and Other Lessons from Cambridge
Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather Plc' (2000) 24 Harvard Environmental Law Review 287.
102 Rabie op cit at 259.
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6.6.3 Injunction
An injunction - known in other jurisdictions as an interdict - is a double-edged sword: it
has the potential of compelling administrative bodi es and officials to comply with their
environmentally relevant statutory duties. At the same time it may serve the interests of
administrative bodies and officials in compelling persons to comply with environmental
law generally. 103
The authority for granting injunctions in environmental protection has been confirmed by
statute. Section 5 of the EMA allows any person to bring an action in the High Court to
enforce the right to a clean and healthy environment. In that action the person may seek:
(a) to prevent or to stop any act or omission which is deleterious or injurious to any
segment of the environment or likely to accelerate unsustainable depletion of natural
resources; (b) to procure any public officer to take measures to prevent or stop any act or
omission which is deleterious or injurious to any segment of the environment for which
the public officer is responsible under any written law; or (c) to require that any on-going
project or other activity be subjected to an environmental audit in accordance with the
EMA. However, it must be noted that the matters specified in (a) to (c) may be ordered
under a remedy other than injunction because section 5 does not restrict its application to
injunctions. So it is possible to obtain the remedies specified in (a) to (c) under sundry
orders.
A court may grant either an interlocutory or perpetual injunction.l'" For an interlocutory
injunction to be granted a number of elements must be satisfied and these include: (i)
existence of a serious question to be tried; (ii) apprehended harm which may be
irreparable; and (iii) a balance of convenience in relation to the inadequacy of damages as
103 Section 5 of the EMA provides clear authority on these matters.
104 Dr Cassim Chilumpha v Chendawaka Family and Blantyr e Print and Publishing Company Ltd Civil
Cause No. 984 of 2004, decision of Chipeta J (26 March 2004) (unreported).
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a remedy. 105 Generally an interlocutory injunction is granted upon application while a
perpetual injunction is normally granted by way of action.l'" However, a perpetual
injunction may be granted on application if no bona fide factual dispute exists.l'" The
requisites for establishing the right to a perpetual injunction are a clear right, injury
actually committed or reasonably apprehended and the absence of adequate protection by
any other ordinary rernedy.l'" Where the applicant's interests will be adequately
safeguarded by an action for damages, a perpetual injunction may not be granted.l "
Since in actions relating to the environment, damages will usually not suffice as a
remedy, it is likely that more often than not perpetual injunctions will be granted.
The injunction is a very useful tool, having regard to the preventive and precautionary
principles of environmental law. It has a number of advantages. It can be obtained
within hours if the matter at hand is sufficiently urgent. It is easier to prove the need for
an injunction than for a criminal sanction since the standard of proof is the preponderance
of the evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Further, the applicant may
recover the costs of the application if the application is successful. I 10
105 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396; Richard Scott et al (eds) The Supreme Court
Practice 1999 Voll London: Sweet and Maxwel1 1998 at paras 29/L/2 to 29/L/ll; and 21 Halsbury's Laws
of England (3ed) paras 763 to 766.
106 The Supreme Court Practice op cit at para 29/1 N2 .
107 Eaden v Firth (1863) I Hem & M 573 at 574.
108 21 Halsbury's Laws of England (3ed) paras 740, 742 and 745.
109 21 Halsbury's Laws of England (3ed) para 739.
110 Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation v Bina Kakusa Civil Cause No. 713 of 2000
decision of Justice Mwaungulu (11 May 2000); Micahil lama Ali tla Putland Importing Company v Alt
Dere and Others Civil Cause No. 3684 of 2002 , decision of Justice Chimasula Phiri (10 January 2003).





Malawian statute and case law suggests that there are two forms of judicial review, one
based on the Constitution and the other based on common law. For want of better
terminology the former will be referred to as constitutional judicial review and the latter
common law judicial review. Though related in some respects they are different in many
areas as will be apparent from the analysis below.
6.6.4.2 Constitutional judicial review
Section 108(2) of the Constitution confers upon the High Court original jurisdiction to
review any law, and any action or decision of the Government for conformity with the
Constitution. When determining the validity of the decisions of the executive branch of
Government the court may take into account environmental considerations. I11 However,
in the absence of a constitutional environmental right , this power of judicial review is of
limited use in environmental law. The principle of national policy relating to the
environment declared in the Constitution is only directory in nature. 112 The obvious
suggestion to strengthen this species of judicial review is to elevate the environmental
right provided for in the EMA into a constitutional right.
6.6.4.3 Common law judicial review
The High Court's general powers ofjudicial review are another species ofjudicial review
- this is actually the type that has been used most by litigants in Malawian courts but
most of this litigation has taken place outside environmental law. Statute empowers the
High Court to make orders akin to the United Kingdom orders of mandamus, prohibition
I I1 Section 13(d) as read with section 14 of the Constitution.
112 Ibid.
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and certiorari.U'' So a decision-maker empowered by public law to make a decision or
take action may have the decision or action reviewed and subjected to an appropriate
order.i'" There is scope for using this form of judicial review in challenging
environmentally prejudicial decisions or actions.
It is fairly settled that there are three grounds for common law judicial review. In State v
Commissioner General ofMalawi Revenue Authority ex parte Chipiliro Phiri Anganile'l?
it was stated that the grounds are illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. By
illegality is meant the failure by a decision-maker to understand correctly and/or give
effect to the law that regulates his decision-making power. Irrationality - also known as
Wednesbury unreasonableness 116 - 'applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its
defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied
his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.' 117 Procedural impropriety
encompasses failure to observe basic rules of natural justice, failure to act with
procedural fairness towards the person to be affected by the decision and failure by an
administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules expressly laid down in the legislation
by which its jurisdiction is created even where that failure does not amount to denial of
113 Section 16(2) of the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act cap 5:01 of the Laws of Malawi.
114 State v Commissioner General of Malawi Revenue Authority ex parte Chipiliro Phiri Anganile
Miscellaneous Civil Cause No 89 of 2002, decision of Justice Tembo (12 March 2003) (unreported but
copy available on http: //www.judiciary.mw when accessed in September 2005).
115 Ibid. The court approved the restatement of the law in this regard by Lord Diplock and Lord Roskill in
Council ofCivil Service Unions and Others v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
116 Named after the case of Associated Provincial Picture House Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1
KB 223.
117 Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at 410 per
Lord Diplock.
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natural justice. 118 These grounds are tempered with the constitutional clause on
d
.. . . . 119
a rmmstrative justice.
An applicant for judicial review (both constitutional and common law) is also required to
demonstrate locus standi: he must show that he has a sufficient interest in the matter. 120 In
Administrator of the Estate of Dr H. Kamuzu Banda v Attorney Generat'" Chimasula
Phiri J was of the opinion that section 5 of the EMA confers wide locus standi on litigants
in environmental matters. He said:
'In recognition of the pressing need to preserve the environment, the Environment
Management Act has given locus standi to ' any person' to bring suits to enforce
the right to a clean and healthy environment, which right is of course, also not
localised. In a nutshell, the Environment Management Act departs from orthodox
requirements for locus standi and gives any person the right to involve himself or
herself in environmental litigation.'
However, it is doubtful whether this is indeed the position, having regard to the decision
of the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal, delivered three months after Chimasula Phiri 1's
judgment, in Civil Liberties Committee v Minister of Justice and Registrar General. 122
118 [1985] AC 374 at 411 per Lord Diplock. On all the three grounds see also Lord Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell
and Andrew Le Suer (eds) De Smith, Woolf and Jowell 's Principles ofJudicial Review London: Sweet &
Maxwell 1999 at 147 - 518.
119 Section 43 of the Constitution provides as follows: 'Every person shall have the right to:- (a) lawful and
procedurally fair administrative action, which is justifiable in relation to reasons given where his or her
rights, freedoms, legitimate expectations or interests are affected or threatened; and (b) be furnished with
reasons in writing for administrative action where his or her rights, freedoms, legitimate expectations or
interests (sic) if those interests are known.' There appears to be a grammatical error in this section. It seems
that this error may be corrected by inserting the words 'are affected or threatened,' between the last-but-one
occurrence of the word 'interests' and the word 'if.
120 Order 53 rule 3(7) of the Rules of the Supreme Court; sections 15(2) and 46(2) of the Constitution.
121 Civil Cause No. 1839(A) of 1997, unreported decision of II January 2004 (but copy available on
http://www.judiciary.mw when accessed in December 2005).
122 MSCA Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1999 (unreported but copy available on http://www.judiciary.mw when
accessed on 13 September 2005) .
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The Registrar General had cancelled the registration certificate of an organisation called
Chikonzero Communications which was the publisher and distributor of an
antigovernment newspaper, The National Agenda. The Registrar General also banned the
publication, printing and distribution of the newspaper. Civil Liberties Committee
(CILIC), a human rights non-governmental organisation, sought judicial review of these
decisions of the Registrar General. The government resisted the action on the basis that
CILIC did not have locus standi. The relevant legislative provisions that fell to be
construed were sections 15(2) and 46(2) of the Constitution.lv' The court held that these
provisions should not be interpreted literally. On the contrary they should be regarded as
requiring locus standi 'expressed in terms of sufficient interest, special or substantial
interest or existence of a legal right or interest in the outcome of the suit.' On the facts
before it the court was of the view that CILIC did not have locus standi. The court
intimated that there were other organisations which could successfully show sufficient
interest in the subject matter or outcome of the action and these were the Media Council
of Malawi, the National Media Institute of Southern Africa (NAMISA) and the
Journalists Association of Malawi (lAMA). Unlike CILIC these organisations were
specifically concerned with the rights and freedoms relating to the press. 124
123 Section 15(2) provides: 'Any person or group of persons with sufficient interest in the protection and
enforcement of rights under this Chapter shall be entitled to the assistance of the courts, the Ombudsman,
the Human Rights Commission and other organs of Government to ensure the promotion, protection and
redress of grievance in respect of those rights. ' Section 46(2) states : 'Any person who claims that a
fundamental right or freedom guaranteed by this Constitution has been infringed or threatened shall be
entitled - (a) to make application to a competent court to enforce or protect such a right or freedom; and (b)
to make application to the Ombudsman or the Human Rights Commission in order to secure such
assistance or advice as he or she may reasonably require.' See A Peter Mutharika 'The 1995 Democratic
Constitution of Malawi' [1996] 40 Journal ofAfrican Law 205 at 216 for a brief comment on section 15.
124 This narrow approach follows a number of previous decisions delivered by the court. The narrow
approach has been criticised: see Fidelis Edge Kanyongolo 'The Limits of Liberal Democratic
Constitutionalism' in Kings M Phiri and Kenneth R Ross (eds) Democratisation in Malawi: a Stocktaking
Blantyre: CLAIM 1998 353 at 367; Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa ' A Full Loaf is Better than Half: the
Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Malawi' [2005] 49 Journal ofAfrican
Law 207 at 237 - 239; Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa ' Democratisation in Malawi 1994 - 2002: Completing
the Vicious Circle? ' (2003) 19 SAJHR 316 at 333 - 334.
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The Supreme Court rehabilitated two of its own judgements that had been questioned in
the High Court previously.l " In impugning the High Court decision of Registered
Trustees of the Public Affairs Committee v Attorney General and Others 126 the Supreme
Court condemned the presiding judge's preference to follow a decision on the issue of
locus standi which totally contradicted the two Supreme Court cases. Without mincing
words the Supreme Court labelled such preference professionally wrong and
unacceptable. Although the Supreme Court did not identify the 'contrary decision', it is
clear from a perusal of the High Court case of Public Affairs Committee that the decision
in issue was either the Kamuzu Banda case above or Thandiwe Okeke v Minister ofHome
Affairs and Controller of Immigration. 127 In these circumstances it may be that the
statement of Chimasula Phiri J quoted above is no longer good law despite its
attractiveness. This finding is in line with the developments that attended the enactment
of the EMA. It is reported that the draft bill of the EMA had provided for 'a right to
commence court action by any person who felt the environment was being threatened by
some person's activities without the need for him or her to show that they had personally
suffered injury or harm as a result of such activity.' 128 When finally enacting the EMA
this provision was shot down on the official basis that it was superfluous but it is more
likely that the real basis of the rejection was fear of environmental litigious maniacs. 129
125 The two decisions are Attorney General v Malawi Congress Party and Others MSCA Civil Appeal No.
22 of 1996 (commonly known as 'the Press Trust case') (Copy used is that available on
http: //www.judiciary.mw ) and President of Malawi and Another v Kachere and Others MSCA Civil
Appeal No . 20 of 1995 (unreported). These decisions were questioned by Chipeta J in Registered Trustees
of the Public Affairs Committee v Attorney General and Others Civil Cause No. 1861 of2003 (unreported
but copy available on http://www.judiciary.mw when accessed in December 2005).
126 Civil Cause No. 1861 of 2003 (unreported but copy available on http: //www.judiciary.mw when
accessed in December 2005).
127 Civil Cause No. 73 of 1997 (unreported but copy available on http ://www.judiciary.mw when accessed
on 29 December 2005).
128 Gracian Z Banda 'Report on Reform of Environmental Legislation in Malawi: Determining the Scope
and Need for Sectoral Reviews' 1997 (unpublished) at para 3.4 .1.
129 Ibid.
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The current state of the law on locus standi is not fully supportive to the environmental
cause. It is generally understood that individuals may not have the knowledge and
resources to bring court action in favour of the environment. On those rare occasions
when an individual takes up the challenge or when a public interest organisation decides
to take court action, the individual or the organi sation may not have the required
sufficient interest: the only reason for bringing the action may be to move the
environmental cause forward. Sometimes even organisations may fail to take up court
action due to financial constraints. V'' These concerns are arguably applicable to Malawi.
In the premises it is suggested that a provision be introdu ced in the EMA with a view to
conferring locus standi upon 'any person ' or 'any group of persons' literally and
alleviating the burden of costs. A useful precedent for such a provision is section 32 of
South Africa's National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 which is in the
following terms:
'32. Legal standing to enforce environmental laws
(1) Any person or group of persons may seek appropriate relief in respect of any
breach or threatened breach of any provision of this Act, including a principle
contained in Chapter 1, or any other statutory provision concerned with the
protection of the environment or the use of natural resources -
(a) in that person's or group of person's own interest;
(b) in the interest of, or on behalf of, a person who is, for practical reasons,
unable to institute such proceedings;
(c) in the interest of or on behalf of a group or class of persons whose
interests are affected;
(d) in the public interest; and
(e) in the interest of protecting the environment.
(2) A court may decide not to award costs against a person who, or group of
persons which, fails to secure the relief sought in respect of any breach or
130 Frederick R Anderson , Daniel R Mandelker and A Dan Tarlock Environmental Protection : Law and
Policy Boston : ~ittl~ Bro~n 1984 at 75 - 76. See also David Robinson and John Dunkley (ed) Public
Interest Perpectives In Environm ental Law London: Wiley Chancery 1995 passim.
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threatened breach of any provision including a principle of this Act or any other
statutory provision concerned with the protection of the environment or the use of
natural resources if the court is of the opinion that the person or group of persons
acted reasonably out of a concern for the public interest or in the interest of
protecting the environment and had made due efforts to use other means
reasonably available for obtaining the relief sought.
(3) Where a person or group of persons secures the relief sought in respect of any
breach or threatened breach of any provision of this Act or any other statutory
provision concerned with the protection of the environment, a court may on
application -
(a) award costs on an appropriate scale to any person or persons entitled to
practise as advocate or attorney in the Republic who provided free legal
assistance or representation to such person or group in the preparation for
or conduct of the proceedings; and
(b) order that the party against whom the relief is granted pay to the person
or group concerned any reasonable costs incurred by such person or group
in the investigation of the matter and its preparation for the proceedings.'
6.6.5 Appraisal
All civil measures analysed above can only be taken at significant cost. Except for the
injunction, the other civil remedies can only be obtained at the instance of private
individuals or organisations. In Malawi's poverty individuals are preoccupied with
satisfying their basic needs (food, clothing and shelter) and have no time and no money to
engage in litigation that merely serves the public interest in environmental protection.
Few are the occasions when litigation serves their immediate personal interests as well as
the public interest in environmental protection, but even on those few occasions the cost
implications hinder the people from going to court. Likewise environmental organisations
face the cost obstacle. Even if the law were to be amended to make it easier to access
costs from the defendant, it is unlikely that individuals and environmental organisations
would suddenly wake up from their current slumber and take up significant numbers of
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court actions - the environmental awareness and zeal are not that high. 131 These
circumstances suggest that environmental enforcement cannot be left in the hands of
private individuals and private organisations. It follows that civil measures are not
reliably practical alternatives to the criminal sanction in environmental protection in
Malawi's current socioeconomic state.
6.7 Administrative measures
6.7.1 General
Environmental statutes impose various environmentally relevant powers and duties on
administrative bodies, that is to say, central government departments, local authorities,
statutory and other public bodies. The successful implementation of such powers and
duties is sometimes decisive in making environmental law effective. Administrative
bodies may be given direct environmental functions usually undertaken in respect of land
owned by the State, for instance, they may be required to perform certain actions
necessary to conserve some resource. An example is the National Parks and Wildlife Act
11 of 1992 which confers on administrative bodies powers relating to the management of
national parks. Administrative bodies may also be authorized to establish environmental
control provisions in the form of regulations in respect of the environmental aspects
subject to their control. For instance, local authorities under the Local Government Act
42 of 1998 are responsible for promulgating bylaws on, among other things, the
prevention and control of nuisances.V' In addition environmental statutes may require
administrative bodies to authorize persons to perform actions that would otherwise be
131 As a member of Greenwigs, the only environmental non governmental organisation of lawyers in
Malawi, I witnessed how disinterested in environmental litigation lawyers could be. What was more
interesting appeared to be to attend funded seminars (local and international) organised by other
organisations. All the lawyers were actually too busy with their personal business: this was admitted in the
Minutes of the Meeting of Greenwigs held on 16 October 2002 . (I have a copy of these minutes on file) .
The best way in which these lawyers could spring to action was to engage them in fee-earning litigation in
favour of the environment, but no individual or organisation engaged them.
132 Sections 6 and 103 of the Local Government Act 42 of 1998.
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prohibited or restricted (that is, the permit or licence system)!33 or to grant rights or
exemptions.
Administrative bodies may secure persons' compliance with environmental laws in a
number of ways. A preliminary duty is to inform the persons to whom the legislation
concerned is applicable of their obligations arising from the legislation. Although there
may not strictly be a legal duty to inform those persons, such a move is prudent. Of
course it is said that every person is supposed to know the law but this is a blind
statement that does not take cognizance of the facts on the ground, for it is a fact of
common notoriety that legislation - especially subsidiary legislation - is generally
inaccessible to the people.l " Apart from informing the relevant persons, administrative
bodies may themselves take action in the form of abatement. In the next few paragraphs
the discussion will focus on abatement and several ways in which administrative bodies
secure people's compliance with environmental laws. These ways are statutory directives,
suspension or cancellation of authorisations, and entry and seizure.
6.7.2 Abatement and Other Forms of Self-help
Abatement is a right to self-help against a nuisance. Where pollution amounts to a
nuisance, administrative bodies or officers may abate the nuisance (that is, terminate it by
their own acts). They may do so with or without giving prior notice of the intended
abatement.Y'' Under the Public Health Act 12 of 1948 a local authority may serve a
notice on the author of a nuisance requiring him to abate it and if he fails to do so, the
local authority may abate it. !36 As will become clear shortly, this notice operates in a way
similar to a statutory directive or order.
133 Section 47 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 11 of 1992 outlaws the hunting or taking of protected
species, except in accordance with the conditions of a licence.
134 Cf M A Rabie, C Loots, R Lyster and M G Erasmus 'Implementation of Environmental Law' in Fuggle
and Rabie op cit 120 at 126.
135 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts op cit at para 29-22 to 29-28; and R F V Heuston and R A Buckley (eds)
Salmond and Heuston 011 the Law of Torts 1ged London: Sweet & Maxwell 1987 at 682 - 685.
136 Sections 64 - 66 of the Public Health Act 12 of 1948.
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There are also forms of self-help other than abatement which administrative bodies or
officers may employ, for example closure of offending sewer or drain connections 137 and
demolition of offending things or structures. 138
6.7.3 Statutory directives (Notices and Orders)
An administrative body or officer may issue a directive against a person causing or likely
to cause environmental harm or pollution. The directive calls upon the person to perform
certain actions in order to control the environmental harm or pollution or to prevent its
aggravation or recurrence. A number of statutes make provision for such directives.
Under the Environment Management Act 23 of 1996 a directive of this nature is known
as an Environmental Protection Order ("EPO"). The Director of Environmental Affairs
may issue an EPO against any person whose acts or omissions have or are likely to have
adverse effects on the protection and management of the environment. The EPO may,
inter alia, require the person to take measures necessary for the restoration of any land
degraded by reason of the activities of the person. If the person fails to take the action
specified in the EPO, the Director may take such action as he deems appropriate for
achieving the purpose for which the EPO was made . Once this is done, the Director is
entitled to recover in full from the person the expenses reasonably incurred by the
Director in taking such action.l "
The following are the other provisions in Malawi's environmental statutes which contain
statutory directives: sections 71, 77, 89, 90, 91 and 92 of the Public Health Act 12 of
1948; section 35 of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997; section
76 of the Occupational Safety Health and Welfare Act 21 of 1997; section 42 of the
Forestry Act 11 of 1997; sections 6, 19 and 20 of the Water Resources Act 15 of 1969',
sections 54 and 55 of the Waterworks Act 17 of 1995; section 17 of the Monuments and
137 Section 33(6) of the Waterworks Act 17 of 1995.
138 Section 32(1)(e) of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997.
139 Sections 33 and 34 of the EMA.
389
Relics Act 16 of 1990, sections 4 and 5 of the Plant Protection Act 11 of 1969, sections
45 and 49 of the Town and Country Planning Act 26 of 1988, section 117 of the Mines
and Minerals Act 1 of 1981, sections 35 and 38 of the Petroleum (Exploration and
Production) Act 2 of 1983, section 5 of the Noxious Weeds Act 17 of 1936 and section
32 of the Land Act 25 of 1965.
6.7.4 Suspension or cancellation of authorizations
Another sanction for securing compliance is administrative suspension or cancellation of
authorizations. Administrative bodies may be given discretion to suspend or cancel
authorisations usually where the holders of the authorisations have failed to comply with
the terms of the authorizations. The threat of suspension or cancellation arguably
provides an incentive to operate within the confines of the terms of the authorizations.
An example of such power is provided by the Mines and Minerals Act 1 of 1981: the
Minister is empowered to suspend or cancel any reconnaissance licence where the holder
has failed to comply with a condition of the licence .l'" The Minister has also power to
cancel a mineral permit where he considers it necessary or desirable to do SO.141
Other statutory provisions containing this sanction are: sections 49 and 57 of the
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997; sections 51 and 53 of the
Forestry Act 11 of 1997; section 14 of the Water Resources Act 15 of 1969; section 16 of
the Waterworks Act 17 of 1995; sections 34 and 38 of the Monuments and Relics Act 16
of 1990; sections 57, 59 and 94 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 11 of 1992,
section 9 of the Fertilizers Farm Feeds and Remedies Act 12 of 1970, section 42 of the
Town and Country Planning Act 26 of 1988, sections 57, 80 and 84 of the Mines and
Minerals Act 1 of 1981 and section 41 of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act
2 of 1983.
140 Section 57 of the Mines and Minerals Act I of 1981.
141 Section 84 of the Mines and Minerals Act I of 1981 .
390
6.7.5 Entry and seizure
Administrative bodies are sometimes empowered to enter premises, vehicles, etc to
ascertain whether environmental precepts are being complied with. They may also seize
anything which may provide proof of any contravention of the precepts. In the
Fertilizers, Farm Feeds and Remedies Act 12 of 1970 it is stated that an inspector or other
authorised officer may enter upon any premises, place or vehicle suspected of having a
farming requisite'Y or sterilizing plant.l'" He may seize any farming requisite, book,
record or document which appears to afford evidence of a contravention of the Act. 144
Similar powers are found in the following statutory provisions: sections 30 and 32 of the
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997; section 9 of the Forestry Act 11
of 1997; sections 13, 14 and 16 of the Control and Diseases of Animals Act 41 of 1967;
section 46 of the Monuments and Relics Act 16 of 1990; section 9 of the National Parks
and Wildlife Act 11 of 1992, section 11 of the Plant Protection Act 11 of 1969, section 69
of the Town and Country Planning Act 26 of 1988, section 117 of the Mines and
Minerals Act 1 of 1981, section 70 of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2
of 1983, section 3 of the Petroleum Act 1 of 1951, section 4 of the Noxious Weeds Act
17 of 1936, section 8 of the Protection of Animals Act 16 of 1944 and section 33 of the
Land Act 25 of 1965.
6.7.6 Administrative penalties
Sometimes instead of prosecuting an offender an administrative officer or body may
demand a monetary penalty from the offender as long as the offender opts not to go to
court. Under section 50 of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997
142 Section 2 of the Fertilizers, Farm Feeds and Remedies Act 12 of 1970 defines 'farming requisite' as any
fertilizer, farm feed or remedy, or any substance used in the manufacture of a fertilizer, farm feed or
remed y.
~43 According to section ~ ?~ the Fertilizers, Farm Feeds and Remedies Act 12 of 1970 a 'sterilizing plant'
IS a plant used for the stenhzmg of bones or other substances derived from an animal carcass.
144 Section 12(1) of the Fertilizers, Farm Feeds and Remedies Act 12 of 1970 .
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the Director of Fisheries is empowered to offer to an alleged offender the alternatives of
prosecution or payment of a penalty. This offer can only be made where the Director has
reasonable grounds for believing that a minor offence created by the Act has been
committed and that it would be appropriate to impose a penalty. The monetary penalty
does not exceed one half of the maximum penalty to which the person would be liable if
he were convicted of the offence by the court. The marginal note to section 50 of the
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997 describes this penalty as an
administrative fine. This description is contrary to what writers regard as an
administrative fine or penalty.
It appears from the literature that administrative pena lties are closely related to admission
of guilt fines but are not identical. In an admission of guilt fine procedure, an offender is
called upon to pay a fine in respect of an offence. If he pays the fine, the matter ends
there. If he does not pay and opts for trial, the matter is prosecuted in the normal criminal
way which entails proof of the offence beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. 145 In
an administrative penalty procedure an offender is served with a document specifying a
penalty for an offence. If the offender pays the penalty, the matter ends there. If the
offender is unwilling to pay, he may appeal to the relevant authority (an administrative
official or tribunalj.l'" In that event the appeal ing offender has a duty to convince the
appellate forum that his case is stronger and he does so on a standard of proof that is
different from proof beyond reasonable doubt. 147 Thus it is the appealing offender who
has to make out his case before the appellate forum instead of the State machinery
proving the case. 148 One advantage of an administrative penalty is the possibility of
145 Kidd op cit at 38. In the Malawi scen ario admission of gui lt fines are mostly used under the Road
Traffic Act, cap 69:01 of the Laws of Malawi.
146 See samples at http://www.epi.umn.edu/aIcohol /loc al/adm inpen.shtm (Accessed 06 March 2006),
http://www.ene .gov.on.ca/envision/ergreport/down10ads/report_paper1.htm (Accessed 06 March 2006) and
http://www .deh.enr.state.nc.us/pws/rules/SECTION _ 1900.pdf (Accessed 06 March 2006). See also
http://www .customs .govt.nz (Accessed 06 March 2006 ).
147 Kidd op cit at 38 - 39.
148 Kidd op cit at 39 demonstrates, rightly it is submitted, that the use of administrative monetary penalties
does n?t fall foul of the Constitution. Although he writes in relation to South Africa, it is arguable that his
reasonmg can apply to Malawi. Among other things, he writes: ' [If it were found - which is disputed -] that
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keeping the case out of court l49 and so expediting its disposal: time and cost may be
saved. lso
Applying the foregoing elaboration to section 50 of the Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act 25 of 1997, it appears that the fine specified in that section is more in
the nature of an admission of guilt fine than an administrative penalty, and yet the Act
calls it an administrative fine. From this it may be concluded that section 50 does not
distinguish an admission of guilt fine from an administrative penalty. It is suggested that
this state of affairs be modified by introducing in the procedure changes that will
transform the section 50 sanction into a real administrative penalty. The changes will
include the possibility of appealing to an administrative forum instead of a court. The
proposed specific changes are reflected in Chapter 8 hereof.
6.7.7 Appraisal
The operation of the administrative measures analysed above does not depend on private
citizens or private organisations, unlike most of the civil measures. It therefore appears
that administrative measures have potential for immediate use in Malawi just like
criminal sanctions. Accordingly administrative measures are possible alternatives to
criminal sanctions in Malawi's current circumstances. However, there is need to make
administrative penalties (fines) generally available especially in minor offences. This
proposal is being made in light of the fact that they are provided for imperfectly and only
under one environmental statute. In this regard, it is suggested that a section along the
the imposition of administrative penalties does infringe a person 's fair trial rights , it is submitted that the
limitation on these rights will be justifiable. The reason for this is the important rationale (effectiveness of
the administration of justice) behind the use of administrative penalties, coupled with the relatively minor
impact that it will have on "victims".'
149 If the matter goes for judicial review, it cannot be said that the case is kept out of court. The statement in
the text is only valid where there is no judicial review.
150 Kidd op cit at 39. If there is an appeal against the imposition of the administrative penalty, the time and
cost may be more or less the same as the time and cost involved in a normal court case. AIl depends on the
nature and substance of the proceedings. However, the administrative penalty still retains its attractiveness
due to the fact that it is the appealing offender (and not State machinery) who has the onus of proving his
case in the appellate forum.
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lines of section 50 of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997 (with
the modifications suggested above) be introduced in the EMA. That section should apply
to all environmental offences of a minor nature.
6.8 Conclusion
The foregoing analysis has established that self-regulation, eo-regulation, most
information-based instruments, most market-based mechanisms and most civil measures
are not viable alternatives to the criminal sanction in Malawi at present. It is only
administrative measures which have great scope for operation as a reliably practical
alternative. In these circumstances it is unsafe to recommend that the criminal sanction be
reserved for serious crimes and that the other crimes be addressed by alternatives to the
criminal sanction. Such a suggestion is impossible on account of the fact that the
alternatives are largely unavailable in practical terms in Malawi. It is submitted that in the
case of Malawi a different - but related - approach be taken. In this approach reliance on
the criminal sanction will inevitably continue, only that there should be more use of
administrative measures. In particular it is suggested that minor offences should generally
be removed from the realm of the criminal sanction to the realm of administrative
penalties. It is arguable that consigning minor offenc es to administrative penalties will be
cost effective in terms of money, manpower and time.
It is not suggested that the criminal sanction should be used in serious crimes entirely in
the way it has been used up to now. There is need to attend to several aspects of the
criminal sanction with a view to improving its performance. These aspects are considered
in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
OPTIMISING THE USE OF CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS IN ENVIROMENTAL PROTECTION
IN MALAWI
7.1 Introduction
Over the years a number of devices have been employed to strengthen the use of criminal
sanctions. Strict liability, vicarious liability and corporate liability are some of the
devices. There have also been suggestions that sentences and certain procedural aspects
should be revisited with a view to improving the use of criminal sanctions generally. \ The
purpose of this chapter is to examine these devices in the context of environmental
protection in Malawi.
7.2 Strict liability
It has been stated in Chapter 4 hereof that Malawian criminal law follows the traditional
division of a crime into actus reus and mens rea: a person is not guilty criminally for his
conduct unless he had the appropriate state of mind at the relevant time. To this rule there
is an exception: in some offences 'the prosecution is required to prove the actus reus, but
in relation to one or more elements of the actus reus, there is no mens rea element to
prove. The defendant will be convicted even if he was entirely without fault.,2 However,
the accused is still entitled to any generally applicable defences. 3 Such offences are
I See, for example, Martha Grekos 'Environmental fines - all small change?' [2004] Journal of Planning
and Environment Law 1330.
2 A P Simester and G R Sullivan Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine 2ed (Revised 2004) Oxford: Hart
Publishing 2003 at 167.
3 Glanville Williams Criminal Law: the General Part 2ed London: Stevens & Sons 1961 at 215 writes:
'[Those offences] not requiring any kind oflegal fault on the part of the accused ... are said to be crimes of
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known as offences of strict liability." Comparative studies have been undertaken on the
meaning and understanding of strict liability in various countries.i The studies show that
there are differences.
Supporters of strict liability put forward a number of justifications for the doctrine.
6
Opponents of the doctrine refute the alleged justifications with vigour.i It is not intended
to reproduce this debate here, as there is not much use in doing so but it must be noted
that the weight of learned opinion favours the abrogation of strict liability on the basis
that the alleged justifications are not valid.s This position is certainly well grounded.
However, history tells us that these opinions of scholars have not progressed beyond the
stage of mere babblings, at least in Malawian law. " Stri ct liability is still with us today
strict responsibility or absolute prohibition , and the necessity for mens rea or negligence is wholly or partly
excluded. There is no indication in the autho rities that other defen ces are excluded, such as infancy and
duress. The word "strict" is therefore preferable to "absolute", though either tenn may be used if its
meaning is understood.'
4 Ibid. The alternative term 'absolute' liability' is used in some of the literature, but this may cause
confusion as some writers define 'absolute ' liability' in terms which are different from the definition given
in the text: Cf Sweet v Parsl ey [1970] AC 132 at 149 per Lord Reid.
5 C R M Dlamini 'Strict liability in South Afri can criminal law' (2002) 15 SAC} 1; Michael Kidd 'The use
of strict liability in the prosecution of environmental crimes' (2002) 15 SAC} 23. This article of Kidd will
hereinafter be referred to as 'Kidd Strict Liabilit y'. See also Angelo Pantazis ' Criminal law ' [1994] Annual
Surv ey ofSouth African Law 557.
6 Francis Bowes Sayre 'Public Welfare Offences ' (1933) 33 Columbia Law Review 55.
7 Colin Howard Strict Responsibility London: Sweet & Maxwell 1963; L H Leigh Strict and Vicarious
Liability: A Study in Administrative Criminal Law London: Sweet & Maxwell 1982.
8 An example of the opposition to strict liability is that expressed by Jerome Hall in Mueller (ed) Essays in
Criminal Science (1961) at 162 quoted in Howard op cit at 27. He said: ' It is becoming increasingly
recognised that strict liability has no place whatever in the criminal law; indeed, that it smacks of barbarism
to punish people despite the fact that there is no reason for blaming them at all.' More recent crit icism of
strict liability may be found in Dlamini op cit and Kidd Strict Liability op cit.
9 Malawian cases on strict liability abound: Republ ic v Chipole 8 Malawi Law Reports 202 (cultivation of
dangerous drugs); Macholowe v Republic 7 Malawi Law Reports 335 (using an uninsured vehicle: at 338
the court said that 'the interests of the public ' required that this offence be one of strict liability);
Msungama v R 1961 - 63 ALR Mal 49 8; Kamil and Yaghi v Republic 7 Malawi Law Reports 169
(possessing explosives without a permit); Republic v Martins and Noronha Limit ed 1971 - 72 ALR Mal 79
(failure to prevent danger from falling materi als or substances in a quarry) ; General Construction Company
Limited v Republic 1971 - 72 ALR Mal 41 (manufacturing explosi ves without a licence); R v Rustambhai
Miansah eb Munshi 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 89 (employing an unlicensed driver to drive a motor vehic le); R v
Carattella 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 119 (trading without a licence); and R v D 'Arcy 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 121
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and there is no sign that it will be discarded in the foreseeable future.i'' Both the
legislature and the judiciary invoke it now and again. The adherence to the doctrine is
explicable on several counts. One obvious explanation is that the legislature and the
judiciary still hope to exploit its benefits. For sure the doctrine does lessen the burden on
the prosecution in proving the elements of the offence and correspondingly the duty of
the court in satisfying itself that the offence has been proved. Denying these benefits
would amount to sheer falsehood.11
The purists do concede that strict liability has benefits but they contend that there are less
drastic methods which may be used to achieve the sam e ends as those aimed at by the
doctrine.l '' The suggested less drastic methods include the introduction of negligence as
the fault element of an offence or the introduction of a due diligence (no-negligence)
defence to strict liability offences. 13 An examination of Malawian criminal legislation
reveals that the suggested less drastic methods hav e largely not been adopted by
Parliament. It is true that they form part of certain offences (including certain
environmental crimes analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 hereof) but such offences are a
minority.
(making a false declaration on an immigration form) . Strict liability has also been applied in civil cases , for
instance, in Ribeiro v Martins 1968 - 70 ALR Mal 151.
10 Dlarnini op cit considers the question whether strict liability is permissible in terms of the South African
Constitution. He appears to answer this question in the negati ve, with the result that strict liability may
currently be regarded as invalid. If this is a fair interpretation of his writing, it must be put on record that
the South African courts have not decided as much. It is very unlikely that Malawian courts, with their deep
roots in English law, will adopt this line of reasoning.
11 Cf the remarks of Botha lA in Amalgamated Beverage Industries Natal (Pty) Ltd v Durban City Council
1994 (3) SA 646 (A) at 654.
12 Howard op cit at 28 - 45.
13 Williams op cit at 261 - 265 ; Howard op cit passim; Simester and Sullivan op cit at 185 - 186; Kidd
Strict Liability op cit at 39 - 40. At 40 Kidd demonstrates that there is a difference between 'requiring fault
in the form of negligence and strict liability allowing the defence of due diligence.' He writes that the
difference is that ' the accused is required to prove due diligen ce under a strict liability provision , whereas
the State bears the onus, in proving negligence, of pro ving that the accused did not take the steps that were
reasonable in the circumstances. '
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The question that now arises is whether Malawi should encourage or abrogate the use of
strict liability in environmental criminal law. Bearing in mind the valid objections to the
use of strict liability and the availab ility of less drastic methods of achieving the same
ends as those aimed at by strict liabili ty, it is suggested that Malawi should discourage the
use of strict liability in environmental criminal law. If the less drastic methods are fully
utilised, it is likely that most of the benefits from strict liability will be reaped. However,
some difficulties associated with strict liabil ity may remain. As Colin Howard puts it:
'The abolition of strict responsibility .. . would not bring with it the automatic
solution of the underlying problems of which it is a sign. There would still remain
such questions as whether it is desirable to try a person accused of a regulatory
offence upon the same principles of criminal responsibility as are appropriate to
more serious crimes; if not, upon what principles he should be tried; and in what
courts he should be tried. ' 14
The difficulties pointed out by Howard can, it is suggested, be considerably solved by
removing regulatory offences (especially minor environmental offences) from the sphere
of criminal sanctions to the sphere of administrati ve penalties. The principles of
responsibility under administrative penalties are different and more suitable for
regulatory (and especially minor) offences, and the forums where issues relating to
administrative penalties are tried are mostly administrative, for example administrative
tribunals. 15
In light of the foregoing, it is suggested that the use of strict liability in environmental
criminal law in Malawi should be discouraged. Instead there should be wider use of
negligence as the fault element and wider use of the due diligence defence. 16
14 Howard op cit at 29.
15 For more material on administrative penalties, see segment 6.7.6 in Chapter 6 hereof. See also Michael
Kidd 'Alternatives to the Criminal Sanction in the Enforcement of Environmental Law' (2002) 9 SAJELP
21 at 37.
16 Cf Justice Arden 'Criminal Law at the Crossroads: the Impact on Human Rights from the Law
Commission 's Perspective and the Need for a Code ' [1999] Crim LR 439 at 450 where she makes the
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7.3 Vicarious criminal liability
In criminal law the term 'vicarious liability' refers to the imputation on a person of the
conduct of another person and sometimes states of mind of that other person. In a sense
its hallmark is the same as the hallmark of vicarious liability in the law of tort, the
difference being the extent of application. Whereas in the law of tort employers are
saddled with extensive liability for torts committed by their servants in the course of their
employment, the same is not true with vicarious liability in criminal law. There is no
general rule to the effect that the crimes of employees should be attributed to their
employers. In criminal law the general rule is that criminal liability is personal, only that
a person may implicate himself in a crime committed by another through the doctrines of
complicity. 17 Accordingly, employers will bear liability for the crimes of their employees
only when they qualify as participants in those crimes in terms of the doctrines of
complicity.l'' To the stated general rule several exceptions exist. The exceptions come
from English common law and statutory law. It is the substance of these exceptions that
contains the current scope of vicarious liability in criminal law." Under common law
vicarious criminal liability could be imposed in the crimes of criminal libel and public
nuisance.i'' With regard to statutory law, the doctrine was mostly applied in the
interpretation of the licensing legislation of 19th century England. The practice spread
considerably. At present four ways may be discerned in which vicarious criminal
suggestion to read in due diligence defences. Kidd Strict Liability op cit at 39 makes another suggestion.
He proposes that minor environmental crimes should be removed from the sphere of criminal law to
alternative systems of regulation or social control. These two suggestions were made in the context of First
World and Second World countries. The possible adoption of the latter suggestion in Malawi has been
considered in Chapter 6 hereof. On the constitutionality of the due diligence defence (especialIy where it
imposes a reverse onus) , see segment 7.4.3 below.
17 Peter Murphy (ed) Blackstone's Criminal Practic e London: Blackstone Press 2000 at 65; Huggins (1730)
2 Stra 883. See also Simester and SuIlivan op cit at 243; 1 C Smith and B Hogan Criminal Law 6ed
London: Butterworths 1988 at 163.
18 Smith and Hogan op cit at 163.
19 Smith and Hogan op cit at 163; Leigh op cit at 18.
20 The position regarding criminal libel appears to have been modified by section 7 of the Libel Act 1843
(England): Simester and Sullivan op cit at 243 - 244.
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liability arises in respect of statutory offences? 1 In the first place, it may arise by express
provision in legislation. Atkin J (as he then was) expressed the point as follows:
'I think that the authorities .. . make it plain that while prima facie a principal is
not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servants, yet the
legislature may prohibit an act or enforce a duty in such words as to make the
prohibition or the duty absolute; in which case the principal is liable if the act is in
fact done by his servants. To ascertain whether a particular Act of Parliament has
that effect or not regard must be had to the object of the statute, the words used,
the nature of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it is imposed, the person
by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be performed and the person upon
h h 1 · · d ,22W om t e pena ty IS Impose .
Adoption of this principle in Malawi as a basis of vicarious criminal liability took place
over a period of several decades. Three cases merit consideration in this regard. On 20
August 1945 Jenkins CJ delivered a judgment in R v Carattella23 where the owner of a
store was accused of trading without a licence. Contrary to his instructions, trading had
been carried out by his employees on premises which were not covered by a licence. It
was argued that the owner could not be held responsible for he was absent and had given
instructions that trading should not be carried out. Dismissing the argument, Jenkins CJ
held that the offence was a minor statutory offence and came within those offences which
21 Simester and SuIlivan op cit at 244.
22 MOl/sell Brothers Limit ed v London and North Western Railway Company [1917] 2 KB 836 at 845. See
also R v Tyler [1891] 2 QB 588 at 592 - 593 where Bowen LJ said: ' Where, for instance, a statute creates a
duty upon individual persons, it would be a strange result if the duty could be evaded by those persons
forming themselves into a joint stock company. The point becomes stiIl more incapable of argument where
the statute prescribes the duty in the company itself. How can disobedience to the enactment by the
company be otherwise dealt with? The directors or officers of the company, who are reaIly responsible for
the neglect of the company to comply with the statutory requirements, might not be struck at by the statute,
and there would be no way of enforcing the law against a disobedient company, unless there were in such
cases a remedy by way of indictment. It may, therefore, I think , be taken that where a duty is imposed upon
a company in such a way that a breach of the duty amounts to a disobedience of the law, then , if there is
nothing in the statute either expressl y or irnpliedly to the contrary, a breach of the statute is an offence
which can be visited upon the company by means of an indictment. '
23 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 119.
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were absolute, requiring no mens rea and in which a master was liable for the actions of
his servant. Although not expressed in vigorous language, this decision may be regarded
as having planted the seeds of the principle under consideration.
In 1971 the High Court of Malawi in two separate cases confirmed this basis of vicarious
criminal liability. In the first case, General Construction Company Limited v Republic/"
decided on 18 May 1971, the appellant (a limited liability company) was charged with
manufacturing explosives without a licence contrary to section 15 of the Explosives
Act,25 an offence stated to be 'absolutely prohibited. ,26 The appellant entered into a
partnership agreement with two foreign companies with the object of carrying out a road
construction contract. While the partnership was in operation, explosives were
manufactured without a licence by persons employed by the partnership. It was not
established that such persons were also employed by the appellant. At the trial the
appellant was convicted of the offence. On appeal, the court approved the first part of the
dictum of Atkin J quoted above and went on to say that partners in a partnership are
liable for the acts done by their servants within the general scope of the servants'
employment where such acts are absolutely prohibited by statute. Accordingly, since the
offence was of absolute prohibition and the employees of the partnership had executed
the relevant acts in the general scope of their employment, the appellant was vicariously
liable for those acts.
This line of reasoning was followed by the High Court on 10 September 1971 in the
second case of Republic v Martins and Noronha Limited. 27 Without specifically referring
to Atkin J's proposed considerations, the court stated that regulation 4(1) of the Quarries
Regulationsi'' (summarised below) imposes an absolute unqualified duty on a quarry
24 1971 -72 ALR Mal 41.
25 Cap 14:09 of the Laws of Malawi.
26 1971 - 72 ALR Mal 41 at 45 per Skinner Cl .
27 1971 -72 ALR Mal 79.
28 Made under the Factories Act, cap 55:07 of the Laws of Malawi.
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owner and creates absolute liability for any contravention of it, and that if an employee
fails to comply with it, the failure is that of the quarry owner and such quarry owner is
. . 1 li bl 29vicarious y la e.
In the second place, vicarious criminal liability may arise through the application of the
delegation principle. This principle is to the effect that where a licence is awarded to a
named individual to manage a property or an activity within the terms of that licence and
that individual delegates the performance of the terms of the licence to another person,
then in matters relevant to the licence, the conduct and the state of mind of the other
person is imputed to the individual who delegated.i'' For the principle to apply there must
be complete delegation." In Republic v Martins and Noronha Limiteti" the accused was
the owner of a stone quarry at Mount Soche in Blantyre, Malawi. At about noon on 28
October 1969 there was a fall of earth and rock at the quarry, which killed seven workers.
The accused was charged with failing to ensure that its quarrying operations were carried
on in such a way as to avoid danger from falls. Its quarrying operations were under the
direction and supervision of its quarry foreman, a man of 45 to 50 years' experience.
Shortly before the material date , there had been heavy rain which had saturated porous
rock at the top of the west quarry face. Rain-water had been allowed to collect in a cut at
the top of the face which had been made by a bulldozer some months earlier. On the day
before the accident, blasting had been carried out on the adjacent south face and the rock
had precipitated to the floor of the west face. It was while a gang of 22 workers was
breaking up the stone that they were buried by a slid of some 1 500 tons of rock and earth
down the west face. The expert evidence for the prosecution was that the place of work
29 1971 - 72 ALR Mal 79 at 83 per Weston J.
30 Simester and Sullivan op cit at 244; Mullins v Collins (1874) LR 9 QB 292; Allen v Whitehead [1930] 1
KB 211. P J Pace 'Delegation - a Doctrine in Search of a Definition ' [1982] Crim LR 627 lists the
following aspects as still being in doubt: (1) the doctrine 's restriction to crimes requiring mens rea; (2) what
must be delegated; (3) who may be a delegate; (4) the significance of the delegator's absence from the
licensed premises; (5) whether delegation is a question of law or fact; and (6) defences to delegation. It may
be that point (1) is no longer in doubt: see Smith and Hogan op cit at 163 .
31 R v Winson [1969] 1 All ER 197, [1969] 1 QB 371 and Bradshaw v Ewart-Jam es [1983] QB 671.
32 197 1 -72 ALR Mal 79.
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was unsafe. The quarry foreman also admitted that the west face was dangerous.
Regulation 4 of the Quarry Regulations required the accused to ensure that all quarrying
operations were carried on so as to avoid danger from falls , whether of the materials
worked or any other substance. It was held that the accused had delegated the carrying on
of its quarrying operations to the quarry forem an; that the quarry foreman, in the course
of carrying on those operations, had failed to comply with the aforementioned duty; that
the acts or omissions of the quarry foreman had to be imputed to the accused; and that
accordingly the accused was vicariously liable.r'
In the third place, vicarious criminal liability apparently may arise where the actions of
an employee or agent are regarded as the actions of an employer or principal.i" In
Republic v Martins and Noronha Limited35 Weston J stated: ' ... the acts and omissions of
Mr Meyer [the quarry foreman] in the course of his employment are the acts and
omissions of the accused, and in so far as the accused - a limited company and an
abstraction - can be personified, it is for the practical purposes of this case, personified in
the figure of Mr Meyer.' It has been argued, correctly it is submitted, that 'this is not an
instance of vicarious liability, since it requires no attribution of another person's actus
reus to the defendant. ,3 6
Finally, vicarious criminal liability may be imposed for the acts of employees in the
absence of delegation provided the acts are performed in the course of employment, It
33 Another case worth mentioning is Republic v Issa and Grey 12 Malawi Law Reports 157. In this case the
first accused was employed at a photographic studio where he took and printed an obscene photograph of
the second accused (a woman). One L W Chitenje was the licensee and owner of the studio. The first
accused was charged with and convicted of making an obscene picture and the court a quo ordered the
revocation of the studio's business licence. On confirmation , the High Court restored the licence to the
licensee/owner, arguing, inter alia, that the first accuse d's crimin al act could not be imputed to the
licensee/owner since for him to be vicariously liable, it was necessary that he should have delegated
responsibility for the management of the studio to the first accused and it was not sufficient merely that the
first accused had committed the actus reus of the offen ce in the course of his employment. On the evidence,
no such delegation had taken place.
34 Simester and Sulli van op cit at 244.
35 1971 - 72 ALR Mal 79 at 83.
36 Simester and Sullivan op cit at 244.
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has been observed that this way of imposing liability on an employer is actually ad hoc
and unacknowledged at the time it is being imposed.Y Examples of English cases in this
last category are James & Son Ltd v Smee 38 and Coppen v Moore (No. 2).39 There is no
local case that falls neatly in this category."
The principal justification for the doctrine has been stated by Lord Reid in the following
terms:
'The courts relied on the fact that it must have been known to Parliament that the
things prohibited would frequently be done by servants of the licence holder and
that in many cases the licence holder would have no knowledge of what his
servant had done or at least that it would be difficult to prove his knowledge or
connivance. As there was no provision making the servant himself liable to
prosecution it would be impossible to enforce the law adequately if it was
necessary in every case to prove mens rea in the licence holder. ,41
Leigh suggests subsidiary justifications, arguing that 'it would no doubt have been unjust
to punish a mere servant for the act of sale of, for example, adulterated milk, when he
lacked the means of detecting or preventing adulteration. Furthermore, even had he been
aware of the facts constituting the offence, it might have meant his livelihood if he had
failed to do the acts prohibited. ,42
37 Simester and Sullivan op cit at 244 and 251.
38 [1955] 1 QB 78.
39 [1898] 2 QB 306.
40 In Republic v lssa and Grey 12 Malawi Law Reports 157 it was mentioned that an employer would not
be vicariously liable merely because an employee had committed the actus reus of an offence in the course
of his employment. This case is contrary to the case of Coppen v Moore (No 2) which is binding on Malawi
being a pre-1902 case. It appears that resolution of this conflict is left to a future case.
41 Vane v Yiannopoullos [1965] AC 486 at 496.
42 Leigh op cit at 19.
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In the sphere of environmental protection vicarious criminal liability has the potential to
assist in visiting criminal sanctions upon the persons who really matter in the offence
charged.
Opponents of vicarious criminal liability point out, inter alia, that where vicarious
criminal liability results in blameless persons being convicted of criminal offences, the
doctrine is contrary to the established tenets of criminal justice.l'' This objection may be
addressed in at least two ways. In the first place, the possibility of convicting blameless
persons may be obviated or reduced by requiring that the employer or principal be held
liable only where the offence was committed by the employee or agent at least partly due
to the fault of the employer or principal. That is to say, there must be some
blameworthiness or fault on the part of the employer or principal before he is convicted
of the offence committed by the employee or agent. The fault may take various forms:
one form is negligence or failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the execution of the
proscribed conduct by the employee or agent." Alternatively the employer or principal
may be provided with a due diligence defence.V
43 This sounds like a criticism of strict liability but it must be noted that vicarious criminal liability is
different from strict liability. An Act of Parliament may require mens rea and yet impose vicarious liability.
On the other hand, an Act of Parliament may create strict liability without imposing vicarious liability:
Smith and Hogan op cit at 163. Michael Kidd 'Vicarious Liability for Environmental Offences' [2003]
Obiter 186 (hereinafter referred to as 'Kidd Vicarious Liability') writes that 'most commentators are
unanimous in criticising the use of vicarious criminal liability, for essentially the same reasons as strict
liability is criticised - that an individual may be held liable without fault.'
44 Section 34(5) of South Africa's National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 contains this form
of fault. This provision is in the following terms: 'Whenever any manager, agent or employee does or omits
to do an act which it had been his or her task to do or to refrain from doing on behalf of the employer and
which would be an offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 for the employer to do or omit to do,
and the act or omission of the manager, agent or employee occurred because the employer failed to take all
reasonable steps to prevent the act or omission in question, then the employer shall be guilty of the said
offence and, save that no penalty other than a fine may be imposed if a conviction is based on this
subsection, liable on conviction to the penalty specified in the relevant law, including an order under
subsections (2), (3) and (4), and proof of such act or omission by a manager, agent or employee shall
constitute prima facie evidence that the employer is guilty under this subsection.' [Emphasis added]. Kidd
Vicarious Liability op cit at 187 and 191 opines that section 34(5) is probably constitutionally acceptable
but he warns that this view cannot be expressed with certainty.
45 For a discussion of the constitutionality of the due diligence defence (especially where it imposes a
reverse onus), see segment 7.4.3 below.
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In the second place, the above objection will be avoided entirely by recasting vicarious
liability laws with a view to replace vicarious liability with primary liability.l'' It has
actually been contended that the objective of vicarious criminal liability47 is adequately
met by imposing primary liability on the employer or principal'" and that in light of the
problems associated with vicarious liability, primary liability should be preferred.Y
A look at the environmental legislation analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 reveals that
vicarious criminal liability is not expressly provided for therein. However, there is scope
for implying it in some offences relating to licences and permits. An example would be
the pollution offence created under section 67 as read with section 43 of the EMA. From
these provisions it appears that the discharge of effluent may only be done on the
authority of and in accordance with the terms of a licence. The licensee who fails to
comply with the terms of a licence may be convicted of an offence. It seems that the
doctrine of vicarious criminal liability may be applied in those circumstances to obviate
the possibility of the licensee using an agent or employee to discharge the effluent
contrary to the conditions of the licence so as to avoid incurring criminal liability.
In the light of the foregoing, the question arises as to whether vicarious criminal liability
should be retained or abrogated in Malawi for purposes of environmental protection. It is
suggested that this question should receive a qualified response. Vicarious liability may
46 Kidd Vicarious Liability op cit at 192 - 193.
47 The objective of vicarious criminal liability is to ensure that 'the implementation of legislation is not
"hindered by masters or employers evading their duties and responsibilities by hiding behind the sins and
omissions of their servants or employees''': Kidd Vicarious Liability op cit at 191 quoting J Burchell and J
Milton Criminal Law 2ed Cape Town: Juta 1997 at 380. C R Snyman Criminal Law 3ed Cape Town:
Butterworth 1995 at 237 states the objective as follows: 'The policy underlying the creation of such
vicarious liability is that it will encourage the employer to ensure that his employees' conduct complies
with the provisions of the law; he should not be allowed to hide behind his employees' mistakes; their
mistakes are imputed to him; he delegated his powers to them and therefore their actions are deemed to be
his actions.'
48 Kidd Vicarious Liability op cit at 192. Kidd (ibid) seems to argue that the satisfaction of the objective is
achieved without encountering some of the drawbacks of vicarious criminal liability. He demonstrates that
where primary liability is used , there is no question of constitutional invalidity, and the burden of proof
rests firmly on the State throughout the trial (and hence no violation of the right to a fair trial).
49 Kidd Vicarious Liability op cit at 193.
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be retained as long as an element of fault on the part of an employer or principal is
introduced or the defence of due dili gence is made available to the employer or principal.
Alternatively vicarious liability may be abrogated in favour of primary liability. Both of
these are viable options even though the latter seems to be the better option.
7.4 Corporate criminal liability
7.4.1 General
Many pages have been written about the role and impact of corporations and bodies
corporate in the environmental sphere. For many years now attempts have been made to
fix them with environmental liability for their actions. The reasons for this may be those
suggested by Diane Saxe. i" She writes that:
'(a) [corporations] are major sources of environmental degradation, although by
no means the only sources;
(b) they wield extensive economic and political power;
(c) larger corporations commit a disproportionate number of violations of the law;
(d) Corporations handle the most dangerous types of pollutants - individuals
rarely have the resources or the need to handle heavy metals, radioactive waste or
chemical residues;
(e) the environmental degradation which corporations cause IS relatively
concentrate and large in scale compared to the activities of individuals; as a result,
corporate activity is more likely to overwhelm natural equilibria;
(f) corporations have very extensive resources with which to reduce pollution,
resources which they have accumulated in part by using up clean air, clean water
and other public goods; and
50 Environm ental Offences: Corporat e Responsibili ty and Executive Liability (1990) at 21 quoted in
Michael A Kidd 'The Protection of the Environment through the Use of Criminal Sanctions: A
Comparative Anal ysis with Specific Refe rence to South Afri ca ' unpublished PhD Thesis, University of
Natal 2002 at 350.
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(g) the localization and scale of corporate pollution typically make it easier to
control than the equivalent amount of pollution from individuals.'
The above mentioned liability is generally of two kinds: civil liability and criminal
liability. The focus of this segment is the latter: it is intended to consider corporate
criminal liability in the environmental sphere beginning with a brief background.
On the date of reception of English law in Malawi (11 August 1902), English law had not
yet developed the modern concept of corporate criminal liability. The foundation had,
however, been laid. To be sure corporations could be indicted for nonfeasance resulting
in a nuisance. Specifically, corporations could be prosecuted for failure to perform duties
laid upon them by charter, prescription or statute when the failure to perform resulted in a
public nuisance. Corporations could also be held criminally liable for misfeasance in
cases of public nuisance. Further, corporations could be convicted of minor crimes of
strict liability and crimes to which vicarious liability was recognized as applying,
regardless of whether or not mens rea was required as a necessary ingredient. However,
criminal liability did not go as far as covering crimes, regarded as truly criminal in
nature, which required mens rea for their commission.51 It was therefore left open for
Malawi to develop its own unique and comprehensive theory or basis for corporate
criminal liability, but this did not happen. It appears from the literature that Malawi
generally followed developments in English law,52 albeit at a slow pace. The Malawian
developments are set out below after a survey of corporate criminal liability in English
law is conducted.
51 L H Leigh The Criminal Liability of Corporations in English Law London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
1969 at 15 - 24.
52 Thus, after it was held in Lennards Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 that the
element of personal fault on the part of Lennards Carrying Co Ltd was supplied by Mr Lennard, the
Managing Director of the company, on the basis that he was the directing mind of the company, his action
being the very action of the company itself, Malawi followed suit as will be demonstrated below. The most
recent statement on this point was made in Naidoo v Mazi Import & Export Ltd and Tchongwe Civil Cause
No. 706 of 1985 (unreported) where it was held that the liabilities incurred by one of the directors in the
name of the company, were the liabilities of the company itself and the director had incurred them as its
' directing mind and will ': Cassim Chilumpha Introduction to Company Law of Malawi 2ed Limbe:
Commercial Law Centre 1999 at 55 - 56 . Lennards is the English case in which the doctrine of
identification first appeared: Simester and Sullivan op cit at 254 .
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In general there are two facets of corporate criminal liability: the first deals with the
liability of the corporation as an artificial personality (hereinafter referred to as 'corporate
criminal liability' for lack of a different and better term), and the second deals with the
liability of natural persons who run the activities of the corporation (hereinafter referred
to as 'individual criminal liability'). It has been objected that there is no need for this
duality and that individual criminal liability is capable of doing the work of corporate
criminal liability. This objection has been found wanting. Brent Fisse 53 suggests,
correctly it is submitted, the following merits /reasons for the coexistence of corporate and
individual criminal liability:
(1) Organisational secrecy: When faced with a criminal investigation, corporate
personnel tend to close ranks out of loyalty or through fear of dismissal. If they do
so, the result may be de facto immunity from individual criminal liability, at least for
highly placed officers who can stay at a safe distance from criminal acts performed
lower in the corporate hierarchy. Where indiv idual criminal liability is blocked by
organizational secrecy, corporate criminal liability becomes a viable option.
(2) Number of suspects: Hordes of lower-level employees and numerous upper and
intermediate personnel may be involved in one way or another in the commission of
the crime. There are insufficient enforcement resources to investigate such a large
number of suspects in such circumstances. It is preferable to take only the
corporation to court.
(3) Corporate profit motive: Many offences, including environmental offences, can
produce sizable corporation profit, whether in terms of direct gain or, as is usual in
the case of pollution offences, through savings made by not installing effective
preventive equipment. Since the profits accruing from offences committed on behalf
of the corporation almost always flow into corporation coffers (and not into the
coffers of the personnel involved), to leave these illicit profits untouched would
53 'The Duality of Corporate and Individual Criminal Liability ' in Ellen Hochstedler (ed) Corporations as
Criminals Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1984 69 et seq. Where possible the exact words employed by
the author are used. Cf Janet Dine Criminal Law in the Company Context Aldershot: Dartmouth 1995 at
148 - 149. See also Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite 'Corporate Offences: the Kepone Affair' in Rae
Weston (ed) Combating Commercial Crime Sydney: The Law Book Company 1987 31 at 31 - 32.
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encourage the commission of offences. It is imperative to fine the corporation with a
view to cancelling out the illicit profit.
(4) Expendability of personnel: Corporate criminal liability helps to ensure that
corporations bear the social costs of offences committed on their behalf. To impose
individual liability alone would be to allow corporations to externalise the criminal
costs of their enterprise by getting expendable personnel to take the rap.54
(5) Personnel beyond jurisdiction: Guilty personnel may lie beyond the reach of
extraterritorial process, or, where within reach, may nonetheless be difficult to bring
to justice. Where these difficulties arise and a local corporation can be held liable for
the relevant conduct, corporate criminal liability provides a convenient alternative to
individual criminal liability, the aim being to stimulate internal discipline
proceedings and to prompt more effective supervision and control.
(6) Offences defined by reference to corporate status: Numerous statutory offences are
defined in terms of which either invariably or on particular facts, presuppose a
corporation as principal offender. Where corporate personnel are not covered by the
terms of a principal offence, corporate criminal liability enables their conviction for
complicity.
(7) Corporate negligence: Corporate offences often result from corporate negligence, a
form of fault which invokes the need for corporate rather than individual criminal
liability. Tacit operation of authority within organisations is one factor conducive to
corporate negligence. Subordinates, instead of acting on explicit instructions,
normally anticipate the reactions of their superiors and act accordingly. Group
pressures to conform can also give rise to corporate negligence. Another prevalent
source of corporate negligence is collective oversight.
(8) Corporate intentionality: To the extent that corporations can and do have criminal
policies, the blameworthiness inherent in those policies can be reflected by imposing
corporate criminal liability. Through their policies corporations exhibit an
intentionality which is irreducible simply to the intentionality of directors, officers
54 At 73 Fisse continues to say that bureaucracies have greater staying power than their human functionaries
and then he quotes Kenneth Boulding who is reported to have once said that the corporation 'marches on its
elephantine way almost indifferent to its succession of riders. '
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or employees. If corporations can possess an intention, it follows that they can
possess a criminal intention where a corporate policy either expressly or impliedly
contemplates the commission of crime. Once this is seen, corporate criminal liability
emerges as a form of liability which cannot be sufficiently covered by solely relying
on individual criminal liability.
(9) Surrogate liability: Corporations provide convenient surrogates in situations where it
is harsh to impose individual criminal liability, whether by reason of corporate
pressures, harsh rules of criminal liability, or need to inflict exemplary punishment.
Personnel may commit offences on behalf of their corporations at a time when they
are exposed to pressures to make profits, or to conform to pre-existing illicit
practices within the organisations. These pressures usually fall short of what is
required to make out a defence of duress, but can be very strong nonetheless. Where
such pressures exist, corporate criminal liability provides a far less drastic
alternative than crucifying individual offenders.
Having justified the existence of corporate criminal liability, the stage has now been
reached to consider in a bit more detail how corporate criminal liability works. Since
Malawi generally follows the English tradition in this area, the English position will be
set out first, followed by the Malawian position. Then new concepts of corporate criminal
liability will be outlined and suggestions will be made on reforming corporate criminal
liability in environmental matters in Malawi. Thereafter the discussion will turn to
individual criminal liability.
7.4.2 Liability of the corporation as an entity
7.4.2.1 The position under English law
The liability of a corporation as an entity may be considered at two levels: the level of
strict liability offences and the level of mens rea offences. However, this neat division in
determining a corporation's criminal liability runs into difficulties when dealing with
"hybrid" regulatory offences which either allow a due diligence defence or a defence
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based on lack of knowledge or where constructive knowl edge forms part of the definition
of the offence. 55 Be that as it may, the division provides a useful starting point in
analysing the criminal liability of the corporation ' s artificial personality.
In cnmes of strict liability, few conceptual difficulties arise. The weight of learned
opinion is to the effect that the corporation is liable where the actus reus committed by an
employee can be imputed to the corporation or can be regarded as the corporation's act.
Whether this amounts to vicarious liability or not is a point on which there is divergence
of opinion. Celia Wells maintains that the corporation is liable vicariously'? but Simester
and Sullivan assert that the corporation is liable directly; 57 they contend that in legal
terms 'companies will commit offences of strict liability directly: the company, of itself,
will fulfil the offence specifications of regulatory crimes (in terms of selling, leasing,
possessing, using etc) if done in the course of business of the company.' 58
In crimes requiring mens rea the central conceptual difficulty lies in attributing mens rea
(an entirely human capability) to a corporation which in its artificial form may be said to
be incapable of possessing. 59 Faced with this challenge, the courts have developed
strategies for fixing corporations with the necessary mens rea. The primary strategy is the
use of the doctrine of identification. The secondary strategy - which is a more recent
development - is the use of vicarious liability . The doctrine of identification will be
considered first.
55 Celia Wells 'Corporate Liability for Crime: the Neglected Question ' (1995) 14(4) International Banking
and Financial Law 42.
56 Wells op cit at 43. For more on vicarious liabi lity see above.
57 Simester and Sullivan op cit at 753.
58 Ibid .
59 In Director ofPublic Prosecutions v Kent and Sussex Contractors Limited [1944] KB 146 at 157 Hallett
J said: ~ .. . th~ liability of a body corporate for crimes was at one time a matter of doubt, partly owing to the
theoretIcal difficulty of imputing a crimin al intention to a fictitious person and partly to technical
difficulties of procedure. '
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The doctrine of identification - also known as the alter ego principle - is to the effect that
the conduct and state of mind of certain high-ranking officers of the corporation should
be regarded as the conduct and state of mind of the corporation itself. This doctrine was
introduced in English criminal law by the case of Director ofPublic Prosecutions v Kent
and Sussex Contractors Limited.6o The company was accused of making use of a
document with intent to deceive and of making a statement which they knew to be false
in a material particular. It was proved at the hearing that the company sent to the proper
authority on the prescribed form a fortnightly vehicle record containing the alleged
misstatement, the document being signed by the transport manager of the company. The
justices found the record false in the material particular alleged to the knowledge of the
transport manager, but they held that the body corporate could not in law be guilty of the
offences charged since an act of will or state of mind, which could not be imputed to a
corporation, was implicit in the commission of those offences. They, accordingly,
dismissed the charges against the company. On appeal, it was held that the justices were
wrong and that the company could be convicted of the offences charged. Macnaghten J
declared: ' If the responsible agent of a company, acting within the scope of his authority,
puts forward on its behalf a document which he knows to be false and by which he
intends to deceive, I apprehend that ... his knowledge must be imputed to the
company.i'"
At the expiry of exactly six months the wave of thinking demonstrated in the Kent and
Sussex Contractors case was confirmed in R v fCR Haulage Limited62 where the
company was charged (together with ten other accused) with conspiracy to defraud, an
60 [1944] KB 146.
61 [194.4] KB 146 at 156. At 155 - 156 Viscount Caldecote Cl stated: 'The offences created by the
regulation are those of doing something with intent to deceive or of making a statement known to be false
in a material particular. There was ample evidence , on the facts as stated in the special case, that the
compan~, by the only people who could act or speak or think for it had done both these things, and I can
see nothm.g ~n any of the a~thorities to which we have been referred which requires us to say that a
company IS mcapable of bemg found guilty of the offences with which the respondent company was
charged.'
62 [
1944] KB 551. The Kent and Suss ex Contractors case was decided on 11 November 1943. The fCR
Haulage case was decided on 10 May 1944.
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offence which required proof of mens rea. The officer who allegedly bore the relevant
mens rea was the company's managing director. The court held that the company could
be convicted of the offence. It stated that the criminal act of an employee or agent,
including his state of mind, intention, knowledge or belief, is the act of the company or
principal but that this depends, inter alia, on the relative position of the officer or agent
and other relevant facts and circumstances of the case. In the case before the court, the
court was satisfied that the acts of the managing director were the acts of the company
and the fraud of that person was the fraud of the company.
The point that it is only certain officials of the company whose conduct and states of
mind will be regarded as the corporation's is one of the hallmarks of the doctrine. The
point was expressed in the following analytical term s by Denning L J (as he then was):63
'A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and
nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools
and acts in accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the
company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the
work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and
managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company and control
what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the
company and is treated by law as such. So ... in the criminal law, in cases where
the law requires a guilty mind as a condition of a criminal offence, the guilty mind
of the directors or managers will render the company itself guilty. ,64
63 H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159 at 172.
64 In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 at 171 Lord Reid warned against the improper use
of the quoted words. He said: 'There have been attempts to apply Lord Denning's words to all servants of a
company whose work is brain work, or who exercise some managerial discretion under the direction of
superior officers of the company. I do not think that Lord Denning intended to refer to them. He only
referred to those who "represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does.'''
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The House of Lords put its stamp of approval on the doctrine in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd
v Nattrass65 reiterating that only those who represent the directing mind and will of the
company and control what it does could be identified with the company. In other words,
the directors, the managing director and other superior officers of the company who carry
out the functions of management and speak and act as the company. What matters is not
the status per se but rather whether the person in question has authority to determine and
di li 66irect company po ICY·
It may be observed that the doctrine is narrow in its scope: it leaves out of its reach the
actions and states of mind of most of the personnel in a corporation. Secondly, the
doctrine makes it difficult to establish corporate criminal liability against large
companies. Crimes committed on behalf of large companies are often visible only at the
level of middle management whereas the doctrine requires proof of fault on the part of a
top-level manager. By contrast, fault on the part of a top-level manager is much easier to
prove in the context of small companies. Yet that is the context where there is usually
little need to use corporate criminal liability in addition to or in lieu of individual criminal
liability.l" Thirdly, the doctrine is ill-adapted to generate convictions against companies
for some crimes: save in the smallest companies, senior corporate officials are unlikely to
be involved in certain ' sharp-end' incidents, thereby largely precluding the finding of any
corporate culpability arising from the specifics of any particular incident.F' Fourthly, the
doctrine ignores the reality of corporate decision-making which is often the product of
corporate policies and procedures rather than individual decisions.69 Fifthly, it is not an
65 [1972] AC 153. See also the more recent cases of R v Redfern [1993] Crim LR 43, (1992) 13 Cr App R
(S) 709 , R v P & 0 European Ferri es (Dover) Lld (1991 ) 93 Cr App R 72, Attorney General's Reference
(No 2 of 1999) [2000] 3 All ER 182, Meridian Global Funds v Management Asia Ltd [1995] 2 AC 500 and
Seaboard Offshore Ltd v Secretary ofState for Transport [1994] 1 WLR 541 .
66 See also lames Gobert ' Corporate Criminality: New Crimes for the Times' [1994] Crim LR 722 at 723.
67 Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite 'The Alloc ation of Responsibility for Corporate Crimes: Individualism,
Collectivism and Accountability' (1988) I I Sydney Law Review 468 at 504 - 505.
68 G R Sulli van ' Expressing Corporate Guilt' (1995) 15 Oxford Journal ofLegal Studies 28 I at 282 - 283.
69 C M V Clarkson ' Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning their Souls ' (1996) 59 Modern Law Review
557 at 56 1.
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easy task to determine who in a particular corporation qualifies as 'brains' or 'hands.'70
Sixthly, it fails to identify what exactly it is that the company has done wrong to merit
being subjected to criminal sanctions, thereby offending the fundamental principle of
nulla poena sine culpa." Finally, the doctrine fails to capture the full extent of the
corporation's wrongdoing: when a crime occurs in the course of business, it is likely to be
the result of a breakdown in more than one sphere of the corporation' s operation. Policies
may be misguided in conception, inadequately supervised and incompetently carried
out,72
In spite of these criticisms the identification doctrine has held sway as a basis for
corporate criminal liability. Its exclusive reign, however, has been shaken in recent times
by the application of vicarious corporate liability in circumstances where the
identification doctrine ought to have been used. In Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent London
Borough Council' t a 14 year old boy was given money by a trading standards officer and
told to buy a video with an "18" classification certificate at a Tesco supermarket. The boy
bought the video and immediately handed it to the trading standards officer. Tesco was
charged with supplying a video with an "18" classification certificate to a person who had
not attained that age, contrary to a certain statute . Tesco relied, inter alia, on the statutory
defence that they had neither known nor had reasonable grounds to believe that the
purchaser was under "18." It was found that the checkout assistant did have reasonable
grounds to believe that the boy was under 18 and it was not proved that those persons in
Tesco who would be regarded as the directing mind and will of the company knew or had
reasonable grounds to believe that the boy was aged less than 18. It was held that the
checkout assistant's state of mind could be identified with Tesco and so the statutory
defence was not available since the checkout assistant had reasonable grounds to believe
70 Louise Jordaan 'New Perspectives on the Criminal Liabilit y of Corporate Bodies' [2003] Acta Juridica
48 at 55.
71 Emilia Mugnai and lames Gobert ' Coping with Corporate Criminality - Some Lessons from Italy'
[2002] Crim LR 619 at 620.
72 Gobert op cit at 723.
73 [1993] I WLR 1037.
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that the boy was under 18. Staughton LJ stated that it was absurd to suppose that those
who manage a vast company would have any knowledge or any information as to the age
of a casual purchaser of a video film; that it is the employee who sells the film at the
checkout point who will have knowledge or reasonable grounds for belief; and that it is
the checkout point employee's knowledge and reasonable grounds that are relevant.
Similarly, in Director General of Fair Trading v Pioneer Concrete Ltd and Another'"
injunctions were obtained against companies restraining them from giving effect to
certain unlawful agreements. Subsequently employees of the companies, contrary to
express instructions and without the knowledge of the companies, made an unlawful
arrangement to give effect to the unlawful agreements by fixing prices and allocating
work. It was alleged that the companies were in contempt of court as a result of the
activities of their employees. In a unanimous House of Lords it was found that the
knowledge and conduct of a company's sales force sufficed to place the company in
contempt of court.
It may be noted that in the cases of Brent and Pioneer Concrete, the officers who
provided the conduct and states of mind were not high-ranking officers; on the contrary
they were junior officers. It is therefore clear that the courts did not apply the doctrine of
identification; they simply used vicarious criminal liability.
7.4.2.2 The position under Malawian law
The leading Malawian case on corporate criminal liability is probably Nyasaland
Transport Company Limited v R.75 The appellant, a limited liability company, operated
public service vehicles and owned a motor omnibus. This omnibus was used in the course
of the company's business on a public road for the carriage of passengers and driven by a
company driver. The driver had to halt the vehicle because the steering mechanism
became to him obviously defective and it was found to be in a dangerous condition since
74 [1995] 1 AC 456.
75 1961 - 63 ALR Mal 328 decided on 08 November 1962 by Cram J (High Court of Malawi).
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faulty service and inspection by company employees on 05 May, the breakdown having
taken place on 18 May. The inspection, service and supervision were inadequate and
proper precautions were not taken . The defect should have come to light at the time of
inspection.
The company's internal regulations envisaged that every omnibus was to be inspected at
intervals of 14 days in the company's own workshops which it maintained for the service
of its omnibuses. A staff of mechanics was employed by the company for this purpose.
Inspection sheets were provided and supervisors were charged with the duty of checking
all important parts of the mechanism including the steering. The evidence was to the
effect that the defect must have been obvious but deliberately disregarded or, at any rate,
recklessly left in a dangerous condition. The appellant was charged with the offence of
operating a motor vehicle on a road in a condition likely to cause danger to persons on
the road contrary to regulation 65(1) of the Motor Traffic Regulations76 which is in the
following terms: 'Every motor vehicle and all parts and accessories of such vehicle ...
shall at all times be in such condition that no danger is caused or likely to be caused to
any person on the vehicle ... or on a road.' Regulation 4(1) declares that any person
committing a breach of any of the Regulations commits an offence. Regulation 4
continues to say that the driver of the motor vehicle at the time of the offence shall be
guilty of an offence. In addition Regulation 4 states that ' the owner of the motor vehicle
shall also be guilty of an offence, if present at the time of the offence, or, if absent, unless
the offence is committed without his consent and was not due to any act or omission on
his part, and he had taken all reasonable precautions to prevent an offence.'
It was held that the Regulations created, inter alia, a liability on the part of the appellant
company as principal in the first degree, provided there was mens rea on the part of the
company (i.e. on the part of a directive servant) and also created vicarious liability so that
a criminal act committed by an inferior servant of the company could be brought home to
the company provided mens rea on the part of the company was established and this
76 Cap 146 of the Laws ofNyasa1and 1957.
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mens rea would also have to be that of a directive servant of the company. In the instant
case the supervisors and mechanics were not directive officers and so their states of mind
could not be imputed to the appellant company. Further it was no criminal offence to fail
to cure a defect in a motor omnibus or to leave it in a dangerous condition, and so the
mechanics and supervisors could not have been charged with this non-existent offence.
The mechanics and supervisors could also not be charged with the offence of operating a
motor vehicle on a road in a condition likely to cause danger to persons on the road, for
they did not use the omnibus. Thus there was no offence committed by the mechanics and
supervisors as inferior officers, which could be brought home to the appellant company.
Accordingly, the appellant company was not guilty of the offence charged.
It is clear from the foregoing that the court was dealing with a crime of mens rea. In the
process of determining whether the company could be held criminally liable, the court
considered the identification doctrine and vicarious criminal liability. The court referred
to the identification doctrine as the alter ego doctrine, and officers who represent the
directing mind and will of the company as directive servants or 'organs' of the company.
The court also adverted to crimes of strict liability and said that a company nowadays can
be convicted as a principal in the first degree for using a motor vehicle in contravention
of regulations creating strict liability.f These views on strict liability offences were
obiter, as the offence in issue in that case was not one of strict liability.
About nme years later the High Court was afforded an opportunity to consider the
criminal liability of a company in respect of a strict liability offence. In Republic v
Martins and Noronha Limited (discussed above) the accused company was found guilty
of a strict liability offence in respect of the conduct of its quarry foreman in the course of
his employment. This decision arguably completes the general picture of Malawian
77 In General Construction Company Limited v Republic 1971 - 72 ALR Mal 41 at 45 Skinner CJ approved
this aspect of the decision. The learned Chief Justice said: 'There is an abundance of authority to support
the proposition that a corporate body which is an employer is liable for the criminal acts committed by its
servants where such acts constitute offences of absolute liability and are done within the general scope of
the servants ' employment. It is only necessary to refer to a case decided in our courts, namely Nyasaland
Transp. Co. Ltd v R ... which restates the proposition of law that any corporation can be guilty of a crime
of absolute prohibition where the actus is that of its servants. '
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courts' approach to questions of corporate criminal liability. In this regard, it may be
observed that the Malawian courts are treading the English path almost faithfully. They
do not have difficulties in convicting companies of strict liability offences and they base
their decisions in respect of mens rea offences on the doctrines of identification and
vicarious criminal liability.
The question that now anses is whether in respect of mens rea offences these two
doctrines (identification and vicarious criminal liabili ty) suffice for the purpose of
environmental criminal liability on the part of the corporation in Malawi. The answer to
this question is that they do not suffice , especially when their defects outlined above are
taken into account. It is suggested that a comprehensive approach be taken, whereby the
benefits of the doctrines are allowed to continue operating while the defects are
discarded. To this end, it is submitted that aspects of the aggregation theory of attaching
criminal liability be used. It is also submitted that a considerable measure of
organizational models of corporate criminal liabili ty be incorporated. The aggregation
theory and the organizational models will now be explained. Thereafter an appropriate
amendment to Malawi's EMA shall be proposed with a view to put into effect the
expanded version of corporate criminal liability. For the sake of completeness two other
theories or models of corporate criminal liability will be noted and rejected as improper
for Malawi: these are the doctrine of reactive fault and the American version of vicarious
corporate liability.
7.4.2.3 New concepts of corporate criminal liability
(a) The principle of aggregation
The point of departure in the theory of aggregation is the rejection of the idea that a
corporate body can only be held liable through the unlawful conduct and state of mind of
one particular individual. Instead it is argued that the conduct and state of mind of any
two or more persons associated with the corporation may be put together or aggregated
and attributed in toto to the corporation. Thereafter an assessment is made as to whether
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the totality of the consolidated conduct and states of mind amounts to the offence.
Specifically, a judgment is made as to whether the consolidated fault constitutes the
requisite culpability for the offence. The principle is based upon the concept of collective
responsibility.i'' It has been observed that 'the theory can attain some degree of
metaphysical coherence, only if one assumes that the company has the moral agency
properties of a real person; absorbing over time and space, the faults of those associated
with it. In that sense, the theory of aggregation is a theory genuinely concerned with
corporate corporate guilt.' 79 It has further been hailed as appropriate in offences of
negligence. A couple of minor failures by officials of a corporation may add up to a gross
breach by the corporation of its duty of care. 80 In other words, where individual fault
based on negligence is absent, there is a possibility of finding that there was a collective
failure to exercise reasonable care and in this way culpability for a particular corporate
offence may be established.
The principle of aggregation was acknowledged in United States of America v Bank of
New England. 81 The bank had been convicted of 31 violations of a currency transaction
statute. On appeal the bank argued that it was error to find (as the court a quo found) that
a corporation possesses a particular item of knowledge if one part of the corporation has
half the information making up the item, and another part of the entity has the other half.
Rejecting the argument the appeal court said: 'Corporations compartmentalize knowledge
subdividing the elements of specific duties and opera tions into smaller components. The
aggregate of these components constitutes the corporation 's knowledge of a particular
operation. It is irrelevant whether employees administering one component of an
operation know the specific activities of employees administering another aspect of the
operation. ,82
78 Jordaan op cit at 58 - 59; Simester and SuIIivan op cit at 260.
79 Simester and SuIIivan op cit at 260.
80 J Smith Smith and Hogan Criminal Law ged (1999) at 186 quoted in Jordaan op cit at 59.
81 821 F 2d 844.
82 821. F 2d 844 at 856. Similar sentiments were expressed by District Judge Dalton in United States of
America v T 1 M E - DC Inc 381 F Supp 730 at 738: ' [A] corporation cannot plead innocence by asserting
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Although the principle is not part of English law, its usefulness may be demonstrated by
the events that attended the Zeebrugge disaster. On 06 March 1987 the ferry ship 'Herald
of Free Enterprise' capsized off Zeebrugge, resulting in the death of 188 people which
included passengers and crew. Shortly thereafter a public inquiry was conducted by
Sheen J, which culminated in a full report and recommendations. It was established that
the immediate cause of the vessel's loss was that she sailed with her bow doors open
trimmed by the head, that is, with her nose down. The manoeuvre in which she engaged
led to the entry of water into the vehicle deck, the heavy listing of the vessel and her
speedy capsize. Sheen J found that certain individuals had failed to perform their duty, in
particular those responsible for failing to close the bow doors, failing to see that the doors
were closed and sailing without knowing that the doors were closed. These individuals
were the assistant bosun, the master, the chief officer and the captain. It was further
established that the Board of Directors of the company that owned the vessel (Town Car
Ferries Ltd and P & 0 European Ferries (Dover) Ltd) did not appreciate their
responsibility for the safe management of their ships: there was a lack of thought about
the way in which the vessel had to be organised for the Dover/Zeebrugge run. 'All
concerned in management,' declared Sheen J ' from the members of the Board of
Directors down to the junior superintendents, were guilty of fault in that all must be
regarded as sharing responsibility for the failure of management. From top to bottom the
body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness. , 83
Subsequently the company was prosecuted for manslaughter together with two members
of senior management and five staff members who had been on the vessel at material
times including the senior master and the captain. Ultimately the presiding judge stopped
the proceedings and directed that all the accused be acquitted.f" Although it was clear that
that the information obtained by several employees was not acquired by anyone individual employee who
then would have comprehended its full import. Rath er the corporation is considered to have acquired the
collective knowledge of its employees and is held responsible for their failure to act accordingly.'
83 Quoted by Bingham LJ in R v H M Coroner for East Kent ex parte Spooner and Others (1989) 88 Cr
App R 10 at 12.
84 Eric Colvin ' Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability' (199 5) 6 Criminal Law Forum 1 at 17 - 18.
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certain individuals had failed to carry out their duties, there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that any of those individuals who could be regarded as the embodiment
of the company itself bore the requisite fault in order to fulfil the demands of the
identification doctrine. Before the case was halted, an attempt had been made to rely on
the principle of aggregation. It had been argued that a charge of manslaughter could be
founded on the aggregation of individual acts which do not individually constitute gross
negligence. Dismissing this argument, it was ruled that a case against a personal
defendant cannot be fortified by evidence against another defendant and that, similarly, a
case against a corporation can only be made by evidence properly addressed to showing
guilt on the part of the corporation as such through individuals who could be identified as
the embodiment of the company itself. 85
It is submitted that the company would have been convicted if the principle of
aggregation had been used. It is clear from the findings of Sheen J that the total effect of
the individual fault of the various persons in the company would, upon aggregation, have
amounted to the requisite fault upon which the liability of the company could rest. In
these circumstances it is lamentable that the company - which was clearly at fault in the
public eye as evidenced by the moral condemnation in the report of the public inquiry -
escaped corporate criminal liability.
It is suggested that the Zeebrugge scenario - or similar catastrophe - may replay itself in
the environmental sphere. In that event, following English law, Malawi would not be in a
position to punish the offending corporation. In order to prevent this from happening, it is
proposed that the principle of aggregation be incorporated in Malawian law, especially in
negligence based environmental crimes. This proposal is being made with full knowledge
that the principle is not perfect. It has been criticised, for example, on the ground that it
may stigmatise individuals whose conduct and mental states are attributed to the
corporation. The conviction of a corporation may imply fault on the part of individuals,
which may not be justifiable because, if prosecuted separately, they would be acquitted
85 R v H M Coroner for East Kent ex parte Spooner and Others (1989) 88 Cr App R 10 at 16 - 17. See also
Rv P & 0 European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App R 72.
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for lack of the requisite culpability. r'' It has further been contended that it is not possible
artificially to create mens rea by aggregating subjective states of mind: 'Two innocent
states of mind cannot be added together to produce a guilty state of mind. ,87 But the latter
criticism appears to miss the point, for the principle of aggregation does not seek to bring
together innocent states of mind, but rather those states of mind which are blameworthy,
though not to the same extent as a state of mind that can sustain a conviction on its own.
In any case no principle of law is criticism-proof: even the most time-honoured principles
of law have their detractors. The task at present is to find practical solutions and not
necessarily utopian principles. The discussion will now focus on organisational models of
corporate criminal liability.
(b) Organisational models of corporate criminal liability
Organisational models of corporate criminal liability assert that organisations function as
real entities, in ways that are not reducible to propositions about individuals.
'Organisations comprise not only individuals but also institutionalized relationships
among individuals,' writes Colvin. 'The resulting entities involve more than the sum of
the individual parts. They shape the outlook and channel the conduct of their members in
ways that may not be chosen or even understood by any of the individuals concerned.
They can possess knowledge or means of knowledge that may be unavailable in total to
any single individual. They are therefore commonly treated as "real" entities in ordinary
language and in moral discourse. They can be and commonly are "blamed' when they
have failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to other persons. Moreover, they
86 Jordaan op cit at 59 - 60.
87 J Smith Smith and Hogan Criminal Law ged (1999) at 185 - 186 quoted in Jordaan op cit at 59. Colvin
op cit at 22 - 23 criticises the principle in the following terms: 'The major objection to aggregation is not
that it does violence to ordinary language. It is, rather, that it distorts the nature of corporate criminal
liability. As long as aggregation is presented within a framework of vicarious or identification liability, it
carries an air of artificiality. The qualification to the model of derivative liability is so great that the
usefulness of the basic model is called into question . Moreover, once the derivative model is abandoned in
favor of a model of true organizational responsibility, aggregation becomes a weak conceptual tool. The
question to be asked is not whether responsibility can be constructed from bits and pieces of information
about individuals, but rather whether it inheres in the organization itself. At best, aggregation can be
viewed as only one part of a broader conceptual framework for tackling issues of organizational
responsibility.' [Footnote omitted].
424
can be and are commonly blamed while excuses are made for individual representatives.
An individual may not have been in a position to appreciate all the risks or to take
appropriate protective measures, but the same excuse may not be available to a
corporation. ,88 In other words, corporations can acquire ' a momentum and a dynamic of
their own which temporarily transcends the actions of their officers,89 and in that state
incur criminal liability on their own." It is contended that the aims, intentions and
knowledge required for criminal liability may be located in the policies, regulations,
standing orders and institutionalised practices of corporations and that these aims,
intentions and knowledge are not reducible to the aims, intentions and knowledge of
individuals within the corporation. Nico Jorg and Stewart Field continue to say:
'Such regulations and standing orders are authoritative, not because any particular
individual devised them, but because they have emerged from a decision-making
process recognised as authoritative within the corporation. These regulations and
standing orders are also evidence of corporate capacity to differentiate right from
wrong and act accordingly, to think ethically in terms of the consequences of
corporate actions for others and to give reasoned explanations to the outside
world. There is a strong argument for seeing such capacities for reasoning,
understanding and control of conduct as the essence of moral personality and the
basis of moral responsibility. ,91
88 Colvin op cit at 23 - 24. Similarly Gobert op cit at 723 - 724 writes: 'A conceptually different approach
to corporate criminality would locate fault within the company itself without reference to individual
liability. The company is treated as a distinct organic entity whose "mind" is embodied in the policies it has
adopted. Corporate policy is often different from the sum of the inputs of those who helped to formulate the
policy, and typically is the product of either a synthesis of views or a compromise among competing
positions. Policy may also reflect the company's corporate ethos. This ethos, which often is unwritten, may
have been forged by founders of the company who are no longer acti vely involved in its day-to-day affairs.
When company policy or corporate ethos leads to the commission of a crime, the company should be liable
in its own right and not derivatively.' [Footnote omitted].
89 A Ashworth Principles a/Criminal Law 4ed (2003) quoted in Jordaan op cit at 61.
90 Jordaan op cit at 61.
9 1 Nico Jorg and Stewart Field 'Corporate Liability and Manslaughter: Should we be Going Dutch?' [1991]
Crim LR 156 at 159.
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It may be observed that the principle of aggregation is related to these organisational
models of corporate criminal liability. It has actually been suggested that aggregation is
only one part of a broader conceptual framework for tackling issues of organisational
responsibility.V It follows from this relationship that the strengths of the aggregation
principle are also applicable to the organisational models. For instance, they have the
common factor that they do not insist on culpability residing in the directing mind and
will of the corporation. Similarly, some defects of the aggregation principle apply to the
organisational models. By the same token it is suggested that aspects of the organisational
models be incorporated in Malawian law for reasons similar to those advanced for
incorporating the principle of aggregation in Malawian law.
(c) Reactive fault
The originators of reactive fault as a new basis for corporate liability are Brent Fisse and
John Braithwaite.v' Due to the novelty of their proposal, it is hereby set out in extenso
together with its justifications:
'Corporate blameworthiness can also be judged within a reactive time-frame, a
time-frame which generates the concept of reactive corporate fault. Reactive
corporate fault may be broadly defined as unreasonable corporate failure to devise
and undertake satisfactory preventive or corrective measures in response to the
commission of the actus reus of an offence by personnel acting on behalf of the
organisation. This concept reflects three commonplace factors:
92 Colvin op cit at 23.
93 This statement is based on the fact that these two authors jointly published an article entitled 'The
Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crimes: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability' (1988)
11 Sydney Law Review 468 which, inter alia , deals with reactive fault. However, it seems fair to say that the
real originator is Brent Fisse as he had earlier on individually authored an article covering the subject: see
Brent Fisse 'Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and Sanctions' (1983)
56 Southern California Law Review 1141 at 1192 - 1213.
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(l) the strength of communal attitudes of resentment towards corporations
that stonewall or otherwise fail to react diligently when their attention is
drawn to the harmful or excessively risky nature of their operations.
(2) the inevitability in large or med ium size organisations of management by
exception, whereby complianc e is treated as a routine matter to be
delegated to inferiors and handled by them unless a significant problem
arises; and
(3) the extensive reliance on civil modes of enforcement in corporate
regulation and the typical perc eption among enforcement agencies that
criminal prosecutions against companies usually are warranted only where
civil enforcement has failed.
The concept of reactive fault offers a way of attributing intentionality to a
corporation in a manner both workable and corporate in orientation. Corporations
can and do act intentionally in so far as they enact and implement corporate
policies. Frequently, however, a boilerplate compliance policy will be in place,
and it is rare to find a company displaying a criminal policy, at least not a written
one, at or before the time of commission of the actus reus of an offence. The
position is different if the time-frame of inquiry is extended so as to cover what a
defendant has done in response to the commission of the actus reus of an offence.
What matters then is not a corporation' s general policies of compliance, but what
it specifically proposes to do to implement a programme of internal discipline,
struc tural reform, or compensation. This reorientation allows blameworthy
corporate intentionality to be flushed out more easily than is possible when the
inquiry is confined to corporate poli cy at or before the time of the actus reus. ,94
It is submitted that the suggested easy ride is not worth trying. Looking for
blameworthiness in conduct and states of mind which arise after the execution of the
actus reus is radically different from the way the system of finding blameworthiness
94 Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite 'The Allo cation of Responsibility for Corporate Crimes: Individualism,
Collectivism and Accountability' (1988) II Sydn ey Law Review 468 at 505 - 506.
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works at present. The current law is to the effect that culpability is sifted from the
conduct and states of mind at the time of commission of the actus reus." Once reactive
fault is adopted, culpability will be established from a review of corporate safety and
other procedures within an open-ended time frame. As a result the prosecutorial and
forensic burden would be huge. 96 When these factors are considered on the backdrop of
Malawi's economy, it becomes abundantly clear that reactive fault is an expensive basis
for corporate criminal liability, which Malawi cannot afford.
(d) Vicarious liability - the American version
In the United States of America corporate criminal liability is based principally on
vicarious liability. The courts operate from the basic finding that the acts of a corporation
are simply the acts of all of its employees operating within the scope of their
employment. It is said that a corporation, being not a natural living person, can act only
through its agents and that the purposes, motives and intent of those agents are just as
much those of the corporation as are things done." In Commonwealth v Angelo Todesca
Corporation't the corporation was a subcontractor involved in a road widening and
improvement project. The corporation's trucks were used to haul asphalt to the
construction site. On 01 December 2000 the corporation's truck while reversing at the
construction site with the help of a police officer, ran over the police officer's legs. The
corporation was charged with motor vehicle homicide. In delivering its judgment, the
court stated that because the defendant was a corporation, and not a living natural person,
it could act only through its agents. To prove that a corporation is guilty of a criminal
offence, the prosecution must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable
doubt: (1) that an individual committed a criminal offence; (2) that at the time of
committing the offence, the individual was engaged in some particular corporate business
95 Fowler v Padget (1798) 7 Tenn Rep 509,101 ER 1103.
96 Simester and Sullivan at 259 - 260 .
97 State v Ice & Fuel Co 81 S E 737 per Clark Cl
98 62 Mass App Ct 599,818 N E 2d 608.
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or project; and (3) that the individual had been vested by the corporation with the
authority to act for it, and on its behalf, in carrying out that particular corporate business
or proj ect when the offence occurred. Y
Similarly in Commonwealth v L.A.L . Corporation 100 the corporation (a close corporation)
was accused of violating a statute which proscribed the sale or delivery of any alcoholic
beverages or alcohol to any person under the age of 21. The corporation was licensed to
sell alcoholic beverages. On specified dates a minor purchased an alcoholic beverage
from a bartender employed by the corporation at its licensed premises. The minor was not
asked for identification. All the sales by the bartender violated the statute. The court was
required to consider the circumstances in which a close corporation may be criminally
liable for the criminal acts of its employees. It was held that the rule applicable to this
question was the same for both endocratic corporations (that is large, publicly-held
corporations) and close corporations. It was further held that any corporation is
criminally liable for criminal conduct, performed for its benefit, by its agent or employee
authorised to act for the corporation in relation to the particular sphere of corporate
business in which the agent was engaged when the criminal conduct took place. The
court rejected the corporation's argument that a corporation should only be criminally
liable for the conduct of its servants or agents where such conduct was performed,
authorised, ratified, adopted or tolerated by the corporation's directors, officers or other
'high managerial agents' who are sufficiently high in the corporate hierarchy to warrant
the assumption that their acts in some substantial sense reflect corporate policy. The court
emphasised that it was not necessary for the Commonwealth to prove that the individual
who acted criminally was a member of the corporation's board of directors, or that he
was a high-ranking officer in the corporation, or that he held any office at all.
The justification for holding the corporation criminally liable in these circumstances is
similar to the justification for the tort law doctrine of respondeat superior: since the
99 62 Mass App Ct 599 at 605, 818 N E 2d 608 at 613. On the facts before the court it was held that the case
against the corporation had not been made out. Consequently the corporation was acquitted.
100 400 Mass 737, 511 NE 2d 599.
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employee's act is done for the corporation's benefit, justice requires that the corporation
be held liable for the damage caused by the employee's conduct. Further, when a
corporation delegates responsibility to its agent, it should be responsible for the
consequences of that delegation. It seems fair that a corporation, which is a product of the
law and has ability to break the law, should be held liable for its criminal acts committed
h h i 101t roug Its servants or agents.
It may be observed that the American species of vicarious criminal liability is expansive.
Virtually any employee or agent can commit a crime which will be attributed to the
corporation. The range of employees is not limited to high-ranking officers as in English
law. While the wide scope has its advantages, it may be objected that it is unrealistic to
expect a corporation to police the actions of a huge workforce, possibly numbering in the
thousands. It may further be argued that even if the corporation were to take exemplary
steps to police such action, it cannot escape vicarious liability for the crime of a
disgruntled employee who manages to circumvent the relevant safeguards. 102
It is submitted that Malawi does not need such an expansive version of vicarious criminal
liability for the reasons stated in the previous paragraph and for the further related reason
that expansive liability may stifle the much-needed economic development in Malawi.
Instead of adopting this, it is recommended that Malawian law extend the scope of
corporate criminal liability through the incorporation of aspects of the aggregation
principle and organisational models. The suggested extension takes Malawian law a few
steps ahead of English law but does not go as far as the American species of vicarious
criminal liability.
101 Phillip A Wellner 'Effective Compliance Programs and Corporate Criminal Prosecutions' (2005) 27
Cardozo Law Review 497 at 503 - 504.
102 Gobert op cit at 722 - 723.
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7.4.2.4 The future of corporate criminal liability in Malawi
The suggested extension of corporate criminal liability is not an entirely new idea. In
some parts of the British Commonwealth (former English colonies and dependencies)
attempts have been made to effect such changes. For example, in Canada various
stakeholders had for long urged an expansion of corporate criminal liability. It appears
that the 1992 Westray mining disaster103 portrayed further to the authorities the need for
reform of the law in this area. In the year 2003 the Criminal Code 104 was amended with a
view to extend the boundaries of corporate criminal liability. Three crucial definitions
relating to corporate criminal liability were introduced and these are the definitions of
'organisation,' 'representative,' and 'senior officer.' An 'organisation' is defined in
section 2 as a public body, body corporate, society, company, firm, partnership, trade
union or municipality. It also covers an association of persons that is created for a
common purpose, has an operational structure and holds itself out to the public as an
association of persons. It is clear from this definition that the intention of the legislature
was to capture not only the traditional corporation but also similar bodies. However, in
the interest of consistency in presentation, the word 'organisation' is generally not used
hereinafter; in its place the word corporation is used.
The Code then distinguishes between a 'representative' and a 'senior officer.' A
representative in respect of an organisation refers to a director, partner, employee,
member, agent or contractor of the organisation. By senior officer is meant a
representative who plays an important role in the establishment of an organisation's
policies or is responsible for managing an important aspect of the organisation's activities
103 Twenty-six miners were killed in the Westray mining disaster. An inquiry into the disaster found that the
death~ were 'the catastrophic result of a series of failures in mining practices': 'Government Response to
the FIfteenth Report of the Sta~di~g Committee on Justice and Human Rights - Corporate Liability'
Nov~mber 2002 - http://www.JustIce.gc.ca(Accessedon24November2005).This document will
heremafter be referred to as 'Canadian Government Response'.
104 R S 1985, c C-46.
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and in the case of a body corporate, includes a director, its chief executive officer and its
chief financial officer. l05
In cnmes requmng fault other than negligence there are three bases for saddling a
corporation with criminal liability. The first is essentially the identification doctrine: the
corporation is liable if, with the intent at least in part to benefit the organisation, one of its
senior officers acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence. 106 The
second is to the effect that a corporation will be liable if, with the intent at least in part to
benefit the corporation, one of its senior officers having the mental state required to be a
party to the offence and acting within the scope of their authority, directs the work of
other representatives of the corporation that they do the act or make the omission
specified in the offence. The third is to the effect that a corporation will be liable if, with
the intent at least in part to benefit the corporation, one of its senior officers knowing that
a representative of the corporation is or is about to be a party to the offence, does not take
all reasonable measures to stop them from being a party to the offence. l07 It is arguable
from these provisions that the liability of the corporation in crimes requiring fault other
than negligence is not engaged unless and until a senior officer conducts himself
wrongfully with the intent at least in part to benefit the corporation. 108
In negligence-based crimes the Canadian Criminal Code provides that a corporation is
liable if, acting within the scope of their authority, (i) one of its representatives is a party
to the offence; or (ii) two or more of its representatives engage in conduct, whether by act
105 Section 2 of the Criminal Code.
106 The difference between this basis of liability and the identification theory lies in the former's
requirement that the senior officer must have an intent at least in part to benefit the organisation.
107 Section 22.2 of the Criminal Code.
108 This argument is in line with what the Canadian Government said before the amendments were effected.
In the Canadian Government Response op cit the Government stated that it intended to reform Canadian
criminal law to 'hold a corporation criminally liable for crimes of subjective intent that are committed on
behalf of or for the benefit of the corporation where a senior person with policy or operational authority (a)
committed the offence personally; or (b) had the necessary intent and directed the affairs of the corporation
so that lower-level employees carried out the prohibited conduct; or (c) was aware of or wilfully blind to
criminal activity carried out by lower-level employees and failed to take remedial action as soon as
practicable to stop the criminal conduct.'
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or omission, such that, if it had been the conduct of one representative, that representative
would have been a party to the offence. I09 It is arguable that the liability under (ii)
reflects the principle of aggregation as the conduct of more that one representative is
taken together and assessed as the conduct of only one representative. The Code
continues to say that in either requirement (i) or (ii) the corporation's liability will only
attach if the senior officer who is responsible for the aspect of the corporation's activities
that is relevant to the offence departs - or the senior officers, collectively, depart -
markedly from the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could reasonably be
expected to prevent a representative of the organisation from being a party to the
offence.11 0
It is clear from the foregoing that the Canadian law on corporate criminal liability is
wider than the identification doctrine. Although the current Canadian versi on still
requires the involvement of a senior officer, some of the relevant activities may be
conducted by junior officers, and the principle of aggregation may be applied. However,
it may be observed that the Canadian version does not espouse organisational modes of
corporate criminal liability as explained above. For this reason, it is not advisable for
Malawi to adopt this version in its entirety. It is suggested that from the Canadian version
Malawi should adopt the definition of 'organisation' and rework it to fit in the scheme of
its own legislation. This has been done in the proposed reform of Malawian law in
Chapter 8 hereof.
109 Section 22.1 (a) of the Criminal Code.
110 Section 22.1 (b) of the Criminal Code. There is scope for reading this last requirement conjunctively with
requ irement (i) or (ii) as has been done in the text, but there is also scope for read ing these three
requirements disjunctively. It appears that disjunctive reading was not intended as requirement (i) would
have the effect of operating like vicarious liability under American law , a possibility which was rejected in
the hearings for the reform of the law in this area. The Canadian Government Response op cit states:
'Vicarious liability in [the American] form was not the preferred option of any witness before the Standing
Committee. The Government shares the concerns expressed by many witnesses that vicari ous liability as
applied in the United States is contrary to the principles that underlie Canada's criminal law. While its
rigours are somewhat attenuated by the United States Sentencing Guidelines which allow for reductions in
the prescribed fine in accordance with the corporation 's culpability score, many would argue that under
Canadian law it would be wrong in principle to impose the stigma of a criminal offence on a corporation
when its actions are not morally blameworthy.' In light of these comments and considering the use of the
word ' and ' at the end of requirement (ii), the approach adopted in the text is conjunctive reading.
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Another attempt at extension of corporate criminal liability in the British Commonwealth
was made in Australia. The changes that have now been effected in that country are more
extensive than those in Canada. In the Australian Criminal Code Act!!! aspects of the
aggregation principle and organisational models of corporate criminal liability are
incorporated. It is necessary to quote the provisions of the Code in this respect (section
12) since they have potential for operating as a precedent for Malawi. Section 12 of the
Code is in the following terms:
'12.1 General principles
(1) This Code applies to bodies corporate in the same way as it applies to
individuals. It so applies with such modifications as are set out in this Part, and
with such other modifications as are made necessary by the fact that criminal
liability is being imposed on bodies corporate rather than individuals.
(2) A body corporate may be found guilty of any offence, including one
punishable by imprisonment.
Note: Section 4B of the Crimes Act 1914 enables a fine to be imposed for
offences that only specify imprisonment as a penalty.
12.2 Physical elements
If a physical element of an offence is committed by an employee, agent or officer
of a body corporate acting within the actual or apparent scope of his or her
employment, or within his or her actual or apparent authority, the physical
element must also be attributed to the body corporate.
III Act No. 12 of 1995.
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12.3 Fault elements other than negligence
(1) If intention, knowledge or recklessness is a fault element in relation to a
physical element of an offence, that fault element must be attributed to a body
corporate that expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the
commission of the offence.
(2) The means by which such an authorisation or permission may be established
include:
(a) proving that the body corporate's board of directors intentionally, knowingly
or recklessly carried out the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence; or
(b) proving that a high managerial agent of the body corporate intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly engaged in the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or
. impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the offence; or
(c) proving that a corporate culture existed within the body corporate that
directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance with the relevant
provision; or
(d) proving that the body corporate failed to create and maintain a corporate
culture that required compliance with the relevant provision.
(3) Paragraph (2)(b) does not apply if the body corporate proves that it exercised
due diligence to prevent the conduct, or the authorisation or permission.
(4) Factors relevant to the application of paragraph (2)(c) or (d) include:
(a) whether authority to commit an offence of the same or a similar character had
been given by a high managerial agent of the body corporate; and
(b) whether the employee, agent or officer of the body corporate who committed
the offence believed on reasonable grounds, or entertained a reasonable
expectation, that a high managerial agent of the body corporate would have
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence.
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(5) If recklessness is not a fault element in relation to a physical element of an
offence, subsection (2) does not enable the fault element to be proved by proving
that the board of directors, or a high managerial agent, of the body corporate
recklessly engaged in the conduct or recklessly authorised or permitted the
commission of the offence.
(6) In this section:
"board of directors" means the body (by whatever name called) exercising the
executive authority of the body corporate;
"corporate culture" means an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice
existing within the body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in
which the relevant activities takes place;
"high managerial agent" means an employee, agent or officer of the body
corporate with duties of such responsibility that his or her conduct may fairly be
assumed to represent the body corporate's policy.
12.4 Negligence
(1) The test of negligence for a body corporate is that set out in section 5.5.
(2) If:
(a) negligence is a fault element in relation to a physical element of an offence;
and
(b) no individual employee, agent or officer of the body corporate has that fault
element;
that fault element may exist on the part of the body corporate if the body
corporate's conduct is negligent when viewed as a whole (that is, by aggregating
the conduct of any number of its employees, agents or officers).
(3) Negligence may be evidenced by the fact that the prohibited conduct was
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substantially attributable to:
(a) inadequate corporate management, control or supervision of the conduct of
one or more of its employees, agents or officers; or
(b) failure to provide adequate systems for conveying relevant information to
relevant persons in the body corporate.
12.5 Mistake of fact (strict liability)
(1) A body corporate can only rely on section 9.2 (mistake of fact (strict liability))
in respect of conduct that would, apart from this section, constitute an offence on
its part if:
(a) the employee, agent or officer of the body corporate who carried out the
conduct was under a mistaken but reasonable belief about facts that, had they
existed, would have meant that the conduct would not have constituted an
offence; and
(b) the body corporate proves that it exercised due diligence to prevent the
conduct.
(2) A failure to exercise due diligence may be evidenced by the fact that the
prohibited conduct was substantially attributable to:
(a) inadequate corporate management, control or supervision of the conduct of
one or more of its employees, agents or offic ers; or
(b) failure to provide adequate systems for conveying relevant information to
relevant persons in the body corporate.
12.6 Intervening conduct or event
A body corporate cannot rely on section 10.1 (intervening conduct or event) in
respect of a physical element of an offence brought about by another person if the
other person is an employee, agent or officer of the body corporate. '
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The Australian Criminal Code Act departs from the identification doctrine where, inter
alia, it permits the prosecution to lead evidence that the corporation's unwritten rules
tacitly authorised non-compliance or failed to create a culture of compliance. This feature
will address situations in which non-compliance was expected, although formal
documents appeared to require compliance.lf In addition, this feature reflects
organisational models of corporate criminal liability, especially when one considers the
meaning of 'corporate culture.' The corporate culture cannot be identified with any
employee, agent, or officer. It can only be identified with the corporation or part of it. So
liability based on corporate culture is truly corporate in nature.113 Further, the Australian
Criminal Code Act incorporates the principle of aggregation when it states that
negligence as a fault element of an offence may exist on the part of a corporation if the
corporation's conduct is negligent when viewed as a whole, that is, by aggregating the
conduct of any number of its employees, agents or officers. The overall effect of these
features , together with other corporate liability provisions, is that the Australian Criminal
Code Act applies general principles of criminal responsibility to natural and corporate
persons almost uniformly with few exceptions aimed at accommodating the fact that
criminal liability is being imposed on corporations rather than natural persons.'!"
Although the corporate criminal liability provisions of the Australian Criminal Code Act
are laudable, their adoption in Malawi needs to take into account local circumstances. For
112 Alan Rose' 1995 Australian Criminal Code Act: Corporate Criminal Provisions' (1995) 6 Criminal Law
Forum 129 at 136.
113 Celia Wells ' The Law Commission Report on Involuntary Mans laughter: The Corporate Manslaughter
Proposals: Pragmatism, Paradox and Peninsularity' [1996] Crim LR 545 at 552 - 553 writes: 'The Act
legislates general principles of criminal responsibility and the section dealing with corporate liability
provides that for offences of intention, knowledge or recklessness "that fault element must be attributed to a
body corporate that expressly, tacitly or impl iedl y autho rised or perm itted the commission of the offence."
Authorisation or permission can be shown in one of three ways--the first echoes the Tesco v. Nattrass
version of identification liability, and the second extends the net wider to "high managerial agents". It is the
third which represents a clear endorsement of an organisational or systems model, based on the idea of
"corporate culture. '" [Emphasis added. Footnotes omitted].
114 Rose op cit at 137 - 138. The autho r continues to say, 'The j ustification behind this approach to
corporate criminal liability is that the pervasive role played, especially by large national and multinational
companies, in economic, financial, social , and polit ical affairs on the national and the international level
requires tools to force compliance across the full civil, criminal, and administrative/regulatory spectrum.'
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instance, it is not necessary in the Malawi scenario to make specific provision for the test
of negligence. Similarly, it is not necessary to state expressly that in offences of strict
liability bodies corporate have a defence of mistake of fact. Actually reference to 'strict
liability' in the Australian Criminal Code Act is not exactly the same as reference to
'strict liability' in Malawi. The confines of strict liability in the two jurisdictions are
somewhat different. In the light of these concerns and differences, it is suggested that the
Australian provisions be modified appropriately to fit in the Malawian mould. This has
been done in Chapter 8 hereof.
7.4.3 Liability of controlling officers
Several environmental statutes in Malawi contain provisions dealing with the liability of
controlling officers, that is, those natural persons who run the activities of the
corporation. These provisions may be split into two categories: provisions which do not
have an inbuilt defence and those which have an inbuilt defence. The former occur in the
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1983, the Mines and Minerals Act 1 of
1981 and the Public Health Act 12 of 1948. The latter occur in the Environment
Management Act 23 of 1996 and the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of
1997. These provisions will now be analysed.
Section 126 of the Mines and Minerals Act 1 of 1981 and section 75 of the Petroleum
(Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1983 are identical. They state that when an offence
committed by a body corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or
connivance of, or to be attributable to any neglect on the part of, a director, manager,
secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate or any person who was purporting
to act in any such capacity, he, as well as the body corporate, is guilty of that offence and
liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. From this it is clear that there
must be two factors for liability of the controlling officer to attach: (a) an offence
committed by a body corporate; (b) relevant consent or connivance or neglect on the part
of the controlling officer. Proof of these factors beyond reasonable doubt rests on the
prosecution throughout the trial. It appears that 'consent' and 'connivance' extend the
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common law slightly, since the controlling officer who expressly consents or connives at
the commission of the offence may be held liable under the principles of secondary
participation in the crime. I IS The word 'neglect' introduces broader negligence-based
liability: the controlling officer may be convicted for negligently failing to prevent the
offence. Whether the controlling officer is under a relevant duty depends on the facts of a
particular case and, as stated above , it is the obligation of the prosecution to show the
existence of that duty and breach thereof by the controlling officer. I 16
In this connection, the special position of directors must be noted. In order to ascertain
the duties of a director, it is necessary to consider the nature of the company's business
and the manner in which the work of the company is in fact distributed between the
directors and other officials of the company. A director need not exhibit in the
performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than may reasonably be expected from
a person of his knowledge and experience. A director is not bound to give continuous
attention to the affairs of his company. In respect of all duties that may properly be left to
some other official, a director is generally justified in trusting that official to perform
such duties honestly. I 17 In Huckerby v Elliott l 18 a company was convicted of providing
gaming premises without an appropriate licence contrary to a statute. A charge was
brought under the same statute against a director in that the offence was attributed to her
neglect. The evidence revealed that she knew little of the conduct of the premises and that
she had no knowledge of whether or not a licence had been obtained. The court dismissed
the charge against the director, holding that a director of a company cannot be said to be
neglectful if he fails to enquire about certain matters which are dealt with by a fellow
director or a company official, that the accused director was entitled to leave certain
115 S . h d H .rmt an ogan op crt at 175.
116 Ibid.
117 Re City Equitable Fire Insuranc e Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 at 427 - 429 per Romer 1. See also Chilumpha
op cit at 144 - 149.
118 [1970] 1 All ER 189.
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matters to a fellow director or a company official and that in the circumstances neglect on
her part had not been shown.
Another statute which has a provision dealing with the liability of controlling officers
without an inbuilt defence is the Public Health Act 12 of 1948. Its section 139 provides
that where a contravention of the Act or any rule made under it is committed by any
company or corporation, the secretary or manager thereof may be summoned and held
liable for such contravention and its consequences. It is worth noting that the controlling
officers mentioned are only the secretary and the manager. It is suggested that 'manager'
should mean a person managing the affairs of the company and not necessarily everyone
bearing the title of 'manager' in the company set-up.i'" It is further suggested that the
number of controlling officers who may potentially be liable should be increased
expressly in the section by adopting the more common formula/phrase 'director,
manager, secretary or other similar officer.' Confining potential liability to the secretary
and manager only appears to be unduly restrictive.
Of the provisions on the criminal liability of controlling officers with an inbuilt defence,
the most important is section 75 of the EMA. It declares that where an offence under the
EMA is committed by a body corporate, every director, manager or similar officer of the
body corporate shall be guilty of the offence. Where the offence is committed by a
partnership, every partner is jointly and severally liable for the offence. 120 A person is not
liable on these grounds if he proves to the satisfaction of the court that the act constituting
the offence was done without his knowledge, consent or connivance and he did his part to
prevent the commission of the offence having regard to all the circumstances of the case.
It is suggested that section 75 of the EMA creates an offence of strict liability. In R v
Howells
121
the court stated that in an offence not containing an express requirement of
119 Tesco Supermarkets Ltdv Nattrass [1972] AC 153 at 178; Smith and Hogan op cit at 175.
120 This is a time-honoured principle: see R v Mahomed Hanif 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 145 and Rv Patel and
Sons 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 569.
121 [1977] QB 614 at 626. See also R v Bradish [1990] 1 QB 981.
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mens rea, the existence of a defence of proof of lack of knowledge may indicate that the
offence is one of strict liability as the defence seeks to alleviate its strictness. Writers
have accepted this line of thinking and have expanded on it. It is said that where an
offence 'apparently cast in absolute terms ' allows the applicability of a due-diligence
defence or no-negligence defence, the offence is one of strict liability.122 On a more
general level it has been argued that a clearer indication of the strict liability nature of an
offence occurs where the statute itself creates a specific defence, e.g. of no-negligence. It
is contended that such a defence would be otiose if full mens rea was a necessary
ingredient of the offence. 123 Applying these authorities to section 75 of the EMA, it will
be noted that section 75 does not expressly require mens rea on the part of a controlling
officer and it also has a no-knowledge and due diligence defence. It follows that section
75 is an offence of strict liability. Upon establishing that an offence has been committed
by the company there is no need to prove fault on the part of the controlling officer. The
defence provided to the controlling officer alleviates the strictness of the offence and it is
unlikely on this score that Malawian courts will strike it down as being
unconstitutional. 124
Section 48 of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997 is couched in
considerably different language. It provides:
'Where any offence under this Act is committed by a company or by any member
of a partnership, firm or business, society or association of persons, every director
or officer of that company or any other member of the partnership or other person
122 Blackstone 's Criminal Practice op cit at 64 .
123 Simester and Sullivan op cit at 177.
124 Writers accept the use of strict liability when it is coupled with a rele vant defence: Simester and Sullivan
op cit at 185 - 186 and Jordaan op cit at 69. Even Lord Reid implicitly accepted this in Sweet v Parsley
[1970] AC ~32 at 150 whe~ he said: 'The choice would be much more difficult if there were no other way
open than either mens rea In the full sense or an absolute offence; for there are many kinds of case where
putting o~ the pro~ecutor the full burden of pro ving mens rea creates great difficulties and may lead to
many unjust acquittals. But there are at least two other possibilities. Parliament has not infrequently
transfeITe~ the om~s as regards mens rea to the accused, so that , once the necessary facts are proved, he
must convince the Jury that on balance of probabiliti es he is innocent of any criminal intention .'
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concerned with the management of such partnership, firm or business, society or
association of persons shall be liable for the offence unless he proves to the
satisfaction of the court that -
(a) he used due diligence to secure compliance with this Act; and
(b) the offence was committed without his knowledge, consent or
connivance. '
This section spells out more clearly the types of organisation the officer should be part of
for him to be held liable: the controlling officer may be part of a company, partnership,
firm, business, society or association of persons. The section does not use the term 'body
corporate.' Further, apart from company directors and officers, liability will only attach
to those members who are concerned with the management of the partnership, firm,
business, society or association. These comments aside, it appears that the section has
largely the same effect as section 75 of the EMA. Accordingly, for the reasons advanced
above in respect of section 75, it is suggested that section 48 contains a strict liability
offence. As long as it is proved that an offence has been committed by a company, etc,
the controlling officer will be held liable withou t proof of mens rea unless he can make
out the due diligence and no-knowledge defence.
It may be argued that the so-called defences are actually reverse burdens of proof125 and
that such reverse burdens may conflict with an accused person's right to a fair trial, in
particular the accused person's right to be presumed innocent as provided for in section
42(2)(f)(iii) of the Malawian Constitution. The challenge appears to have considerable
force. Actually in some jurisdictions the challenge has been the subject of litigation for
125 A reverse burden, it may be recalled from Chapter 3 hereo f, is an onus on an accused to prove some
matter the effect of which is that he is not guilty of the offence charged. Such a burden may require the
accused to prove the absence of one of the ingredients of the actus reus or the absence of a particular type
of mens rea or the existence of a defence: Ian Dennis ' Reverse Onuses and the Presumption of Innocence:
In Search of Principle' [2005] Crim LR 901 at 901 - 902. At 902 Dennis draws a distinction between the
legal burden (also known as persuasive burden) of proof and the evidential burden. He writes: 'A defendant
who bears a legal burden will lose if he fails to persuade the fact-finder of the matter in question on the
balance of probabilities. An evidential burden in relation to a matter is a burden of adducing sufficient
evidence to raise an issue regarding the existence of the matter. The burden of disproof will then fall on the
prosecution in accordance with the normal rule . The significance of the distinction ... is that evidential
burdens are regarded as compatible with the presumption of innocence. '
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long. Malawi has not had such litigation, but it is likely to arise in the near future. What
should be the response of Malawian courts? The approaches in South Africa and the
United Kingdom will be considered and then recommendations will be made as to how
Malawian courts should deal with the matter.
In South Africa the matter was essentially settled by S v Coetzee. 126 In this case the
accused had been charged with, inter alia, fraud. On his request the trial was suspended in
order to have the guidance of the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of section
332(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. That section provided that a servant or
director of a body corporate that had committed an offence was deemed to be guilty of
that offence and personally liable to punishment unless the servant or director could
prove on a balance of probabilities that he or she had not participated in the offence and
could not have prevented it. Delivering the majority judgment, Langa J (as he then was)
held that section 332(5) imposed an onus on the accused to prove an element which was
relevant to the verdict and that the onus provisions of the section violated the right to be
presumed innocent. Specifically he said:
'The fact that section 332(5) requires that the accused director should, on pain of
conviction, prove that he or she did not take part in the commission of the offence
and could not have prevented others from doing so, even if it is formulated as an
exception, has the same consequences as a reverse onus provision which relates to
an essential element of the offence. Such accused will be convicted unless he or
she discharges the onus; this despite the existence of a reasonable doubt with
regard to such accused's participation in the offence and the ability to have
prevented it.' 127
126 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC).
127 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC) at para 39. See the analysis of this case by Angelo Pantazis 'Criminal Law'
[1997] Annual Survey of South African Law 610 at 611 - 614 and by M P Larkin and Julia Boltar
'Company Law (including Close Corporations)' [1997] Annual Survey ofSouth African Law 403 at 433 _
435.
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The court went on to hold that the violation of the right to be presumed innocent could
not be justified in terms of section 33(1) of the South African Constitution and that,
notwithstanding the legitimate purposes served by the section in relation to the honest
conduct of the affairs of corporate bodies, the section was impermissibly overbroad in
imposing an onus on a director or servant of a corporate body to avoid liability for an
offence committed by the corporate body. The type of offence by the corporate body for
which an accused director or servant could be held liable was not limited. All the
offences were included notwithstanding their nature, purpose or degree of remoteness
from the ordinary activities of the corporate body and therefore from the legitimate
purpose of the section. In these circumstances section 332(5) was declared
unconstitutional, invalid and of no force or effect whatsoever. No severance of the invalid
provisions of the section was possible that would leave the section constitutionally valid
while giving effect to the purpose of the legislative scheme.
In the United Kingdom several recent cases have grappled with the question whether
statutory defences which in effect impose reverse burdens on the accused are compatible
with the presumption of innocence. In R v Lambert128 the strongest and most forceful
views on the point were expressed by Lord Steyn but these views were obiter.
Subsequently in R v Johnstone 129 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead suggested the principles to
be applied, but again his speech on these issues was obiter. In Attorney General's
Reference (No 1 of2004/ 30 the Court of Appeal adv ised that courts should not follow R v
Lambert but R v Johnstone and the ten-point guidance advanced by the Court of
Appeal. 131 Not long after the delivery of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Andrew
128 [2001] 2 Cr App R 511, [2002] 2 AC 545 (House of Lords) .
129 [2003] 1 WLR 1736 (House of Lords).
130 [2004] 2 Cr App R 27, [2004] 1 WLR 2111.
131 Attorney Gell era~ 's Reference (No 1 of 2004) [2004] 2 Cr App R 27, [2004] 1 WLR 2111 at para 52. For
a commentary on this case , see P W Ferguson ' Reverse Burdens of Proor (2004) 22 Scots Law Times 133.
Ferguson is of the opinion that the guidance appears to be intended to make justification of reverse burdens
easier for the prosecution.
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Ashworth prophesied that the decision would be short-lived. 132 This prophecy was
fulfilled about six months later in Sheldrake v Director ofPublic Prosecutions'l where
Lord Bingham of Cornhill (delivering the majority judgement) refused to endorse the
guidance given by the Court of Appeal save to the extent that it was in accordance with
the opinions of the House of Lords in several cases , the most prominent of which were
Lambert, Johnstone and Sheldrake itself. 134 After tearing down the ten-point guidance of
the Court of Appeal, Lord Bingham did not offer clear alternative guidance on how to
interpret statutes that impose reverse burdens. l" The consequence is that there is no
single United Kingdom decision that contains the relev ant principles, but the effect of
several decisions is that in determining whether reverse burdens are compatible with the
presumption of innocence, a three-stage inquiry must be followed:
(1) Interpretation of the statute: does the provision in question, interpreted in
accordance with the ordinary principles of construction, place a burden on the
accused? If so, is it a legal or an evidential burden? If it is evidential no further
inquiry need be made about compatibility with the presumption of innocence. If it
is a legal burden, the court must move to stage 2 to assess the question of
compatibility.
(2) Justification of the reverse onus: does the prOVISIon In question serve a
legitimate aim and is it proportionate to that aim? If the answer is Yes, the
132 Andrew J Ashworth [2004] Crim LR 832 at 835.
133 [2005] 1 AC 264, [2005] 1 All ER 237.
134 [2005] 1 AC 264 at para 32. At para 30 Lord Bingham of Cornhill declared: ' Both R v Lambert [2002] 2
AC 545 and R v Johnstone [2003] 1 WLR 1736 are recent decisions of the House, binding on all lower
courts for what they decide. Nothing said in R v Johnstone suggests an intention to depart from or modify
the earlier decision, which should not be treated as superseded or implicitly overruled. Differences of
emphasis (and Lord Steyn was not a lone voice in R v Lambert) are explicable by the difference in the
subject matter of the two cases. '
135 Andrew J Ashworth [2005] Crim LR 215 at 219 writes that the only certainty from the judgment is that
' courts should use section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 fully, and should not defer to the intention of
P~rliament, least of all where there is no evidence that the legislature had the presumption of innocence in
mind. Beyond t~la~ , there seem to be three major factors to be taken into account - maximum penalty, the
danger of convicting the innocent, and the ease of proof. ' See also P W Ferguson 'Proof of Innocence'
(2004) 36 Scots Law Times 223 .
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provision is an acceptable qualification to the presumption of innocence. The
defendant will then bear the burden of proof on the matter in question, although to
a lower standard of proof than the prosecution (namely the balance of
probabilities). If the answer is No, the court must move to stage 3.
(3) Reading down the provision: if the reverse legal burden cannot be justified,
can the court 'read down' the burden to an evidential one? If it can, it should do
so. If it cannot, the court should make a declaration of incompatibility of the
.. 136
provision.
The process of interpretation of the statute must consider three factors. First, the object of
the legislation (i.e. the mischief at which the statute was aimed). Second, practical
considerations affecting the burden of proof, for instance the relative ease or difficulty of
proof. Third, the seriousness of the offence. These same principles are applied in the
process of justification of the reverse onus, coupled with several others among which are
judicial deference and classification of offences. 137
It may be observed that following the South African approach will mean that the defences
specified in section 75 of the EMA and section 48 of the Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act will be declared null and void on the basis of incompatibility with the
presumption of innocence. On the other hand, adopting the English approach has scope
for saving the defences or at least reading them down into evidential burdens. The
English approach therefore commends itself to adoption. However, its adoption should be
meant only to inform the local constitutionality adjudication process. It may be recalled
that in Chapter 3 hereof it was demonstrated that whenever there is an apparent violation
(limitation) of a particular human right or freedom, the violation (limitation) may be
justified if it satisfies the following conditions: (a) it must be prescribed by law; (b) it
136 Dennis op cit at 905.
137 Dennis op cit at 907 - 918. Judicial deference deals with the question of how much weight courts should
give to the decisions of Parliament as to the imposition of the burden of proof. The courts appear to accept
that deference is a matter of degree. As for classification of offences, a distinction is sometimes drawn
between acts which are truly criminal and those which are merely regulatory or quasi-criminal. It is said
that it is easier to justify an interference with the presumption of innocence when the relevant offence is
quasi-criminal or regulatory in nature: ibid.
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must be reasonable; (c) it must be recognised by interna tional human rights standards;
and (d) it must be necessary in an open and democratic society. It is recommended that in
going through these elements, courts should bear in mind the crucial importance of
environmental protection. The scientific evidence worldwide suggests that there is need
for strong action to protect the environment. We are living in an environmental crisis, an
environmental emergency. In these circumstances the present generation of humankind
has no basis for unnecessarily maintaining strict adherence to these so-called time-
honoured fundamental principles of criminal law especially in areas like the liability of
controlling officers of companies. These principles can be qualified where necessary and
it is submitted that it is necessary in the present scenario. If the defences (reverse
burdens) in issue do indeed infringe the accused's right to be presumed innocent - which
is disputed below - such infringement can be justified on the ground that it is meant to
deal with the special problems created by companies that engage in criminal activity.
When a corporation is convicted of a crime, the commonest punishment meted out
against it is a fine which can simply be dismissed as the cost of doing business. The
corporation cannot be imprisoned. Making controlling officers liable for the sins of the
corporation provides an opportunity for the sanction of imprisonment to be employed.
In the process of imputing liability to the controlling officers it is unrealistic to require
that the prosecution prove fault - the prosecution would meet insuperable difficulties to
prove fault beyond reasonable doubt on the part of the controlling officer. When
corporations are faced with criminal investigation, corporate personnel tend to close
ranks out of loyalty or through fear of dismissal resulting in the shielding of controlling
officers.l " In such circumstances it is almost impossible for the prosecution to gather
evidence of fault on the part of the controlling officers. This problem is exacerbated in
large corporations. In contrast the controlling officers know their corporate systems and
are better placed to show lack of fault on their part. Requiring them to show that lack of
fault doesn't appear to be unfair when the severity of the environmental threat is borne in
138 Brent .Fisse 'The Duality of Corporate and Individu al Criminal Liability' in EIIen Hochstedler (ed)
Corporations as Criminals Beverl y HiIIs: Sage Publications 1984 69 at 70.
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mind. After all, these are offences of strict liabil ity and permitting the accused to rely on
the defences is in essence doing him a favour. This point leads to the next.
From the literature on the subject it seems that the opposition against the defences
(reverse burdens) in this area is highly premised on their alleged violation of the
presumption of innocence (and hence the right to a fair trial) through the possibility of the
accused being convicted where there is reasonable doubt as to the accused's complicity in
the crime. 139 This argument is misguided especially when considering section 75 of the
EMA and section 48 of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act. As indicated
above, these provisions contain strict liability offences: once it is established that an
offence has been committed by the corporation, the prosecution is not required to prove
any fault on the part of the controlling officer in order to hold him liable for the offence.
If these sections had stopped here (that is, if the sections had not included the defences)
no question would generally arise as to the infringement of the presumption of innocence
or the unfairness of the trial. In the circumstances, it does not make sense to say that the
defences - which are meant to mitigate the strict liability nature of the offences - lead to
unfairness of the trial or the conclusion that the accused is not being presumed innocent.
In the language of Kentridge AJ, 'if an offence of absolute liability had been created, it
would not in itself have given rise to any question of unfairness of the trial of such an
offence. When the severity of such a provision has been mitigated by allowing the
accused to prove a special defence it is in my view illogical if not perverse to say that this
destroys the fairness of the trial.' 140 This South African judge has not been a lone voice in
the wilderness. Cory J (a Canadian) has declared:
'Criminal offences have always required proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; the accused cannot, therefore, be convicted where there is a reasonable
doubt as to guilt. This is not so with regulatory offences, where a conviction will
lie if the accused has failed to meet the standard of care required .... If the false
139 See, for instance, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in R v Johnstone [2003] 1 WLR 1736 at para 50.
140 S v Coetzee 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC) at para 93. It is clear from the judgment that by 'offence of absolute
liability,' Kentridge AJ means an offence of strict liability.
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advertiser, the corporate polluter and the manufacturer of noxious goods are to be
effectively controlled, it is necessary to require them to show on the balance of
probabilities that they took reasonable precautions to avoid the harm which
actually resulted. In the regulatory context, there is nothing unfair about imposing
the onus; indeed it is essential for the protection of our vulnerable society.' 141
Similarly Mclntyre J stated that if the accused 'is convicted in the face of such a defence,
it is not because he has been presumed guilty or because the commission of the crime has
not been shown, but because his excuse was rejected after proof of the commission of the
offence. An accused raising such a defence or excuse is not seeking relief because of an
absence of guilt. He seeks relief despite his commission of the offence.' 142
Even in the United Kingdom Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Lord Carswell concurring) has
acknowledged the validity of rejecting the argument that the defences (reverse onuses) in
issue permit a conviction in spite of the existence of a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the accused. 143
In light of the foregoing, the present researcher is of the view that the reverse onuses in
the form of statutory defences provided for in section 75 of the EMA and section 48 of
the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act do not violate an accused person's right
to be presumed innocent or right to a fair trial. The reverse onuses in this context are
necessary in the interest of environmental protection. It is suggested that Malawian courts
should uphold the validity of these two sections. 144
141 R v Wholesale Travel Group Inc (1992) 84 DLR (4th) 161 at para 100.
142 IR v Ho mes (1988) 50 DLR (4th) 680 at para 63.
143 Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions [2005] I AC 264 at paras 65, 69 and 71. For Lord
Carswell's concurrence, see para 79. P W Ferguson 'Proof of Innocence ' (2004) 36 Scots Law Times 223
described Lord Rodger's and Lord Carswell's line of thinking as more compelling than that of the rest of
the Lords who presided over the matter (Lord Bingham of Comhill, Lord Steyn and Lord Phillips of Worth
Matravers MR) .
144 It must be pointed out that in Malawian environmental legislation it is only these two sections (section
75 of the EMA and section 48 of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act) which deal with the
liability of controlling officers and contain inbuilt defences in the form of reverse onuses. There are other
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The discussion will now focus on sentencing.
7.5 Sentencing environmental offenders
7.5.1 General
Proper sentencing is crucial in environmental protection, but this is only possible where
legislation or the law generally makes provision for appropriate punishments. The present
segment will investigate the types of punishments available for use in Malawi's
environmental protection. Thereafter a number of punishments used in other jurisdictions
or suggested by writers will be explored and proposals shall be made as to the possible
adoption of such punishments in Malawi.
7.5.2 Current sentencing for environmental crimes
7.5.2.1 Generally applicable penalties
The Penal Code 145 specifies the following punishments for crimes: death, imprisonment,
fine, payment of compensation, finding security to keep the peace and be of good
behaviour or to come up for judgment, liability to police supervision, forfeiture,
community service and any other punishment provi ded by the Code or by any law or
ACt. 146 Death is out of the question in environmental matters: actually there is no
environmental crime that allows the imposition of the death penalty. As for most of the
other punishments, there is scope for applying them in environmental crimes. However,
section 2(1) of the Penal Code states that nothing in the Code 'shall affect the liability,
environmental statutes in Malawi which contain reverse onuses but these other statutes do not deal with the
liability ofcontrolling officers and so they are not in issue here.
145 Act No 22 of 1929, cap 7:01 of the Laws of Malawi .
146 Section 25 of the Penal Code. Before 1994 this section included corporal punishment among the
possible punishments. This sanction has now been expressly repealed by section 19(4) of the Constitution
which states: 'No person shall be subject to corporal punishment in connection with any judicial
proceedings or in any other proceedings before any organ of State. '
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trial or punishment of a person for an offence against the Common Law or against any
other law in force in the Republic other than the Code.' The effect of this provision seems
to be that the punishments specified in the Code have no application to offences created
by other statutes including environmental statutes, but other provisions in the Code have
the opposite effect. For instance, section 29(3) provides, among other things, the periods
of imprisonment which may be imposed in default of payment of a fine ordered under
any Act. 147 The difficulty here may be solved by construing the reference to 'any other
law in force in the Republic other than this Code' as meaning any other law that was in
force at the date of commencement of the Code. This construction is in line with
available authority on saving clauses. 148 The function of a saving clause is to preserve
existing rights or powers and not to alter them. 149 Unless it expressly says so, it is no
function of a saving clause to preserve non-existing rights. In the instant case it is
arguable that section 2( 1) of the Code is a saving clause: there is arguably nothing in
section 2(1) that suggests that it intended to preserve rights or powers provided for in
subsequent legislation. Accordingly, it may be concluded that section 2(1) preserves
rights and powers provided for in legislation which was in force at the date of
commencement of the Code. Since most environmental statutes were enacted after the
commencement of the Code, the effect of the suggested construction is that the Code can
affect the punishment of environmental offenders at least in appropriate cases. After
adopting the suggested construction, it is still necessary to examine each relevant
provision on punishment in the Code to see whether it strictly applies to offences in the
Code only or not. When this is done, it is arguable that section 27 (imprisonment) and
section 29 (fines) are of general application whereas the other provisions on punishment
are either debatable on this aspect or strictly applicable to offences in the Code only.
147 See also section 25(9) and section 27 of the Penal Code.
148 J h IIo n Be and George Engle (eds ) Cross: Statutory Interpretation 2ed London: Butterworths 1987 at
121 sta~e that ' [a] saving clause resembles a proviso in its funct ion of qualifying the main provision , but has
no particular form. It often begins with a phrase such as "N othing in this section shall be construed as ... '"
149 Ibid. See also R v Brent Health Authority ex parte Francis [1985] QB 869 , [1985] 1 All ER 74.
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Apart from the foregoing penalties, Malawian courts are mandated to impose probation
and ancillary orders and to order an offender to perform public work. These are generally
applying penalties and so may be used in environmental circles. In imposing them courts
may specifically tailor them to serve the dema nds of environmental protection. Due to
their potential importance, they will be fleshed out in a bit more detail in the next few
paragraphs.
Where in any trial for an offence, other than an offence the sentence for which is fixed by
law, the court thinks that the charge is proved but that it is inexpedient to inflict any
punishment, the court may impose probation or ancillary orders. ISO The permissible
grounds for the opinion that it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment are the youth, old
age, character, antecedents, home surroundings, health or mental condition of the
accused, or the fact that the offender has not previously committed an offence, or the
nature of the offence or the extenuating circumstanc es in which the offence was
committed. ISI
A probation order may be imposed after or without convicting the offender. In either case
the offender must express his willingness to comply with the probation order. The court
cannot issue a probation order in the absence of the offender's willingness. Further,
before making the order, the court is required to explain to the offender that if he
commits another offence during the probation period, and if he fails in any respect to
comply with the order, he will be liable to be sentenced or convicted and sentenced for
the original offence. I s2
The probation order requires the offender to be under the supervision of a specified
probation officer for a period of between one and three years. Conditions attaching to the
150 Where a convicted person is detained, it is not possible for the court to make a probation order at the
same time: R v Tselize 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 331.
15\ Section 337 of the Criminal Procedure and Eviden ce Code, Act 36 of 1967, cap 8:01 of the Laws of
Malawi.
152 Section 337(l)(c)(i) and (5) of the Crimin al Procedure and Evidenc e Code.
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order may be such as are necessary for securing the offender's supervision and good
conduct and for preventing the commission of further offences by him.
153
If the offender
under a probation order fails to comply with the probation order or commits further
offences, he may be sentenced or convicted and sentenced in respect of the original
offence in connection with which the probation ord er was made.
154
Probation orders are
generally not made against adult offenders altho ugh there is scope for doing SO.155
The orders ancillary to a probation order include a probation bond, security for keeping
the peace and conditional discharge. With regard to a probation bond, section 337(1) of
the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code provides that where punishment is
inappropriatc' <" and it is expedient to release the offender on probation, a court may
convict the offender and direct that he be released on his entering into a probation bond,
with or without sureties, subject to the condition that during a specified period not
exceeding three years, he shall appear and receive sentence when called upon and in the
meantime shall keep the peace and be of good behaviour. The court may require the
offender to comply with additional conditions relating to supervision, residence,
employment, associations, abstention from intoxicating liquor or any other matter
whatsoever as the court may think desirable to impose.157 It appears from this (especially
the words in italics) that the court has a wide discretion as to what terms to impose. This
153 David Newman Criminal Procedure and Evidence in Malawi Zomba: University of Malawi Faculty of
Law 1982 at 241; section 4( 1) and section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act 10 of 1945, cap 9:01 of the
Laws of Malawi.
154 Sections 6 and 7 of the Probation of Offenders Act 10 of 1945. Failure to comply with a probation order
may also attract a fine not exceeding £10 without prejudice to the continuance in force of the probation
order: section 7(3)(a) of the Probation of Offenders Act 10 of 1945.
155 In Republic v Nasoni [1990] 13 Malawi Law Reports 400 at 403 Tambala Ag J acknowledged this fact.
He said: 'Probation orders affecting adult offenders are never, or very rarely, made by courts in this
country. The reason is simply that there is no prob ation servic e for adult offenders at the moment in the
country. There is however probation service prov ided by the Ministry of Community Services in
connection with juvenile offenders.'
156 The permissible grounds for the opinion that punishment is inexpedient are the same as those for a
similar opinion relating to a probation order.
157 Section 53 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code.
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apparently wide discretion was cut down in Republic v Kum wenda 158 where the court
ruled that the conditions 'must be reasonable, capable of precise construction so that a
court can readily ascertain any breach, and be associated in some way with the
circumstances surrounding the offence.' 159 Upon failure to comply with the conditions or
upon commission of another offence during the probation period, the offender may be
sentenced for the original offence. 160
In many ways security for keeping the peace operates like a probation bond. An offender
convicted of an offence the punishment for which is not fixed by law may, instead of or
in addition to any punishment to which he is liable, be ordered to enter into a bond with
or without sureties, in such amount as the court thinks fit, that he shall keep the peace and
be of good behaviour for a specified time.i '" The difference between this sanction and the
probation bond lies in the absence in the former of the possibility of the offender being
called upon in the future to receive sentence. Upon failure to keep the peace and failure to
be of good behaviour, the offender or any other surety will be required to pay the amount
secured under the bond as a penalty. 162
A conditional discharge is also similar to a probation bond. Where in a trial for an
offence the sentence for which is not fixed by law it is inexpedient to inflict any
punishment, the court may convict the offender and, if probation is not appropriate, make
an order discharging him subject to the condition that he commits no offence during a
'fi d . d di 163speci le peno not excee mg 12 months. If the offender commits an offence during
158 1971 -72 ALR Ma1425.
159 Newman op cit at 243.
160 Section 337(5) of the Criminal Procedure and Eviden ce Code.
161 Section 338 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code.
162 Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code.
163, ~ection 337( .I)(b) of.th~ Crimi,nal Procedure and Evidence Code. The permissible grounds for the
opinion that punishment IS inexpedient are the same as those for a similar opinion relating to a probation
order.
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the period of conditional discharge, he is liable to be sentenced for the original offence,
whereupon the order for conditional discharge ceases to have effect. 164
Sometimes a court may make an absolute discharge. The court may do this where it
thinks that the charge is proved but that it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment. The
court may, without proceeding to conviction, make an order dismissing the charge after
giving the offender an appropriate admonition or caution. Alternatively, the court may
convict the offender and, if probation is not appropriate, make an order discharging him
1 165absolute y.
Another sanction related to a probation order is police supervision. When a person,
having been convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of three
years or upwards, is again convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a
term of three years or more, the court may, at the time of passing the second sentence of
imprisonment, also order that he shall be subject to police supervision for a term not
exceeding five years from the date of his release from prison.l'" During the period of
supervision the offender reports himself personally once a month to the officer in charge
of a police station nearest to his place of residence. 167
With regard to community service, the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code authorises
the imposition of it as a condition of a suspended sentence. When a person is convicted of
an offence, not being an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law, the court may, if
it is of the opinion that the person would be adequately punished by a fine or
164 Section 337(5)(i) and (6) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code.
165 Section 337(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code. The permissible grounds for
the opinion that punishment is inexpedient are the same as those for a similar opinion relating to a
probation order.
166 In Petro v R 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 589 at 590 Spenser-Wi lkinson Cl stated that it is undesirable to
impose a police supervision order on a convicted person in addition to a removal order, as this is likely to
work unnecessary hardship on him. On the requirement that the total period of supervision must not exceed
five years , see R v Bester 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 426.
167 Sections 342 and 343 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code.
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imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, fine the person or sentence the
person to a term of imprisonment not exceeding twelve months but the court may, as the
case may be, order the suspension of the payment of the fine or operation of the sentence
of imprisonment on condition that the person performs community service for such
number of hours as the court may specify in the order.
In the same family with community service is the sanction of performing public work
The Convicted Persons (Employment on Public Work) Act 16 of 1954 ("CPEPWA,,)168
provides that where the offence for which the accused has been convicted would be
adequately punished by a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding six months, a court
may, in lieu thereof, order the accused to perform public work for a period of up to six
months. 169 The court may also order an offender to perform public work in default of
payment of a fine. 170 An offender ordered by a court to perform public work is required
to work for a period not exceeding eight hours each day (excluding Sundays and public
holidays) on such work as is allotted to him by the District Commissioner of the district
in which the offender was convicted.Y' Such offender may also be required to reside in
such place as the District Commissioner may direct or in a camp if the court so orders.l "
If the offender without reasonable cause fails to perform the allotted work or absents
himself from his place of work or residence, or fails to comply with any rules made under
the CPEPWA, he may be imprisoned for six months. The court imposing such
imprisonment may, in its discretion, revoke the order to perform public work l73 The
court has no power to impose an additional term of public work 174
168 Cap 9:03 of the Laws of Malawi.
169 Section 3(1) of the CPEPWA.
170 Section 3(3) of the CPEPWA.
171 The District Commissioner may authorise another person to allot the work to the offender: section 5(a)
of the CPEPWA.
172 Section 5 of the CPEPWA. The Convicted Persons (Employment on Public Work) Rules (GN 149/1948
and GN 152/1964 (M)) empowers the Minister to declare any place to be a labour camp for the purpose of
housing offenders ordered to perform public work.
173 Section 6 of the CPEPWA. See also R v Watchman s/o Soda and Jarson s/o Mbega 1961 - 63 ALR Mal
94 and Rv Gilliam 1961 - 63 ALR Mal 129.
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7.5.2.2 Penalties from environmental statutes
Although the Penal Code and other statutes discussed above do not speak with a clear
voice on the applicability of certain types of punishments to environmental crimes, it is
virtually beyond dispute that punishments other than imprisonment and fines may be
imposed in environmental crimes. The analysis of environmental crimes in Chapters 4
and 5 hereof established this fact. It was demonstrated in those chapters that the
following penalties may be imposed upon environmental offenders:
• Imprisonment: The maximum period of imprisonment is ten years. There is no
environmental statute that prescribes a longer term of imprisonment than this.
175
• Ordinary fines : These are once-off fines, meted out in respect of proscribed
conduct which is not being continued. i" The maximum fine expressly prescribed
so far is MWKl million. In
• Continuing offence fines: These fines are imposed in respect of continuing
offences. These fines are apposite in pollution offences or offences of omission.
Often an ordinary fine is exacted for proscribed conduct already committed and
then a continuing offence fine is imposed to deal with the possibility of the
conduct continuing. Such a penalty obviates the need for fresh prosecutions
whenever the conduct recurs. 178
174 R v Stefano s/o Chikoti 1923 - 60 ALR Mal 197 at 199 per Rigby Ag Cl.
175 For instance, under section 67 of the EMA.
176 For instance, under section 64 of the Forest ry Act 11 of 1997.
177 See section 67 of the EMA. However, there is a possibility ofa higher fine under section 74(1)(c) of the
Forestry Act 11 of 1997. This section prov ides that upon conviction of any person for an offence under that
Act the court may order that the person convicted pay ten times the amount of any royalties and other fees
which, had the act constituting the offence been authorised, would have been payable in respect thereof.
178 An example of the application of this penalty is section 61 of the EMA.
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• Value-equivalent fines: Here the fine is pegged to the value of the property or
resource which was the subject of the offence. Fines of this nature are fitting for
I . I' 179natural resource egis anon,
• Compensation: Upon conviction, the court may order compensation to be paid by
h ff d i 180the offender to any person w 0 su rere injury.
• Demolition or removal of offending structures or things: Where a structure or a
thing is erected or found in a prohibited area, the court may, upon conviction,
order that the structure or thing be demolished or removed. 181
• Seizure: The only place (in environmental legislation) where this is provided for
is section 74( 1)(f) of the Forestry Act 11 of 1997. Any carrier or vehicle which
has been used in the commission of an offence may be seized. This penalty is
different from forfeiture as there is in the penalty of seizure the possibility of
returning the carrier or vehicle to the offender after some time.
• Forfeiture: A number of statutes make provision for the forfeiture of 'contraband'
objects and instrumentalities of crime.
182
• Surrender or revocation of authorisations and disqualification: Upon conviction of
an offence involving an authorisation, the court may order that the offender
surrender the authorisation to a relevant authority or the court may revoke the
authorisation. The court may also disqualify the offender from holding an
authorisation for a specified period. 183
179 Section 35 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 11 of 1992 provides for this type of penalty.
180 Section 6 of the Protection of Animals Act 16 of 1944 and section 74(1)(b) of the Forestry Act 11 of
1997. The payment of the compensation may be direct or indirect. The compensation may be paid directly
from funds provided by the offender as compensation. The compensation may also be paid indirectly, that
is, from fines paid by the offender - this occurs where substantial compensation is in the opinion of the
court recoverable by civil suit: section 145(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code.
181 Section 74(1)(d) and (t) of the Forestry Act 11 of 1997.
182 For example secti on 17 of the Control and Diseases of Animals Act 41 of 1967 and section 13(2) of the
Fertilizers Farm Feeds and Remedies Act 12 of 1970. The language in the text has been adopted from
Michael Kidd 'Sentencing Environmental Crimes ' (2004) 11 SAJELP 53. This article will hereinafter be
referred to as 'Kidd Sentencing'.
183 See section 116 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 11 of 1992 and section 49 of the Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997. The latter section is a good precedent for the generally
applying provision that is needed for the EMA.
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7.5.2.3 Evaluation
The picture that emerges from the foregoing outline of penalties is that there is a wide
variety of penalties from which a court may choose to impose on an environmental
offender. This picture is misleading because the court 's choice is severely limited by the
specific provisions of the statutes. Most of the penalties are available only in respect of
offences in a particular statute. There are no generally applying penalties, only that
imprisonment and fines occur most often. Actually imprisonment and fines are the
standard penalties. The other penalties are mostly used as additional penalties.
Some penalties are apposite for certain proscribed conduct wherever the conduct is
proscribed, an example being surrender or revocation of authorisations. This penalty can
be imposed regardless of which statute makes provision for the offence involving the
authorisation. It is not suggested that this be a mandatory penalty; rather it is proposed
that it should be a discretionary penalty, which may be imposed in the most serious of
violations.
In this connection, it has been claimed that the penalties prescribed by Malawi's
environmental legislation are too low to deter offenders.184 This is not entirely correct.
The analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 reveals that the penalties prescribed in the EMA go as
high as MWK1 000 000 (US$ 9 174). These amounts may not be considered reasonably
capable of deterring offenders in the United States of America and other developed
countries or in Second World countries, but Malawi is not one of them. As a Third World
country the economy is small and so the fines prescribed in the EMA are reasonably
capable of deterring offenders at least for a couple of years to come. Certainly as the
economy improves, there will be need to increase the amounts.
As for the fines prescribed under other statutes, it is true that they are prima facie low.
However, the amounts of some of these fines should not be taken on face value because
184 Gracian Z Banda 'Report on Reform of Environmental Legislation in Malawi: Determining the Scope
and Need for Sectoral Reviews' 1997 (unpublished) at 92.
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some of these fines have been impliedly amended by the EMA. It may be recalled that
section 7 of the EMA declares that where a written law on the protection and
management of the environment or the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural
resources is inconsistent with any provision of the EMA, that written law is invalid to the
extent of the inconsistency. From this it is arguable that where a statute creates an offence
which is identical to or encompassed by an EMA offence, the penalty prescribed by the
EMA will take precedence over the penalty in the other statute. For instance, the
Waterworks Act 17 of 1995 creates the offence of passing prohibited matter into sewers
or drains and prescribes for it the penalty of MWK200 fine and a further fine of
MWK100 for each day on which the offence continues after conviction. 185 The prohibited
acts in this offence are essentially aspects of pollution. In the EMA offences relating to
pollution are punishable by a fine of not less than MWK20 000 and not more than
MWK1 000 000 and imprisonment for ten years. 186 An inconsistency in terms of penalty
is therefore evident in these two provisions. In light of the provisions of section 7 of the
EMA, the Waterworks Act provision is invalid to the extent of the penalties prescribed. It
follows that the punishment for the Waterworks Act offence is a fine of MWK20 000 or
more up to a maximum of MWK1 000 000 and imprisonment for ten years. As stated
above, these penalties are not low by Malawian standards. So even though on the face of
it the penalties prescribed in the Waterworks Act are low, they are in fact not so due to
the operation of section 7 of the EMA. This state of affairs applies to many offences
created by statutes other than the EMA.
However, it must be observed that not all offences have been affected by the EMA in that
way. There are still many offences the penalties of which have not been impliedly
amended by the EMA. For example, the offence of failure to give notice of discovery of a
mineral provided for in the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1983 187 is
not identical to or encompassed by any offence in the EMA. So no scope for
185 Section 29 of the Waterworks Act 17 of 1995.
186 Section 67 of the EMA.
187 Section 69 of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1983.
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inconsistency between it and the EMA exists and consequently implied amendment does
not apply. Its penalty of MWK5 000 therefore applies. Bearing in mind that offenders
under this offence are likely to be corporate bodies or juristic persons generally, the fine
is merely small change: it cannot deter them from committing the offence.
In light of the foregoing discussion, it may be concluded that the correct position
regarding penalties in Malawi is that some environmental statutes prescribe adequate
penalties for the time being, but others prescribe penalties which are too low to deter
offenders. The obvious recommendation is that the low penalties should be increased.
Thereafter there should be periodic reviews of the penalties in order to ensure that they
are in line with the state of the economy and the value of the currency (Malawian
Kwacha). It is further recommended that those offences that have been impliedly
amended by the operation of section 7 of the EMA should be identified and expressly
amended to reflect the correct penalties for the avoidance of doubt. In Malawi the bulk of
criminal trials are presided over by magistrates, most of whom are lay (non-lawyers) and
the prosecutors are mostly police officers who again are generally lay. This combination
of factors suggests that when faced with an environmental offence that has been
impliedly amended by the EMA, the prosecutors and the court may not readily recognize
the implied amendment. Actually they may not even have the urge to look elsewhere
when the statute before them clearly indicates a penalty for the offence, albeit small.
It may further be observed that many of the penalties discussed above are apparently
meant for natural persons. Even though 'person' is defined in the General Interpretation
Act 36 of 1966188 as including any company or association or body of persons, 'corporate
or unincorporate,' it is clear from the elaboration of many offences and penalties that
there is a general leaning towards expected commission by natural persons and
consequent imposition of the prescribed penalties on natural persons. In fact some of the
penalties can only be imposed on natural persons, for example imprisonment. This fact
reduces the number of penalties that can be meted out against the most dangerous
188 Cap 1:01 of the Laws of Malawi.
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environmental culprit, the corporation. In addition, some of the penalties are defective in
application or require reworking in order to achieve the goals of deterrence when applied
to corporations. Prominent among these is the fine which is by far the most common
sanction that can be levied against the corporation in the present legislative setup. One
difficulty about this is that our ability to deter the corporation by way of fines is
'confounded by our inability to set an adequate punishment cost which does not exceed
the corporation's resources. ,189 Other difficulties are that fines do not necessarily
encourage the delinquent corporation to put in place sufficient internal controls or to
rectify defective procedures; 190 that the fines are ultimately passed on to shareholders,
creditors, employees and consumers; 191 and that faced with the implications of fines on
innocent or less culpable parties, courts may refuse to impose high fines. 192 These
difficulties call for an adoption of sanctions that can adequately meet the challenges
posed by the corporate criminal. One of such sanctions is probation in a revised form.
This needs further explanation.
It will be recalled that the Malawian version of probation requires that the offender
should consent to its imposition. The court is not permitted to impose probation in the
absence of consent on the part of the offender. The problem with this requirement is that
a corporation which foresees the possibility of being saddled with stringent costly and
incapacitating probation conditions may not consent to probation; instead it may opt to
pay a fine or incur some other penalty. 193 This possibility of refusing to consent must be
negated in order to allow the use of probation in all appropriate cases. It is suggested that
189 John C Coffee Jr ' "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment' (1981) 79 Michigan Law Review 386 at 390. The author calls this barrier 'the
deterrence trap'. See also Poonam Puri 'Sentencing the Criminal Corporation' (200 I) 39 Osgoode Hall
Law Journal 61 I at 617 - 619.
190 Kidd Sentencing op cit at 69 .
191 Coffee op cit at 400 - 402. The author calls this 'the externality problem' or 'the overspill problem'.
192 Coffee op cit at 405 - 407. The author calls this ' the nullification problem'. Further difficulties have
been summarised by Kidd Sentencing op cit at 69 - 70.
193 Cf Coffee op cit at 448 - 449 .
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the offender should not have a choice in the matter: the requirement of consent should be
removed.
It may further be recalled that the Malawian version of probation requires the offender to
be put under supervision. The supervision is generally done by probation officers.
194
In
environmental matters, it is crucial that such probation officers be environmental experts
who can effectively and professionally supervise the implementation of the conditions of
probation. These experts may be drawn from government circles or the private sector. If
they are drawn from the private sector, they should be paid by government and in turn the
government should recover such payments from the offending corporation. This strategy
is likely to stimulate professionalism by obviating bias in favour of the corporation. The
argument here is that if the corporation is allowed to pay the private-sector expert, the
expert may feel obligated to act favourably towards the corporation. This possibility is
negated by the suggested payment from the government.
In addition the Malawian version of probation must be reformed in two other respects if it
is to be of great use in sentencing corporations which engage in environmental crime. In
the first place, probation should be regarded as a criminal sanction in its own right. It may
be recalled that the applicable legislation currently requires probation to be imposed only
where 'it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment. ' 195 This requirement suggests that
probation is not punishment (criminal sanction). Requiring an offender to take specified
steps or to follow a specified course of conduct and then denying that those steps or that
conduct amount(s) to punishment does not seem to be logical especially when the
specification of the steps or conduct follows after a criminal charge is proved and when
the steps or conduct lead(s) to loss of freedom in the way the offender conducts his or its
affairs. Accordingly it is suggested that probation should be regarded as punishment
(criminal sanction). In the second place, the legislative obsession with natural persons as
offenders should be done away with. The legislation should acknowledge the corporation
194 Section 8 of the Probation of Offenders Act 10 of 1945.
195 Section 337(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Eviden ce Code.
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as an offender and as a candidate for the sanction of probation especially In
environmental crime.
In order to effect the foregoing proposals on probation especially in respect of
corporations, it is suggested that a new provision be introduced in the EMA. It is not
advisable to effect the reforms in this regard by amending the Criminal Procedure and
Evidence Code or the Probation of Offenders Act because these statutes are general
enactments; they cover crimes of all sorts. Since the suggested reforms are limited to
environmental crimes, a better vehicle of reform is the EMA.
After effecting the suggested probation reform, it shall be possible to craft
environmentally beneficial probation conditions. For instance, a condition may require
the corporation to put in place sufficient internal controls or to rectify defective
procedures.
The discussion will now dwell on penalties that are currently not available for use in
Malawi. This is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of such remedies; rather it is
intended to be a brief description of selected penalties and an indication of their possible
adoption in Malawi. The omission of some penalties is deliberate: the current researcher
is of the opinion that the omitted penalties would not contribute much to the
environmental cause in the country.
7.5.3 Other sentencing options in environmental crime
Of the sentencing measures not in current use in Malawi the following will be
considered: adverse publicity, reparation order and disqualification from government
contracts. 196
196 I have borrowed these terms from Kidd Sentencing op cit.
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7.5.3.1 Adverse publicity
The sanction of adverse publicity entails requiring an offender to publicise his conviction
and the details of the offence he committed. While it may be used in respect of both
, 197" , f h 1 198 I' idnatural persons and corporations, It IS more potent In respect 0 t e atter. t IS Sal
that corporate prestige is a huge asset in the corporate world and that consequently
corporations hate unfavourable publicity that dents the prestige. One common effect in
certain societies is that consumers may shun the delinquent corporation's products and
this may lead to loss of profits. Although it has been shown to be effective in deterring
criminal conduct, adverse publicity has been faulted on a number of grounds. Among
these are that corporations can dilute adverse publicity through engaging in counter-
publicity; and that the exact impact of adverse publicity cannot be estimated reliably.l'"
These perceived faults are not insurmountable. The former loses much of its force when
one considers the possibility of restricting rebuttals. The latter is adequately met by the
observation that uncertainties of impacts attend all sentencing and it is not legitimate to
reject the use of adverse publicity on this perceived defect alone. 2oo
In the Malawi scenario adverse publicity has a role to play in environmental sentencing
albeit not a prominent one, It may be used as an additional sanction. It is arguable that
environmental consciousness among the citizenry has not reached a stage where the
public can drastically react to adverse publicity (for example, by shunning the
corporation's products). However, in the course of time this consciousness may grow and
the sanction of adverse publicity may graduate into a fully- fledged sanction.
197 David A Skeel Jr 'Shaming in Corporate Law' (200 1) 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
1811.
198 Grekos op cit at 1336 - 1337; Duncan Chappell and Jennifer Norberry ' Deterring Polluters: the Search
for ~ffective Strategies' (1990) 13 University ofNew South Wales Law Journal 97 at 108; Kidd Sentencing
op cit at 73.
199 Coffee op cit at 426 - 428. At 425 - 434 the author outlines more criticisms of adverse publicity,
200 Kidd Sentencing op cit at 73.
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7.5.3.2 Reparation orders
By 'reparation order' is meant an order after conviction that the offender take steps to
rectify any damage resulting from the offence he has been convicted of. This is similar to
an administrative order that requires a person whose acts or omissions have adverse
impacts on the environment to take such measures as are necessary to deal with those
adverse impacts. The major difference between the two orders lies in the legal sphere in
which they are imposed: the reparation order is part of the criminal process whereas the
administrative order is, as the name suggests, part of administrative action.
The reparation order encapsulates the polluter pays principle - those responsible for
environmental damage are made to bear the costs of remediation thereof. It is a sanction
that easily commends itself for adoption in Malawi especially in the light of its 'blood-
relationship' to the above mentioned administrative order which is well known in
Malawian environmental circles. i '" It is recommended that the Malawian provision on
this sanction should use section 29(7) and (8) of South Africa's Environment
Conservation Act 73 of 1989 as precedents as those provisions are laudable
enactments.i '"
7.5.3.3 Disqualification from government contracts
This sanction entails the suspension or debarring of persons or corporations from
contracting with government once the persons or corporations have been convicted of
environmental crimes.203 Many Malawian corporations depend on government contracts
for their survival. As a result this is a particularly severe penalty against such
201 An example of an administrati ve order of the kind discuss ed in the text is provided by section 33 of the
EMA.
202 A Malawian attempt at a reparation order is contained in section 84 of the Occupational Safety, Health
and Welfare Act 21 of 1997 but it is unc lear whether such an order can be made in any environmental
offence under the Act. The difficulty is that it is unclear whether contravention of the environmental
pro visions in the Act amounts to a criminal offence.
203 Kidd Sentencing op cir at 76.
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corporations for it may ultimately lead to their insolvency. Thus its deterrent effect may
not be difficult to perceive. How ever, the sanction has been criticised as being
inappropriate for imposition by a court: it is said that it is not the function of a court 'to
distribute government largesse. ,204 This criticism may not be taken too far as the nature
of the so-called 'largesse' is not very different from some natural resources which the
government distributes by way of authorisations. If in the case of the natural resources
the court is mandated to prevent further benefiting from the natural resources through
revocation of authorisations, it does not seem extraordinary to allow the court to prevent
further benefiting from government contracts through a disqualification order.
Another criticism is to the effect that disqualification from government contracts may
cause hardship in small economies like Malawi where the only supplier of a particular
product or service is prevented by the disqualification order from satisfying the
government's needs?05 This is certainly a valid argument but it may be met at least
partially by making the sanction discretionary so that the court should only impose it in
appropriate cases. 206 It may further be observed that the criticism is a limited objection: it
allows the operation of the sanction in those instances in which suppliers are many.
Consequently, it does not oust disqualification from government contracts from possible
application in Malawi as a criminal penalty.
7.5.4 General evaluation
From the foregoing it is clear that Malawian statute law prescribes vanous types of
penalties which may be used in sentencing environmental crimes. The most commonly
prescribed are imprisonment and fines. These, however, are not the best penalties for all
204 Rachel Mulheron 'Criminal enforcement of environmental law: limitations and "flat-earth thinking"
sanctions ' (1996) Queensland Law Society Journal 427 at 442 referred to in Kidd Sentencing op cit at 76.
205 Kidd Sentencing op cit at 76.
206 Kidd Sentencing op cit at 76 suggests that disqualification from government contracts 'would be useful
not as a stand-alone sanction , but a condition of probation. For example, a corporation ordered to
implement a corporate compliance programme might be disqualified from government contracts until such
time as the compliance programme is implemented to the satis faction of the court.'
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offences and offenders. The existence of other pena lties is therefore a strength of the law
in this area. Regrettably, the other penalties are not generally applicable; they apply to
offences in the particular statute in which they occur. This defect may be rectified by the
introduction in the EMA of appropriate provisions that make the relevant penalties
generally applicable. The proposed provisions are set out in Chapter 8 hereof. Some
penalties require substantial revision for them to operate effectively. Such revision may
also be done by effecting appropriate amendments. The suggested revision includes
provisions which target corporate offenders.
It is arguable that although the criminal sanctions provided for in the legislation are
apparently adequate to counter the challenges posed by environmental offenders, there is
still room for adopting several new penalties, among which are reparation orders and
disqualification from government contracts. An amendment incorporating these proposed
changes is set out in Chapter 8 hereof.
7.6 Orders as to costs and recipients of fines
7.6.1 General
The finding made in Chapter 6 hereof to the effect that in Malawi's current
socioeconomic state the criminal sanction has no viable alternatives with the exception of
administrative measures, raises the concern that Government may not have sufficient
financial resources to service its duties in this respect. This concern is particularly pointed
when it is remembered that in criminal trials there are generally no orders as to costs and
that when fines are ordered, they are invariably paid into the general fiscus to which
environmental enforcement departments have no easy access . There is need to reconsider
the law in these areas with a view to lightening the State' s financial burden.
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7.6.2 Costs
As a starting point it may be recall ed that the Protection of Animals Act 16 of 1944
("PAA") makes provision for the payment of costs by the convict. The PAA states that in
all cases of a conviction for an offence under the Act, the court may order the convict to
pay all or any part of the costs and expenses of his prosecution.i'" The court may order
the whole or a portion of the costs and expenses recovered from the convict to be paid to
the prosecutor or complainant.i'" It is arguable that the term 'prosecutor' encompasses
both a public prosecutor and a private prosecutor.i'" In the case of the former, he cannot
receive the costs on his own account since the costs incurred in the prosecution are borne
by the State. He is under a fiduciar y duty to hand over the awarded costs to the State.
Although this contention may readily be accepted, it is suggested that for the avoidance
of doubt the State's entitlement to the costs should be stated expressly. Apart from this,
the operation of the PAA costs clause is limited to criminal trials in that statute and so it
is not of much use in other environmental offences. For the State (and possibly in future,
private prosecutors) to access the costs more wide ly, there is need to have a generally
applying costs clause. The right location for such a clause is the EMA. The clause may be
partly modelled on section 11 of the PAA and section 34(4) of South Africa's National
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998.210
207 Section 11(1) of the PAA.
208 Section 11(2) of the PAA.
209 Under section 82 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code it is provided that a private person may
be given permission to conduct the prosecution of a crime. He may do so personally or through counsel. So
reference in the text to a private prosecutor means the complai nant or any other person prosecuting and not
necessari ly the lawyer representing him or her.
2 10 Section 34(4) of South Africa 's Nat ional Envi ronmental Management Act 107 of 1998 provides:
' Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 the court
convicting such person may, upon application by the public prosecutor or another organ of state, order such
person to pay the reasonable costs incurred by the public prosecutor and the organ of state concerned in the
investigation and prosecution of the offenc e.' .
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7.6.3 Recipients of fines
Again the PAA provides a starting point as it makes provision for the awarding of a
portion of the fines paid under the Act to a private prosecutor or some other person. It
states that where in any proceedings under the Act any fine is imposed, the court may
award any sum or sums not exceeding half the total fine to the person, not being a police
officer, who complained and prosecuted or to some other person or society as the court
thinks fit.211 It may be observed that this section impliedly includes the State in the
receiving of fines, but the fines are payable into the Consolidated Fund.
212
The result is
that the fines cannot easily be used for environmental purposes by environmental
departments or relevant public bodies. It may further be noted that the fines may be
awarded to some other person or society in the discretion of the court. There is no
requirement that such person or society must have participated in the prosecution of the
offender or done anything in relation to the offence. The wide province of this provision
does not seem to be justified, especially where the award of the fine does not operate as
compensation for injury or harm sustained and arising from the offence.
It is suggested that a general clause be included in the EMA providing for the direct
payment of all the fines from environmental criminal proceedings to government
departments or public bodies responsible for environmental matters. Actually some
departments administering certain environmental statutes are mandated to operate Funds,
for instance the Fisheries Fund.213 The fines may be paid into such Funds where this is
possible.i"
211 Section 12 of the PAA.
212 Section 172 of the Constitution states that all revenues or other moneys raised or received for the
purposes of the Government shall , subject to the Constitution and any Act of Parliament, be paid into and
form one fund to be known as the Consolidated Fund.
213 Established under section 22 of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997.
214 Some of the statutes creating the Funds specify the sources of the money to be put in them. It is clear
that some statutes do not envisage fines as a possible source: see, for example, the Forest Development and
Management Fund established under section 55 of the Forestry Act 11 of 1997.
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7.7 Appraisal
As the primary tool for achieving environmental protection in Malawi, the criminal law
needs to be reformed in certain respects. In this light corporate criminal liability must be
reformed in order to make available additional bases upon which corporate offenders may
be made answerable for their activities. Sentencing must also be reformed in order to
prescribe more effective punishments. Further, the use of strict criminal liability should
be discouraged: instead there should be wider use of negligence as the fault element and
wider use of the due diligence defence. With regard to vicarious criminal liability, it is
suggested that it may be retained as long as an element of fault on the part of an employer
or principal is introduced or the defence of due diligence is made available to the
employer or principal. Alternatively vicarious criminal liability may be abrogated in
favour of primary criminal liability. Finally, it is imperative that provision be made for
the award of costs after successful prosecution of environmental offenders and for the






Many arguments relating to environmental pro tection in Malawi have been advanced in
the preceding chapters. A number of general proposals for reforming the law have also
been made. In the present chapter the main argum ents will be summarized. Thereafter
specific draft legislative proposals will be set out. These will be followed by a few
concluding remarks.
8.2 Main arguments in a Nutshell
The magnitude of environmental degradation in Malawi suggests that environmental law
has not been effective. While inadequate enforcement of the law is certainly a significant
cause of ineffectiveness, it has been demonstrated that the other cause is the current
normative state of the law . Mala wi uses three traditional legal tools for achieving
environmental protection: the criminal sanction, administrative measures and civil
measures. An examination of the current environmental laws reveals that the criminal
sanction is the primary tool prescribed in Malawian environmental circles.
From a stage when the purposes of the criminal sanction were reconciliation of the parties
to a dispute and the disciplining of the recalcitrant party, the criminal sanction has
evolved to the current stage when its purposes are retributive and utilitarian. In the
context of environmental protection the most acceptable aspect of retribution is just
deserts, especially the notion of proportionality: a person who commits a serious
environmental crime must be punished severely whereas a person who transgresses a
minor environmental regulation ought to be punished less severely. Further, an attempt to
commit an environmental crime must be visited by a more lenient sentence than the
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commission of the full offence. Thus retribution provides a theoretical framework for
environmental crime to the extent that it ensures proportionality between punishment and
moral blameworthiness and between punishment and the harm done. With regard to
utilitarianism, deterrence, prevention (incapacitation) and reinforcement may be regarded
as legitimate purposes of the criminal sanction in environmental law. Since
environmental law seeks to protect the environment, criminal sanctions are acceptable in
environmental law if they advance that objective. The theories of deterrence, prevention
(incapacitation) and reinforcement are in line with the goals of environmental protection
and so they may readily be welcomed as forming part of the necessary conceptual
framework for environmental criminal sanctions. Reformation lies on the verge of
acceptability and does not seem to lay a significant claim to the status of being a purpose
of the criminal sanction in environmental protection.
In the current stage of the criminal sanction its operation is affected greatly by the Bill of
Rights in Malawi's Constitution. One environmentally significant way in which this
happens concerns the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons. These rights deal
with the procedure before, during and after trial and the fairness of the criminal trial
itself. In many environmental statutes are found presumptions that infringe the right to be
presumed innocent and to remain silent during plea proceedings or trial and not to testify
during trial. Whether these presumptions can escape being declared constitutionally
invalid is a matter on which Malawian jurisprudence is lacking. It is suggested that in
dealing with these presumptions, Malawian courts should lean towards saving them. In
particular, it is contended that the evidentiary or factual presumption doesn't violate the
accused person's right to be presumed innocent since it does not shift the burden of proof.
Although it infringes the accused's right to remain silent and not to testify during trial,
such infringement may be justified under the limitations clause in appropriate
circumstances, for instance where in the majority of cases the presumed fact is peculiarly
within the knowledge of the accused and not the State. Similarly an irrebuttable
presumption should be saved from unconstitutionality because it is a rule of substantive
law and not a rule of evidence and so cannot result in the conviction of an accused person
despite a reasonable doubt as to his guilt in relation to an element of an offence. Thus an
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irrebuttable presumption does not infringe the accused person's right to be presumed
innocent. In addition an irrebuttable presumption does not violate the accused person's
right to remain silent and not to testify during trial since the prosecution shoulders the
onus to prove all the elements of the offence throughout. With regard to reverse onus
presumptions, it is suggested that even though they transgress the presumption of
innocence and the right to silence, environmental statutory provisions containing them
should not be declared unconstitutional outright but should be examined carefully with a
view to saving them as much as possible in the interest of achieving environmental
protection. It is necessary to do so because the urgency of stemming the tide of
environmental degradation in Malawi demands a paradigm shift and a more favorable
stance in the way the courts handle issues pertaining to the environment.
Further, it has been contended that environmental statutes which allow the giving of
expert evidence (e.g. scientific evidence) by way of certificate or report do not violate the
accused's right to challenge evidence on two grounds. In the first place, the accused
person may avail himself of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code
under which the author of the certificate or report may be brought to court and cross-
examined: in this way the accused's right to challenge evidence is guaranteed. In the
second place, even in the absence of cross-examination, the certificate or report may be
received in evidence constitutionally on the basis that the apparent infringement of the
right to challenge evidence is a justifiable limitation under the Constitution especially
where the evidence allowed by the impugned statutory provision was generally of a
formal non-contentious nature. Allowing such evidence to be adduced by way of
certificate or report is not only meaningful but it is also essential to the proper
administration ofjustice in Malawi.
As stated above, an analysis of Malawi's environmental statutes shows that the criminal
sanction is prescribed more often than any other sanction. Actually the number of
statutory provisions devoted to criminal sanctions in the enforcement of environmental
law is not matched by any other sanction. This reliance on the criminal sanction is
expressed in two modes: criminal penalties are applied as a primary sanction and they are
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also applied as a subsidiary or supporting sanction. However, some of the criminal
offences have not been articulated clearly and others conflict with constitutional
provisions in a non-defensible way. Unclear articulation will undoubtedly lead to
difficulties in the process of interpretation. Confl icting with constitutional provisions will
lead to invalidity of the inconsistent parts of the offences. In order to cure these defects
legislative amendments will be set out in segment 8.3 below.
On a more general level the prescribed criminal sanctions have weaknesses. Firstly, their
use is costly in terms of money, manpower and time. Secondly, environmental crimes
may sometimes be complex, requiring specialized knowledge which in Malawi is not
generally available due to insufficient specialized offic ials. Thirdly, the criminal law
standard of proof - proof beyond reasonable doubt - is difficult to achieve. To this may
be added the related difficulty of complying with the due process of law required in
criminal proceedings. Further criminal sanctions may not stop an on-going
environmentally prejudicial activity. In addition, policing of prohibited activities is
inadequate due to resource constraints, consequently the chances of offenders being
caught are minimal. When these weaknesses are weighed against the criminal sanction's
strengths (its stigmatizing quality, its being the only adequate remedy in serious offences
and its familiarity), it is clear that the criminal sanction has more weaknesses than
strengths. This scenario has led many scholars to conclude that criminal sanctions are not
appropriate for crimes of all sorts. They suggest that criminal sanctions should be
reserved for serious offences and that other measures should be used for less serious
offences. While this suggestion certainly has merit especially in respect of First World
and Second World countries, the practical realities in Malawi as a Third World country
urge a different approach. These practical realities relate to the availability of alternatives
to the criminal sanction in Malawi.
The literature suggests that alternatives to the criminal sanctions include self-regulatory
instruments (self-regulation), eo-regulatory instruments (eo-regulation), information-
based instruments, market-based instruments (economic instruments), administrative
measures and civil measures. An analysis of these alternatives reveals that self-
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regulation, eo-regulation, most information-based instruments, most market-based
mechanisms and most civil measures are not viable alternatives to the criminal sanction
in Malawi at present. It is only administrative measures which have great scope for
operation as a reliably practical alternative. In these circumstances, it is unsafe to
recommend that the criminal sanction be reserved for serious crimes and that the other
crimes be addressed by alternatives to the criminal sanction. Such a suggestion is
impossible on account of the fact that the alternatives are largely unavailable in practical
terms in Malawi. It is submitted that in the case of Malawi a different - but related -
approach be taken. In this approach reliance on the criminal sanction will inevitably
continue, only that there should be more use of administrative measures. Specifically
minor offences should attract administrative penalties instead of criminal sanctions. Such
an approach is likely to make the business of environmental protection more efficient and
more cost effective in terms of money, manpower and time in Malawi's current
socioeconomic state.
It is not suggested that the criminal sanction should be used in serious crimes entirely in
the way it has been used up to this stage. There is need to attend to several aspects of the
criminal sanction with a view to improving its performance. In this light it is
recommended that use of strict criminal liability should be discouraged; instead there
should be wider use of negligence as the fault element and wider use of the due diligence
defence. Similarly, use of vicarious criminal liability should be discouraged: it should
only be used where an element of fault on the part of the employer or principal is
introduced or where the due diligence defence is made available to the employer or
principal. Alternatively primary liability should be imposed on the employer or principal.
With regard to corporate criminal liability, it must be reformed in order to make available
additional bases upon which corporate offenders may be made answerable for their
activities. The identification doctrine - the principal basis of corporate criminal liability -
is narrow in its scope: it leaves out of its reach the actions and states of mind of most of
the personnel in a corporation. Secondly, the doctrine makes it difficult to establish
corporate criminal liability against large companies. Thirdly, the doctrine is ill-adapted to
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generate convictions against companies for some crimes. Fourthly, the doctrine ignores
the reality of corporate decision-making which is often the product of corporate policies
and procedures rather than individual decisions. Fifthly, it is not an easy task to determine
who in a particular corporation qualifies as 'brains' or 'hands.' Sixthly, it fails to identify
what exactly it is that the company has done wrong to merit being subjected to criminal
sanctions, thereby offending the fundamental principle of nulla poena sine culpa. Finally,
the doctrine fails to capture the full extent of the corporation's wrongdoing.
In recent years courts have used vicanous criminal liability to attach liability to a
corporation, but they have done so on a comparatively minimal level. Even with this
development, it is argued that the current bases for corporate criminal liability
(identification doctrine and vicarious criminal liability) do not suffice for the purpose of
environmental criminal liability on the part of the corporation in Malawi. It is suggested
that new bases be adopted: in particular, aspects of the aggregation theory of attaching
criminal liability be used and a considerable measure of organizational models of
corporate criminal liability be incorporated.
Sentencing must also be reformed in order to prescribe effective punishments. The fines
prescribed in many environmental statutes are low. Although some of them are upgraded
or updated through the operation of the EMA's superiority clause, the scope of operation
of that clause is narrow. The upgrading of fines in environmental statutes may, therefore,
not be left to the operation of the EMA' s superiority clause. It is recommended that the
fines in all environmental statutes should be amended to reflect current trends as set by
the EMA.
It is further suggested that the Malawi version of probation be reformed in at least four
respects. Firstly, the requirement that a court can impose probation only where the
offender consents, must be removed in order to allow the use of probation in all
appropriate cases. Secondly, probation should be regarded as a criminal sanction in its
own right. Thirdly, probation officers in environmental offences should be environmental
experts drawn from government circles or the private sector, but if drawn from the
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private sector, they should be paid by the government and in turn the government should
recover such payments from the offender in order to stimulate professionalism by
obviating bias in favour of the offender especially where the offender is a corporation.
Finally, the legislative obsession with natural persons as offenders should be done away
with. The legislation should expressly acknowledge the corporation as an offender and as
a candidate for the sanction of probation especially in environmental crime.
In addition it is recommended that Malawi adopt two new punishments in order to beef
up the current sanction weaponry. The new punishments are reparation orders and
disqualification from government contracts.
Finally, it is recommended that there be legislati ve provision for a court to make orders as
to costs in appropriate criminal trials relating to the environment and to make orders
directing the payment of fines (paid into court) to government departments or public
bodies responsible for environmental protection. These provisions (especially the orders
as to costs) are likely to go some way in providing financial resources to the government
departments or public bodies and so lightening the State's financial burden.
8.3 Specific Legislative Proposals for Reform
8.3.1 General
The draft statutory proposals for reform set out below are limited to those that are likely
to effect wide-ranging fundamental change of the law. For this reason, only suggested
changes to the EMA are dealt with at this stage. Suggested amendments to other
environmental statutes are laid out in Chapters 4 and 51 and it has not been felt necessary
to repeat these amendments.
I See, for instance , segments 4.2 .3,4.2.7,4.3.8,4.3 .9, 4.3.10 ,4.3.12,4.3.19, 4.3.32 , 4.3.35, 4.3.36, 4.3.37,
4.3 .38, 5.2.2, 5.2.5, 5.2.12, 5.2.13, 5.4.2, 5.4.5, 5.4.9, 5.7.2, 5.10.3 and 5.14.6.
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It must be pointed out that the proposed reforms set out below are meant to be a starting
point of the overhaul of the law in this area. In this regard, it will be noted that some of
the reforms are based on the legislation of other countries, for example South Africa and
Australia. Although some of this legislation has been criticised or has scope for criticism,
it is submitted that this fact does not entirely disqualify the legislation from being used as
initial precedents for Malawi. In any case the criticisms would not necessarily apply to
the proposals below because the proposals are not direct transplants: the foreign
legislation has been modified in order to suit the Malawi scenario.
For convemence of presentation suggested side-notes are not typed in the margins;
instead they appear as the first words of a particular provision. Normally Malawian
statutes have side-notes in the margin of particular provisions. All proposed provisions
are indented and set in Univers font. Where necessary the proposals are followed by a
brief commentary.
8.3.2 Proposed Statutory Clauses
It is proposed that a new Part containing relevant provisions on corporate criminal
liability be inserted in the EMA. This Part should largely be based on Part 2.5 of the
Australian Criminal Code Act 12 of 1995. It is suggested that the new Part be numbered
'Part XIII.' The current Part XIII should be renumbered 'Part XIV', its title should be
changed to 'General Compliance and Enforcement' and sections 76 and 77 should be
renumbered 86 and 87 respectively. It is further suggested that the current section 75
should be modified, renumbered 80 and put under the new 'Part XIII'. After effecting
these and other changes, the EMA will read as follows from section 75 onwards:




"board of directors" means the body (by whatever name called) exercising the
executive authority of the body corporate.
"corporate culture" means a formal or informal attitude, policy, rule, course of
conduct or practice existing within the body corporate generally or in the part of
the body corporate in which the relevant activities take place.
"high managerial agent" means an employee, agent or officer of the body
corporate with duties of such responsibility that his or her conduct may fairly be
assumed to represent the body corporate's policy.
76. General principles
(1) All written criminal laws on the protection and management of the
environment or the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources
apply to bodies corporate in the same way as they apply to individuals. They so
apply with such modifications as are set out in this Part, and with such other
modifications as are made necessary by the fact that criminal liability is being
imposed on bodies corporate rather than individuals.
(2) A body corporate may be found guilty of any offence, including one
punishable by imprisonment: provided that where the offence is punishable by
imprisonment only, the court may, instead of imprisonment, impose a fine of not
more than K2 000 000.
77. Physical elements
If a physical element of an offence is committed by an employee, agent or officer
of a body corporate acting within the actual or apparent scope of his or her
employment, or within his or her actual or apparent authority, the physical
element must also be attributed to the body corporate.
78. Fault elements other than negligence
(1) If intention, knowledge or recklessness is a fault element in relation to a
physical element of an offence, that fault element must be attributed to a body
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corporate that expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the
commission of the offence.
(2) The means by which such an authorisation or permission may be established
include:
(a) proving that the body corporate's board of directors intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly carried out the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence; or
(b) proving that a high managerial agent of the body corporate intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly engaged in the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or
impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the offence; or
(c) proving that a corporate culture existed within the body corporate that
directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance with the relevant
provision; or
(d) proving that the body corporate failed to create and maintain a corporate
culture that required compliance with the relevant provision.
(3) Subsection (2)(b) does not apply if the body corporate proves that it exercised
due diligence to prevent the conduct, or the authorisation or permission.
(4) Factors relevant to the application of subsection (2)(c) or (d) include:
(a) whether authority to commit an offence of the same or a similar character had
been given by a high managerial agent of the body corporate; and
(b) whether the employee, agent or officer of the body corporate who committed
the offence believed on reasonable grounds, or entertained a reasonable
expectation, that a high managerial agent of the body corporate would have
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence.
(5) If recklessness is not a fault element in relation to a physical element of an
offence, subsection (2) does not enable the fault element to be proved by proving
that the board of directors, or a high managerial agent, of the body corporate
recklessly engaged in the conduct or recklessly authorised or permitted the




(a) negligence is a fault element in relation to a physical element of an offence;
and
(b) no individual employee, agent or officer of the body corporate has that fault
element;
that fault element may exist on the part of the body corporate if the body
corporate's conduct is negligent when viewed as a whole (that is, by aggregating
the conduct of any number of its employees, agents or officers).
(2) Negligence may be evidenced by the fact that the prohibited conduct was
substantially attributable to:
(a) inadequate corporate management, control or supervision of the conduct of
one or more of its employees, agents or officers; or
(b) failure to provide adequate systems for conveying relevant information to
relevant persons in the body corporate.
80. Liability of controlling officers
(1) Where an offence under this Act, or any other written law on the protection
and management of the environment or the conservation and sustainable
utilization of natural resources, is committed by a body corporate or a
partnership-
(a) in the case of the body corporate, every director, manager or similar officer of
the body corporate shall be guilty of the offence; and
(b) in the case of a partnership, every partner shall jointly and severally be guilty
of the offence.
(2) A person shall not be guilty of an offence under subsection (1), if he proves to
the satisfaction of the court that the act constituting the offence was done without
his knowledge, consent or connivance and that he did his part to prevent the
commission of the offence having regard to all the circumstances of the case.
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Commentary: The justification for introducing the foregoing provisions on corporate
criminal liability has been set out in segment 7.4 in Chapter 7 hereof. The phrase ' the
protection and management of the environment or the conservation and sustainable
utilization of natural resources ' is commonly used in the EMA and it is used in these
legislative proposals for the sake of consistency of language in the Act.
PART XIV-GENERAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
81. Sentencing in environmental offences
(1) A court may impose any of the following punishments in respect of offences
created under any written law on the protection and management of the





(e) Suspension or revocation of authorisations;
(f) Probation;
(g) Reparation; or
(h) Disqualification from government contracts.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall prevent a court from imposing any other
penalty prescribed by any written law: Provided that the court may in its
discretion impose any of the punishments specified in subsection (1) in addition
to or in substitution for that other penalty.
(3) Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any written law on the
protection and management of the environment or the conservation and
sustainable utilization of natural resources the court convicting such person may
summarily enquire into and assess the monetary value of any advantage gained
or likely to be gained by such person in consequence of that offence, and, in
addition to any other punishment imposed in respect of that offence, the court
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may order the award of damages or compensation or a fine equal to the amount
so assessed.
(4) Any person convicted of an offence under any written law on the protection
and management of the environment or the conservation and sustainable
utilization of natural resources, and who after such conviction persists in the act
or omission which constituted such offence, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding
K20 000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 30 days or to both such
fine and such imprisonment in respect of every day on which such act or
omission continues.
(5) Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any written law on the
protection and management of the environment or the conservation and
sustainable utilization of natural resources and it appears that such person has
by that offence caused loss or damage to the State or any lead agency or other
person, including the cost incurred or likely to be incurred by the State or lead
agency in rehabilitating the environment or preventing damage to the
environment, the court may in the same proceedings at the written request of the
State or lead agency or other person concerned, and in the presence of the
convicted person, inquire summarily and without pleadings into the amount of the
loss or damage so caused.
(6) Upon proof of the amount referred to in subsection (5), the court may give
judgment therefor in favour of the State or lead agency or other person
concerned against the convicted person, and such judgment shall be of the same
force and effect and be executable in the same manner as if it had been given in
a civil action duly instituted before a competent court.
(7) A court convicting any person of an offence under any written law on the
protection and management of the environment or the conservation and
sustainable utilization of natural resources may declare to be forfeited to the
State:
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(a) any vehicle or other thing by means whereof the offence concerned was
committed or which was used in the commission of such offence, or the rights of
the convicted person to such vehicle or other thing; and
(b) any natural resource or other thing obtained from or in the commission of
such offence.
(8) A declaration of forfeiture under subsection (7)(a) shall not affect the rights
which any person other than the convicted person may have to the vehicle or
other thing concerned, if it is proved that he did not know that the vehicle or other
thing was used or would be used for the purpose of or in connection with the
commission of the offence concerned or that he could not prevent such use.
(9) If any person holding a licence, permit or other authorisation issued under any
written law on the protection and management of the environment or the
conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources is convicted of an
offence which involves the licence, permit or other authorisation, the court may:
(a) suspend the operation of such licence, permit or other authorisation for a
period of up to three years from the date of conviction; or
(b) revoke such licence, permit or other authorisation.
(10) When imposing probation under subsection (1) -
(a) the court shall not seek the consent of the offender to be put under probation;
(b) the court shall impose conditions that advance the protection and
management of the environment or the conservation and sustainable utilization
of natural resources;
(c) the court shall appoint suitably qualified persons from the public sector or
private sector to serve as probation officers, provided that where a probation
officer is appointed from the private sector, he shall be remunerated for his
services by the Government; provided further that the Government may recover
such remuneration from the offender where it is just and reasonable to do so.
(11) Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any written law on
the protection and management of the environment or the conservation and
sustainable utilization of natural resources, the court may order that any damage
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to the environment resulting from the offence be repaired by the person so
convicted, to the satisfaction of the State or a lead agency.
(12) If within a period of 30 days after a conviction or such longer period as the
court may determine at the time of the conviction, the reparation order made in
terms of subsection (11) has not been complied with, the State or a lead agency
may take the necessary steps to repair the damage and recover in full the
expenses incurred in taking such steps from the person so convicted, and if the
expenses remain unpaid for a period of more than 30 days from the date of first
demand in writing, the amount in respect of the expenses shall be recoverable as
a civil debt.
Commentary: This long provision is meant to make certain penalties generally available
in environmental criminal proceedings, to fine-tune some of these penalties, to introduce
new penalties and to obviate the need for commencing separate civil proceedings for the
recovery of damages associated with loss or damage incurred or for the recovery of the
costs associated with rehabilitating the environment or preventing damage to the
environment. The doing away with separate civil proceedings will assist in cutting the
costs of enforcement and is particularly attrac tive in Malawi' s current Third Word status.
The removal of any advantage gained or likely to be gained from the offence - provided
for in subsection (3) - arguably sends a message to the offender that environmental crime
does not pay. Subsection (1) follows the format of section 25 of the Penal Code.
Subsections (5), (6) and (3) are largely based on sections 34(1), 34(2) and 34(3) of South
Africa 's National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 respectively.
It must be noted that the term ' lead agency' is currently used in the EMA. According to
section 2 of the EMA it means 'any publi c office or organization including every
Ministry or Government department which is conferred by any written law with powers
and functions for the protection and management of any segment of the environment and
the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources of Malawi. '
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Subsections 11 and 12 address the issue of reparation orders. The need for such orders
was expounded in segment 7.5.3.2 in Chapter 7 hereof. Subsection 12 aligns the recovery
of default reparation expenses with a similar remedy provided for under section 34 of the
EMA. Subsections (4), (11) and (12) are based on sections 29(6),30(1) and 30(2) of
South Africa's Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989. Subsection (9) is based on
section 116 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 11 of 1992 and section 49 of the
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997.
82. Orders as to Costs in Criminal Proceedings
Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any written law on the
protection and management of the environment or the conservation and
sustainable utilization of natural resources, the court convicting such person may
order such person to pay the reasonable costs and expenses incurred by a
private prosecutor, the State and/or any lead agency in the investigation and
prosecution of the offence, and such costs and expenses shall be paid to the
private prosecutor, the State and/or the lead agency, as the case may be.
Commentary: This clause is based on section 34(4) of South Africa's National
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. The rationale behind it is to lighten the
State's financial burden in prosecuting environmental offenders.
83. Payment of Fines
All fines paid in respect of offences under any written law on the protection and
management of the environment or the conservation and sustainable utilization
of natural resources shall be paid to lead agencies responsible for the protection
and management of the environment or the conservation and sustainable
utilization of natural resources.
Commentary: The purpose of the above provision is to provide lead agencies with easier
access to the financial resources they need for carrying out their environmental duties
which include enforcement endeavours.
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84. Administrative Penalty
(1) Where the Director or any responsible public officer has reasonable grounds
to believe that:
(a) an offence under any written law on the protection and management of the
environment or the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources
has been committed by any person;
(b) the offence is of a minor nature; and
(c) having regard to the previous conduct of the person concerned and to the
dictates of environmental protection, it would be appropriate to impose an
administrative penalty under this section,
he may cause a notice in writing, in accordance with subsection (2), to be served
on that person.
(2) A notice under subsection (1) shall specify:
(a) the nature of the offence and the date of its commission;
(b) a summary of the facts upon which the allegation that an offence has been
committed is based; and
(c) any other matter that the Director or responsible public officer considers
relevant to the imposition of a penalty,
and shall be endorsed with a statement setting out the provisions of this section.
(3) Any person on whom a notice under subsection (1) is served may, within
thirty days after such service, by notice in writing to the Director or responsible
public officer require that the proceedings in respect of the alleged offence be
dealt with by the court or admit the offence or appeal to the Tribunal against the
allegation that he has committed an offence.
(4) Where, pursuant to subsection (3), a person opts to have the alleged offence
dealt with by a court:
(a) no further proceedings shall be taken under this section by the Director or
responsible public officer; and
489
(b) nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing proceedings in
respect of the alleged offence to be dealt with by the court or as preventing the
imposition by the court of any penalty upon conviction in such proceedings.
(5) Where, pursuant to subsection (3), a person opts to admit the offence, he
may, by notice in writing to the Director or responsible public officer:
(a) admit the offence; and
(b) make submissions to the Director or responsible public officer as to the
matters he wishes the Director or responsible public officer to take into account in
imposing any penalty under this section.
(6) Where a person on whom a notice under subsection (1) is served does not,
within thirty days after the notice is served on him:
(a) require that proceedings in respect of the alleged offence be dealt with by the
court; or
(b) admit the offence; or
(c) appeal to the Tribunal against the allegation that he has committed an
offence,
he shall, on the expiration of that period, be presumed to have admitted the
offence.
(7) Where pursuant to this section a person admits or is presumed to have
admitted an offence, the Director or responsible public officer may, after taking
into account any submissions by the person under subsection (5), impose a
monetary penalty on the person in respect of the offence not exceeding two-
thirds of the maximum penalty to which the person would be liable if he were
convicted of the offence by the court.
(8) Where the Director or responsible public officer imposes a penalty on a
person under this section in respect of an offence, the Director or responsible
public officer shall serve that person with a notice in writing of the particulars of
the penalty and place where the penalty should be paid.
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(9) A person on whom a penalty is imposed under this section shall pay the
penalty within thirty days after the notice of the penalty is served on him in
accordance with subsection (8) and the penalty shall be paid into the Fund or into
any other relevant Fund established under any written law on the protection and
management of the environment or the conservation and sustainable utilization
of natural resources or to any relevant lead agency.
(10) A person on whom a penalty is imposed under this section may appeal to
the Tribunal against the penalty imposed within thirty days after the notice of the
penalty is served on him in accordance with subsection (8).
(11) Without prejudice to the requirements of subsection (9), a penalty imposed
under this section shall be recoverable by the Government from the person on
whom it has been imposed in the same manner as a fine is recoverable on
conviction of an offence.
(12) Where an offence has been admitted or is presumed to have been admitted
under this section, no criminal charge may be laid in respect of the offence
against the person who has admitted or is presumed to have admitted the
offence.
Commentary: The foregoing long-winded section is a transplant from the Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997 (section 50). It has been slightly modified
to cater for situations in all environmental statutes where administrative penalties are
necessary. The need for this provision arises from the fact that administrative penalties
are the only reliably practical alternative remedies in Malawi's present socioeconomic
state as demonstrated in Chapter 6 hereof.
The Tribunal referred to in this section is the Environmental Appeals Tribunal established
under section 69 of the EMA. Under its current jurisdiction the Tribunal cannot hear
appeals against any decision or action of any person other than the Minister, Director or
inspector under the EMA. For the suggested appeals to be legally possible, there is need
to extend the categories of decision makers. So section 69(a) of the EMA must be
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amended by deleting the words after 'Director' and replac ing them with the words 'or
any other responsible public officer under any written law on the protection and
management of the environment or the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural
resources. ' After effecting this amendment, section 69(a) will read as follows: ' consider
appeals against any decision or action of the Min ister, Director or any other responsible
public officer under any written law on the protection and management of the
environment or the conservation and sustainable utilizat ion of natural resources. '
85. Legal standing to enforce environmental laws
(1) Any person or group of persons may seek appropriate relief in respect of any
breach or threatened breach of any provision of any written law on the protection
and management of the environment or the conservation and sustainable
utilization of natural resources -
(a) in that person's or group of persons' own interest;
(b) in the interest of, or on behalf of, a person who is, for practical reasons,
unable to institute such proceedings;
(c) in the interest of or on behalf of a group or class of persons whose interests
are affected;
(d) in the public interest; and
(e) in the interest of protecting the environment.
(2) A court may decide not to award costs against a person who, or group of
persons which, fails to secure the relief sought in respect of any breach or
threatened breach of any provision of any written law on the protection and
management of the environment or the conservation and sustainable utilization
of natural resources if the court is of the opinion that the person or group of
persons acted reasonably out of a concern for the public interest or in the interest
of protecting the environment and had made due efforts to use other means
reasonably available for obtaining the relief sought.
(3) Where a person or group of persons secures the relief sought in respect of
any breach or threatened breach of any provision of any written law on the
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protection and management of the environment or the conservation and
sustainable utilization of natural resources, a court may on application -
(a) award costs on an appropriate scale to any person or persons entitled to
practise as a legal practitioner in the Republic who provided free legal assistance
or representation to such person or group in the preparation for or conduct of the
proceedings; and
(b) order that the party against whom the relief is granted pay to the person or
group concerned any reasonable costs incurred by such person or group in the
investigation of the matter and its preparation for the proceedings.
Commentary: It is proposed that the above provision should be introduced in the EMA
with a view to alleviate the locus standi barrier environmental litigants face and are likely
to face in environmental litigation. More on this has been stated in segment 6.6.4 in
Chapter 6 hereof. As indicated in that segment the above provision is based on section 32
of South Africa's National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998.
86. Closure of premises
(1) Where the Director believes, on reasonable grounds, that this Act or any
regulations made thereunder, has or have been contravened, the Director may,
subject to subsection (2), order the closure of any premises by means of, or in
relation to which the Director reasonably believes the contravention was
committed.
(2) The closure of any premises shall cease after the provisions of this Act or any
regulations made thereunder have, in the opinion of the Director, been complied
with, unless before that time court proceedings have been instituted in respect of
the contravention, in which event the premises shall remain closed until the
proceedings are finally concluded.
Commentary: This section and the one below are the sections currently numbered 76 and
77 in the EMA. They have not been modified.
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87. Regulations
The Minister may make regulations for the better carrying out of the purposes of
this Act.
8.4 Concluding Observations
Although Malawi has a considerable body of environmental law, many aspects of it are
defective. It is tempting to think that rectification of these defects will automatically
translate into enhanced environmental protection, but this is arguably not so. While
rectification of the defects will certainly contribute towards enhanced environmental
protection, it is acknowledged that enforcement is a necessary partner in this enterprise.
For this reason, what the present study has striven to achieve is modest, namely, to clarify
the normative state of environmental law in Malawi (with emphasis on the criminal
sanction) so that when the enforcement official or agent goes about his business, he
should face less obstacles than before. It is hoped that this modest contribution will go
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